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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents an account of some of the mental mechanisms
and processes that take the addressee from a linguistic input to the
interpretation of that input. Because on—line interpretation involves
our knowledge of language, the relation between input processing and
grammar is evaluated. The full interpretation of a linguistic input
also involves pragmatic, i.e. central cognitive processes, but these
processes are the least well understood within psycholinguistics.
Relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986) gives us a way of making
our understanding of these processes more explicit. However,
Relevance theory claims turn out to be incompatible with
psycholinguistic models which postulate an autonomous syntactic parser,
such as the 'Garden—path' model.
	 A review of the experimental
literature reveals that the findings claimed to support the 'Garden—
path' model do not in fact support it. Likewise, the principle of
Lexical Preference, proposed to account for how verb subcategorization
frames are accessed, turns out not to be supported by the experimental
evidence.
Full interpretation involves computing a conceptual representation,
and an account is given of what constitutes conceptual structure.
This leads to the proposal that verbs are represented as structured
concepts. This view of verb representation together with Relevance
theory can account for when arguments of verbs can be left implicit.
Finally, an account is given of how the addressee computes the
propositional form communicated by an utterance, by building hypotheses
about the conceptual structure of the proposition on—line. These
hypotheses are based on structural information stored under the
concepts referred to by the utterance. This proposal can account for
psycholinguistic research findings, with pragmatics playing an integral
role in the explanations: it is no longer grafted onto the model as a
psycholinguistic afterthought.
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Introduction.
This thesis grew out of my interest in the question of whether
Relevance theory has implications for a psycholinguistic model of
sentence input processing. A theory of the comprehension process
should account for how people compute the full pragmatic meaning of an
utterance, but there is, as yet, little psycholinguistic theorisation
of pragmatic aspects of interpretation. Because Relevance theory
makes explicit claims about how natural language is interpreted in real
time, and gives an explanation of how processes such as disambiguation
and reference assignment can be accounted for, it should have
consequences for a psycholinguistic model of processing.
In Chapter 1, I review the relation between input processing and
grammar, as it has been interpreted by many psycholinguists. Because
in much psycholinguistic work it has been assumed that underlying on-
line processing there is a modular 'language faculty', as proposed by
Fodor (1983), I address the question of whether his proposals are
supported by independent evidence. I go on to to look at the relation
between the linguistic input and central cognitive processes, and
introduce Relevance theory. I then give a first assessment of what
the consequences of Relevance theory are for a psycholinguistic model
of input processing.
Because the predictions of Relevance theory are at odds with models
of input processing which assume an autonomous parser, I evaluate the
experimental evidence claimed to support this type of model in Chapter
2, and argue that the findings do not in fact support this model.
Some of these findings can be reinterpreted if we assume that verb
subcategorization information (of some sort) is used to analyse the
linguistic input. In chapter 3, I look at different proposals
concerning how verb subcategorization information is used in on—line
processing.	 I evaluate experimental findings which are said to
support the Principle of Lexical Preference, proposed to account for
how addressees access and use verb subcategorization.
	 We find that
this principle is not supported by the experimental findings.
In Chapter 4, I look at Relevance theory proposals concerning on-
line sentence processing, and point out a number of problems these
proposals face. To understand how we compute the full pragmatic
interpretation of an utterance, we have to have a better insight in
what constitutes conceptual structure.
	 To this end, I look at
proposals made by Jackendoff (1983) and Pinker (1989), and propose an
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account of what constitutes conceptual structure, showing that verbs
are represented as structured concepts. This view of verb
representation together with Relevance theory gives us an account for
when arguments of verbs can be left implicit.
In Chapter 5, I propose an account of sentence processing which
shows how the addressee computes the propositional form communicated by
an utterance by building hypotheses about the propositional form on-
line, in accordance with the principle of Relevance. I show how this
proposal gives us a better insight in what constitutes 'processing
effort'.	 The model can account for experimental findings concerning
structural ambiguity and 'garden-path' sentences. Moreover, it
explains why some multiple centre-embedded sentences are difficult to
process, and gives an alternative view of how 'fillers' are associated
with their 'gaps' in sentences with long distance dependencies.
To conclude I re-evaluate the relation between the grammar,
conceptual structure and on-line processing.
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chapter 1: Theoretical considerations.
The psycholinguistic study of comprehension tries to account for
the mental mechanisms and processes that take the addressee from a
linguistic input to the interpretation of that input. In order to
understand these mechanisms and processes, psycholinguists can conduct
psychological experiments to gather data, awl develop a theoretical
framework against which to evaluate experimental findings.
Because interpretation involves interaction with general cognitive
processes at some stage, an explanatory theory of comprehension should
account for its place within a theory of cognition. Moreover, because
comprehension involves our knowledge of language, an explanatory theory
of comprehension should account for its relation to linguistic theory.
Tanenhaus, Carison & Seidenberg (1985) put forward two possible views
of the relationship between the grammar and the general cognitive
system, which make different predictions for the relationship between
the grammpr and how addressees process sentences. The first view, the
Chomskyan view, is that the grammar is a cognitive subsystem which
accounts for the structure of language, whose vocabulary and operations
are defined independently of the general cognitive system (cf. Chomsky,
1980a). On this view, linguistics explains the structure of language.
The second view is that the structure of language is explained by basic
principles of the general cognitive system, for example, the nature of
concepts in interaction with basic properties of the human information
processing system. On this view, linguistics describes the structure
of language, hit does not explain it.
Tanenhaus et al. suggest that these two views of linguistics point
to different research strategies concerning the grammar and the inter-
pretation process. On the first view, the view that the linguistic
system is primary, the question is how linguistic representations as
defined by the grammar are recovered from a perceptual input during
comprehension. This raises questions such as whether the rules of
grmmr are actually realized as processing operations. On the second
view, which proposes that the general cognitive system is basic, the
focus of research shifts to questions concerning the operation and
organization of the cognitive system. Properly understood, the struc-
ture of language would fall out as a consequence of the structure of
the cognitive system itself.
	 (Tanenhaus et al., 1985, pp. 359-360).
In the literature many researchers have argued against the second
view.	 For example, Carston (1986) says that:
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"The fallout view faces strong disconfirming evidence in
the detailed and very complex knowledge of language which
investigations by Chomsky and his colleagues have shown
very young children to have." (Carston, 1988, p.41).
The question is whether this means that one has to opt for the first
view put forward by Tanenhaus et al., the view that the constructs of
linguistic theory are both mental and primitive. As Tanenhaus et al.
point out, there are different versions of the 'linguistics as descrip-
tion' view. Apart from the extreme version, which states that
constructs of linguistic theory do not play a serious role in language
acquisition and use, one can take the position that grammars are mental
entities without claiming that the constructs of linguistic theory are
mental primitives. On this view, one can seek to explain how linguis-
tic constructs are derived from other mental properties. A further
possible position is the view that some linguistic constructs are
mental primitives, without committing oneself to the view that the
grammar as a whole, as defined by linguists, is a cognitive subsystem
independent of the general cognitive system. On this view, the
question which linguistic constructs are mental primitives becomes a
matter of theoretically motivated investigation, rather than a matter
of a priori belief.
However, rejecting the 'fallout view' has lead many psycholinguists
to embrace the first view of the relationship between the grammar and
the general cognitive system. This has had some important conse-
quences for the way in which psycholinguists have studied language
processing and acquisition. The view of the grammar as constituting
an independent 'language faculty' has influenced the way in which
psycholinguists have thought of the organization of models of compre-
hension.	 As Frazier, Clifton & Randall (1983) say:
"The claim that there are distinct components in our
linguistic knowledge permi ts (though it does not dictate)
the claim that there are corresponding components in our
language comprehension mechanism, and that these components
operate at different points in time in the comprehension of
a sentence."	 (Frazier et al., 1983, p. 218).
Although Frazier et al. qualify their statement by saying that it is
not necessarily the case that the structure of the grammar is reflected
in the structure of the language processor, in practice it is generally
assumed that the different components of the gramm pr, phonology, syntax
and semantics, correspond to components of the language processor, i.e.
a word-level processor, a syntactic processor and a message-level
processor (e.g., cf. Forster, 1979).
	 Moreover, this view of the
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relationship between grammar and parser, has encouraged psycholinguists
to assume that the different components operate in a serial fashion,
i.e. that the analysis of the input by one component has to be
completed before analysis by another component can commence. This
means that the information flow among different components of the
processor is one-way, from the bottom up. Chomsky's proposal that
syntactic concepts should be defined without reference to pragmatic,
phonological or semantic information, has encouraged psycholinguists to
assume that the different components of the language processor operate
autonomously. This has given rise to 'autonomous' models of
processing, in which the sub-processors can only make use of
information contained within themselves to conduct an analysis of the
input.
Furthermore, the claim of Chomskyan linguistics that the grammar is
'psychologically real', has given rise to the assumption that rules and
representations as proposed by the grammar should be borne out by
experimental evidence. As Black & Chiat (1981) point out:
"Psycholinguistics has seen itself as a testing-ground for
linguistic theories. It has been dominated by attempts to
find 'evidence' for components of the grammar." (Black &
Chiat, 1981, p.45).
A problem with this is that without an explanatory psycholinguistic
theory against which data can be evaluated, we cannot be sure what the
data actually tell us. This means that purported 'evidence' for or
against a particular grammar does not necessarily advance our under-
standing of psycholinguistic processes and mechanisms. Moreover, by
assuming that the grammar is the backbone of a psycholinguistic theory,
it seems that developing such a theory will only be feasible when it
has been ascertained which of the many (changing) grammars proposed by
linguists correctly represents the mental grammar.
In the next section, we will look at some psycholinguistic research
and proposals that have been concerned with the relation between the
grammar and on-line sentence comprehension.
1.1. The grRmm.r and sentence processing.
Inspired by Chomsky's (1957) 'Syntactic structures', psycholin-
guistic research in the 1960's set out to test whether the grmmr
could be taken as a model for language processing, which gave rise to
the Derivational Theory of Complexity (DTC). The DTC posits that the
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language processor uses the rules of the grammar directly in the inter-
pretation process. Since the then current view of the grmmr was
that the surface structure of a sentence is related to a deep structure
by some number of transformations, the hypothesis was that the proces-
sing complexity of a sentence is dependent on the number of transfor-
mations needed to derive the deep structure of the sentence from its
surface structure. Although early experiments seemed to comply with
the DTC, the hypothesis was abandoned after a range of experiments
failed to bear out the predictions made by the DTC (cf. Fodor, Bever &
Garret, 1974). When it was found that there were alternative expla-
nations possible for the experimental evidence, based on semantics, it
was concluded that processing complexity cannot be explained solely in
terms of syntactic complexity.
After the demise of the DTC, much psycholinguistic research shifted
to semantically based accounts (e.g. Schank, 1972), and the search for
heuristic strategies to account for the comprehension process (e.g.
Fodor, Garrett & Bever, 1968; Bever, 1970). The latter program was
based on the view that the processor computes linguistic represen-
tations, but uses heuristics, rather than rules of the grammar, in
doing so.	 The use of these heuristic strategies should explain
findings of processing complexity and difficulty, which were not
predicted by the grammar. However, the strategies proposed were ad
hoc, and did not give any theoretically based explanation of how the
language processing system is organized or operates.
The importance of such an explanation was first considered by
Kimball (1973). Kimball argued that, in order to explain processing
complexity, we have to look for a theory of how the language processor
computes the surface structure of a sentence. He suggested that the
processor makes use of grammatical rules. i.e. phrase structure rules.
However, the way in which it uses these rules is governed by seven
specific parsing principles. These principles constitute a coherent
whole, intended to explain why sentences get assigned the surface
structure that they do. 	 Frazier & Fodor (1978) developed Kimball's
proposal into "the sausage machine", a two-stage parser which operates
using one parsing principle.	 In turn this model has developed into
the 'garden-path' model (e.g. Frazier, 1987a,b,c; Ferreira & Clifton,
1986; Rayner, Carlson & Frazier, 1983). The 'garden-path' model
postulates that the parser computes a single structural analysis guided
by two parsing principles, the principle of Minimal Attachment, which
says that "one does not postulate any (potentially) unnecessary nodes",
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and the principle of Late Closure, which says that "if grammatically
permissible, new nodes are attached into the clause or phrase currently
being processed (1. e. the phrase or clause postulated most recently)"
(Frazier, 1987a, p.562). This model predicts that in the case of
(1.1), the VP is analyzed as (l.la) rather than (l.lb), because the
analysis in (la) contains fewer nodes:
1.1. John hit the man with the stick.
a. John ((hit)(the man)(with the stick)).
b. John ((hit) ((the man) (with the stick))).
A problem with this proposal is that it presupposes that the phrase
structure rules used by the parser contain only categories of the types
X (e.g. N, V, F) and XP (e.g. NP, VP, PP). When one assumes richer
phrase structure rules, such as proposed in X'-theory, the two parsing
principles will make different predictions concerning the initial
analysis of a sentence that the parser will go for. For example, on
an X' analysis, the two readings of (1.1) have the same number of
nodes, so that the principle of Minimal Attachment would not apply, and
instead the principle of Late Closure would predict that the reading in
(1.lb) would be computed.
The main claims of the 'garden-path' model are, that syntactic
processing is autonomous, i.e. that it cannot make use of semantic
and/or contextual information; and that a single syntactic represen-
tation is computed. We can ask whether these claims are borne out by
the experimental evidence.
Marslen-Wilson & Tyler (1980) present some experiments which they
conducted to track the availability of different types of processing
information as these become available on-line. Subjects were asked to
monitor for a target word in three types of prose material, as in
(1.2):
1.2a. Normal prose.
The church was broken into last night.
The thieves stole most of the lead off the roof.
b. Syntactic prose.
The power was located in great water.
No buns puzzle some in the lead of f the text.
c. Random word-order.
In was power water the great located.
Some the no puzzle buns in lead text the off.
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Normal prose materials were normal sentences which can be analyzed both
syntactically and semantically.
	 Syntactic prose materials were
syntactically well-formed, lxit were semantically anomalous.
	 Random
word-order materials were both syntactically and semantically ill-
formed. All test materials were presented with or without a lead-in
sentence (the first sentence in each condition in (1.2)), and each test
sentence contained a target word (e.g. lead in (1.2)), whose position
in the test sentence was varied. Marslen-Wilson & Tyler argue that by
measuring the monitoring response times at different serial positions
in the test sentences, one can determine the time course with which
syntactic and semantic processing information becomes available.
Furthermore, by comparing response times for the test sentences with
and without a lead-in sentence, it can be established whether discourse
context affects this time course.
Marslen-Wilson & Tyler found that for the test sentences with a
lead-in sentence, response times for Normal prose were significantly
faster than for the two other conditions, even at the very beginning of
the test sentence: at the beginning of the test sentence Normal prose
sentences are responded to about 50 msecs. faster than Syntactic prose
sentences, and this remains the same over the whole sentence. When
there is no lead-in sentence present, Normal prose sentences are
responded to only marginally faster than the other two conditions,
although this becomes significant later in the sentence. Syntactic
prose sentences, on the other hand, are not significantly faster than
Random word-order sentences at the beginning of the sentence, either
with or without a lead-in sentence. Later on in the sentence
Syntactic prose sentences are responded to significantly faster than
Random word-order sentences, although this is still significantly
slower than Normal prose response times. Marlsen-Wilson & Tyler argue
that:
"These results show that the semantic dimensions of
processing are dominant throughout a sentence, and that
they have a significant effect on monitoring response even
at the very beginning of the test-sentence, where the
syntactic dimension has only a marginal effect."
(Marslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1980, p. 41).
Furthermore, because of the difference in response for the Normal prose
sentences with and without a lead-in sentence, Marslen-Wilson & Tyler
conclude that contextual information is used by the processor without
any time lag in analyzing the input.
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Tyler & Warren (1987) present some experiments which were conducted
to see how listeners use the global and local structural organization
of an utterance in the process of language comprehension. The first
experiment was set up to test the structural implications of local and
global variables, independent of the meaning of the utterance.
Because of this sentences were made up which were meaningless, but
syntactically well-formed (globally and/or locally). 	 Subjects were
asked to monitor for a target word.	 Sentences were made up in five
conditions, as in (1.3):
1.3a. Early target (syntacticall y well-formed)
A SLOW KITCHEN! was loudly watching! the house! because an orange
dream! snored! with crashing leaves.
b. Late target (syntactically well-formed)
An orange dream! was loudly watching! the house! during smelly
lights! because within these signs! A SLOW KITCHEN! snored! with
crashing leaves.
c. Scrambled ( global syntactic disruption)
Because within these signs! during smelly lights! was loudly
watching! the house! an orange dream! A SLOW KITC11EN! snored!
with crashing leaves.
d. Syntactic disruption (local)
An orange dreain/ was loudly watching! the house! during smelly
lights! because within these signs! SLOW VERY KITCHEN! snored!
with crashing leaves.
e. Phonological disruption
An orange dream! was loudly watching! the house! during smelly
lights! because within these signs! A SLOW !! KITCHEN IN MIST!
snored! with crashing leaves.
Because of the finding of Marsien-Wilson & Tyler (1980), discussed
above, that target words are responded to faster late in the sentence
than early in the sentence, Tyler & Warren included an Early and a Late
condition. Target words in the other three conditions were positioned
in the same place as in the Late condition. To test the relevance of
the global structure of an utterance, constituent phonological phrases
were scrambled in the Scrambled condition. In the Syntactic
disruption condition, the importance of local (within constituent)
structure for processing was tested, by inserting an adverb between the
adjective and the target noun, while in the Phonological disruption
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condition, a local prosodic disruption was created by inserting a pause
immediately before the target noun (denoted by // in (1.3)).
Tyler & Warren found that, as expected, response times in the Late
condition were significantly faster than response times in the Early
condition. However, they found that response times in the Scrambled
condition were not significantly slower than those in the Late
condition (while targets occurred in the same position in the
sentence). This result cannot be explained if one assumes that the
processor computes the global syntactic structure of an utterance,
because then one would expect that the absence of such a structure
would significantly slow down response times. On the other hand,
Tyler & Warren did find that disruption of the local syntactic
structure (the Syntactic disruption condition) did significantly slow
down response times as compared to the Late condition, as did response
times in the Phonological disruption condition, as compared to the Late
condition. According to Tyler & Warren, this suggests that:
"... when listeners process an utterance which is not
meaningful, the representation which they develop is based
on local phrases, perhaps defined both prosodically and
syntactically, as were the local phrases in the present
study. There is no evidence from these data that the
listener's representation spans anything larger than a
local phrase, and therefore no evidence that listeners
construct a syntactic representation consis tirzg of the
hierarchical organization of local phrases."
	 (Tyler &
Warren, 1987, pp. 646-647).
In their second experiment, Tyler & Warren compare response times
for anomalous prose (as in the first experiment) with response times
for normal prose (syntactically and semantically well-formed
sentences). Again they compare five conditions: Anomalous Late,
Normal Late, (Normal) Scrambled, (Normal) Syntactic disruption, and
(Normal) Phonological disruption.
Tyler & Warren got the following results:
Mean monitoring
 RT (nisecs)
Anomalous Late	 363
Normal Late	 313
Scrambled	 339
Syntactic disruption	 427
Phonological disruption 385
As was expected, the difference in response time between the Anomalous
Late condition and the Normal Late condition is significant. The
difference between the Normal Late and Scrambled conditions, of 26
msecs. is not significant on the Newman-Keuls analysis, although it is
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significant on both item and subject analyses. Tyler & Warren suggest
that this may be partly due to the disruption of the semantic global
organization of an utterance. What we see, furthermore, is that
violations of local structure have a much larger effect on response
times than violations of global structure. Tyler & Warren note that
although the global structural organization in the sentences in the
Scrambled condition is disrupted, these sentences do have a normal
global prosodic structure.
	 It could be the case that this prosodic
patterning provides global structural information which subjects use in
developing a representation of the utterance. To test this
hypothesis Tyler & Warren ran a third experiment, using sentences in
both Normal and Anomalous prose, in which the global syntactic
structure was retained, while the global prosodic structure was
disrupted. The results of this third experiment show that disruption
of the global prosodic structure significantly slows down response
times, in both the Normal prose and anomalous prose conditions. Tyler
& Warren argue that these results show that it cannot be the case that
prosodic information is used only when there are syntactic options,
such as syntactically ambiguous phrases. Rather the findings suggest
that prosodic information is an integral part of the comprehension
process.
Concerning the consequences that the findings of these three
experiments have for the question whether purely syntactic
representations are computed, Tyler & Warren argue that:
"When listeners hear a normal utterance (...) the
representation they construct is developed on the basis of
local phrases which are integrated together by means of the
semantic and prosodic relationships between phrases. As
each word is heard, listeners use information abeut
prosodic, syntactic, and semantic relationships between
words to construct local phrases which have a coherent
prosodic, syntactic and semantic structure. These local
units are integrated into a higher level representation of
the utterance on the basis of the semantic relationships
between phrases, and the relationship between the prosodic
structure wi thin a phrase and the overall prosodic
structure of the utterance. There is no evidence in the
data presented here that a syntactic level of
representation which spans an en tire utterance is ever
constructed." (op. cit., p. 656).
In spite of these findings, proponents of the 'garden path model'
maintain that the parser autonomously yields a syntactic representation
in comprehension. In the next chapter, we will look in more detail at
the evidence that they put forward in support of this claim.
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The view that the parser operates according to special principles
in addition to the rules of the grammar is not the only view held in
the psycholinguistic literature. For example, Berwick & Weinberg
(1984) argue that one can retain the view that only the rules of
transformational grammar are used in language comprehension, if one
assumes that the parser performs certain operations in parallel, rather
than serially. They propose a two—stage parser which incorporates the
use of the subjacency constraint, proposed in GB as a constraint on
constituent movement. Fodor (1985) argues against this proposal on the
grounds that it presupposes that the particular version of generative
grammar in which the subjacency constraint plays a role is the grammar
that underlies language use.
Garnham (1985) puts forward a more general argument against the
equation of rules of grammar with rules used in processing:
"There are plausible arguments against the view that the
rules people use in language processing are those
discovered by linguists. Despite Chomsky's
characterization of their discipline as part of cognitive
psychology, linguists take no account of strictly
psychological considerations. Their goal is to produce
elegantly formulated grammars. But a concisely stated set
of linguistic rules may not correspond to mental
mechanisms, which are subject to processing constraints.
A linguist 's rules might require very complex computational
procedures if they were to be incorporated into a language
processor, whereas a slightly less elegant set of rules
that had the same consequences for linguistic structure,
might be computationally more tractable." (Garnhan, 1985,
pp. 24-25).
However, Cram & Fodor (1985) assume as a working hypothesis that
the grammar and the parser are well matched, i.e. that the rules of the
grammar should be usable in a straightforward way in sentence
processing. They argue that if the language processor cannot make use
of the rules of grammar, but has to rely on heuristics to analyze
sentences, processing would be a complicated matter which constantly
threatens to exceed the capacities of the system. Cram & Fodor
propose that by adopting their hypothesis,
"we may be able to appeal to the way in which [the parser
and the grammar] interrelate in order to help us decide
between various alternative grammars." (Cram & Fodor,
1985, p.95).
They go on to compare what consequences transformational grammar
(as set out in Chomsky, 1980b) and generalized phrase structure
grammar, GPSG (e.g. Gazdar, 1981), would have for parsing sentences
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containing fillers and gaps. They argue that the uniformity of the
syntactic component of a GPSG, in which phrase structure rules and
constraints are blended in the grammar, makes for efficient processing
of sentences containing fillers and gaps, and go on to look at
experimental evidence to see whether this claim is borne out.
	 They
find that although the experimental evidence is compatible with their
claim, it does not provide positive evidence for it.
	
However, they
argue that:
"Other theories of grammar may be compatible with the on-
line application of constraints by the parser, but only
GPSG predicts it. The GPSG parsing model therefore
recommends i tself as a basis for current psychol irzguis tic
research."	 (Cram & Fodor, 1985, p. 126).
However, this way of looking at the grammar—language processor
relation raises a problem. Although a good case can be made for the
view that, in an explanatory theory of comprehension, the rules of the
grammar and the parser should be well matched, it is questionable
whether this hypothesis justifies the move to use evidence from
processing for deciding between the various alternative grammars, as
proposed by linguists. Linguists working within the framework of
generative grammar set out to investigate natural language by
constructing fully explicit descriptions of the linguistic knowledge of
language which underlies linguistic abilities. On this view,
linguistics is mentalist, i.e. the reason for studying language in this
way is to achieve an understanding of how the human mind uses language,
and therefore linguistics is conceived of as a branch of cognitive
psychology.	 However, this does not mean that the construction of
linguistic theories is dependent on psychological evidence, or
delimited by psychological considerations.
	 As Black & Chiat (1981)
argue:
"The notion of psychological reality has never played any
role in the motivation of linguistic concepts or in
linguistic argumentation. Its alleged role is simply due
to a misleading use of the term 'psychological reality' to
mean tlinguistic validity'." (Black & Chiat, 1981, p.42).
Gazdar, Klein, Pullum and Sag (1985), in the introduction to
'Generalized phrase structure grammar', distance themselves from any
psychological claims:
"We make no claims, naturally enough, that our grammatical
theory is eo ipso a psychological theory. Our grammar of
English is not a theory of how speakers think up things to
say and put them into words. 	 Our general linguistic
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theory is not a theory of how a child abstracts from the
surrounding hubbub of linguistic and nonlinguistic noises
enough evidence to gain a mental grasp of the structure of
a natural language.	 Nor is i t a biological theory of the
structure of an as-yet-unidentified mental organ. It is
irresponsible to claim otherwise for theories of this
general sort." (Gazdar et al., 1985, p.5).
However, to claim that psycholingLustic considerations can help to
decide between various alternative grammars, presupposes that one of
those grammars IS 'psychologically real', and that what we need to do
is find the right one, be it GB, LFG, GPSG, or any other grammar.
This has as an undesirable consequence that psycholinguistic
explanations of comprehension are dependent on the particular grammar
that has been adopted as the 'right' one, and that these explanations
will have to change when changes in the grammar are made.
Nevertheless, psycholinguists continue to argue for or against
different grammars on the grounds of psycholinguistic evidence. For
example, Frazier, Clifton & Randall (1983) conducted some experiments
in which they compared the processing of filler-gap sentences
containing 'control' verbs and 'non control' verbs, such as in (1.4)
and (1.5):
1.4. Non-control
a. Who could the girl have begged ____ to sing?
b. Who could the girl have begged to sing to ____?
1.5. Control
a. Who could the girl have forced ____ to sing?
b. Who could the girl have tried to sing to _?
They found that sentences like (1.4a) take longer to comprehend than
sentences like (1.4b). They propose that this is due to the fact that
the girl is initially assigned to the gap in (1.4a), so that reanalysis
has to take place later.	 They also found that sentences like (1.5a)
take longer to understand than sentences like (1.5b). However, verbs
like force are 'object control' verbs (i.e. these verbs required that
their object be the subject of the infinitive), and verbs like try are
'subject control' verbs (i.e. verbs that require that their subjects be
the subject of the infinitive), so that for the sentences in (1.5) only
one interpretation is possible after the verb is encountered. 	 This
would lead one to expect that sentences like (1.5a) would not take
longer to process than sentences like (1.Sb). 	 Because of these
finai'gs,Fra.zie t ol.. cov4tick. kkoI. cor1ra k4ona4iovt is rot se 4&i.r	 +ekt
cvo.Lysis o
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They go on to argue that their results fit naturally with a GB
style grammar, because of the GB claim that there are distinct,
finegrained components in linguistic knowledge. This claim permits
the proposal that corresponding components are used in language input
processing, and moreover that these components, such as control
information, come into play at different points in time during the
comprehension process. On the other hand, Frazier et al. claim that
their findings are not compatible with the view that the grammar is a
GPSG, because in such a grammar all relevant grammatical constraints
are checked as the phrase structure representation of a sentence is
constructed, so that one would expect that control information would
have an immediate effect.
However, Ford & Dalrymple (1988) retort to this that Frazier et
al.'s argument is flawed, and set out to show that the findings fit as
naturally within a GPSG view, as within a GB view of the grammar.
They argue that the findings of Frazier et al. can be accounted for
within a GPSG, if we assume that the parser looks for the subject
control form of verbs before looking for non-subject control forms.
Altmann & Steedman (1988) take a similar stance as Cram & Fodor
(1985) concerning the relation between grammar and language processor,
although they draw a different conclusion from this. They take as
their starting point the 'strong competence hypothesis' of Bresnan and
Kaplan (Bresnan, 1982), which proposes that rules of natural language
grammar may be expected to correspond directly to the steps that a
processor goes through in assembling a given analysis. 	 Altmann &
Steedman note that under this hypothesis the processor needs only two
additional components: a mechanism for building interpretable
structures according to the rules of the grammar, and a mechanism for
coping with local ambiguities as to which rule of the grammar to apply.
However, they point out that if one takes this hypothesis together
with the intuition that comprehension is an incremental process, this
leads to a paradox. On this view, one would expect the grammar to be
left-branching, because a terminal node in a left branching tree would
be interpretable as soon as it is syntactically incorporated into a
phrase, in a left-to-right pass through the sentence. English,
however, is a striking example of a right branching language, which
means that comprehension cannot occur in an incremental way, if the
'strong competence hypothesis' holds. 	 There are different ways in
which one can resolve this paradox. 	 One way of doing this is to
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reject the 'strong competence hypothesis', by pointing out that there
is no necessary relation between rules of the grammar and the way in
which language is interpreted. Altmann & Steednian reject this view,
on the grounds that:
". . . in the case of human language there is a price to pay
in theoretical terms, for to abandon the strong competence
hypothesis is to complicate greatly the problem of
"plastic" or incremental development. The explanatory
burden is merely shifted onto the theory of acquisition,
and hence (by arguments familiar from Chomsky, 1968) onto
the theory of evolution. In the absence of any good
argument showing why the apparently extremely rapid
evolution of language should have eschewed the obvious
advantages of plasticity, such a move falls by Occam's
razor." (Altmann & Steedman, 1988, pp. 194-195).
They suggest that, rather than rejecting the 'strong competence
hypothesis', or intuitions concerning the incremental nature of
comprehension, the paradox can be resolved by rejecting standard
theories of grammar.	 Instead one should opt for a grammar which is
directly compatible with incremental semantics. As an example of
this, Altmann & Steedman refer to 'combinatory grammar' (e.g. Ades &
Steedman, 1982).
Altmann & Steedman go on to sketch a language processor which is
'parallel weak interactive', i.e. alternative syntactic analyses of
ambiguous strings are offered in parallel, and a choice is made amongst
them depending on the context. In order to account for how this
choice is made, Altmann & Steedman propose two principles (cf. Cram &
Steedman, 1985): the principle of referential support, which states
that:	 "An NP analysis which is referentially supported will be
favoured over one that is not.", and the principle of parsimony, which
states that:	 "a reading which carries fewer unsupported
presuppositions will be favoured over one that carries more."
(Altmann & Steedman, 1988, pp.201-203). By introducing these two
principles into their account of input processing, Altmann & Steedman
move from the grammar-processor relation to processes which have access
to the context, i.e. pragmatics, and their role in input processing.
Although the principles make intuitive sense, a problem is that they do
not follow from a general theory of pragmatics.
	 Because of this, one
cannot evaluate how they interact with other pragmatic processes, nor
are they made completely explicit. For example, the notion
'presupposition' is problematic, in that there is no agreement as to
what presuppositions are and how they are recovered from the input, nor
as to whether presuppositions can be validly distinguished from
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entailments (cf. e.g. Garner, 1971;	 Keenan, 1971;	 Kempson, 1975;
Wilson, 1975).
The view that rules of the grammar should be directly usable in
language processing is taken a step further in the view that the
grammar is shaped by functional (processing) considerations. For
example, Clark & Haviland (1974) argue that the study of language use
will lead to an account of language itself, which in effect would make
linguistics as a discipline redundant. Garrtham (1985) argues against
this view on the grounds that psycholinguists have produced very few
linguistic insights, and besides that even if structural factors cannot
explain all of language use, this does not mean that structural factors
are unnecessary in the explanation.
Givon (1979) stresses the communicative purpose of language. He
argues that formulating grammatical rules and constraints only
describes phenomena of language, without providing an explanation for
these phenomena.	 An explanation will only be possible when we take
into account that the structure of language is based on its
communicative function and on discourse-pragmatics. Newmeyer (1983)
takes issue with this position by arguing that generative granunar is an
explanatory theory. He says that the competence model as proposed by
generative grammar interacts with other models to explain language.
As an example, he refers to the unacceptability of multiple centre-
embedded constructions, such as:
1.6. The cheese that the rat that the cat chased ate was rotten.
He argues that in order to explain the unacceptability of sentences
like (1.6), we need both the competence grammar and a model of
immediate memory storage. Having the competence grammar alone does not
explain why sentences like the above are so difficult to process,
because the grammar characterizes these sentences as grammatical.
However, a memory model on its own can not account for this either,
since "even a rough description of the phenoia en on demands a notion of
linguistic structure" (Newmeyer, 1983, p.124). A combination of the
two models, Newineyer argues, does give us an explanation of the
sentence's unacceptability. Unfortunately, this combination of the
two models still does not give us an explanation of why the sentence in
(1.6) is unacceptable, while the sentence in (1.7), which has the same
multiple centre-embedded structure, is fine:
1.7. The game those boys I met invented resembles chess.'
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This means that it is not due to the syntactic structure of multiple
centre—embedded sentences, nor to limitations of immediate memory
storage, that some of these sentences are difficult or impossible to
process. This in turn suggests that we may have to turn to pragmatics
for an explanation of the phenomenon.
The view that processing considerations may help shape particular
rules of the grammar is not completely rejected by generative
linguists. For example, Chomsky & Lasnik (1977) consider functional
explanations of grammatical rules in the light of the fact that
sentential subjects in English require a complementizer. However,
Chomsky (1980) points out that even when there are functional
explanations for linguistic rules, these functional explanations apply
only on the evolutionary level, either the evolution of the organism,
if the rule is a universal, or the evolution of the language, if the
rule is language specific. In either case, Chomsky argues,
"the child does not acquire the rule by virtue of its
function any more than he learns to have an eye because of
the advantages of sight." (Chomsky, 1980, p. 231).
Carston (1988) puts forward two main reasons why a complete
functional explanation of grammatical rules and constraints does not
seem possible. In the first place, she notes that there are
innumerable local ambiguities in natural language that are not excluded
by grammatical rules and constraints although their exclusion would
facilitate parsing.	 And in the second place, that there are
constraints which do not facilitate sentence processing, and may even
make processing more difficult. However, until we have a better
insight into how addressees actually process sentences, it is difficult
to evaluate whether these two points are valid because they rest on
unvalidated assumptions concerning language processing. For example,
although it is the case that sentences of natural language contain
numerous local ambiguities, it has not been shown convincingly that
this presents the processor with difficulties when it interprets actual
utterances of these sentences, so that it is not obvious that if these
ambiguities were ruled out by the grammar this would facilitate
processing. 2
 Moreover, the reasons Carston gives against functional
explanations of grammatical rules and constraints rest on the
assumption that the rules and constraints proposed by linguistic theory
are 'psychologically real'. For example, Carston says that the
constraint that prohibits (1.8) seems to have no role in aiding
perception because the sentence is completely straightforward to parse,
23
so that there cannot be a functional explanation for having the
constraint:
1.8. *y do you think that - will win?
The fact remains that people find (1.8) unacceptable. If the
syntactic constraint which prohibits this structure is mentally
represented as such, then the unacceptability of (1.8) may well be due
to this constraint. However, an alternative explanation is that
sentences like (1.8) do present some processing difficulties, which
make people judge them to be unacceptable, even if they seem perfectly
straightforward to parse to linguists. 3 If this is the case, then
identifying what causes the processing difficulties would give us a
functional explanation of why sentences like (1.8) are ruled out.
It seems that in order to decide on whether rules of the grammar
are shaped by functional considerations, we need better answers to the
question of how people process language. To do this we need to be
clearer about the motivation for many of the assumptions on which
psycholinguistic theories have been based. Some of these assumptions
have been adopted not because they were supported independently by
psycholinguistic evidence, but because they followed from, or were more
compatible with, more general cognitive hypotheses or linguistic
metatheory.	 As we have seen in this section, the linguistic
metatheoretical notion of 'psychological reality' of the grRmmr
underlies much psycholinguistic theorization and research. 	 Fodor
(1983) has incorporated this view of the grammar into a general theory
of the organization of the mind, the modularity hypothesis. This has
been interpreted by many psycholinguists as independent motivation for
the assumption that processing proceeds by means of the stages and
types of representations postulated in linguistic theory. In the next
section, we will look at Fodor's proposals in more detail, and ask
whether the modularity hypothesis does indeed provide independent
motivation for a particular architecture of psycholinguistic models.
1.2. Is the language faculty a Fodorian module ?
Fodor (1983) presents an account of the overall organization of the
mind, in which he distinguishes three types of cognitive mechanisms,
transducers, input systems and central mechanisms. Input systems
mediate between transducer outputs and the central cognitive mechanisms
by computing representations usable by the central mechanisms, based on
"transduced premises".	 Fodor proposes that these input systems
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consist of the perceptual systems and language. He includes language
on the basis of the similarity of function between the linguistic and
the perceptual systems:
"both serve to get information about the world into a
format appropriate for access by such central processes as
mediate the fixation of belief." (Fodor, 1983, p.46).
Furthermore, Fodor claims that, although both input systems and
central systems are inference-making systems, they differ in that input
systems are modules, whereas central systems are not, i.e. input
systems share a number of properties which make them modular, and which
are not shared by the central cognitive systems. Some of the
properties that make a systeo modular are that the system is domain
specific; that processing is mandatory; that there is only limited
central access to the representations that the system computes; that
the system is fast; that the system is informationally encapsulated;
and that the system computes a 'shallow' output.
	 Fodor argues that
language processing shares these properties, i.e. it is fast, dumb and
automatic. We cannot help hearing an utterance of a sentence in a
language we know as a sentence of that language rather than as a string
of sounds.
Fodor assumes that the interpretation of an utterance involves
making an analysis of the input at a number of different levels of
representation, such as phonetic, phonological, lexical, and syntactic.
At each of these levels, the analysis involves idiosyncratic
computations, which make the different operations domain-specific.
Moreover, in performing its analyses the language processor can only
make use of information within the module. Information derived from
central processes cannot directly affect the analysis of the language
processor.	 In this way, input systems are 'inforinationally
encapsulated', which Fodor calls "the essence of their modularity" (op.
cit., p.71). Informational encapsulation is one of the reasons why
input systems, including language processing, operate very fast: they
operate by only taking a limited amount of information into
consideration. Because input systems are informationally
encapsulated, their outputs will be 'shallow', i.e. the output will be
a representation of the input which can be computed without any appeal
to general knowledge.
	 Fodor (1983) puts forward that in the case of
language, the processor specifies its linguistic and maybe its logical
form.	 Fodor (1990) goes one step further and proposes that there is
an algorithm which is used by the language processor to take an
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addressee from the acoustic properties of an utterance P to a canonical
description of the communicator's mental state, i.e. a description of
the communicator as intending to communicate his belief that P. Fodor
says about this that:
"All you have to know about an English speaker is that he
made a certain noise, and the intentional interpretation of
his behaviour is immediately transparent. (...) There
appears to be something like a procedure for the
intentional interpretation of verbal behaviour; but all
that executing the procedure gives you is a specification
of the propositional object of a communicative intention.
The only intentional information about a speaker that his
colinguals are ipso facto able to recover from his verbal
behaviour is the ii teral content of what he says. For all
the other sorts of things that you might want to know about
the speaker's state of mind ("fhy did he say that?" "Did he
mean it?" ...) you're on your own; hermeneutic
sophistication comes into play, mediated by heaven knows
what problem solving heuristics." (Fodor, 1990, p.214).
However, Wilson & Sperber (1981), and Sperber & Wilson (1986) have
shown that processes such as reference assignment, disambiguation, and
the restoration of elliptical material crucially involve pragmatics and
context, which are not part of the language faculty. They also show
that recovering the content of what someone has said often involves
more than the above processes: the linguistic input has to be enriched
in various ways in order to yield a complete proposition (for a more
detailed discussion of this, see section 1.4). This process of
enrichment again is not part of the language faculty, but involves
central cognitive processes and context (see also Blakeinore, 1987;
Carston, 1988). This means that for Fodor's proposal to have any
substance, he will have to show what algorithm, within the
informationally encapsulated language input system, can account for
reference assignment, disambiguation, the restoration of elliptical
material, and enrichment. Furthermore, he will have to account for
the experimental finding that people do not need to first process the
literal meanings of non-literal expressions before deriving their non-
literal interpretations (e.g. Gibbs, 1986, 1989).
Marsien-Wilson & Tyler (1987) take issue with Fodor's (1983) view
of modularity on two grounds. They argue that the properties proposed
to distinguish modular from non-modular systems are not in fact
distinguishing properties; and they argue that the proposed properties
lead Fodor to make unwarranted assumptions about the language
processor.
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Fodor proposes that modules have specific domains in which they
perform idiosyncratic computations, which indicates a specialized
processor. However, Mars len—Wilson & Tyler point out that Fodor does
not provide any arguments or evidence that the mapping of linguistic
representations onto discourse representations is any less domain
specific. It may well be that this process is as domain—specific and
idiosyncratic as the mapping from the acoustic input onto 'shallow'
linguistic representations.
Sperber & Wilson (1986) propose that the linguistic content of an
utterance underdetermines its propositional content,
	 i.e.	 a
semantically complete logical form. The output of the linguistic
decoding process is taken to be an incomplete (non—linguistic) logical
form, which the addressee then has to complete into the fully
propositional form, which the communicator intended to convey. This
process of enriching the incomplete logical form is a pragmatic
process, which makes use of general conceptual knowledge, and is
therefore outside the realm of the 'language faculty'. Although this
process of enrichment is not part of the language input system, it
solely applies to incomplete logical forms, turning them into
propositional forms, which makes it 'domain specific'. 4
 Fodor
concedes that domain specificity is not a strong argument for
modularity: although it seems a good characteristic of modular systems
that they operate in specific domains, the reverse, that 'domain
specific' operations are modular, does not automatically follow.
Concerning Fodor's claim that modular processes are mandatory (i.e.
that they apply automatically, whereas central processes do not),
Marslen—Wilson & Tyler remark that there is no reason to suppose that
mandatory processing stops at logical form, which Fodor claims is the
output of the language input system. As an example they give (1.9),
uttered in a normal conversation after a lecture:
1.9. Jerry gave the first talk today.
	 He was his usual ebullient
self.
They say about this example that:
"Hearing this, it seems just as cognitively mandatory to
map the pronoun He at the beginning of the second sentence
onto the discourse representation of Jerry set up in the
course of the first sentence as it does, for exajrq,le, to
hear All Gaul is divided into three parts as a sentence and
not as an acoustic object (...)." (Marslen—Wilson &
Tyler, 1987, p.39).
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Fodor does not give any arguments for why processing would be
mandatory only up to logical form. He notes that:
"Perceptual processes apparently apply willy-filly in
disregard of one 's immediate concerns. "I couldn 't help
hearing what you said" is one of those cliches which, often
enough, expresses a literal truth; and it is what is said
that one can't help hearing, not just what is uttered."
(Fodor, 1983, p. 55).
However, as is implicit in Marsien-Wilson & Tyler's criticism, the
question is what Fodor means by 'what is said'. As we saw above,
Wilson & Sperber (1981) and Sperber & Wilson (1986) have shown that
recovering 'what is said' crucially involves pragmatic processing and
context, which are not part of the language faculty, so that the above
quote argues against the view that processing is mandatory only up to
logical form, rather than for it. 	 Fodor's (1990) proposal reflects
the position that mandatory processing continues until the content of
the utterance is recovered. However, as we saw above, unless it can
be shown that there is an algorithm within the language input system
which can compute the content of an utterance without appeal to general
knowledge, this proposal entails that not only processing up to logical
form, but also the central processes involved in utterance
interpretation are mandatory.
Fodor says that 'informational encapsulation' is at the core of
modularity. He argues that if it is not the case that at least some
information is encapsulated, then we would not be able to account for
the persistence of many perceptual illusions, even when the subject has
explicit knowledge that the percept is an illusion, such as the Muller-
Lyer illusion in vision. For language processing, Fodor gives as an
example of informational encapsulation the finding by Swinney (1979),
and Tanenhaus, Leirnau & Seidenberg (1979), that on hearing an
ambiguous word both readings are accessed. 	 Swinney (1979, 1982) set
out to test the intuition that biasing contexts facilitate lexical
decisions.	 He presented subjects with sentences like I wanted to
write a letter to my mother but I couldn't find a p. After
processing the sentence subjects did a lexical decision task, i.e. they
were presented with a word about which they had to decide whether it
was a word or a non-word. Swinney found that decision times were
faster for words related to the target word (i.e. pen), such as ink,
than for words which were unrelated to the target word, such as king.
However, pen is ambiguous between a reading 'writing material' and a
reading 'animal enclosure', and Swinney found that words related to the
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reading which was not facilitated by the sentential context, such as
pig, were also recognized faster than the unrelated word. Swinney
found that both readings of pen are accessed in all contexts, whether
the context is neutral, or biased towards one or the other reading.
Fodor argues that because the access of both readings is facilitated,
even though only one reading is contextually relevant, these
experiments show that lexical access is not cognitively penetrated, but
rather informationally encapsulated: "This looks a lot less like the
intelligent use of contextual/background information to guide lexical
access." (op. cit., p.79). To account for this, Fodor argues that:
"what it looks like (...) is some sort of associative
relation among lexical forms (...); a relation pitched at
a level of representation sufficiently superficial to be
insensi tive to the semantic content of the i tems involved.
This possibility is important for the following reason: if
facilitation is mediated by merely interlexical relations(and not by the interaction of background information wi th
the semantic content of the i tern and i ts context), then the
information that is exploited to produce the facilitation
can be represented in the lexicon; hence internal to the
language recognition module.	 And if that is right, then
contextual facilitation of lexical access is not an
argument for the cogni ti ye penetration of the module.
(op. cit., p.79-80).
There are two points that can be made regarding this account.
Podor presents the mental lexicon as "a sort of connected graph, with
lexical i tems at the nodes and wi th paths from each i tern to several
others." (op. cit., p.80). This raises the question of what he means
by 'lexical item'. In the psycholinguistic literature, a distinction
is usually made between stored word forms (phonological and
orthographic), and stored word meanings (cf.. Aitchison, 1987; Garman,
1990; Garnham, 1985). Since Fodor discusses a level of
representation which is "insensitive to the semantic content of the
items involved', it seems that what he means by 'lexical items' are
stored word forms, rather than word meanings. However, although it
has been proposed in the literature that word meanings may be stored in
semantic networks, no such semantically inspired networks have been
proposed for word forms. Rather, the psycholinguistic evidence shows
that word forms are organized around similarities in sound, especially
around similarity at their beginnings and ends (e.g. Aitchison, 1987;
Fay & Cutler, 1977). If this is correct, then Swinney's findings must
be due to the semantic content of the words involved.
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More importantly, the conclusions drawn from the experiments by
Swinney and others turn out to be unwarranted. Underlying these
conclusions is the assumption that lexical access is a one-step
process: either a word meaning is accessed or it is not. Based on
this assumption, the finding that both readings of an ambiguous word
are accessed is taken as evidence that context cannot facilitate one
reading of an ambiguous word at early stages of recognition or access.
However, an alternative view of lexical access is that it involves a
continuous gradual activation process, rather than a single step.
Based on this we can view lexical access as a joint function of
contextual and phonological input: both phonological input and context
contribute to the activation of a word meaning. On this view,
although the phonological form of an ambiguous word will activate all
readings of an ambiguous word, the contextually appropriate reading
will also receive activation from the context, so that this reading
will be activated more. As the activation process continues, the
contextually appropriate reading will come to dominate, while the
inappropriate reading(s) will be pushed out (as proposed by Kawamoto,
1988; McClel land, St. John & Taraban, 1989).
This second view of lexical access is supported by research of St.
John (1988), reported in McClelland et al. (1989). St. John
reanalyzed the findings of 19 studies concerning lexical access of
ambiguous words (including Swinney's experiments). This reanalysis
reveals that even at the earliest probe point, although both readings
of the ambiguous word are activated, the contextually appropriate one
is activated more. As processing continues, facilitation of the
appropriate reading continues, while facilitation of the inappropriate
reading fades away. This pattern is illustrated in figure (1), which
shows St. John's reanalysis of Swinney's (1979) experiment:
fig . 1.	 Swinney . 1979 (Expt. 2)
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What we see then is that the findings concerning lexical access of
ambiguous words do not support Fodor's claims of informational
encapsulation, but rather show that context does play a role in lexical
access.
In the case of structural ambiguity, Fodor allows for limited
interaction between the language processor and central systems.
Although the central systems cannot guide the analysis that the
processor makes, it can reject an analysis on the grounds of contextual
incompatibility.
Marsien-Wilson & Tyler claim that Fodor has no evidence that the
relationship between syntactic parsing and central processes is
interactive in the way he proposes. They go on to discuss a number of
findings of experiments, including those of Marsien-Wilson & Tyler
(1980) discussed above, which they interpret as evidence for the
hypothesis that context does guide the parser on-line. They point out
that:
"The results do not force a single-computation account.
No matter how early context effects are detected, it is
always possible to argue that multiple readings were
nonetheless computed, so that what we are picking up are
after-the-event-selection effects rather than direct
control of the initial syntactic parse. But the cost of
this move is that it makes it very difficult to
discriminate the modular version of interaction from an
account that allows continuous or even predictive
interactions between levels. 	 The modular account simply
fails to make empirically distinct predictions. And if
this is the case, then the claim for informational
encapsulation cannot help us to distinguish modular from
central processes." (op. cit., p. 51).
Fodor argues that the point at issue is that context cannot predict
the linguistic form of an utterance, however much it may predict its
content. He says that even if one knows what a communicator is going
to say, one cannot know in what way s/he is going to say it; "there
are simply too many linguistically different ways of saying the same
thing." Because of this, he argues that "linguistic form recognition
can 't be con text driven because con text does not determine form, if
linguistic form is recognized at all, it must be by largely
encapsulated processes." (Fodor, 1983, p. 90).
There are a number of points that can be made regarding this
argument. Although Fodor says that 'informational encapsulation' is
at the core of modularity, it turns out that whether (post-lexical)
processing is 'inforniationally encapsulated' and therefore modular,
depends on whether linguistic form is recognized prior to, and
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independent of the conceptual (or discourse) representation of an
utterance. Fodor refers to experimental evidence by Forster & Olbrei
(1973) to support his claim that linguistic form recovery is mandatory.
Forster & Olbrei conducted a number of experiments which they argued
showed that syntactic processing time is constant for sentences of
varying semantic plausibility but constant syntactic structure. 	 In
one experiment they compared reaction times to semantically plausible
and implausible sentences containing one or two clauses.	 The
different sentences used had the same syntactic structure, and all
sentences contained seven words. 	 Moreover, the average word length
was equated for all four sentence types.
	 Examples of sentences used
are given in (1.10):
1.lOa. One—clause plausible:
The officials were given a warm reception.
b. One—clause implausible:
The aborigines were shown a rusty invention.
c. Two—clause plausible:
The dress that Pam wore looked ugly.
d. Two—clause implausible:
The aunt that Jim ate tasted foul.
Forster & Olbrei found that the semantically implausible sentences
took longer to process than the semantically plausible sentences, and
furthermore, that two—clause sentences of each type took longer to
process than one—clause sentences of the same type. Forster & Olbrei
took these results to show that the time required to analyze a
particular syntactic structure is approximately constant, while
differences between the plausible and implausible sentences are due to
semantic processing.
However, when we look at the method that Forster & Olbrei used in
conducting their experiments, it turns out that their conclusion is not
warranted. They use the notions 'semantic plausibility' and
'semantic implausibility' in an intuitive sense, without giving any
theoretical justification for what makes a sentence semantically
plausible or implausible. This means that one cannot be sure what the
experimental findings signify, since what is being compared is not
spelled out. Also, in all experiments that Forster & Olbrei
conducted, subjects read the sentences in their totality, and had to
decide for each sentence whether it was an intelligible, grammatical
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sentence. This means that the reaction times reflect the overall time
it took the subjects to interpret the sentences, so that one cannot
tell from the reaction times how much time was spent on the different
subprocesses, such as syntactic processing, or indeed whether any
purely syntactic processing had taken place at all. These
experiments, therefore, do not show whether linguistic form recovery is
mandatory. Moreover, this experimental evidence can be contrasted
with Tyler & Warren's (1987) finding discussed above that, when the
global constituent structure of a sentence is scrambled, this does not
significantly slow down reaction times, relative to those obtained on
syntactically we! 1-formed sentences.
Although context may not be able to predict the exact linguistic
form that an utterance is going to have, it does not follow
automatically from this that it cannot be used to make any predictions
at all. Let us consider the following example:
1.11. Ann: Where did you put the book?
a. Pat: I put it on the table.
b. Pat: On the table.
If the context predicts that the content of Pat's utterance is going to
be a specification of SOMEWHERE in the conceptual representation PAT
PUT BOOK SOMEWHERE, then although it cannot predict whether Pat is
going to utter (1.11a) or (l.11b), it may predict that the utterance is
going to be constrained by this conceptual representation. Of course
there is no guarantee that the prediction is not mistaken, i.e. that
Pat will not say something completely different, such as "Oh, shut up".
However, if the context predicts that Pat will specify where she put
the book, then this utterance will startle Ann, because she was not
expecting it. Moreover, if Pat said "I can't remembef', in the above
example, Ann needs the conceptual representation to reach the
interpretation that Pat cannot remember where she put the book.
	 The
point is that although there may be "many linguistically different ways
of saying the same thing", underlying the different linguistic
realizations will be one conceptual representation, otherwise it would
not be 'the same thing'. This means that if one knows what a
communicator is going to say, one has a conceptual representation of
the utterance; and this conceptual representation constrains the
linguistic form of the utterance that one expects the communicator to
utter.
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A further property which Fodor proposes as distinguishing modular
systems from central systems is that modular systems are fast, whereas
central processes such as problem solving are relatively slow.
However, Sperber & Wilson (1986) point out that pragmatic processing is
constrained as to how much time is spent:
"... ordinary utterance comprehension is almost
instantaneous, and however much evidence mi ght have been
taken into account, however many hypotheses mi ght have been
considered, in practice the only evidence and hypotheses
considered are those that are immediately accessible."
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p.66).
Similarly, Marslen-Wilson & Tyler (1987) argue that this property
cannot help one distinguish a language input system from central
processes involved in interpretation, because the available evidence
shows that mapping onto a discourse representation happens as fast as
any (postulated) mapping onto a logical form, even when it involves
pragmatic inference.
In point of fact, Fodor has very little to say about the central
processes involved in on-line language comprehension. His main
concern is to compare processes of input systems with central processes
such as problem solving and belief fixation. When he talks about
central processes involved in language comprehension, he refers
primarily to such processes as recovering the illocutionary force of
the utterance, and not to such processes as disambiguation and
ref erence assignment.	 However, it is not at all inconceivable that
there are differences between these different types of central
processes.
There are two further distinguishing properties that Marsien-Wilson
& Tyler claim do not make a distinction between modular and central
processes. Fodor claims that intermediate modular levels of
representation are less accessible to central processes than the output
representation. Moreover, Fodor claims that this output of the
language input system is a 'shallow' output, i.e. linguistic or logical
form. Marslen-Wilson & Tyler argue that in a series of processes the
output of one process will automatically be overwritten by another,
without this giving any special status to the last representation other
than it being the last. And furthermore, this begs the question of
which level of representation is the output representation. Whether
the output of the language input system is a 'shallow output' needs to
be researched, and cannot simply be assumed.
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Marslen—Wilson & Tyler argue that, on their analysis of the
properties proposed by Fodor, the output of the class of mandatory,
fast processes does not distinguish modular from central processes, nor
linguistic from nonlinguistic processing. Marsien—Wilson & Tyler also
argue that the 'hidden agenda' of the modularity thesis is to equate
the constructs of linguistic theory with psychological processes of
language comprehension. This invites one to accept assumptions about
the language processor, rather than to question these assumptions.
In order to answer these criticisms put forward by Marslen—Wilson &
Tyler, it seems then that the onus falls on proponents of the
modularity thesis to show (among other things) that addressees compute
syntactic representations. Tanenhaus et al. (1985) discuss the
question of whether the hypothesis that listeners compute linguistic
representations can be preserved as a hypothesis with empirical
content. They point out that this hypothesis faces the problem that,
when processing utterances, one cannot identify a temporal stage at
which a mental representation of a complete sentence is a linguistic
representation.	 They suggest that one possibility, "maybe the only
viable one", is to adopt the modularity thesis. They take as a
working hypothesis that a (linguistic) logical form representation is
computed, as well as a 'constructed representation', a non—linguistic
conceptual level of representation. They present some experiments
based on work by ilankamer & Sag (1976), and Sag & Hankamer (1984).
Sag & Hankainer propose that there is a distinction between deep and
surface anaphors, which is due to the different anaphors finding their
referents at different levels of representation. Surface anaphors do
not allow for pragmatic control and find their referent in a preceding
logical form, whereas deep anaphors do allow pragmatic control and find
their referent in the addressee's discourse representation (in the
constructed representation). On this account VP—ellipsis is an
example of a surface anaphor, whereas definite pronouns are deep
anaphors, as in Sag & Hankamer's (1984) example:
1.12. (Hankamer fires a gun at stage right. A blood—curdling female
scream is heard.)
a. Sag: *1 wonder who was. (no pragmatic control, surface anaphor)
b. Sag: I wonder who she was? (pragmatic control possible,
deep anaphor).
Sag and Hankamer note that another difference between deep and
surface anaphors is that there can be a lot of intervening material
35
between a deep anaphor and its referent, but not between surface
anaphors and their referents, as in (1.13) and (1.14):
1.13. Someone has to paint the garage.
a. Let's take a vote and see who has to do it.
	 (deep anaphor)
b. Let's take a vote and see who. 	 (surface anaphor)
1.14. Someone has to paint the garage. The paint is peeling and
the wood is beginning to rot.
a. Let's take a vote and see who has to do it.
	 (deep anaphor)
b. ?? Let's take a vote and see who.
	 (surface anaphor)
Again, this difference can be explained if one proposes that surface
and deep anaphors get there referents from different representations.
Hankamer & Sag assume that memory for logical form decays quickly,
which can explain why the surface anaphor in (1.14) is awkward, while
the deep anaphor is fine.
Tanenhaus et al. (1985) tested whether deep and surface anaphors,
as in (1.13) and (1.14), are processed differently. They found that
in the condition without any intervening material (as in (1.13)),
surface anaphors were processed more quickly than deep anaphors.
However, in the condition with intervening material (as in (1.14)),
deep anaphors were processed more quickly than surface anaphors.
The question is whether findings from experiments like this constitute
evidence for different levels of representation. Although the
findings can be explained by proposing that the anaphors get their
referents from different levels of representation, this is not the only
explanation possible. Let us look again at the example in (1.12):
1.12. (Hankamer fires a gun at stage right. A blood-curdling female
scream is heard.)
a. Sag: *1 wonder who was (no pragmatic control, surface anaphor)
b. Sag: I wonder who she was? (pragmatic control possible,
deep ariaphor).
In the situation in (1.12), one can conclude, through observation and
inference, that there was someone present apart from Hankamer and Sag,
that that person was female, that she screamed, that therefore she
could have been in the firing line, and that she maybe was shot, or
that she was frightened by the shot. In order to interpret Sag's
utterance in (1.12a), one has to establish which of the properties,
sketched above, Sag is referring to, shot, frightened, screarairzg, or
even in the firing line, or present.	 Because Sag could in principle
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have intended to convey any of these, the addressee has nothing to go
on to decide for one particular interpretation. In contrast, the
interpretation of Sag's utterance in (1.12b) is constrained by his use
of the pronoun she, which directs the attention of the addressee to the
identity of the female person already present in the non—linguistic
context. The problem with (1.12a) then is that Sag does not constrain
his utterance enough to guide the addressee to the intended
interpretation, so that the utterance seems awkward. In other words,
the difference between (1.12a) and (1.12b) can be explained, not by
reference to different levels of representation, but rather by
proposing that both get their interpretation from the "constructed
representation".
When we look at example (1.14), we see that the situation is
reversed, with respect to the "deep" and "surface" anaphors:
1.14. Someone has to paint the garage.	 The paint is peeling and the
wood is beginning to rot.
a. Let's take a vote and see who has to do it. 	 (deep anaphor)
b. ?? Let's take a vote and see who. 	 (surface anaphor)
In order to interpret (!.14a) and (1.14b), the addressee has to
establish which predicate the communicator intended to convey. In the
preceding utterances three predicates are given, is beginning to rot,
is peeling, and has to paint the garage. The utterance in (1.14a)
guides the addressee to the right interpretation, because of the
repetition of has to. Moreover, if one accepts the proposal of
Tanenhaus et al. (1985) that it in do it refers to an activity, then
only the activity of painting the garage will yield an interpretation.
The utterance in (1.14b), on the other hand, is not constrained as to
which predicate the communicator intended to convey. This means that
the addressee will have to access and evaluate all three predicates,
and that by uttering (1.14b), the communicator encourages the addressee
to consider who is beginning to rot, and who is peeling, which makes
the utterance in (1.14b) awkward. In other words, the difference
between (1.14a) and (1.14b) can be explained, not by referring to
different levels of representation, but rather by the momentary
indeterminacy of the interpretation of (1.14b) as opposed to (1.14a).
Given that there are alternative explanations of why the different
anaphors are more or less difficult to interpret in different contexts,
experiments involving the distinction between surface and deep anaphors
cannot constitute evidence f or the claim that addressees compute
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logical form as well as conceptual representations. Furthermore, if
it is the case that the difference in ease of processing of the
different anaphors is not due to different levels of representation
being involved, but rather to the interaction of the anaphor used with
the context, then the distinction between deep and surface anaphors
becomes much less clear-cut than was sketched above.
As we saw above, adopting the modularity thesis was put forward by
Tanenhaus et al. (1985) as a way of preserving the hypothesis that
listeners compute linguistic representations as a hypothesis with
empirical content. However, the modularity thesis does not commit one
to the view that linguistic representations are computed. By allowing
weak interaction between the syntactic processor and central processes,
the modularity thesis can accommodate parallel weak interactive models
of language input processing, such as Altniann & Steedman's (1988)
proposal discussed above. But as we saw, this proposal entails that
although the processor makes use of rules of the grammar, it does not
compute linguistic representations.
Frazier (1987c) discusses a number of problems that she claims a
non-modular discourse driven model faces. One problem that is
specifically determined by the non-modularity of such a model, is
inspired by a further property Fodor proposes input systems to have.
This property is that input systems are associated with fixed neural
architecture.	 Fodor argues that we find neurological structure
associated with language and other input systems, but not with central
systems or processes.	 Frazier argues that the apparent fact that
humans are specialized for language may present a challenge for a non-
modular discourse oriented model of language processing. If there is
no clear cut off point between linguistic processes and pragmatic
processes, then it becomes quite unclear what it is that humans are
specialized for. Although the left, language dominant hemisphere
cannot be specialized for all aspects of language processing, a modular
approach suggests that what humans are specialized for is the
grammatical aspects of language processing. Frazier argues that on a
non-modular discourse driven approach it is quite unclear what else
there could be, apart from phonetic processing.
Whether this argument is valid depends entirely on what kind of
non-modular discourse oriented model is proposed. For example,
Marslen-Wilson & Tyler propose a processing model in which no
linguistic level is computed between lexical representations and a
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representation of the message that the communicator intends to convey.
Mars len-Wilson & Tyler assume that the rules of syntax describe the
process which takes one to a semantic interpretation; there is no
need to postulate that a syntactic representation is computed.
However, they propose that language processing makes use of "a stable
set of highly skilled, automatized processes that apply obligatorily to
their characteristic inputs." (op. cit., p. 58). These processes apply
bottom-up, at least as long as the input is unambiguous and complete.
In cases of ambiguity and incompleteness, contextual factors come into
play and may even guide the interpretation. On the assumptions that
there is a stable set of processes which apply obligatorily, it may
well be that these processes are "what humans are specialized for".
Moreover, if the process of mapping onto discourse representations is
as 'domain-specific' as any input system process proposed by the
modularity thesis, then this may also turn out to be a process that
humans are specialized for.
The remaining two properties that Fodor proposes as distinguishing
modular systems from non-modular systems are that input systems exhibit
characteristic and specific breakdown patterns, and that the ontogeny
of input systems exhibits a characteristic pace and sequencing.
However, Fodor concedes that these two properties do not necessarily
define modular systems, although they are compatible with there being
modular systems.
What we have seen then is that the properties that Fodor proposes
for distinguishing input systems from central systems do not in fact
distinguish purely linguistic processes from central processes involved
in language comprehension. Although Fodor says that informational
encapsulation is central to the modularity thesis, when we look at the
process of lexical decision it turns out that this is in fact
'informationally penetrated'. In the case of post-lexical input
processing, we saw that evidence that Fodor cites in support of purely
linguistic processing and the recovery of a purely linguistic
representation does not in fact constitute evidence for the claim that
linguistic form recovery is mandatory. The findings of Tyler & Warren
(1987), on the contrary, indicate that an overall linguistic
representation is not recovered. It seems then that rather than the
modularity thesis being an a priori limitation on the form a
psycholinguIstic model can take, it makes the wrong predictions
concerning how people actually process a linguistic input.
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1.3. Language processing and cognition.
Most objections that Marslen—Wilson & Tyler raise against the
modularity thesis are based on assumptions about the role that
pragmatic processes play in language comprehension. In order to
further evaluate their objections, we should have a closer look at
these processes. Unfortunately, pragmatic processes are the least
well understood processes within psycholinguistics, and there is, as
yet, little psycholinguistic theorisation of how an addressee computes
a full interpretation of the linguistic input. This has not stopped
psycholinguists from conducting experiments involving notions such as
'pragmatic (ini)plausibility' and 'pragmatic anomaly' (e.g. Holmes et
al., 1989; Rayner et al., 1983; Tanenhaus et al., 1985, 1989).
However, these notions have no theoretical content, and are used only
intuitively, so that we should be cautious about interpreting the
findings.
Until recently there was only one serious theory of pragmatics,
that developed by Grice (1975). He proposes that conversation is
governed by the Co—operative Principle, which he formulates as:
"Make your conversational contribution such as is required,
at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged."
(Grice, 1975, p.45).
Grice proposes a number of conversational maxims which spell out in
more detail what is meant by the Co—operative Principle. Furthermore,
Grice introduces a distinction between 'what is said' by an utterance,
and 'what is implicated'. Working out 'what is said' involves
recovering the linguistic meaning of words, disambiguation and
reference assignment. 	 Implicatures on the other hand have to be
calculated.	 Work in Gricean pragmatics has been largely concerned
with how implicatures are recovered, while little has been said about
how reference assignment and disambiguation take place. However,
reference assignment and disambiguation, as well as such processes as
restoring elliptical material, are part of computing the full
interpretation of an utterance, so that a theory of language
comprehension should account for these processes.	 Because of its
preoccupation with implicatures, the Gricean approach to pragmatics is
not explicit enough to provide a basis for such an account. 	 More
promising are the pragmatic principles proposed by Altmann & Steedman
(1988).	 However, as we saw above, these principles face a number of
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problems, such as that they do not follow from any general theory of
pragmatics.
Because processes such as reference assignment and disambiguation
involve context and background knowledge, they cannot be explained as
part of linguistic processing, but are situated within the domain of
the central cognitive systems. This has as a consequence that the
linguistic input has to be represented in a format that is usable by
the central systems. This means that in order to get more insight in
how an addressee achieves a full interpretation of an input, two
questions need to be addressed, the question of what kind of
representations are used by the central systems, and the question of
how the central systems involved in language comprehension operate.
In the literature the outcome of the interpretation process is
referred to by many different names, such as the 'discourse
representation', and the 'constructed representation'.
	 The question
is what these representations consist of. One proposal (see, for
instance, Chomsky (1986)), is that the language faculty is used in both
speaking and thought, i.e. that the representations used in thinking
are linguistic representations. 	 Fodor (1975) argues against this
view, and instead proposes that there is a separate 'language of
thought'. The language of thought is language—like, in that thoughts
are like sentences, they consist of strings of structured symbols. It
is in virtue of their being structured that inferences can be drawn
over these strings. However, thoughts are conceptual representations,
rather than linguistic representations.
Fodor advances a number of arguments for the view that thoughts are
like sentences.	 Amongst other things, he argues that thinking, like
language, is productive and systematic. We can, in principle, utter
an indefinite number of different sentences, and similarly, we can, in
principle, think an indefinite number of different thoughts.
Moreover, if we can utter a sentence like John saw Mary, then we can
utter a sentence like Mary saw John; likewise if we can think John saw
Mary, then we can think Mary saw John. That we can utter sentences
like the above is due to our having a finite lexicon and rules as to
how lexical items can be combined to form sentences.	 Because we can
think thoughts such as the above, we must have rules for combining
concepts to form these thoughts. Although language and thoughts are
alike in these respects, Fodor argues against the view that the public
language is used in thought on two grounds. He argues that there are
nonverbal organisms that think.
	 Prelinguistic children and (some)
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animals show evidence of such actions as problem solving and
remembering, which involve computation. Since computation needs a
medium to operate in, they must have a non-linguistic system of
representation.	 Fodor also argues that learning one's first language
involves hypothesis formation and confirmation. It follows from this
that we need to have a representational system which is at least as
expressively powerful as the system that is being learnt, because
otherwise we would not be able to formulate these hypotheses.
An alternative account of the language of thought hypothesis is
proposed by, for example, Smith (1982), and Devitt & Sterelny (1987).
They propose that one may start with a non-linguistic system of
representations, which serve as the basis for language acquisition.
As the natural language is learned, it is incorporated into the non-
linguistic system and ultimately becomes the system of mental
representations as well as the system of communication.
Sperber & Wilson (1986) argue against the view that the language of
thought is natural language, on the grounds that the semantics of
natural languages may be too weak to encode all humanly thinkable
thoughts. In discussing Katz's 'principle of effability', which says
that: "Each proposition (thought) is expressible by some sentence in
every natural language." (Katz, 1981, p. 226), they argue that the way
in which we represent things, need not be in terms of any external-
language definite description. They say that:
"It seems plausible that in our internal language we often
fix time and space references not in terms of universal co-
ordinates, but in terms of a private logbook and an ego-
centred map; furthermore, most kinds of reference - to
people or events for instance - can be fixed in terms of
these private time and space co-ordinates. Thoughts which
contain such private references could not be encoded in
natural languages, but could only be incompletely
represented." (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 192).
However, it does not necessarily follow from the 'private' nature of
these references that they cannot be encoded in natural languages. It
may simply be the case that, if we wanted to communicate these private
references, we would have to spell out too many other thoughts
concerning our life histories, which would be a practical obstacle
rather than a theoretical impossibility. It seems then that further
research is needed to establish the exact nature of the representations
in the 'language of thought'.
The different proposals described above have in common that they
all rest on the assumption that the output of the interpretation
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process is some sort of representation. Recently this representational
view of the mind has been challenged by the emergence of connectionist
approaches to cognition (e.g. Rumeihart & McClelland, 1986; Smolensky,
1988).	 On the connectionist view, the mind consists of networks of
interconnected processing units, nodes.	 Each node is connected to
many other nodes, and the connections between nodes can either be
excitatory or inhibitory. 	 Input nodes get activated by different
stimuli, other nodes get activated by their neighbours. 	 Nodes send
activation to their neighbours depending on their own level of
activation.	 This means that there is no overall processor 'in
charge', activation spreads automatically through the network.
One of the reasons that connectionist approaches have received a
lot of attention is that it is claimed that they are biologically more
plausible than representational approaches, because networks of nodes
can be compared to clusters of neurons in the brain. However, as
Sterelny (1990) points out, concerning the language of thought
hypothesis:
"... it doesn't require that opening someone's head would
reveal a tiny white—board with sentences written
recognizably on it. 	 Patterns of neural activity could
well be sentential representations."	 (Sterelny, 1990,
p.24).
It may be the case that connectionist approaches give a better
account of some processes than representational approaches. For
exaniple, connectionist approaches have been successful in modelling
pattern recognition (e.g. Churchiand, 1988). However, the question
remains whether connectionism can account for all cognitive processes,
and should replace the representationalist view of the mind.
Tanenhaus et al. (1987) argue for a connectionist approach to
language input processing, such as the model developed by Cotrell
(1985). This model proposes that during processing of a sentence like
Bob saw the cat, the nodes for the concepts BOB!, SEE and CAT! are
activated (by, e.g. letter and feature nodes in the network). Of
course, there cannot be nodes for comçkte sentences, because that would
have as a consequence that there would be individual nodes for all
possible sentences.	 Nor do the concept nodes together constitute a
complete representation. Special binding nodes relate the concept
nodes to thematic role nodes, to give a semantic representation of the
sentence. Binding nodes also relate the concept nodes to nodes for
syntactic constituents, to give a syntactic representation of the
sentence.	 However, there are a number of problems with this sort of
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approach. The most important one is the question of what is meant by
a connectionist representation. As Sterelny (1990) points out:
"Given that the influence of node on node is local, given
that there is no processor that looks at groups of nodes as
a whole, it seems that seeing a distributed representation
in a network is just an outsider's perspective on the
system."	 (Sterelny, 1990, p.188).
In other words, either collections of activated nodes can be combined
into representations, in which case the connectionist approach to post-
lexical processing is just an alternative implementation of the mental
representation view, or they cannot be combined, in which case it has
to be explained how the connections between concept nodes and binding
nodes give us an interpretation of Bob saw the cat as Bob saw the cat,
rather than the cat saw Bob.
The language of thought hypothesis at least gives us an explanation
of structure-dependent processes, because it proposes structured
representations. This does not mean that adopting the language of
thought hypothesis rules out any connectionist explanations: it may
well be that some of our cognitive processes are connectionist (for
example,	 phonological	 form recognition),	 but	 that	 certain
configurations of activated nodes map onto mental representations.
In order to get more insight in how an addressee achieves a full
interpretation of a linguistic input, we need not only look at what
kinds of representations are involved, but also at how the central
systems involved in language comprehension operate.
One of the reasons why Fodor (1983, 1987,1990) advocates the
modularity thesis, is his belief that central, non-modular systems are
not amenable to study. Fodor (1983) says that:
"... though the putatively nonrmodular processes include
some of the ones that we would most like to know alx,ut
(thought, for example, and the fixation of belief), our
cognitive science has in fact made approximately no
progress in studying these processes, arid this may well be
because of their nonwodulari ty." (Fodor, 1983, p.38).
Fodor (1987) reinforces this point, in discussing the frame problem in
artificial-intelligence. He argues that the frame problem and the
problem of constructing a theory of nondemonstrative inference are
essentially the same thing, and since he believes that such a theory is
not in sight, he proposes that A.I. restrict itself to modelling
encapsulated, i.e. modular processes. The problem with unencapsulated
processes, Fodor argues, is the following:
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"Suppose that, in pursuit of rational belief fixation, you
undertake to subject whichever hypothesis might reasonably
be true to scrutiny in light of whatever evidence might
reasonably be relevant. You then have the problem of how
to determine when demands of reason have been satisfied.
You have, that is to say, Hamlet's problem: How to tell
when to stop thinking." (Fodor, 1987, p.26).
However, Sperber & Wilson (1986) point out that Fodor's pessimism
concerning the feasibility of a theory of central processes stems from
his taking scientific theorising as a typical example of a central
thought process. They argue that the explicit standards of
confirmation that a scientist applies to each piece of evidence in
scientific theorising, may well be quite different from the way in
which we make spontaneous, instantaneous and unconscious inferences in
our every-day life. Sperber & Wilson propose that inferential
comprehension may be a more typical example of a central process, and
more amenable to study, because it differs from scientific theorising
in a number of important respects. While scientific theorising is
unconstrained as to how much time is spent, and how many hypotheses can
be taken into consideration, this is not the case for utterance
interpretation:
"... ordinary utterance comprehension is almost
instantaneous, and however much evidence might have been
taken into account, however many hypotheses mi ght have been
considered, in practice the only evidence and hypotheses
considered are those that are immediately accessible."
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p.66).
Inferential comprehension also differs from scientific theorising in
that communicators want their addressees to recognize their
communicative intentions, which means that they construct their
stimulus in a way that helps addressees to do this. The data for
scientific theorising, on the other hand, do not come from a helpful
source but have to be identified by the scientist. Sperber & Wilson
argue that, because of these two facts, the study of inferential
comprehension is more likely to give us an insight into central
cognitive processing. They go on to present an approach to cognition
and communication which is based on the considerations that
comprehension is almost instantaneous, and that it is achieved with the
active help of the communicator, Relevance theory.
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1.4. Relevance theory.
Sperber & Wilson (1986) follow Fodor (1983) in viewing the output
of the input systems as logical forms. However, within the framework
of Relevance theory, logical forms are well—formed formulae in the
language of thought, rather than linguistic representations. 	 These
logical forms can contain concepts and logical variables. When a
logical form is semantically complete (i.e. when it contains only
concepts, and therefore is capable of being true or false), it is
called a propositional form.
Sperber & Wilson see concepts as psychological objects, considered
at a fairly abstract level. Concepts consist of conceptual addresses,
which give access to different types of information, logical,
encyclopaedic and lexical.	 These different types of information may
all play a role in the processing of logical forms. 	 Concepts then
have different entries for the different types of information:
"The logical entry for a concept consists of a set of
deductive rules which apply to logical forms of which tha t
concept is a constituent. The encyclopaedic entry
contains information about the extension and/or denotation
of the concept ... The lexical en try contains information
about the natural language counterpart of the concept: the
word or phrase of natural language which expresses it.
.information about its syntactic category membership and
co—occurrence possibilities, phonological structure and so
on."	 (op. cit., pp.86, 90).
Sperber & Wilson argue that incomplete logical forms play an
important role in cognition. They can be stored in memory as
assumption schemas, which can be completed into propositional forms
expressing factual assumptions, on the basis of contextual information.
Also, the output of the language input system is often an incomplete
logical form (see below), which the addressee has to complete into the
fully propositional form the communicator intended to convey.
Propositional forms, on the other hand, represent definite states of
affairs. They constitute one's encyclopaedic knowledge, one's overall
representation of the world.
Sperber & Wilson propose that one of our central systems is a
deductive device, which differs from other central systems in the type
of computation it performs. This deductive device is used in
spontaneous inference and normal utterance comprehension, and makes use
of elimination rules but not of introduction rules.	 These rules are
stored in the logical entries of concepts and become available when
their conceptual address is processed. 	 Sperber & Wilson justify the
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claim that only elimination rules are used by pointing out that only
elimination rules are genuinely interpretive. The output assumptions
of a deductive process involving only elimination rules explicate or
analyze the content of the input assumptions, whereas the use of
introduction rules leaves the content of the input assumptions
unchanged, while adding arbitrary information. Sperber & Wilson see
the formation of assumptions by deduction as the key process in non-
demonstrative inference.
Postulating this deductive device goes some way towards explaining
how spontaneous inference is constrained. However, it does not
account for Fodor's claim that any piece of evidence may be taken into
account. This brings us to the central claim of Relevance theory:
Sperber & Wilson propose that in processing information, people try to
achieve the greatest possible cognitive effect for the smallest
possible amount of processing cost, i.e. that human cognition and
communication is driven by relevance and the maximisation of relevance.
In their theory, information is relevant to an individual if it yields
contextual effects, i.e. if it interacts in a certain way with the
individuals's existing assumptions about the world.
	 Sperber & Wilson
distinguish	 three	 different	 types	 of	 contextual	 effect:
strengthenings, contradictions and contextual implications.
Assumptions can be held with different degrees of strength. A
'strengthening' of an assumption takes place if new information causes
a person to have more confidence in an assumption already (weakly)
held.	 New information may also contradict an existing assumption,
in which case the weaker of the two assumptions is eliminated.
A contextual implication is defined as
"A set of assumptions (F) contextually implies an
assumption Q in the context (C) if and only if
(1) the union of (F) and (C) non-trivially implies Q,
(ii) (F) does not non-trivially imply Q, and
(iii) (C) does not non-trivially imply Q."	 (op. cit., pp.
107-108).
While non-trivial implication is defined as
"A set of assumptions (F) logically and non-trivially
implies an assumption Q if and only if, when (F) is the set
of initial theses in a derivation involving only
elimination rules, Q belongs to the set of final theses."
(op. cit., p. 97).
Relevance cannot be established purely in terms of contextual effects.
Computing contextual effects involves processing effort, and since we
do not have infinite processing resources, this means that the more
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effort is required to work out the contextual effects of some
phenomenon, the less relevant it is. Because of this, Sperber &
Wilson define relevance as follows:
a. The greater the contextual effects, the greater the
relevance.
b. The smaller the processing effort, the greater the
relevance.
How does this notion of relevance help explain how language is
interpreted? According to Sperber & Wilson people will only pay
attention to information they think is relevant, or more relevant than
any other information they could be attending to at that moment. For
a communicator this means that her/his information should be relevant
to the addressee.	 Because a communicator asks for the attention of
the addressee, the addressee is entitled to assume that the
communicator is trying to be relevant.
	 Sperber & Wilson capture this
in the principle of relevance, which says that:
"Every act of ostensive communication communicates the
presumption of its own optimal relevance."
	 (op. cit, p.
158).
where the presumption of optimal relevance is defined as:
"a. The set of assumptions (I) which the communicator
intends to make manifest to the addressee is relevant
enough to make i t worth the addressee 's while to process
the ostensive stimulus.
b. The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one the
communicator could have used to communicate (I)."
	 (op.
cit., p. 158).
Sperber & Wilson argue that the linguistic content of an utterance
underdetermines its propositional content, i.e. a semantically complete
logical form. They say that linguistic coding and decoding is
involved in communication, bit that the linguistic meaning of an
utterance falls short of encoding what the speaker wants to
communicate: the addressee can only take the output of the linguistic
decoding process as a piece of evidence about the communicator's
intentions. The output of the linguistic decoding process is taken to
be an incomplete logical form, which the addressee then has to complete
into the fully propositional form, which the communicator intended to
convey. This process of enriching the incomplete logical form is a
pragmatic process; points at which the logical form is incomplete have
to be assigned values from the context, and this assignment is done in
accordance with the principle of relevance.
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This principle of relevance differs from Grice's (1975) Cooperative
Principle and maxims in that:
"Grice 's principle and maxims are norms which communicators
and audience must know in order to communicate adequately.
Communicators generally keep to the norms, but may also
violate them to achieve particular effects; and the
audience uses i ts knowledge of the norms in interpreting
communicative behavior. 	 The principle of relevance, by
contrast, is a generalization about ostensive—inferential
cominuni cation. Communicators and audience need no more
know the principle of relevance to communicate than they
need to know the principles of genetics to reproduce.
Communicators do not 'follow' the principle of relevance;
and they could not violate it even if they wanted to. The
principle of relevance applies wi thout exception." 	 (op.
cit., p. 162).
In order to derive contextual effects, a context has to be found
against which the information is to be processed. It has often been
assumed that the context of an utterance is uniquely determined and
that the relevance of the utterance is assessed against this context.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the context is determined before the
utterance is interpreted (e.g. Brown and Yule, 1983; Levinson, 1983).
However, relevance theory proposes that an utterance communicates the
presumption of optimal relevance. Because of this, the addressee can
assume that the relevance of the utterance is given, and therefore need
not be assessed. The task of the addressee is rather to select a
context which bears out this guarantee of the relevance of the
utterance.
How is this context selected ? Sperber & Wilson propose that at
the start of processing some new item of information there is an
initial context consisting of the assumptions left over in the memory
of the deductive device from the immediately preceding deductive
process. This initial context can be extended in different directions
during the interpretation process. One way of extending the context
is to add assumptions used or derived in previous deductive processes.
A second way is to add assumptions stored under the encyclopaedic
entries of concepts already present in the context or in the assumption
being processed. A third way of extending the context is to add to it
information about the immediately observable environment. However,
extending the context involves processing cost, which means that an
addressee cannot freely access all kinds of different extensions,
because this would diminish the overall relevance of the assumption
being processed.
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Sperber & Wilson assume that there is a finite set of contexts,
and that they are ordered in ternis of accessibility. 	 The initial
context is immediately given. 	 Extensions which only have the initial
context as a sub-part can be accessed in one step, and are therefore
the most accessible contexts; extensions which have the initial
context and the one-step extension as sub-parts can be accessed in two
steps and are therefore the next most accessible contexts, and so on.
The following picture of language comprehension then arises. 	 The
linguistic input maps onto an (incomplete) logical form. At points
where the logical form is incomplete (e.g., where reference has to be
assigned or in cases of ambiguity), this logical form has to be
enriched into a fully propositional form. This process of enrichment
is guided by the principle of relevance.	 Let us look at what this
means in the case of lexical ambiguity, as in (1.15):
1.15. Susan went to the bank.
On hearing the ambiguous word bank all interpretations become
available, e.g. (1.15a) and (1.15b):
1.lSa. Susan went to the financial institution.
b. Susan went to the side of the river.
If speaker and hearer are discussing whether they have enough money
available to pay the rent, then a context in which (1.15a) yields
contextual effects is easily accessible, while a context in which
(1.lSb) yields contextual effects is less or not accessible. The
hearer is then justified in going for the interpretation in (1.15a) as
being the interpretation that the speaker intended, because it is
consistent with the principle of relevance. Moreover, it follows from
this that the first interpretation tested	 found consistent with the
principle of Relevance, is the only interpretation consistent with the
principle of relevance: any further interpretation which yields
contextual effects will automatically falsify the second part of the
definition of relevance, because it will involve more processing cost,
so that it is not optimally relevant.
In the case of structural ambiguity, Sperber & Wilson assume that
the linguistic input is mapped onto a logical form up to the point of
ambiguity. At that point the different possibilities are computed and
a choice is made between them, again in accordance with the principle
of relevance. Sperber & Wilson point out that processes such as
reference assignment and disambiguation are not the only processes
involved in computing a fully propositional form.
	 Quite often, they
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argue, semantic representations must be enriched, where this cannot be
accounted for by the processes mentioned above. 6 As an example of
this they compare (1.16) and (1.17):
1.16. I have had breakfast.
1.17. I have been to Tibet. 	 (op. cit., p.189).
All that the linguistic input gives you is that the speaker has had
breakfast (1.16), or has been to Tibet (1.17), at some time point
within a period of time before the time of utterance. However,
Sperber & Wilson argue that:
"In real life, a hearer would be expected to make some more
or less specific assumption about how long that period was.
In this, he is guided by the fact that a presumption of
relevance has been communicated. In the case of [1. 16],
for example, t would normally go wi thout saying that the
speaker had had breakfast at some point in her life. If
she intends her utterance to be manifestly relevant, she
must intend to make manifest that she has had breakfast
recently enough for it to be worth remarking on: for
example, recently enough not to be in immediate need of
food. In the case of [1.17], by contrast, the mere fact
that the speaker had visited Tibet at some point in her
life could well be relevant enough, and in the absence of
more specific information this is the interpretation that
would be consistent with the principle of relevance."
(op. cit., pp.189-190).
A consequence of Relevance theory is that there is no need to
propose any specific principles to account for reference assignment and
disainbiguation, such as the principles proposed by Altmann & Steedman
(1988).	 In the case of reference assignment, the following picture
arises. An utterance containing a referential expression,
analytically implies that the entity the expression refers to exists.
Recovering this implication may be enough to yield adequate contextual
effects.	 If this is not the case, then the addressee accesses the
immediate context for a possible referent such that the resulting
propositional form is consistent with the principle of relevance. 	 If
no such referent is found then the context is extended and the process
is repeated.	 If no referent is found at all, then communication
fails.	 This may cause the addressee to ask something like What/who
are you talking about?
In cases of ambiguity, the addressee again goes for the
interpretation that is consistent with the principle of relevance, as
illustrated above. Sperber & Wilson argue that one of the few cases
in which ambiguity is consciously perceived during the comprehension
process, is the situation in which two different interpretations of an
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utterance seem to come to mind simultaneously, and are both consistent
with the principle of relevance. In cases like this, again
communication will fail. In general, Relevance theory proposes that:
"At every stage in disambiguation, reference assignment and
enrichment, the hearer should choose the solution involving
the least effort, and should abandon this solution only if
it fails to yield an interpretation consistent with the
principle of relevance." (op. cit., p.185).
1.5. Relevance theory and on—line comprehension.
With Relevance theory, we have a theory of pragmatics which not
only accounts for how iniplicatures are worked out but also accounts for
how the propositional content of the utterance is recovered. Sperber
& Wilson give an account of how central systems involved in language
comprehension operate, and of what kind of representations are used by
these central systems. They propose that what a hearer recovers from
the linguistic input is an incomplete logical form, which has to be
enriched in various ways, until it yields a complete propositional
form. However, they do not claim that this logical form has to be
recovered completely, before any enrichments can take place.
Processes such as reference assignment and recovery of elliptical
material occur on—line. In the case of structural ambiguity, Sperber
& Wilson propose that different possibilities are computed and chosen
between, again on—line, in accordance with the principle of relevance.
These proposals are motivated by the assumption that the sooner
operations such as disainbiguat ion and reference assignment are
achieved, the less processing effort will be required:
"If processing costs were no object, the hearer could
explore	 all	 possible	 parsings,	 disambiguations,
illocutionary	 forces,	 reference	 assignments	 and
enrichments. (...) This method of processing would
guarantee that no conceivable interpretation would be
overlooked, no possible context unexplored, and no possible
contextual effect left underived.	 Clearly, however, it
would also involve a lot of fruitless processing." 	 (op.
cit., p.204).
In order to save a hearer from going through a lot of "fruitless
processing", Sperber & Wilson propose that a speaker aiming at optimal
relevance should phrase her utterance in such a way as to facilitate
early, and correct, disambiguation. This raises the question of how a
speaker can anticipate the way in which a hearer is going to interpret
an utterance. Sperber & Wilson propose that the hearer makes
anticipatory hypotheses about the overall logical structure of the
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utterance, in a principled way, and that s/he resolves potential
ambiguities and axnbivalences on the basis of these hypotheses 7 . By
virtue of being a hearer as well as a speaker, the speaker can
anticipate what hypotheses the hearer is going to make, and structure
his/her utterance accordingly.
These proposals delimit the type of on—line comprehension model
that is compatible with Relevance theory, and in particular rule out a
serial autonomous model, such as the 'garden—path' model, discussed in
section 1.1. The 'garden—path' model claims that the parser computes
a single syntactic analysis of the linguistic input, purely on the
basis of parsing principles; the context in which the input is
processed cannot influence the initial analysis assigned by the parser.
Since Relevance theory claims that context plays an essential role in
disambiguation and other operations, this means that the two proposals
make quite different predictions concerning the nature of on—line
interpretation. Proponents of the 'garden—path' model claim that much
experimental evidence supports their view of input processing, while no
psycholinguistic experiments have been conducted which explicitly test
the claims made by Relevance theory. This means that in order to
assess whether the proposals made by Relevance theory concerning the
interpretation process can be upheld in view of the experimental
evidence, we have to address the question whether the claims of the
'garden—path' model are really borne out by this experimental evidence.
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Chapter 2: The 'Garden—path' model.'
One view of the parser is that it computes an analysis on purely
structural grounds, and that even in the case of syntactic ambiguity
only one analysis is made, guided by structural criteria. (Frazier,
1978, 1987a, 198Th, 1987c; Frazier & Fodor, 1978; Frazier & Rayner,
1982; Rayner, Carison & Frazier, 1983; Ferreira & Clifton, 1986).
Frazier (1978) proposes that the parser is guided by the principle of
Minimal Attachment, which says that one does not postulate any
(potentially) unnecessary nodes. 	 This principle predicts that in the
case of (2.1) the VP is analyzed as (2.la) rather than (2.lb):
2.1. John hit the man with the stick.
(2.la)	 VP	 (2.lb)	 VP
"N	 A
V NP PP	 V	 NP
NP	 PP
A second criterion, proposed by Kimball (1973) as 'right
association', by Ford et al. (1982) as 'final arguments', and by
Frazier (1978, 1987a) as 'late closure', says that "if grammatically
permissible, new nodes are attached into the clause or phrase currently
being processed (i.e. the phrase or clause postulated most recently)."
(Frazier, 1987a, p.562). This principle predicts that sentence (2.2)
is analyzed as (2.2a), rather than (2.2b):
2.2. Joyce said Tom left yesterday.
a. Joice said (Tom left yesterday).
b. Joyce said (Tom left) yesterday.
These two principles have been incorporated in the 'garden—path'
model of input processing. This model postulates that the parser
computes syntactic representations using the rules of the grammar but
governed by the principles of Minimal Attachment and Late Closure.
Frazier (1987a) says about these principles:
"let me emphasize that the Minimal Attachment and Late
Closure strategies are not arbi trary, e.g., one can
understand why different individuals should each adopt
these particular strategies and not, say, their inverses.
Both Minimal Attachment and Late Closure may be viewed as
the result of adopting the first analysis available to the
processor. (...) Assuming the need to structure material
quickly is related to restrictions on human immediate
memory capacity, we might expect all humans to adopt the
first available constituent structure analysis. If so, we
expect the Minimal Attachment and Late Closure strategies
to be universal."	 (op. cit., p.564-565).
54
However, as we saw in chapter 1, the model makes different predictions
depending on what kind of phrase structure rules the parser uses, i.e.
'simple' phrase structure rules, or richer phrase structure rules such
as proposed in X'-theory.
The experimental findings that have been presented in support of
the 'garden-path' model either concern the principle of Minimal
Attachment, or the principle of Late Closure. I will therefore
evaluate the experimental evidence for the two principles separately.
2.1. Minimal Attachment
Minimal Attachment has been used as an explanation for the 'garden-
path' effect, observed in sentences like:
2.3. The horse raced past the barn fell.
Here Minimal Attachment causes 'the horse raced past the barn' to be
taken as a main clause, rather than a complex NP.
Rayner et al. (1983) report two experiments conducted to examine
whether there are effects of semantic and pragmatic information on the
syntactic analysis of ambiguous sentences. Rayner et al. assume that
ambiguous sentences will be analyzed according to Minimal Attachment,
so that they do not expect any semantic or pragmatic effect. In the
first experiment, subjects read sentences like the following, while
their eye movements were recorded:
2.4a. The florist sent the flowers was pleased.
b. The performer sent the flowers was pleased.
c. The performer who was sent the flowers was pleased.
d. The performer sent the flowers and was very pleased with herself.
The assumption behind these sentences is that florists are expected to
send flowers rather than receive them, whereas it is more plausible
that performers receive flowers rather than send them. Rayner et al.
say that:
"If the language processor initially adopts the
pragmatically most plausible analysis of a string, then
readers should be garden-pa thed in the implausible
sentences [2.4a] and [2.14], but not in the plausible
sentences [2.4b] and [2.4c]. By contrast, if the
processor initially follows its structural preference for
assigning the minimal necessary syntactic structure to a
string (...) wi thou t regard for the relative pragmatic
plausibility of this analysis, then readers should be
garden-pathed in sentences [2.4a] and [2.4b], but not in
[2.4c] or [2.14]."
	
(Rayner et al., 1983, p.361).
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Rayner et al. found that plausibility did not affect the syntactic
analysis of the different sentences. Readers were garden-pathed both
in implausible sentences like (2.4a) and plausible sentences like
(2.4b), but not in active implausible sentences like (2.4d). These
results are taken to indicate that only a single syntactic analysis of
a sentence is initially computed (if all syntactic analyses of a
sentence were initially computed, readers would not have been garden-
pathed), and that this analysis is not guided by pragmatic constraints.
These conclusions, however, are not as inevitable as it may at
first appear. The term 'pragmatic plausibility' is not defined. For
instance, we are just told that the reduced relative reading of a
sentence like (2.4b) involves the most plausible assignment of thematic
relations on pragmatic grounds. 	 Consider, however, the following
sentence:
2.5. The performer sent flowers to her director to thank him for his
patience with her.
It is hard to see what is pragmatically implausible about the action
expressed in this sentence.
Bever (1970) found that the garden-path effect in (2.6a)
disappeared, when 'the authors' was replaced by an NP which could not
be interpreted as an agent, as in (2.6b):
2.6a. The authors read in the garden stank.
2.6b. The articles read in the garden stank.
It seems that the implausibility of inanimate objects being involved in
an act of reading is of a different nature than the implausibility of
performers sending rather than receiving flowers: no plausible
continuation of (2.6b) can be found, unless one really stretches one's
imagination (e.g., in a fantasy or s.f. story). 2
 However, the finding
that the garden-path effect disappears in these sentences suggests that
processing these sentences is sensitive to semantic information,
because if it were not, we would expect that subjects would be garden-
pathed even in sentences like (2.6b).
Although Rayner et al. set out to test whether pragmatic
information has an effect on syntactic analysis, they do not take into
account that the use of restrictive relative clauses is governed by
pragmatic considerations. The function of restrictive relative
clauses is to narrow down or restrict the meaning of a noun (cf. for
example, Leech & Svartvik, 1975).
	 Restrictive relative clauses can
therefore help an addressee identify the referent(s) of an NP.
	 For
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example, sentence (2.4b) could help an addressee identify a particular
performer in a situation\context where there are several performers,
one of whom has been sent flowers.	 However, in the experiment
subjects read sentences in isolation. When the subjects encounter the
first NP (e.g. the performer) they can establish from the definite
article that the sentence involves a particular performer, but they
won't be able to identify which performer is meant.
	 Nor can they
expect that more information will help them identify the performer,
since there is no context for the sentence. In fact, in order to
accommodate the restrictive relative clause in the interpretation of
the sentence, the reader has to make the extra assumptions that there
is a group of performers, and that one of them received flowers, which
means an increase in processing load. Because of this, the main
clause reading of a sentence like (2.4b) is actually pragmatically the
most plausible in view of the extra amount of processing that
postulating a restrictive relative clause involves. 3 Rayner et al.'s
findings therefore do not in fact constitute any evidence for the
Minimal Attachment strategy.
Cram & Steedman (1985) note in respect to restrictive relatives
that:
"The use of a referential definite like 'the horse which
was raced past the barn' presupposes (among other things):
1) that a set of individuals identified by the head nominal
(in this case a set of horses) is already represented in
the hearer's model; 2) that it is already given or
implicit that the relative clause applies to some
individual in that set;
	
3) that the whole expression
identifies a single individual.	 (...) indefinites like 'a
horse which was raced past the barn' need presuppose none
of these things. One can use the latter phrase if no
particular set of horses has been mentioned, whether or not
the question of racing has been raised, and of course there
is no implication that there is only one individual who
fits the description."	 (Cram & Steedman, 1985, pp.335-
336).
Cram & Steedman report on an experiment they conducted to
determine what kind of semantic and pragmatic information is called on
by the parser. In this experiment they used test sentences like the
following:
2.7a. The teachers taught by the Berlitz method passed the test.
b. The children taught by the Berlitz method passed the test.
c. Teachers taught by the Berlitz method passed the test.
d. Children taught by the Berlitz method passed the test.
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They found that the (b) and (d) sentences were judged grammatical
significantly more often than the (a) and (c) sentences. This result
is similar to the findings of Bever (1970) (see above). 4 Moreover,
Cram & Steedman found that the indefinite sentences (c) and (d) were
judged grammatical significantly more often than the definites (a) and
(b). These results together with Bever's (1970) results argue against
Minimal Attachment, because structurally there is nothing to
distinguish (2.6a) and (2.6b), and the sentences in (2.7) from one
another.
Cram & Steedman also report on an experiment they conducted to
determine the effect of context on parsing structurally ambiguous
sentences. Minimal pairs of contexts were constructed to induce
either relative or complement readings of locally ambiguous sentences.
They used materials like the following:
2.8a. Complement-inducing context
A psychologist was counselling a married couple. One of the
pair was fighting with him, but the other one was nice to him.
b. Relative-inducing context
A psychologist was counselling two married couples. One of the
couples was fighting with him, but the other was nice to him.
c. Complement target sentence
The psychologist told the wife that he was having trouble with
her husband.
d. Relative target sentence
The psychologist told the wife that he was having trouble with to
leave her husband.
Cram & Steedman found that the subjects were garden-pathed about
equally often in both contexts when the completing phrase was
inconsistent with the context, but that garden-path effects largely
disappear when the completing phrase j consistent with the context.
They concluded that:
"The experiments presented here suggest that there may be
no intrinsically garden-pa thing structures whatever, but
rather that, for any given sentence, there are certain
contexts (including the null context) which induce garden
paths and others that do not. We have also argued that
such evaluations can be made well before the sentences are
complete. The fact that the contextual cues seem to be
used during the first pass through a sentence, often before
the last words have been encountered at all, is important.
(...) i t (...) appears to be incompatible wi th non-
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interactive processing of syntax, even in a "modified"
version limiting interaction to the level of major phrases,
at least on the reasonable assumption that the
corresponding representationally autonomous units provide
the input to semantic interpretation, for such models do
not explain how the effects could be found before the
constituent is complete."
	 (Op.cit., pp.345-346).
Ferreira & Clifton (1986) point out that Cram & Steednian's
experiments did not use an on-line measure of sentence processing.
They say that because of this it cannot be determined whether the
disappearance of the 'garden path' effect is caused by initial (or
early) use of semantic information and the context, which argues
against the minimal attachment strategy. It could be due to later
use of semantic information and the context, which does not rule out an
initial minimal attachment analysis. They conducted three experiments
to find out whether semantic content or pragmatic context can direct
the initial syntactic analysis assigned to sentences. In the first
experiment eye movements were recorded to assess the on-line operation
of the parser when it has available thematic information that biases
the interpretation of a syntactic string.
	 Materials like the
following were presented in isolation:
2.9a. The defendant! examined! by the lawyer! turned out! to be
unreliable.	 (animate, reduced).
b. The evidence! examined! by the lawyer/ turned out! to be
unreliable.	 (inanimate, reduced).
c. The defendant! that was! examined! by the lawyer! turned out! to
be unreliable.	 (animate, unreduced).
d. The evidence! that was! examined! by the lawyer! turned out! to
be unreliable.	 (inanimate, unreduced).
The slashes give the relevant phrases of the sentences: c-2 (c for
critical), c-i, c (= by the lawyer), c+!, and c+2.
Ferreira & Clifton found that the reduced relative sentences gave
rise to increased reading times in the disambiguating by phrase region,
which reflects that subjects were garden-pathed. They found that this
was the case not only for the reduced relatives which have an animate
subject, but also for the reduced relatives with an inanimate subject.
Because the inanimacy of the subject NP should block the Minimal
Attachment analysis if it were taken into consideration, Ferreira &
Clifton conclude that subjects did not use semantic information to
guide the syntactic analysis.
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However, when we look at the Mean First Pass reading times (see
below), we see that the results obtained by Ferreira & Clifton are open
to a different interpretation.
Mean First Pass Reading
 Times per character (in ms.)
c-i	 c	 c+l
Animate Reduced
Animate Unreduced
Inanimate Reduced
Inanimate Unreduced
	
33.3	 40.4	 31.9
	
31.9	 30.7	 33.1
	
37.7	 38.4	 32.6
	
30.1	 30.3	 28.6
These reading times show that the animate reduced sentences were indeed
subject to the difficulty in the disambiguating 'c' region, reflecting
garden-pathing.	 This is to be expected under a Minimal Attachment
strategy as well as under a semantically directed strategy.
	
When we
look at the reading times for the inanimate reduced sentences, we see
that although the reading time in the 'c' region is significantly
higher than the reading times for the unreduced sentences in this
region, the reading time in the 'c-i' region (e.g., 'examined') is also
significantly higher than for the other three sentences types, whereas
there is only a 0.7 difference between the 'c-i' and 'c' reading times
for these inanimate reduced sentences. Ferreira & Clifton say that:
'Reading times for the first verb (region c-I) were long
when the verb followed the inanimate NP, indicating that
readers were sensi ti ye to the fact that the preferred
analysis resulted in an anomaly. This fact indicates that
eye movements are sensitive in an immediate fashion to
syntactically sensitive anomaly effects, providing further
evidence for rapid on-line comprehension of sentences.
(...) Nonetheless, the readers apparently did not resolve
this anomaly on a semantic basis, but instead waited for
syntactic information." (op. cit., p.355).
Altmann & Steedman (1988) note about this that:
"If a simplex NP analysis, that is pragmatically favoured
by the null context is also comparatively implausible (...)
then the effect of the anomaly will show up immediately.
However, unless the simplex reading is a complete semantic
impossibility (as seems to be the case with Bever's
'articles read ...') i t will not override the pragmatic
preference, and the analysis will be pursued until the
syntactic anomaly is encountered." (Al tmann & Steedman,
1988, p.213).
Altmann & Steedman point out that most of the sentences in this
experiment can be given a fairly plausible interpretation up to the
disambiguation point, for example, The car towed ... could be followed
by a minivan.	 This means that, for most of the materials used,
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initial use of semantic information and context did not bias the reader
against the minimal attachment analysis, but rather the opposite:
since the sentences were presented in isolation there was nothing in
the context to encourage the reader to make any extra assumptions,
needed for the reduced relative reading. Furthermore, some of the
verbs that were used do not in fact cause an anomaly in combination
with inanimate NPs at all, but rather allow for different argument
structures.	 For example, feel, which Ferreira & Clifton used in the
sentence in (2.lOa), can also appear with just a theme as in (2.lOb):
2.lOa. The skin (that was) felt by the blind man was very soft and
delicate.	 (actor, theme).
b. The skin felt very soft.
Smell, which Ferreira & Clifton used in (2.11a), can also appear with
just a theme as in (2.11b):
2.11a. The trash smelled by the dog was laying on the sidewalk.
(actor, theme)
b. The trash smelled awful! of rotten eggs.
In these cases there is no reason at all for the reader to consider a
reduced relative reading, although accessing the two possibilities and
choosing between them may be responsible for an increased reading time
here. This means that these findings do not constitute evidence for
the use of a Minimal Attachment strategy.
Ferreira & Clifton (1986) conducted a further two experiments to
determine whether contextual information can direct the initial
analysis assigned to sentences. They used two sets of target
sentences, like the following:
2.12a. The editor played the tape agreed the story was big.
b. The editor played the tape and agreed the story was big.
2.13a. Sam loaded the boxes on the cart onto the van.
b. Sam loaded the boxes on the cart before his lunch break.
These were presented in a variety of contexts, i.e. a Non—Minimal
Attachment (NMA) inducing context followed by a NMA target (e.g.
2.12a), a MA inducing context followed by a MA target (e.g. 2.12b), a
Neutral context followed by a NMA target, and a Neutral context
followed by a MA target. Ferreira used an on—line eye movement
measure for the second experiment, and the third experiment was a paced
reading task (only involving type 2.12 sentences).
	 In the second
experiment, they found that the results for the reduced relatives were
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only marginally significant. They conclude that the results indicate
that Non-minimal sentences take longer to read than Minimal Attachment
sentences, because the difference in reading times occurred in the
regions after the disainbiguation region, and was not influenced by
context.	 These findings then seem to confirm that syntactic
processing takes place regardless of contextual information.
Altmann & Steedinan (1988) point out that Ferreira & Clifton's
results are based on the assumptions that MA and NMA sentences require
the same processing times, and that their contexts were felicitous with
respect to the assumptions that had to be made for each target
sentence. They say that one possible explanation of the fact that the
NMA sentences took longer than the MA sentences is that it is quite
unlikely that MA and NMA sentences take the same processing times:
"This is because of the extra work required for the NMA
sentences in order to infer that "the editor played the
tape" has as its antecedent the editor mentioned in "he ran
a tape for one of his edi tors". (....) Ferreira & Clifton
(1986) reject this as a possible objection, because, they
claim, any such difference should show up on the ambiguous
noun-phrase, and not, as they find, on the following
(disambiguating) material.
	 (...) However, according to
Ehrl ich and Rayner (1983, p. 84):
• .more complex processes [than lexical retrieval and some
syntactic parsing] such as those involving integration are
not necessarily completed during the fixation on which the
process was initiated (...)."
So the observed increases in reading time in the
disambiguating regions could (and most likely do) reflect
integrative processes concerned with the evaluation of the
preceding noun-phrase, rather than syntactic reanalysis."
(Altmann & Steedinan, 1988, pp.214-215).
Moreover, they note that what Ferreira & Clifton claim to be a strictly
neutral context, in fact biases towards a MA analysis:
"In the "neutral" context below, which Ferreira and Clifton
used in conjunction with [2.12] a&'ve, a number of
potential referents are introduced ("his editors").
Ferreira and Clifton claim that this satisfies Cram and
Steedman 's (1985) requirement that more than one editor is
mentioned (which is felicitous with the reduced relative
interpretation). But in order to ensure felicity with the
minimal attachment interpretation, one of these potential
referents for the ambiguous noun-phrase is then
"foregrounded" (...):
"(...) He went to his edi tors wi th a tape and some photos
because he needed their approval before he could go ahead
with the story.	 He brought out a tape for one of his
editors and told him to listen carefully to it.
	 The
editor played the tape (and) agreed the story was big."
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However, in making the minimal attachment felicitous, this
also has the effect of making the restrictive modification
infelicitous."	 (op. cit., p.216).
Furthermore, Altmann & Steedman point out that:
"the presuppositions associated with specifically past-
participle reduced relatives are extremely complex and ill-
understood. These presuppositions are particularly
difficult to control experimentally (Cram, personal
communication, 1988; Forster, personal communication,
1988), and are not among the constructions actually used by
ei ther C & S or the present authors in experiments
manipulating context." (op. cit., p.216-217).
Ferreira & Clifton's findings are clearly open to reinterpretation and,
therefore, they do not constitute decisive evidence for the
independence of syntactic processing, as envisaged in the 'garden-path'
model.
Frazier (1987b) uses two sets of findings to illustrate why she
thinks that empirical evidence supports the 'garden-path model'
(Minimal Attachment and Late Closure). She discusses an experiment
conducted by Frazier & Rayner (1982), in which they recorded the eye-
movements of subjects reading sentences like the following:
2.14a. John knew the answer to the physics problem by heart.
b. John knew the answer to the physics problem was easy.
Their data showed increases in fixation durations and reading time
in the disambiguating region of nonminimal-attachment sentences like
(2.14b), which they take to be evidence for a minimal attachment
strategy: the second NP is minimally attached as the direct object of
the verb 'knew', so that reanalysis has to take place when subjects
encounter the disambiguating region.
Frazier (198Th) also discusses her (1987c) experiments in Dutch, a
partially head-final language. In one of the experiments, Frazier
(1987c) presented subjects with ambiguous sentences such as (2.15),
using self-paced frame-by-frame reading times as a measure of
complexity:
2.15. Jan houdt niet van [de Amerikaanse die de Nederlander wil
uitnodigen}.
(John likes not from the American who the Dutchman wants invite)
a. John doesn't like the American who wants to invite the Dutch
person.
b. John doesn't like the American who the Dutch person wants to
invite.
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Frazier found that in ambiguous sentences like (2.15), the
interpretation in (2.15a) is preferred over the interpretation in
(2.lSb).
She also presented subjects with unambiguous object relatives and
unambiguous subject relatives, such as those in (2.16), and found that
reading times for unambiguous object relatives were longer than for
unambiguous subject relatives. It should be noted, however, that the
sentences in (2.16) are ambiguous up until the final verb (i.e.
zoeken/zoekt):
2.16a. Subject relative.
Wij kennen /[de meisjes die de jongen zoeken].
We know	 the girls who the boy search
(We know the girls who are looking for the boy.)
b. Object relative.
Wij kennen /[de meisjes die de jongen zoekt].
We know	 the girls who the boy searches
(We know the girls whom the boy is looking for.)
To account for these findings, Frazier (1987c) proposes that the
principle of Minimal Attachment operates in Dutch as well as in
English. Frazier (198Th) says that the experimental findings from
Frazier & Rayner (1982) and from Frazier (1987c) are difficult to
explain without appealing to general structural-preference principles.
However, another explanation, without appeal to such principles is
available. When we look at Frazier's test sentences we see that in
both the type (2.14) sentences and the type (2.15/2.16) sentences the
difference between the minimally attached and non-minimally attached
sentences is not just a difference in structure. When processing
sentence (2.14b) the reader does not only have to postulate that John
knew something, but also will have to make the extra assumption that it
was something about the answer that John knew, rather than just the
answer. Because the sentence is processed in isolation, there is
nothing in the context that would induce the reader to make this extra
assumption.
In sentence (2.15) the relative pronoun die (which cannot be
deleted in Dutch) signals that a subordinate proposition will follow,
so that the reader can make the assumption that some more information
about de Amerikaanse will follow. However, in order to get the object
relative reading, the reader will have to make an extra assumption,
namely that de Amerikaanse is the object of an event involving somebody
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else, which implies a shift in focus; something the reader does not
have to do in order to get the subject relative interpretation.
Frazier found that with object relatives as in (2.16), the head of the
relative was incorrectly identified as the subject of the relative
clause 31% of the time. On the view that in order to get an object
relative interpretation the reader would have to make an extra
assumption (which is not supported by the context, since the sentences
were presented in isolation), this could be expected, since the
sentences in (2.16) are ambiguous up until the last disambiguating
verb. 5
Another experiment that Frazier (1987c) conducted in order to test
the cross language validity of her processing model, involved sentences
like:
2.17. 1k weet dat de man in Holland investeert.
(I know that the man in Holland invests)
=	 a) I know that the man invests in Holland.
or: b) I know that (the man in Holland) invests.
Frazier found that the preferred reading of (2.17) is (2.17a),
rather than (2.1Th), which she explains by saying that the parser
operates on the principle of Minimal Attachment in Dutch, as well as in
English. However, as was the case with the Rayner et al. (1983) test
sentences discussed above, in order to get the (2.17b) interpretation,
the reader not only has to establish that the sentence involves a
specific man, but also has to make the extra assumptions that there is
a group of men and that the whole expression refers to one individual
in that group. Since the sentence is presented in isolation there is
nothing in the context to encourage the reader to make these extra
assumptions. This means that the (2.17a) interpretation is
pragmatically the most plausible interpretation, in view of the extra
amount of processing that making extra assumptions involves.
Frazier & Rayner (1987) report on three experiments which they
conducted in order to test the effects of interaction of lexical and
syntactic processes during language comprehension. Eye movements were
recorded during the reading of sentences containing syntactically
ambiguous lexical items, such as • warehouse fires', where warehouse can
be a noun or an adjective, and fires can be a verb or a noun. They
used materials like the following:
2.18a. The warehouse fires numerous employees each year.
b. The warehouse fires harm some employees each year.
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2.19a. This warehouse fires numerous employees each year.
b. These warehouse fires harm numerous employees each year.
The aim of these experiments was to test alternative hypotheses about
how the parser resolves these syntactic category ambiguities, the first
analysis strategy, the multiple analysis strategy, and the delay
strategy.	 The first analysis strategy predicts that the processor
will go for the first available analysis of an input; 	 the multiple
analysis strategy predicts that the processor will compute different
analyses in parallel; and the delay strategy predicts that the
processor will delay assigning an analysis until it receives
disanibiguating material.
Frazier & Rayner argue that if the processor immediately adopts the
first analysis of warehouse, this will result in warehouse being
categorized as a noun. That will have as a consequence that fires
will be analyzed as a verb, because that is the only analysis
consistent with the analysis of the warehouse as an NP. This means
that the first analysis strategy predicts that the adjective-noun forms
in (2.18b) and (2.19b) will take longer to process than the noun-verb
forms in (2.18a) and (2.19a), because only the adjective-noun forms
will lead to reanalysis.
Frazier & Rayner go on to say that they have reasons for expecting
that the principles governing the analysis of categorial].y ambiguous
strings differ from the principles governing unambiguous or already
categorized strings. They point to studies of lexical access, which
support the view that all meanings of an ambiguous word are activated,
even in circumstances where preceding syntactic context disambiguates a
categorially ambiguous item (Prather & Swinney, 1979; Seidenberg et
al. 1982; Tanenhaus & Donnenwerth-Nolan, 1984).
	 Frazier & Rayner
say that:
"If all entries associated wi th an ambiguous lexical i teizi
are automatically activated arid aiiade available for purposes
of syntactically structuring an input sentence, the
processor need not perform any active computations to
determine that it is at a choice point where there may be
more than one well-formed analysis of the input. In
short, the existence of more than one (local) analysis
might be determined effortlessly as an automatic
consequence of the normal operation of the lexical access
mechanisms." (Frazier & Rayner, 1987, p.506-507).
Based on this one can postulate that the processor follows a 'multiple
analysis strategy', i.e. that the processor makes more than one
analysis of categorially ambiguous strings until disambiguating
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material is encountered. Frazier & Rayner argue that the 'multiple
analysis strategy' predicts that there will be an increase in the
complexity of processing categorially ambiguous items, because the
processor will have to construct different syntactic analyses and
actively maintain them in memory. This means that each analysis of an
ambiguous word must be compared with the different analyses assigned to
preceding material to determine which continuation of the sentence
fragment is permissible. 	 Frazier & Rayner argue that this means that
the 'multiple analysis strategy' predicts that:
"... the ambiguous sentence forms in [2.18] (...) take
longer to process than the corresponding forms in [2.19],
where the determiner 'this' or 'these' provides advance
disambiguating information which would alleviate the need
to maintain any but the correct analysis of the ambiguous
string."	 (op.cit., pp.506-507).
However, when we look at sentence (2.!9a) we see that the
determiner this does not in fact provide "advance disambiguating
information which would alleviate the need to maintain any but the
correct analysis of the ambiguous string"; when this warehouse is
accessed, it could still be followed by either the verb fires, or by a
noun, e.g. fire, as in This warehouse fire was worse than any we have
had here. The difference between this sentence and the sentences in
(2.18) is that the disambiguation can take place when the third word is
accessed, rather than the fourth or fifth word (harm in (2.18b) is
again ambiguous between a noun and a verb reading).
It is a question whether a multiple analysis strategy indeed
predicts that the ambiguous sentence forms in (2.18) take longer to
process than the corresponding forms in (2.19). Although in (2.19a)
the ambiguity can be resolved earlier than in the (2.18) sentence
forms, and in (2.!9b) only one analysis has to be maintained, the
different entries of the categorially ambiguous lexical items will be
accessed and a choice between the different entries will have to be
made. This may offset the time needed to maintain two representations
in memory, or even take more time:
the adj(warehouse) ... => the adj(warehouse) noun(fires)
the noun(warehouse) ... => the noun(warehouse) verb(fires)
this adj(warehouse) ... => *this adj(warehouse) noun(fires)
this rioun(warehouse) ... => this noun(warehouse) verb(fires)
*these noun(warehouse)
these adj(warehouse) ... => these adj(warehouse) noun(fires)
.> *these adj(warehouse) verb(fires)
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The third strategy that Frazier & Rayner postulate, the delay
strategy, predicts that the parser delays syntactic integration of
categorially ambiguous items until disambiguating material is
encountered:
"The delay strategy predicts that processing the ambiguous
words 'warehouse fires' should take longer in the
disambiguated sentence forms in [2.19] than in the
ambiguous sentence forms in [2.18], assuming decisions
about the syntactic analysis of these words takes time,
since these decisions will be accomplished as the ambiguous
words are encountered in (2.19], but not in [2.18].
However, according to the delay strategy, the region
following the ambiguous words should be associated with
longer reading times in [2.18] than in [2.19], since in the
ambiguous sentence forms in (2.i8 J the syntactic analysis
of the ambiguous words will be accomplished only in this
region of the sentence, i.e. once the the disambiguating
information is encountered." (op. cit., p.507).
Frazier & Rayner conducted two experiments to test the different
hypotheses.	 In the first experiment sentences like (2.18) and (2.19)
were presented. The noun-verb ambiguous words in experiment 1 had two
semantically unrelated meanings (e.g. fires). In order to determine
whether different patterns of results would be obtained when there was
a systematic relationship between the meanings of the ambiguous words
(e.g., swing), experiment 2 was run, testing sentences like the
following:
2.20a. Some of us weren't aware that the church pardons very few
people. (N-V ambiguous).
b. Some of us weren't aware that the church pardons are difficult
to obtain. (A-N ambiguous)
c. Some of us weren't aware that this church pardons very few
pecple.	 (N-V disambiguated)
d. Some of us weren't aware that these church pardons are difficult
to obtain.	 (A-N disambiguated).
Frazier & Rayner claim that the results of experiment 1 provide
clear evidence for the delay strategy:
"Both the multiple analysis strategy and the delay strategy
are consistent with the finding that reading times in the
disambiguating region were longer in the ambiguous sentence
forms than in the disambigua ted sentence forms but only the
delay strategy predicted that reading times for the two
ambiguous i tems should take longer in the disambigua ted
forms than in the ambiguous forms." (op. cit., p.511).
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This claim rests on the assumption that with the multiple analysis
strategy the reading times for the ambiguous items take longer in the
ambiguous forms than in the disambiguated forms. However, when we
look at the reading times that Frazier & Rayner found in the first
experiment, we see that this assumption is not very well supported:
Average Reading Time Per Character (in msecs.) for Ambiguous
words and for the Remainder of the Sentence in Experiment 1
Word order
Syntactic class 1st
	 2nd	 X	 Remainder
Ambiguous
N-V	 35 (219)	 48 (237)	 41.5(228)	 46
A-N	 38 (230)	 52 (258)	 45 (228)	 49
x
	
36.5(225)	 50 (247)	 43 (236)
	
47.5
Di sambiguated
N-V
	
39 (234)	 52 (259)	 45.5(247)	 43
A-N
	
46 (263)	 50 (248)	 48 (255)
	
44
X	 42.5(249)	 51 (253)	 47 (251)	 43.5
Note.	 Average gaze duration (in msecs.) is presented in
parentheses.	 (op. cit., p.511).
The reading time increases at the second ambiguous word in the
disambiguated N-V sentences, and at the first ambiguous word in the
disambiguated A-N sentences.
	 This was to be expected, since the
disainbiguation takes place at these points. The reading time is also
high at the second ambiguous word in the disambiguated A-N, which may
be due to the fact that again a choice must be made between the two
readings of the word. However, reading times also increase at the
second ambiguous word in the ambiguous sentences, as much as in the
disainbiguated N-V sentence. Frazier & Rayner say about this:
"The generally longer reading times for the second of the
two target words might be due to any of a variety of
factors (including, for example, the particular lexical
items tested, serial position effects, a reflection of
ongoing seman tic processing in the disambigua ted forms
offset by some advance disambiguation in the ambiguous
forms in cases where readers were exploiting perceptual
information about the following word, etc.)." (op. cit.,
p.512).
On the view that multiple analyses are made, the fact that the increase
in reading time occurs at the second ambiguous word in ambiguous
sentences can be explained by postulating that the reader must
accommodate the two readings of the word in the two analyses s/he
already has.
	 On the other hand, if it is the case, as Frazier &
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Rayner say, that some advance disainbiguation takes place in cases where
readers were exploiting perceptual information about the following
word, we would expect this not only to show up at the second of the two
target words in the ambiguous sentences, but also at the first target
word of the 'disambiguated' N-V sentences. The first target word in
the 'disainbiguated' N-V sentences is ambiguous and gets disambiguated
by the second target word. Therefore, when we compare the reading
times for the first target words in the ambiguous sentences, where no
advance disambiguation can take place, with the reading time for the
first target word in the 'disambiguated' N-V sentences, where some
advance disambiguation can take place, we would expect a significant
difference. However, Frazier & Rayner do not find a significant
difference between the ambiguous sentences (35/38 msecs.) and the
disambiguated N-V sentences (39 msecs.).
The results of their second experiment are very similar to those of
the first experiment:
Average Reading Times Per Character (in msecs.) for the Ambiguous
Words and for the Remainder of the Sentence in Experiment 2
Word Order
Syntactic class 1st	 2nd	 X	 Remainder
Ambiguous
N-V	 34 (214) 43 (257)
	 38.5(236)	 52
A-N	 34 (214) 41 (245)
	 37.5(230)	 50
X	 34 (214) 42 (251)
	 38 (233)	 51
Di sambiguated
N-V	 37 (234) 44 (261)	 40.5(248)	 38
A-N	 39 (240) 41 (246)	 40 (243)	 49
X	 38 (237) 42.5(253) 	 40.25(246)	 42
Note. Average gaze duration (in msecs.) is presented in
parentheses.
Frazier & Rayner say about these results:
"There was, however, one interesting difference that
emerged in the pattern of results in Experiment 2. In
sharp contrast to Experiment 1, adjective-noun forms did
not take longer to read than noun-verb forms in terms of
total reading time (...). This result strongly suggests
that the relative compl exi ty of the adjective-noun forms in
Experiment 1 was not due simply or directly to the
derivative adjectival categorization of the first ambiguous
item, but rather was due to the unconstrained semantic
relation between the adjective and noun in Experiment 1.
(...) In short, the relative coiiplexity of adjective-noun
sentences in Experiment 1 may be attributed to the need to
construct a salient semantic relation between the adjective
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and noun without the benefit of thematic constraints."
(op. cit., pp.513-514).
However, Frazier & Rayner cannot have it both ways. On Frazier &
Rayner's view, semantic processing only starts after a syntactic
structure is assigned. On the delay strategy hypothesis, no structure
is assigned to the ambiguous sentences until the point of
disambiguation. They explain the increased reading times for the
second ambiguous word in the ambiguous sentences by saying that they
may be due to a variety of factors, including some advance
disambiguation in the ambiguous forms. However, when we compare the
results for the ambiguous sentence forms of Experiment 1 and Experiment
2, we see the following difference:
Word Order
Syntactic class	 1st	 2nd	 X	 Remainder
Experiment 1
N—V	 35 (219)	 48 (237)	 41.5(228)	 46
A—N	 38 (230)	 52 (258)	 45 (228)	 49
Experiment 2
N—V	 34 (214)	 43 (257)	 38.5(236)	 52
A—N	 34 (214)	 41 (245)	 37.5(230)	 50
If the increase at the second ambiguous word is caused by serial
position effects, or some advance disambiguation, then we can't explain
how there can be such a difference between increase in reading time in
the ambiguous A—N sentence forms in Experiment 1 (14 msecs. per
character), and in Experiment 2 (7 msecs. per character). If,
however, this difference is due to semantic processing, as Frazier &
Rayner suggest above, this implies that one or more syntactic
structures have already been assigned since, on their view, semantic
processing only takes place after a syntactic structure has been
assigned. But this goes against the delay strategy hypothesis which
claims that no structure is assigned until the point of disambiguation.
These findings then actually favour a multiple analysis strategy over a
delay strategy, since only the multiple analysis strategy makes
syntactic structures available to semantic processing and evaluation.
Frazier & Rayner say that their findings clearly favour the delay
strategy but this conclusion rests on the assumption that a multiple
analysis strategy requires more processing time than resolving
ambiguities. Furthermore, their findings present several problems for
the delay strategy which they do not account for. Frazier & Rayner
suggest that the human language processor is characterized by the
following general principles:
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"when a representation must be computed by rule, the
processor adopts the first analysis available to it; when
representations are precompu ted, the processor considers
the alternatives available to it and then selects and
computes all of the (global) structural consequences of
just a single analysis; and selection from among prestored
alternative analyses is delayed just in case helpful
information is more likely to arrive irzzmediately than
further downstream."	 (op. cit., p.522).
This view of the processor raises a number of questions.
	
On this
view the processor automatically assigns a syntactic structure to
incoming material, unless there is a categorial ambiguity. 	 In the
case of a categorial ambiguity it delays analysis until disambiguating
material arrives. 	 Furthermore, it has to make guesses about the
likelihood of the immediate arrival of 'helpful information'.	 The
'garden-path' model gives no explanation of how the processor
hypothesizes about this likelihood. Also, Frazier & Rayner do not
account for how the processor goes about assigning an analysis in case
the helpful information is more likely to arrive 'further downstream':
does this happen according to some principle, or arbitrarily? Nor is
it clear why the parser delays analysis in the case of syntactic
category ambiguity, but pursues a Minimal Attachment strategy in the
case of, for example, a simple past vs. a participle form of a verb
(The horse raced past the barn fell). All Frazier & Rayner say about
this is that:
"The question immediately arises why the language processor
delays analysis of an input under some circumstances
(syntactic category assignment, thematic frame selection)
and adopts the first available analysis under others
(assigning a syntactic structure to lexically categorized
items). Apparently in circumstances where developing an
analysis of an input involves active computation of a
representation (as is necessary in the case of syntax,
since the syntactic structures of a language cannot be
prestored, there being indefinitely many of them), the
language processor adopts the first anaiysis available.
When multiple analyses of an input are precomputed (i.e.
stored in memory), the language processor may consider
various alternatives, as in the case of semantically
ambiguous lexical items, syntactic category ambiguities,
and lexical (thematic) frame ambiguities. (op.
cit. ,p.521).
The difference between the simple past tense of a verb and the
participle form of a verb is not a difference that cannot be prestored,
so that one would expect that the language processor consider the
various alternatives, rather than go for Minimal Attachment.
	 Hence,
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as it stands, their proposal of the delay strategy actually undermines
the Minimal Attachment strategy explanation that they have proposed for
dealing with 'garden—path' sentences like The horse raced past the barn
fell.
Some evidence that the delay strategy is not used in the case of
categorially ambiguous phrases comes from Marsien—Wilson & Tyler
(1987). Marsien—Wilson & Tyler discuss a number of experiments they
conducted to test their claim that semantics and context guide
syntactic parsing (the strong interactionist view). They looked at
ambiguous phrases, such as landing planes, which can have two different
readings, an 'adjectival' and a 'gerund' reading. These phrases were
put in disambiguating contexts, like the following:
2.21a. Adjectival bias
If you walk too near a runway, landing planes
b. Gerund bias
If you've been trained as a pilot, landing planes
These materials were presented through head phones, while at the
acoustic offset of planes, etc., either IS or ARE was flashed up on a
screen. The subjects had to name this word as quickly as possible.
Marsien—Wilson & Tyler found that reaction times were significantly
faster for appropriate continuations of both the verbal and adjectival
readings, than for inappropriate continuations. On the view that the
delay strategy is used, we would expect no difference in reaction times
for the different continuations, because on that strategy no analysis
of the ambiguous phrase would have been made yet. Marslen—Wilson &
Tyler also found that the effects of context were just as strong for
these ambiguous phrases as they were for a comparison group of
unambiguous phrases, such as smiling faces. Marslen—Wilson and Tyler
argue that these findings show that context has a significant and
immediate effect at the earliest point at which it can be measured.
However, Carston (1989) points out that when we look at the —ing
words used in the unambiguous phrases, most of the examples used have
transitive verbs as their base:
2.22a. Verbal
making movies, mixing drinks, cleaning teeth, whistling tunes,
firing employees, turning corners, carving meat, shouting
insults.
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b. Adjectival
creaking stairs, working mothers, travelling salesmen,
flattering remarks, shooting stars, wading pools, dancing
classes, landing lights.
Carston says that this means that all the -ing words by themselves
could be taken as either gerunds or adjectives, and because most of the
verbs involved can take objects, also the whole phrase has two possible
analyses.	 Carston argues that this suggests that all the phrases
presented as unambiguous are in fact categorially ambiguous. It then
seems that it is the semantic content of the whole phrase which
determines whether the -ing word will be interpreted as an adjective or
a gerund. For example, cleaning teeth does not seem very plausible on
a 'teeth that clean' reading but it is not a structural impossibility,
and might be quite plausible in some contexts, e.g. in a science
fiction story.	 This then suggests that the processor accesses and
processes the different possible analyses, rather than just accessing
one, as Marslen-Wilson & Tyler assume.
	 Disainbiguation then takes
place when semantics and context choose between these different
analyses.	 However, Carston goes on to say that this is not the only
possible explanation of the processing of these structures. An
alternative is that the parser follows the Minimal Attachment strategy.
According to Cars ton, on this strategy the parser would always try the
adjectival analysis first, "since a verbal analysis would require more
nodes, presumably at least an additional S-node and an empty category
NP subject."	 (Op. cit., p.348).	 If this analysis is rejected on
grounds of sense and plausibility, the parser will have to reanalyze
the fragment. As evidence f or the Minimal Attachment strategy,
Carston points at the results obtained by Marslen-Wilson and Young
(1984), from a rerun of the syntactic ambiguity experiment:
Mean naming latencies (in msecs) for appropriate and inappropriate
IS and A1E targets:
APPROPRIATE	 INAPPROPRIATE
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Carston says about this:
"We see here the significant effect of contextual
appropriateness on response times to the IS and ARE
probes, a difference of around 20 msecs. in each case, but
what is curious is that the two lines don't coincide.
(...) Serial access of syntactic structures in accordance
with some preferential strategy such as the Minimal
Attachment Strategy would provide an explanation. If,
when confronted with one of these -irzg phrases, the parser
goes for the adjectival reading, then given the plural noun
in all the examples here, the continuation of ARE is, at
this stage, more appropriate than IS. Only when the
structure proves unable to integrate with the preceding
context clause and so is rejected will the gerund structure
be accessed. (...) This then looks like suggestive
evidence for such a strategy, imposing serial access."
(op. cit., p.349).
However, an alternative explanation could be that on the gerund
reading not only an additional S-node and an empty category NP subject
have to be postulated, but also that a semantically/pragmatically
appropriate filler has to be found for this empty subject. If this is
the case, then we would expect the same kind of difference as Carston
takes to be 'suggestive evidence' for the Minimal Attachment strategy.
It is interesting to compare the above to the third experiment that
Frazier & Rayner (1987) conducted. This experiment was conducted to
further test the generality of the delay strategy, and to distinguish
more directly between the delay strategy and the semantic preference
account (which predicts that the semantically preferred reading of an
ambiguous string should take less time to read). The materials used
contained similar ambiguous phrases to those tested by Marsien-Wilson &
Tyler (above):
2.23a. Without a doubt, ringing bells is disturbing to everyone in the
neighbourhood. (V-N ambiguous).
b. Without a doubt, ringing bells are disturbing to everyone in the
neighbourhood. (A-N ambiguous).
c. Without a doubt, ringing loud bells is disturbing to everyone in
the neighbourhood.	 (V-N disambiguated).
d. Without a doubt, loud ringing bells are disturbing to everyone
in the neighbourhood.	 (A-N disambiguated).
Frazier & Rayner say that:
"in all sentences, the items immediately following the two
target items [ringing bells] syntactically disambigua ted
the analysis of the target items. In the unambiguous
versions (c and d forms), the posi tion of the adjective
(loud) or sometimes a determiner (some, the) disambigua ted
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the target string before the second target item.
(Frazier & Rayner, 1987, p.517).
It should be noted, though, that several of the type (d) sentences are
in fact still ambiguous before the second target item, for example in
(2.23d) Without doubt, loud ringing ... could be followed by ...of
bells is disturbing to everyone in the neighbourhood. Frazier &
Rayner used 16 experimental sentences, which were tested in a prior
rating study to establish what the preferred interpretation for the
ambiguous fragments was (adjective-noun or verb-noun interpretation),
by having 25 subjects complete the sentences from the second target
item. Frazier & Rayner say that:
"If (counter to the delay strategy) the processor
categorizes the first target item as soon as it is
encountered, then the verb-noun form (a) should take less
time to read than the adjective-noun form (b)." (op. cit.,
p.517).
What we see here is that Frazier & Rayner predict that the 'first
analysis strategy' would predict the opposite analysis to Carston's
hypothesis that given the Minimal Attachment strategy the adjective-
noun form should take less time to read. Unfortunately, Frazier &
Rayner do not give an explanation of why the principle of Minimal
Attachment would cause the processor to go for the verb-noun analysis.
Frazier & Rayner found that Minimal Attachment cannot account for
their results, not on their prediction, nor on Carston's hypothesis:
Average Reading Time Per Character (in msecs.) for Ambiguous Words
and for the Remainder of the Sentence in Experiment 3
Syntactic	 Word order
class	 1st	 2nd	 Remainder
Verb-noun preference
Ambiguous	 VN	 35(245)	 41 (267)	 40.5
AN
	
33 (240)
	
40(260)
	
43
Disambiguated	 VN
	
43(295)
	
45 (292)
	
35
AN
	
39(277)
	
49 (3 14)
	
41.5
Adjective-noun preference
Ambiguous	 VN
	
32 (235)
	
40(259)
	
44.5
AN
	
36 (248)
	
40(262)
	
39.5
Disambiguated	 VN
	
38(266)
	
44(285)
	
37.5
AN
	
40(288)
	
45(293)
	
34
Although the 'unpreferred' VN sentences took slightly longer to
disambiguate than the 'unpref erred' AN sentences, and the 'preferred'
VN sentences took slightly longer to disambiguate than the 'preferred'
AN sentences, the 'preferred' ambiguous AN sentences took significantly
longer in the disambiguating area than the 'preferred' disambiguated AN
sentences.	 The 'unpref erred' hit already disanbiguated AN sentences
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also took slightly longer in the 'remainder' area than the 'preferred'
ambiguous VN sentences.	 Neither of these findings can be explained
with the Minimal Attachment strategy. On the view that the Minimal
Attachment strategy predicts that the verb-noun analysis is made, there
should not be any difference in reading times in the disambiguating
area of the ambiguous and disambiguated V-N sentences, which there is.
Moreover, reading times for the A-N sentences should be longer than for
the V-N sentences, regardless of preferences, which they are not. On
the view that the Minimal Attachment strategy predicts that the
adjective-noun analysis is made, there should not be any difference in
reading times in the disambiguating area of the ambiguous and
disambiguated A-N sentences, which there is. Moreover, reading times
for the V-N sentences should be longer than for the A-N sentences,
regardless of preferences, which they are not. It seems then that
contrary to Carston's claim, Marsien-Wilson & Tyler's results discussed
above cannot be explained by postulating the Minimal Attachment
strategy.
Altmann & Steedman (1988) report on some experiments they conducted
in order to investigate the effects of referential context on locally
ambiguous prepostional phrases, i.e. PPs that are locally ambiguous
between NP attachment and VP attachment as in:
2.24a. The thrglar blew open the safe with the diamonds.
b. The borgiar blew open the safe with the dynamite.
The experiments tested the hypothesis that the NP attachment is
facilitated when the preceding context introduces more than one
candidate referent to the NP. The VP attachment should be facilitated
when there is just one candidate referent to the NP in the preceding
context. Altmann & Steedman contrast this hypothesis with predictions
made by Minimal Attachment:
"Under the minimal attachment hypothesis, one would expect
no effect of context on the VP-attached materials, since
these are minimally attached and hence the first analysis
to be chosen will be the correct one. Moreover there
should be no effect of referential context on the NP-
attached targets because the VP attachment will always be
attempted first, and then be rejected on the besis of
Rayner's et al. 's (1983) thematic selection process, in
which real world knowledge, (...), coupled with knowledge
about the alternative thematic structures of a verb (e.g.,
(experi encer,	 theme)	 versus	 (experi encer,	 theme,
instrument)), is used to suggest an alternative
attachment."	 (Altmann & Steedman, 1988, p.218).
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In the first experiment global reading times were measured.
Altmann & Steedman briefly discuss this method of testing as compared
to eye-movement measurements:
"Al though eye-movement data have been argued to provide a
finer-grain analysis of where reading time differences are
located, we feel that reading times alone are only
marginally less informative. It is often unclear what
differences in eye movements reflect." (op. cit., p.217).
They used materials like the following:
2.25. NP-supporting context:
A burglar broke into a bank carrying some dynamite.
He planned to blow open a safe.
Once inside he saw that there was a safe with a new lock and a
safe with an old lock.
	 (2 referents)
VP-supporting context:
A burglar broke into a bank carrying some dynamite.
He planned to blow open a safe.
Once inside he saw that there was a safe with a new lock and a
strongbox with an old lock.
	 (1 referent)
NP-attached target sentence:
The burglar blew open the safe with the new lock and made off
with the loot.
VP-attached target sentence:
The burglar blew up the safe with the dynamite and made off with
the loot.
Furthermore, two additional contexts were created, by replacing the
first sentence of each of the contexts above by:
2.26. A burglar broke into a bank carrying some dynamite and some
gelignite.
In these additional contexts there are two instruments rather than one.
Altmann & Steedman say that these contexts may make the VP attachment
more felicitous, because there is a choice of instrument.
Altmann & Steedman found that there were effects of referential
context on the VP- and the NP-attachments, and also that the minimally
attached VP materials evoked longer response times than the
nonminimally NP-attached materials:
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Experiment 1: Reading times per sentence (in centiseconds)
Context
1 referent	 2 referents
Target	 1 instrument 2 instrument 	 1 instrument 2 instrument
VP-attachment	 275.2	 275.5	 310.9	 313.4
NP-attachment	 272.7	 276.8	 262.0	 265.0
We see that the contexts involving two instruments did not in fact
induce faster reading times for the VP-attachment sentences: the
differences between the reading times for the 1 instrument and 2
instruments contexts are not significant in the 1 referent context nor
in the 2 referents context. To counter the possible objection that
these reading times do not reflect differences located at the
disambiguating points, but reflect post-interpretive processing
effects, Altmann & Steedman conducted a second experiment in which
phrasal reading times were measured, rather than global reading times.
In this experiment, the same context and target sentences were used,
with the difference that, rather than having PPs in the contexts (such
as 'with a new lock'), they had relative clauses, such as 'which had a
new lock'. The target sentences were segmented as follows:
2.27. The burglar/blew open/the safe/with the dynamite (new lock)/ and
made off/with the loot.
Altmann & Steednian obtained the following results in this second
experiment:
Experiment 2: Reading times to Phrase 4 (in centiseconds)
Context (no. of referents)
Target	 1	 2
VP-attachment	 66.9	 71.5
NP-attachment	 63.9	 61.4
Altmann & Steedman say that these results reflect the results they
obtained with the first experiment, so that they cannot be an artifact
of differences occurring in the target sentence:
"... the global reading times from experiment 1 are
reflected almost perfectly in the phrasal reading times
found [in experiment 2] using one of the on-line-measures
favoured by Ferreira and Clifton (1986) themselves. Given
that the results so closely mirror those of Experiment 1,
this experiment provides evidence against the suggestion
that the pattern of results in the earlier experiment may
have been artifactual on the fact that the contexts had
contained prepositional phrases which, like the NP-attached
target sentences, modified NPs, but had not contained any
prepositional phrases, which, like the VP-attached target
sentences, modified VPs." (op. cit., p.226).
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What we have seen is that the experimental findings cited in
support of the Minimal Attachment strategy either do not support the
use of this strategy, or are open to alternative explanations. As we
have seen some of the 'evidence' depends on an intuitive use of the
notion of 'pragmatic plausibility', while at the same time the
researchers have not taken into account the pragmatic effects that the
use of, for example, restrictive relative clauses may have. That
Minimal Attachment seems to explain some of these findings turns out to
be a consequence of the fact that a lot of experimental sentences are
presented in isolation: often, the Minimal Attachment reading of an
ambiguous sentence coincides with what Cram & Steedman (1985), and
Altmann & Steedman (1988) call the reading carrying fewest
presuppositions.	 When sentences are presented in a context, we see
that subjects go for the interpretation which is contextually
supported. Furthermore, we have seen that by proposing a 'delay
strategy' in the case of categorially ambiguous phrases, adherents of
the 'garden-path' model actually undermine their case for a principle
of Minimal Attachment, because they do not give an explanation of why
the processor would delay analyzing the input in the case of ambiguity
between a noun interpretation and a verb interpretation, but not in the
case of ambiguity between a simple past vs a 	 participle form of a
verb. Moreover, when we looked at the experimental findings
concerning categorially ambiguous phrases, it turned out that the
findings do not support either a delay strategy, nor a Minimal
Attachment strategy.	 Instead the processor seems to compute multiple
analyses until it obtains semantic/pragmatic information which enables
it to disambiguate the phrase.	 And as we saw in chapter 1, this is
what Relevance theory predicts in the case of ambiguity.
2.2. Late Closure.
The second principle proposed in the 'garden-path' model is the
principle of Late Closure. This principle states that, " if gramma-
tically permissible, new nodes are attached into the clause or phrase
currently beirzg processed (i.e. the phrase or clause postulated most
recently." (L. Frazier, 1987a, p.562). In this section, we will
evaluate the experimental findings which are said to support Late
Closure.
Frazier & Rayner (1982) report on an experiment they carried out in
order to test the validity of postulating the Late Closure strategy.
They recorded eye movements of subjects reading sentences like the
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following, in which the length of the ambiguous phrase was varied
(long—short):
2.28a. Since Jay always jogs a mile and a half this seems like a short
distance to him.	 (Late closure—Long).
b. Since Jay always jogs a mile and a half seems like a short
distance to him.	 (Early closure— Long).
c. Since Jay always jogs a mile this seems like a short distance to
him. (Late closure—short).
d. Since Jay always jogs a mile seems like a short distance to him.
(Early closure-short).
They found that the late closure sentences took significantly less
time to read than the early closure sentences, as was predicted by the
late closure strategy. However, when we look at the sentences used in
this experiment, the question arises whether these sentences do not
actually bias the reader towards one interpretation rather than the
other. When a reader encounters sentences like the sentences in
(2.28) in a normal piece of writing, the two clauses in both the late
and early closure sentences will be separated by a comma, e.g.:
2.29a. Since Jay always jogs a mile, this seems like a short distance
to him.	 (Late closure).
b. Since Jay always jogs, a mile seems like a short distance to
him.	 (Early closure).
Leech & Svartvik (1975) note about this that:
"In written English, a PIECE OF INFORMATION can be defined
as a piece of language which is separated from what goes
before and from what fol lows by punctuation marks (. , ; :
- ? !), and which does not itself contain any punctuation
marks.	 (Leech & Svartvik, 1975, p.170).
When the subjects in the experiment encounter a mile without a comma
separating it from jogs, they will take it to be part of the same
'piece of information', so that there is no need for them to postulate
that it is the beginning of a new clause. When the subjects encounter
this without a comma separating it from mile, they are forced to take
it as the beginning of a new clause, because it cannot be incorporated
in the existing clause. This means that leaving out the commas in
these sentences actually biases the reader towards the Late Closure
reading of the sentences, so that the findings seem to tell us more
about the role of commas in written language than about whether the
Late Closure strategy is used.
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Kennedy & Murray (1984) report on an experiment they conducted
using similar materials to those of Frazier & Rayner (the sentences in
(2.28)). They were primarily interested in whether patterns of word-
by-word reading times vary for the same materials depending on whether
these materials were presented in a cumulative mode (in which words
previously read remain visible), whether all words were visible at
once, or whether words previously read were unavailable for inspection.
Their findings with regards to the Late Closure strategy confirm the
results of Frazier & Rayner (1982). However, since they also
presented their materials with omission of commas, the same point
regarding the validity of their findings as evidence for the Late
Closure strategy that was made above can be made here.
Mitchell & Holmes (1985) conducted several experiments to test the
suggestion that the verb of a sentence contributes critical information
that might be used to guide the parsing of a potentially ambiguous
clause or phrase. They used materials containing different types of
structural ambiguity, among others preposed clauses that could give
rise to early or late closure:
2.30. As soon as he had (arrived/phoned) his wife
Before conducting the experiments, Mitchela & Holmes collected
subjects' preferences for readings of the structurally ambiguous
sentences in view of the different verbs used (such as arrived vs.
phoned), using a questionnaire technique similar to that used by Ford
et al. (1982). It was found that changing the verb shifted the
structural choice in the expected direction, i.e., with a transitive
verb like phoned, the preferred reading was:
2.31. As soon as he had phoned his wife, (something else happened).
whereas with an intransitive verb like arrived, the preferred reading
was:
2.32. As soon as he arrived, his wife (did something).
In the first experiment the sentences were presented in segments,
in a subject-paced reading task, e.g.:
2.33. As soon as he had! (arrived-phoned) his wife! started to
prepare! for the trip.
(the italicized segment is the 'Indicator segment').
Mitchell & Holmes found that the Indicator segments took different
times to process depending on whether the sentence supported the
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preferred reading of the verb involved or not, so that the Indicator
segments were processed significantly faster when following an
intransitive verb (the 'Non-Garden Path condition'), than when
following a transitive verb (the 'Garden Path condition'):
Mean Viewing Times for Indicator Displays (in msecs.).
Non-Garden Path
	
Garden Path
Condi t ion	 Condition
Early vs. late closure
	 1230
	
1434
(Mitchell & Holmes, 1985, P. 549).
In the second experiment, Mitchell & Holmes (1985) used the same
materials as were used in experiment 1, but here they presented the
test sentences as a whole. This was done to counter the possible
objection that the 'garden-path' effects could have been merely an
artifact introduced by the use of segmented materials.
They found that although reading times in this experiment were
rather longer than in the previous one, they found that the 'garden-
path' effect was significantly similar to the effect found in the first
experiment:
Mean Viewing Times for Entire Test Sentences (in msecs.)
Non-Garden Path
	
Garden Path
Condition	 Condition
Early vs. late closure 	 5739
	
7485
(op. cit., p. 551).
If the parser operates solely on the principles of Minimal
Attachment and Late Closure, then it is inexplicable why both
conditions (the 'Garden Path' and the 'Non-Garden Path' conditions) do
not give rise to an initial Late Closure analysis (in which the second
NP is analyzed as a 'sister' of the verb), which then has to be
reanalyzed. These findings seem to indicate that subcategorization
information about the verbs is used in parsing the sentences.
In the third experiment Mitchell & Holmes (1985) tested the
structural interpretation of the garden path effect by using
punctuation marks and other surface structure cues to disambiguate the
sentences in favour of the interpretations required by the 'Indicator'
segments. They did this in order to test the possibility that the
effects found were due to the general implausibility of the meaning of
the sentence, rather than to the structural choices made by the
subjects in processing the sentence. They say about this that:
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"If the original effect was entirely due to inappropriate
parsing decisions wi th one of the verbs, then the effect
should become less pronounced when new cues are added to
guide the reader to the correct structural interpretation.
On the other hand, if the garden path effect in experiment
1 was attributable to the fact that the Indicator phrase
was less plausible in one of the conditions (even on trials
when the structural interpretation was correct), then the
introduction of helpful surface structure cues should not
reduce its magnitude. If anything, it should increase the
probability of selecting the structural interpretation that
generates the implausible combination of propositions, and
so on this account the garden-path effect might even be
slightly increased."	 (op.cit., p.552).
In this experiment a comma was introduced after the main verb in the
early/late closure sentences. Furthermore, the segmentation was
changed so that the main verb appeared in the first segment, thereby
separating it from the NP that was intended to be the subject of the
main clause:
2.34. As soon as he had (arrived-phoned),! his wife! started to
prepare/ for the trip.
As in the first experiment, the sentences were again presented in a
subject-paced reading task. Mitchell & Holmes found that reading
times for the garden path condition were significantly reduced in this
experiment as compared to experiment 1:
Mean Viewing Times for Indicator Displays (in msecs.)
Non-Garden Path Garden Path
Condition	 Condition
Early vs. late closure	 1279	 1333
(op. cit., p.553).
(Compare Experiment 1:	 1230	 1528 )
One can conclude from this that the major garden-path effects found
in experiment 1 were produced by preferences regarding the argument
structure of the verbs involved. For intransitives (which do not take
an object) the only possible reading is the 'early closure' reading,
and therefore they do not give rise to the 'garden-path' effect in any
of the experiments. The preferred reading of transitives in these
sentences is the reading with an explicit object, so that they give
rise to the 'garden-path' effect, unless there is a marker (i.e. a
comma) which rules out this reading.
	 This means that subcategori-
zation information of the verbs is used in processing these sentences.
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These findings do not support postulating the Late Closure
strategy. If we assume that parsing is solely guided by Minimal
Attachment and Late Closure, then we would expect that the subjects in
experiment 1 would not only be 'garden—pathed' in the sentences
containing transitive verbs, but also in the sentences containing
intransitive verbs, because (VP - > V NP) is a grammatically permitted
expansion. This means that on the Late Closure view one would have to
postulate that the parser also makes use of subcategorization infor-
mation, which overrides the preferences given by the Late Closure
principle. However, we would predict exactly the same results for
these experiments if we postulate that the parser is guided only by
subcategorizat ion information.
Subcategorization information is not mentioned explicitly in
the Minimal Attachment/Late Closure literature. it is alluded
to in Frazier and Fodor (1978), when they discuss the example in
(2.35):
2.35. John put the mustard in the
Frazier & Fodor say that a processor using the rules of grammar
could establish with certainty the following partial phrase marker for
this sentence fragment:
S
	
NP	 VP
I /N
	
N	 V NP	 Prt
	
I	 I	 PP
	
John	 put	 Adv
NP	 PP
/\
Det	 N	 P	 NP
I	 I	 (N
the	 .ustard	 in	 Det. ..N...
the
They point out that the processor knows that linguistic input must
contain another noun as daughter to the NP within the PP, but it does
not know how many other words will precede this noun. The processor
also knows that the verb phrase must contain an NP and some sort of
locative phrase, but it does not know whether the mustard and in the
are the NP and the locative phrase that it is looking for. It
seems then that Frazier & Fodor take it for granted that the processor
makes use of subcategorization information, otherwise they would not
85
postulate that the above phrase marker could be built on encountering
put.
This does not shed any light on how the principle of Late Closure
and subcategorization information interact. As we saw, in order to
account for Mitchell & Holmes's (1985) findings we have to assume that
subcategorization information overrides the preferences given by Late
Closure. However, Frazier (1987a) says that Late Closure operates to
choose low attachment of the PP in (2.36), overriding the available
subcategorization information:
2.36. Jessie put the book Kathy was reading in the library
Frazier says about this example that:
"Intuitions indicate the prepositional phrase in [2.361 is
initially interpreted as a sisteir to "read" despite the
fact that "read" does not require a locative phrase but
"put" does."	 (Frazier, 1987a, p.568).	 (emphasis, mg.).
Frazier does not say whose intuitions indicate this. 	 She implies that
evidence for this analysis is to be foundi in Frazier & Fodor (1978) but
this is not the case.	 However, even if it turns out that the Late
Closure reading is the preferred reading of (2.36), this example is not
without problems. If the parser makes use of subcategorization
information , as is implied by Frazier & Fodor, then it is not clear
why the parser would interpret the PP as a sister of read, rather than
of put, especially since read does not require a locative phrase,
whereas put does. Moreover, if subcategorization is used, then there
is a clash between the Minimal Attachmemt and Late Closure strategies:
on the Minimal Attachment strategy, the PP in (2.36) would be attached
to the VP in the main clause:
S
NP	 VP
I
N	 V	 NP	 PP
Jessie put the book Kathy in the library
was reading
By attaching the PP to the VP in the subordinate clause the parser
creates a (potentially) unnecessary node, since the main clause must
still contain some sort of locative phrase:
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SNP	 VP
I
N	 V	 NP	 PPiI/	 I
	
Jessie put	 NP	 5,	 ?
£
the book that Kathy was
reading in the library
It seems that, if subcategorization information is used by the parser,
the Late Closure strategy has precedence over the Minimal Attachment
strategy in this example.	 Why else would the parser prefer a
syntactically incomplete string to a complete sentence? But if this
is the case, it is not clear why Minimal Attachment seems to have
precedence over Late Closure in many of the examples discussed in the
last section, e.g.,
2.1. John hit the man with the stick.
a. John (hit (the man) (with the stick)). Minimal Attachment.
b. John (hit (the man with the stick)). 	 Late Closure.
In order to account for example (2.36) we have to assume then that the
parser solely operates on the principles of Minimal Attachment and Late
Closure, without making use of subcategorization information.
However, this clashes with the findings of Mitchell and Holmes
discussed above.
Warner & Glass (1987) report on three experiments they conducted to
determine the effects of various types of syntactic and nonsyntactic
information on grammaticality judgments f or 'garden-path' sentences
with Late and Early closure readings. They presented short and long
sentences like the following:
2.37a. When the boys strike the dog kills. 	 (short intransitive).
b. Before the boy kills the man the dog bites strikes. 	 (long
intransitive).
c. After the dog bites the man the cat kills. 	 (Short transitive).
d. When the horse kicks the boy the dog bites the man. 	 (Long
transitive).
These sentences were presented in a variety of contexts. Some of
these contexts were thought to be biasing towards the required
interpretation, for example, by having the same syntactic structure, or
by being semantically biasing. 	 Others were thought to be biasing
towards a 'garden-path' reading, by presenting an intransitive target
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sentence in the context of a transitive sentence, or by semantically
biasing towards the garden—path reading. For example the short
intransitive garden path sentence (2.37a) above was presented in the
following contexts:
2.38a. Contexts biasing towards the grammatical interpretation:
Syntactic:
Before the man sleeps the cat eats.
(this sentence has the same (intransitive) structure as the
target sentence).
Semantic:
The dog becomes dangerous while the boys attack.
b. Contexts biasing towards the ungrammatical interpretation:
Syntactic:
If the girls pet the cat they sing.
(a transitive context sentence followed by an intransitive
target sentence).
Semantic:
Violence occurs because the boys attack the dog.
c. Control (Neutral context):
Men have to be put out.
In the first experiment the materials were presented one word at a time
without punctuation using the rapid visual presentation method. At
the end of each sentence subjects had to make a grammaticality
judgment. Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly as possible,
without taking time thinking further about the materials. The purpose
of using a rapid, on—line form of presentation was to make the
syntactic judgments as free as possible of conceptual processes.
Warner & Glass found that context significantly affected the
proportion of 'garden—path' sentences called grammatical. When the
context biased towards the grammatical interpretation this would
increase the likelihood of the sentence being called grammatical, and
when the context biased towards the ungrammatical interpretation this
would increase the likelihood of the sentence being called
ungrammatical. They also found that there was a 'powerful' preference
for a transitive construction.
	 In four out of five of the different
context conditions, intransitive sentences were more likely to be
misinterpreted as being transitive than the reverse.
	 This is not
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surprising if we accept that the absence of punctuation in fact biases
towards a transitive reading of the materials.
It may be argued that, because the grammaticality judgments were
made at the end of each sentence, they reflect conceptual processes
rather than structural analyses, and therefore cannot give us an
insight into whether the Late Closure strategy was used or not.
However, it turns out that the findings are problematic for the view
that the Late Closure strategy is used, even taking into account that
conceptual processes have taken place. When we look at, f or example,
the syntactic context conditions, we see that with the short and long
transitives, 100% were judged grammatical in the positive context, but
only 56% of the short and 61% of the long transitives were judged
grammatical in the negative context, e.g.
2.39a. Negative syntactic context:
While the boy swims the dog that the man owns plays.
b. Target sentence:
After the cow kicks the girl the horse bites.
Late Closure would assign the right structure to these target
sentences; moreover, neither the semantics of the context sentence nor
that of the target sentence is such as to bias towards the intransitive
interpretation of the target sentence. Therefore, on the view that
the Late Closure strategy was used, we would not expect subjects to
judge these sentences ungrammatical, but they regularly did, as noted
above. A possible objection here would be that the context and target
sentences were semantically so dissimilar as to render the target
sentence incomprehensible. However, when we compare these sentences
to the sentence pairs consisting of a positive syntactic context
sentence and a transitive target sentence, we see that these were as
semantically dissimilar, e.g.:
2.40a. Positive syntactic context:
While the man completes his work the clock chimes.
b. Transitive target sentence:
After the horse kicks the boy the dog bites.
These target sentences were always judged grammatical.
	 This then
implies that the structure of the context sentence influences the way
in which structure is assigned to the target sentence. But this is
not compatible with the view that parsing is guided solely by the
principles of Minimal Attachment and Late Closure.
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Frazier (!987a) says that she expects Late Closure to be a
universal strategy, because if one assumes that the need to structure
material quickly is related to restrictions on human immediate memory
capacity, one may expect all humans to adopt the first available
constituent structure analysis, which, according to her, is provided by
the Minimal Closure and Late Closure strategies. Cuetos & Mitchell
(1988) conducted a number of experiments in order to find out whether
Late Closure is used in Spanish, which would add some evidence in
favour of Frazier's expectation that Late Closure is universal. In
the first experiment they presented Spanish subjects with sentences
containing a relative clause, such as:
2.41. El periodista entrevisto a la hija del coronel que tuvo el
accidente.
(The journalist interviewed the daughter of the colonel who had
the accident.)
The subjects were presented with a sentence followed by a question
for which they wrote down the answer.
	 For example, the question
following (2.41) was 'Who had had the accident?' (in Spanish).
	 Late
Closure predicts that the relative clause in these sentences is
attached to the lowest NP (del coronel in (2.41)). However, Cuetos &
Mitchell found that there was a marked tendency for Spanish subjects to
follow an Early Closure strategy, and attach the relative clause to the
second NP in the sentence (la hija in (2.4!)).	 They conducted the
sane experiment with English subjects, using as far as possible literal
translations of the Spanish test sentences. They found that English
subjects favoured the Late Closure reading over the Early Closure
reading, so that it seems that there is a genuine cross-linguistic
difference in the way that Spanish and English subjects process these
sentences.
Cuetos & Mitchell conducted a further three experiments, using a
clause-by-clause subject-paced reading task, to test whether the
Spanish subjects' preference for the Early Closure reading of the
sentences in the first experiment reflected on-line choices, or whether
the Spanish subjects initially used Late Closure, and then reversed the
majority of their decisions before answering the questions. They used
materials like the following:
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2.42. Pedro miraba el libro de la chica/ que estaba en el salon!
viendo la tele.
(Peter was looking at the book of the girl! who-that was in the
living room! watching TV.)
2.43. Alguien disparo contra el criado de la actriz,/ que estaba en al
balcon/ con su inarido.
(Someone shot the (male) servant of the actress! who was on the
balcony! with her husband.)
If an Early Closure strategy is adopted for these sentences, and the
relative clause is attached to, for example Lbro in (2.42), then the
reader should have some difficulty in interpreting the final clause,
because books do not watch TV.	 Cuetos & Mitchell found that the
results of their experiments indeed pointed to the use of an Early
rather than a Late Closure strategy.
	 However, as they point out:
(...) after we had completed the experirnen ts i t occurred
to us that we had inadvertently relied on the use of the
Late Closure strategy in designing the materials for the
on-line studies. The underlying rationale of these
experiments was that the final phrase or clause of each
sentence (e.g., "watching TV" in example [2.42]) should
have been easy
 to process if subjects had used the Late
Closure strategy to handle the preceding (ambiguous)
display but difficult to process if they had not.
However, it is clear that this prediction only follows if
the final display is itself attached to the material in the
second display (i.e. using Late Closure). If the relative
clause had been closed early, forcing the final display to
be attached at some higher point in the sentence (e.g., to
the word "girl" in example [2.42]), then there would not
necessarily have been any processing difficulty in this
condition. In other words, the results suggest that while
Early Closure was apparently used for the possessive
construction, Late Closure must have been used in attaching
the final adverbial clause to the relative clause. This
raises questions about the prevalence of Early and Late
Closure strategies in Spanish." (Cuetos & Mitchell, 1988,
pp.92-93).
One of the questions Cuetos & Mitchell address is why the 'general
rule' of Late Closure is overruled in some of the constructions used in
the experiments. They tentatively conclude that Early Closure may be
used by Spanish speakers in possessive constructions because in
Spanish, unlike in English, adjectives follow the noun, rather than
precede it. Because of this the sequence (...N-adj-RC...) is quite
common in Spanish. This might give rise to a generalized strategy of
the form (...N-[modifying constituent}-RC...) which would cause the
addressee to attach the relative clause to the first N when this
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constituent contains a noun phrase. This specialized strategy then
takes precedence over the more general Late Closure strategy which will
be used when this specific configuration is not encountered.
However, one can ask whether one can justifiably claim that if the
relative clause had been closed early there would not necessarily have
been any processing difficulty, because the final display would have
been attached higher up in the tree. Although it may be the case that
attaching the final display at some higher point does not present
processing difficulties from the point of view of syntactic processing,
it does imply a shift of focus and perspective:
2.44. Peter was looking at ((the book (of the girl))(that was in the
living-room))	 (the girl was) watching TV.
MacWhinney (1977) found that perspective maintenance or change
influences the ease of processing for languages like English and
German, and MacWhinney & Pleh (1988) found the same in a study of the
processing of restrictive relative clauses in Hungarian. They found
that sentences with relative clauses were processed easiest (leading to
lowest error rates) when the subject of the main clause was also the
subject of the relative clause, more difficult when the object of the
main clause was the subject or the object of the relative clause, and
most difficult when the subject of the main clause was the object of
the relative clause.	 This pattern of results is the same as that
found in English, French and German.
When we look at the analysis in (2.44) we see that the subject of
'watching tv' is not the subject or object of the main clause, but
rather the NP within the PP modifying the book (i.e. the PP which helps
determine which book is meant).
	 This means that the perspective is
changed even more dramatically than in the difficult SO pattern. If
this is the case, then we would expect processing difficulties to occur
on an Early Closure as well as a Late Closure reading of sentences like
(2.44). The findings of Cuetos & Mitchell then do not provide any
evidence for the use of the Late Closure strategy in Spanish, whereas
they do show that there are cases where it is not followed, i.e. the
possessive constructions.
Most studies set up to test the Late Closure strategy involve
written materials, which often give rise to unnatural constructions,
i.e. two clause sentences in which the clauses are not separated by a
comma. Carroll & Slowiaczek (1987) report on some experiments they
conducted to test the influence of prosodic structure on language
92
Late Closure
(Cathy kept)
Early Closure
(kept Cathy)
(op.cit., p. 224).
processing.	 In one experiment they used Early Closure /Late Closure
sentences like the following:
2.45a. Earl y Closure
[Because her grandmother knitted] [pullovers] [kept Cathy warm in
the wintertime].
b. Late Closure
[Because her grandmother knitted] [pullovers] [Cathy kept warm in
the wintertime].
In the experiment an Early Closure and a Late Closure form of each
of 40 sentences was spoken naturally and recorded.
	 These sentences
were then spliced as shown in (2.45). The segments of the two
versions of the sentence were recombined to form eight conditions,
involving a late (prosodic) boundary, an early boundary, both
boundaries and no boundary, for both the Late and Early Closure
sentences.
Carroll & Slowiaczek found that the prosodic information had an
important impact on how quickly the sentences were understood:
"When the prosodic information was inconsistent with the
syntactic information (i.e. in the late-closure/early-
boundary condi ti on or the early-closure/late-boundary
condition), response time was slower than in the consistent
conditions. In addition, the late-closure sentences were
generally conipreherided more rapidly than the early-closure
sentences. This experiment shows that prosodic
information can influence how a sentence is organized for
comprehension." (Carroll & Slowiaczek, 1987, p.225).
mean response times (in msecs.)
Late
boundary
(knitted
pullovers!)
1,132
1 , 798
Early
boundary
(knitted!
pullovers)
1,536
1 ,282
Both
boundaries
(knitted!
pullovers!)
1,142
1,537
No
boundary
(knitted
pullovers)
1,243
1,386
The results in the Late and Early boundary conditions are as could
be expected if one takes it that prosodic information applies before
parsing.	 However, when we look at the other two conditions the
results cannot be explained in such a straightforward way. In the
'both boundaries' condition we would expect the parser to go for the
Early Closure reading after encountering the first boundary (as happens
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in the 'early boundary' condition), and to reanalyze this to a Late
Closure reading after encountering the second boundary.
	
However, the
reading times do not reflect this. The reading time for the Late
Closure sentences turns out to be about as fast as in the 'late
boundary' condition (1,132 vs. 1,142), where we would expect it to be
slower. The reading time for the Early Closure sentences turns out to
be faster than in the Late closure condition (1,798 vs. 1,537), where
we would expect it to be slower, because on the assumption that the
Late Closure strategy was used, we would expect this to involve two
reanalyses (after encountering the second prosodic boundary and after
hearing kept).
In the 'no boundary' condition, the Late Closure strategy would
predict that the Late Closure analysis would be made in a
straightforward way (because there is no prosodic information which
would indicate otherwise), and we would expect the response times to
reflect the times of the 'late boundary' condition. However, when we
look at the response times, it turns out that the late closure reading
takes slightly longer than in the 'late boundary' condition (1,243 vs.
1,132). On the other hand the Early Closure reading takes a lot less
time than in the 'late boundary' condition (1,386 vs. 1,798).
Although the slightly longer response time for the late closure reading
might be explained by saying that this reflects the absence of
confirmation of the analysis by a prosodic boundary, this does not
explain why the early closure reading has a shorter response time. On
the Late Closure strategy, reanalysis would have to take place in these
sentences, and although there may not be confirmation of the Late
Closure analysis, there is no confirmation of the Early Closure
analysis either. These findings then do not constitute clear evidence
for the use of the Late Closure strategy. Note that when one
postulates that the parser makes use of the information that knit is a
transitive verb which may or may not have its object filled by a
lexical item, the findings in the last two conditions become far less
problematic to explain: no reanalysis would have to take place.
2.3. Conclusions.
When reviewing the evidence for the Late Closure strategy, it turns
out to be even weaker than the evidence for the Minimal Attachment
strategy. Several of the experiments reviewed above rely on materials
which in fact bias the reader towards the Late Closure reading, because
of the absence of a comma.	 When a comma is introduced in the
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materials (cf. Mitchell & Holmes, 1985) the effect disappears. In
fact we have seen that these findings can be better accounted for if we
postulate that the parser makes use of information about the argument
structure of verbs.
As we have seen, the fact that Minimal Attachment and Late Closure
seem successful in explaining some of the experimental findings is a
consequence of the way in which experimental materials presented, i.e.
in isolation. That this is the case is not surprising, if we accept
that, all other things being equal, people go for the analysis
involving least processing cost, which may well be an analysis which
involves minimal attachment or late closure, since often such an
analysis coincides with the reading for which one has to make fewest
extra assumptions. However, as was shown in several of the
experiments discussed above, when context is introduced, the preferred
reading of a sentence turns out to be the reading that is supported by
that context. In these cases, which resemble normal language use more
than do experimental sentences presented in isolation, following a
Minimal Attachment or Late Closure strategy regardless of context would
be costly in terms of processing effort, since reanalysis would have to
take place every time the Minimal Attachment or Late Closure analysis
did not coincide with the contextually supported reading. What we
have seen then is that the claim of Relevance theory that context plays
an essential role in disambiguation and other operations is not ruled
out by the experimental evidence, but is in fact supported by it.
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Chapter 3: Verb subcategorization information.
In the literature on sentence comprehension, it is generally
accepted that the processor makes use of verb subcategorizat ion
information (i.e. information about what kinds of arguments a verb can
take 1 ) at some stage in the process of interpretation. That we need
verb subcategorization information in interpreting sentences can be
illustrated by comparing the incomplete sentences in (3.1):
3.la. While John greeted the man
b. While John hesitated the man
Whereas we interpret the man as being greeted by John in (3.la), we
cannot get the interpretation that the man is hesitated by John in
(3.lb). Rather (3.lb) does not make sense unless we assume that the
man is the beginning of the main clause, and not part of the
subordinate clause. That we get these different interpretations for
(3.la) and (3.lb) can be explained by postulating that we recover the
subcategorization frames of the different verbs, which tell us that
greet takes two arguments, a subject and an object, whereas hesitate
only takes one argument, a subject.
If we assume that verb subcategorization information is used by the
processor then we have to ask how and when such information is used.
In the literature there are a number of different proposals concerning
this question (cf. Mitchell, 1989, for an overview).	 We can dis-
tinguish the different proposals along two lines. In terms of when
verb subcategorization information is used, we can distinguish models
which postulate that subcategorization information guides the processor
in assigning structure to the input, and models which postulate that
the processor first assigns a structure to the input using some
different strategy, and then uses subcategorization information to
check the consistency of the structure. Examples of serial checking
models are Frazier (1987a,b,c), and Mitchell (1987, 1989), who assume
that the processor assigns an initial structure according to the
principles of Minimal Attachment and Late Closure, and that
subcategorization information is used to check this initial structure.
Concerning the question of how verb subcategorization information
is used, we can distinguish models where subcategorization frames are
stored and accessed according to lexical preference, i.e. the processor
initially goes for the most probable or frequently used
subcategorization frame (serial), and models where all possible
subcategorization frames of a verb are recovered (parallel). The best
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known example of a serial guidance model is Ford, Bresnan & Kaplan's
(1982) lexical preference model, which postulates that when the
processor encounters a verb with multiple subcategorization frames, it
will initially select the preferred one, and only access any other
frame if it cannot assign a structure based on the preferred
subcategorization frame. An example of a parallel guidance model is
Fodor, Garrett & Bever's (1968) model, the lexical analysis strategy,
in which it is postulated that, on encountering the verb, the parser
retrieves all subcategorization frames of the verb and uses these to
assign structure to the sentence. 	 Models based on parallel access
have been criticized in the literature, on the grounds that the
predictions they make are not borne out. This type of model has been
said to predict that there will be an increase in processing load
following a complex verb (a verb with different subcategorization
frames) as compared to the processing load following a simple verb.
It has been argued that the experimental evidence does not support this
prediction (e.g. Frazier & Rayner, 1982, 1987; Hakes, 1971; Mitchell,
1989; Mitchell & Green, 1978).
In this chapter, I will evaluate the evidence that has been
presented in support of the different proposals. I will start by
looking in more detail at the evidence for models in which it is
assumed that subcategorization information becomes available serially,
according to lexical preference, either for guiding the processor, or
for checking the initial analysis.
Before we can establish which type of model reflects the way in
which the processor uses this information, we have to look at what it
means for subcategorization frames of verbs to be stored and accessed
according to lexical preference. According to Ford et al. (1982),
"It seems perfectly reasonable to assume that lexical forms
differ in their s trerzgth. It is well known that words
themselves vary in their salience. There are many studies
which show, for example, that words differ in their ease of
recogni tion depending on their frequency of usage. It is
thus plausible that lexical forms also vary in their
s trerzgth. (...) It may be that strength is determined by
the general frequency of usage in texts and speech in
society and that there is an underlying stability in the
human memory structure (...). But it could also be that
the immediate context of a sentence might dynamically
change the strength of lexical forms as a sentence is being
processed." (Ford et al., 1982, p. 745).
They put forward a number of different possibilities which make
different predictions. 	 In the first place, if the strength of
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different frames is determined by the general frequency of usage in
texts and speech in society, then we would expect that people in
different communities would have different preferences. For example,
we would expect that a test pilot would have the transitive frame of
fly as the preferred frame (as in I flew a DCJO yesterday), whereas a
business person who has to fly a lot would have the intransitive frame
as the preferred frame (as in I flew to Manchester last week). 	 This
possibility would mean that any findings concerning lexical preferences
would have to be relativized to the background of the subjects
involved. I will call this the 'weak preference claim'. In the
second place, if intra- or extra-sentential context can dynamically
change the strength of lexical forms as a sentence is being processed,
then we would need an account of how this process of changing the
strength takes place. 	 Only with such an account would we be able to
distinguish between a 'neutral' preference and a contextually induced
preference. It is only if there is an underlying stability in human
memory structure concerning lexical preferences, independent of
influences of different speech communities and of context, that we will
be able to use specific findings concerning verb frame preferences as
the basis of further experiments, regardless of the backgrounds of the
subjects involved. I will call this the 'strong preference claim'.
3.1. Lexical preference.
Although there are many proponents of the view that verbs are
stored and accessed according to their preferred readings, either in
guiding the processor or in checking the initial structure, it is very
difficult to find evidence which unequivocally supports this view. If
we conduct experiments to establish if and when lexically preferred
forms of the verb play a role in the interpretation process, then we
need to know which subcategorization frame is actually the preferred
one. Three sources are used for establishing which subcategorization
frame of a verb is the preferred one: introspection, where authors
rely on their own intuitions concerning preferred readings of verbs;
conscious preference judgments, where subjects are asked to say which
of two readings of a sentence they prefer, for example, a reading with
the verb used transitively or a reading with the verb used
intransitively; and sentence completion tasks, where subjects are, for
example, given a noun phrase and verb, and are asked to complete the
sentence.	 There are a number of problems with these tasks, which
raise the question of how reliable they are in giving us an insight in
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the way in which verb subcategorization information is actually stored
and accessed.
3.1.1. Introspection.
That judgments concerning language processing based on
introspection should be treated with extreme caution was shown, f or
example, in the experiments by Swinney (e.g. Swinney, 1979, 1982). As
we saw in Chapter 1, Swinney tested the intuition that biasing contexts
facilitate lexical decisions.	 He presented subjects with sentences
like I wanted to write a letter to my mother but I couldn 't find a
and then presented subjects with words about which they had to decide
whether they were words or non—words. He found that decision times
were faster for words related to the target word (i.e. pen), such as
ink, than for words which were unrelated to the target word, such as
king. However, pen is ambiguous between a reading as 'writing
material' and 'animal enclosure', and Swinney found that words related
to the reading of the target word which was not facilitated by the
sentential context, such as pig were also recognized faster than the
unrelated word.	 However, introspection led people to believe that
only words related to the reading of the the target word facilitated by
the context would evoke faster reaction times. 	 Ford et al. (1982)
refer to findings concerning word recognition to argue that it seems
perfectly reasonable to assume that lexical forms of verbs vary in
their salience (see quote above). However, on a par to that claim, we
could take the Swinney results to indicate that all verb
subcategorization frames are momentarily activated and that all but the
contextually appropriate one are immediately discarded. One of the
things that the Swinney experiments showed then, was that introspection
can give us interesting intuitions, but empirical research may prove
them wrong.
3.1.2. Conscious preference judgments.
Conscious preference judgments are in a sense another form of
introspection, because again the experiment relies on subjects'
intuitions. In these experiments, subjects are asked to say which
interpretation of a sentence they prefer, for example, an
interpretation with the transitive reading of the verb or an
interpretation with the intransitive reading of the verb. Ford et al.
(1982) tested people's intuitions about different sentences using the
conscious preference judgment method.
	
Twenty subjects were given a
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booklet containing ambiguous sentences, and were asked to give their
preferred interpretations. Of the sixty-seven sentences tested in
this way, thirty-three sentences were concerned with verb-argument
structure, testing sixteen different verbs, as illustrated in (3.2) and
(3.3), with their possible interpretations in (3.2a,b) and (3.3a,b):
3.2. The woman wanted the dress on that rack.
a. The woman wanted the dress which was on that rack. (90%)
b. The woman wanted it (the dress) on that rack. (10%)
3.3. The woman positioned the dress on that rack.
a. The woman positioned the dress which was on that rack. (30%)
b. The woman positioned it (the dress) on that rack. (70%)
(The percentages at the end of the (a,b) sentences are the percentages
of subjects preferring that interpretation.)
Ford et al. found that six of the thirty-three gave a result
contrary to their expectations. For the remaining twenty-seven
sentences they found that the preference in four sentences was a ratio
of 45%-55%, in three sentences a ratio of 60%-40X, and in four a ratio
of 65%-35%. The preference in the remaining sentences was a ratio of
70%-30% upwards, with two sentences having an absolute preference
(100%-OX).
A problem with this sort of testing is that it is not clear what is
actually tested. Although it could be the case that these results
show the order in which verb subcategorization frames are stored and
accessed, it could also be the case that the preferences shown for some
readings over others is the result of the overall interpretation of the
sentence.	 Clifton, Frazier & Connine (1984) discuss the examples in
(3.2) and (3.3) of Ford et al., and say that:
"(...) the intuitions used as data in investigations such
as this may be sensitive to very late stages of processing,
and they seem likely to be sensitive to pragmatic
information, including information about relations among
the entities mentioned in the sentence (racks are things
that dresses are positioned on)." (Clifton et al., 1984,
p. 697).
A different example is the following. 	 Ford et a!. gave subjects a
sentence like (3.4):
4. Joe bought the book for Susan.
3.4a. Joe bought it (the book) for Susan.
b. Joe bought the book which was for Susan.
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They found that 80% of the subjects preferred the reading in (3.4a),
whereas 20% of the subjects preferred the reading in (3.4b):
Ford et al. take this as showing that the preferred subcatego-
rization frame of buy is the one with three arguments, as in (3.4a)
rather than the one with two arguments, as in (3.4b). However, the
result found for (3.4) is not necessarily evidence for lexical
preference. An alternative explanation could be the following: to
interpret (3.4) the subject has to make a number of assumptions, for
example, the assumptions that Joe existed, that Joe bought something,
that Joe bought a book. The word bought gives access to information
about buying, for example, the information that when we buy something,
we do that either for ourselves or for somebody else, which gives the
interpretation in (3.4a). In order to get the interpretation in
(3.4b) the subject has to make the extra assumption that it is relevant
to know which particular book Joe bought, namely the one for Susan.
However, because the sentence is read in isolation, there is no context
which would encourage the subject to make this extra assumption, so
that the interpretation involving least assumptions is (3.4a).
Ford et al. tested the verb carry in the sentence in (3.5), with
the two interpretations in (3.5a) and (3.5b):
3.5. Joe carried the package f or Susan.
a. Joe carried the package which was for Susan. (10%)
b. Joe carried it (the package) for Susan. (90%)
They interpret the result that 90% of subjects prefer the reading in
(3.5b) to mean that the preferred subcategorization frame of carry is
the one with three arguments.
However, they found that by putting a bit more context in the
sentence they could affect the syntactic biases, as in (3.6) and (3.7):
3.6. When he arrived at our doorstep, I could see that Joe carried a
package for Susan.
a. Joe carried a package which was for Susan. (75%)
b. Joe carried it (the package) for Susan. (25%)
3.7. Whenever she got tired, Joe carried a package for Susan.
a. Joe carried a package which was f or Susan. (5%)
b. Joe carried it (the package) for Susan. (95%)
Ford et al. say that they are not concerned with the effects of
context, but rather with how the contextually neutral preferences for
alternative subcategorization frames govern closure.
	 They use
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ambiguous sentences for which they assume that the different readings
are equally reasonable in meaning. They postulate that any variation
in preference for these sentences must therefore arise from the
strength of the preferences for the alternative subcategorization
frames of the verbs involved. They use this argument to dismiss the
finding that the lexical content of the grammatical arguments of a
predicate can influence the bias, as in (3.8) and (3.9):
3.8. The Boy Scout carried the package for his pet.
a. The Boy Scout carried the package which was for his pet. (75%).
b. The Boy Scout carried it (the package) for his pet. (25%).
3.9. The Boy Scout carried the package for his aunt.
a. The Boy Scout carried the package which was for his aunt. (10%).
b. The Boy Scout carried it (the package) for his aunt. (90%).
However, this finding raises the question of whether one can be sure
that a reported preference constitutes the preferred reading of a verb
per se, or whether it constitutes a preferred reading induced by the
other lexical material in the sentence.
Ford et al. use the argument of lexical bias to explain the
result obtained for sentence (3.10), which was contrary to their
expectations, even though both interpretations seem quite 'reasonable':
3.10. Her mother placed a $20 bill in the book for Mary.
a. Her mother placed a $20 bill in the book which was for Mary. (35%)
b. Her mother placed a $20 bill there (in the book) for Mary. (65%)
This result can be contrasted with the sentence in (3.11), which Ford
et al. take to show the lexical preference for place:
3.11. The secretary placed the schedules in the packages for the
participants.
a. The secretary placed the schedules in the packages which were for
the participants. (60%)
b. The secretary placed the schedules there (in the packages) for
the participants. (40%)
In order to account for the finding for (3.10), they say that:
"In sentence [3.10], the phrase her mother produces a bias
against the interpretation our theory would predict
subjects to favor. The use of the phrase her mother
assumes that the reader knows who her refers to or that the
information will be specified. In the interpretation we
were expecting to be the preferred one, Mary cannot be
taken as the person to which her refers, while in the other
interpretation her can refer to Mary."
	
°i' cit., p.785).
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However, in the same vein one can argue that the phrase in the
packages, in which the definite article indicates that the packages are
some particular packages, produces a bias against the interpretation of
(3.11) as (3.11b), because it would be strange if the secretary placed
schedules for the participants in packages which were not for those
participants. It would be interesting to see what would be the
preferred interpretation of (3.11) if the phrase in the packages was
replaced by a phrase like on the table or on the counter, as in
(3.11'):
3.11'. The secretary placed the schedules on the table/on the counter
for the participants.
Ford et al. argue that the different results obtained for sentence
(3.12), containing the verb warn, and sentence (3.13), containing the
verb debate, is due to their different preferred lexical forms:
3.12. Those are the boys that the police warned about fighting.
a. The police warned the boys about fighting. (89%) n=19
b. The police warned about fighting the boys. (11%) n=19
3.13. Those are the boys the police debated about fighting.
a. The police debated the boys about fighting. (45%)
b. The police debated about fighting the boys. (55%)
The different interpretations of (3.12) and (3.13), Ford et al. argue,
depends on where the subjects perceive a gap in the sentence, and this
in turn is dependent on the preferred lexical form of the verb. For
warn they assume this to be (subj), (obj), (about obj), and therefore
they argue that a gap will be postulated after warn.	 For debate, on
the other hand, they assume that the preferred form is (subj)(about
obj), so that a gap will not be postulated after debate. However,
this proposal does not explain why the findings for (3.13) are far less
convincing than the findings for (3.12). For (3.13) the ratio is 45%-
55%, i.e. 9 subjects versus 11 subjects, whereas for (3.12) the ratio
is 89%-11%, i.e. 2 subjects versus 17 subjects.
A different explanation of the findings is possible which does not
make use of the notion of lexical preference, and which can account for
the difference in ratio in the findings for (3.12) and (3.13). When
we look at (3.12), we see that there are two groups of individuals
explicitly mentioned, the boys and the police. The preferred reading
of (3.12), (3.!2a), only involves those two groups of individuals,
because we understand that the police warn the boys about fighting.
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However, to get the interpretation in (3.12b) we have to construct a
context containing a number of extra assumptions. For example, we
would have to assume that there is another individual or several
individuals involved, who have not been explicitly introduced into the
context. We would also have to assume that these individuals have the
intention of fighting the boys. Moreover, we would have to assume
that the police knows about their intention to fight the boys, and do
not want them to fight the boys, or believe that the boys are
dangerous.	 We cannot interpret (3.12) as saying that the police
warned themselves. In (3.13) we see that again there are two groups
of individuals which are explicitly mentioned, the boys and the police.
In the interpretation in (3.13a), which is like (3.12a), only these two
groups of individuals are involved. However, in the interpretation in
(3.13b) it is also the case that only these two groups of individuals
are involved: we understand the interpretation in (3.13b) as
expressing that the police were debating amongst themselves about
fighting the boys. In other words we do not have to set up a context
containing extra assumptions to get the interpretation in (3.13b), as
we have to do in order to get the interpretation in (3.12b). Because
both the (3.13a) and the (3.13b) interpretations are obtainable without
one having to create an elaborate context, there is not much reason to
prefer the one to the other, which is reflected in the almost equal
numbers of subjects preferring one or the other interpretation (9
versus 11 subjects).
In the sentence in (3.14) the preferred reading is (3.14a) rather
then (3.14b):
3.14. They signaled to everyone that they couldn't hear.
a. They signaled to everyone the fact that they couldn't hear. (90%)
b. They signaled to everyone who they couldn't hear. (10%)
Ford et al. take this to mean that the preferred lexical form of signal
is the one in (3.14a) rather than the one in (3.14b). However, for the
sentence in (3.15), which also involves the verb signal they found that
there was no preferred lexical form:
3.15. They signaled to someone that they couldn't hear.
a. They signaled to someone the fact that they couldn't hear. (50%)
b. They signaled to someone who they couldn't hear. (50%)
Ford et al. argue that this result is due to the fact that the sentence
in (3.15) is not well constructed: "Neither interpretation of the
sentence seems very sensible because of the vagueness of someone."
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(op. cit., p. 785). However, this argument is not very satisfactory,
because one would expect that if lexical preference guides the
processor in assigning a structure to a sentence, then the vagueness of
a lexical item in a sentence should cause the lexical preference to
show up even more strongly than in a sentence in which the content of
the lexical items could influence the overall interpretation of the
sentence more.
Ford et al. argue that the preferred lexical form of object in a
sentence with a choice between a relative clause reading and a
complement clause reading, as in (3.16) and (3.17), is the relative
clause reading:
3.16. The tourists objected to the guide that they couldn't hear.
a. The tourists objected to the guide who they couldn't hear. (55%)
b. The tourists objected to the guide about the fact that they
couldn't hear. (45%)
3.17. They objected to everyone that they couldn't hear.
a. They objected to everyone who they couldn't hear. (55%)
b. They objected to everyone about the fact that they couldn't hear.
(45%)
However, when we look at the results we see that again (as was the case
with (3.13)), these are not very compelling: for both (3.16) and
(3.17) there is a ratio of 45%-55%, i.e. 9 subjects versus 11 subjects.
Ford et al. do not give an explanation of why the lexical preference
does not show up more strongly in these examples.
I propose that the explanation of these findings lies in the fact
that not only can the verb object occur with different argument
structures, but moreover, those different argument structures express
different meanings of object, in other words, the verb object is
ambiguous although the different senses are closely related. When we
compare object to a verb like carry we see that whereas carry continues
to express a meaning like bear or transport whether or not it occurs
with a benefactive phrase like for Susan, as in (3.5), object either
expresses that the subject feels disapproval towards the object, as in
(3.16a) and (3.17a), or it expresses that the subject brings forward or
states something in opposition to something, as in (3.16b) and (3.17b).
That this is the case is borne out by the fact that the prepositional
phrases in (3.16) and (3.17) have different thematic roles in the
different interpretations: in the (a) interpretations the object of to
is the theme, whereas in the (b) interpretations the object of to is
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the goal and the subordinate clause is the theme. The sense of object
as in the (b) sentences itself can occur with different
subcategorization frames, i.e. both with a goal and a theme, or just
with a theme as in (3.18):
3.18. They objected that the proposal would cost too much money.
This means that what Ford et al. are testing with the sentences in
(3.16) and (3.17) is not which subcategorization frame of object is the
preferred one, but rather which sense of object is the preferred one;
and the result shows that there is no strong preference either way.
We can therefore conclude that the results obtained by Ford et al.
do not constitute evidence for the claim that verbs are accessed
according to lexical preference, either to guide the processor or to
check the initial structure assigned by the processor to a sentence.
Al of the results which seem to support lexical preference can also be
explained in terms of the assumptions a reader has to make in order to
get a full interpretation of the sentence. Results which do not
support their proposal, or which show only a slight preference for one
interpretation rather than the other, are not explained in a
satisfactory way by Ford et al. but can in fact be explained without
having to postulate that they are due to lexical preference.
Ford et al. argue that they are not concerned with context, but
that they want to test how the 'contextually neutral strength' of
different subcategorization frames influences the interpretation
process. However, presenting a sentence in isolation does not mean
that it is not processed in a context; the 'null context' is a context
which has no assumptions in it. However, because the lexical items in
the sentence give access to assumptions related to those lexical items,
a richer context is built during the interpretation process, so that
even when the addressee starts with the 'null context', it won't be
empty anymore at the end of the interpretation process. The initial
absence of assumptions may actually influence the interpretation
process to a certain interpretation, not because it is 'contextually
neutral', but rather because making extra assumptions will not yield a
more plausible interpretation. Because the preference judgment is
made after the sentence has been processed as a whole, this means that
the sentence can never be 'contextually neutral', regardless of whether
semantic and pragmatic information become available early or late in
the interpretation process.
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3.1.3. Sentence completion tasks.
Sentence completion tasks face a similar problem as conscious
preference judgments. They are usually a form of 'gap-filling' task
in which subjects are presented with incomplete sentences (for example,
a noun phrase followed by a verb) and are asked to complete the
sentence. If subjects tend to complete the sentence giving the
transitive reading of the verb, then this is taken to be the preferred
reading of that verb. But again, it can be objected that the lexical
material present may influence the way in which a subject completes a
sentence. For example, if we compare the incomplete sentences (3.19a)
and (3.19b):
3.19a. The plant grows
3.19b. The gardener grows
it seems to me that (3.19a) invites a completion in which the
intransitive reading of the verb is preferred, whereas (3.19b) invites
a completion in which the transitive reading of the verb is preferred.
A different form of the sentence completion task is the norming
procedure, which involves subjects making up sentences about certain
topics using specified verbs. This method of testing subjects'
preferences could be problematic since the choice of topic might
influence the reading of the verb that the subjects prefer to use.
For example, the verb approve can either be used with an object to
express something like 'to agree officially to' (e.g. The minister
approved the plan), or it can be used with of and an object to express
something like 'to consider good' (e.g. I don't approve of silly
people). It could be the case that the first reading would be used
more often with a topic like 'news and current events', and the second
reading would be used more often with a topic like 'clothes', or
'parties'.
Connine, Ferreira, Jones, Clifton & Frazier (1984) report on two
experiments they conducted to establish verb frame preferences using
the norming procedure. In the first experiment 39 subjects received a
list of 46 verbs, and 39 subjects received a list of 45 different
verbs, and both groups were asked to write a sentence for each verb,
about some topic. Topics given included 'sports', 'schoolwork', 'news
and current events', 'animals' and 'clothes'. In the second
experiment 29 subjects received a list of 66 verbs, of which 30 had
also been used in the first experiment, with a setting rather than a
topic.	 These settings were 'home', 'downtown' and 'school'.
	 Again
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the subjects were asked to write a sentence for each verb. Connine et
al. found that sentences were made up in nineteen different categories
of syntactic structure, given below with example sentences:
1. [1
2. [PP]
3. [inf-S]
4. [inf-S]/PP/
5. [Wh-S]
6. [that-S]
7. [verb-ing]
8. [perception compl.]
9. [NP]
10. [NP][NP]
11. [NP][PP]
12. [NP] [inf-SJ
13. [NP] [Wh-S]
14. [NP] [that-S]
15. [adj. or N]
16. passive
17. use verb as noun.
18. use verb as adjective.
19. other, unclassifiable.
The teacher remembered.
The teacher remembered in class.
The teacher remembered to talk.
The teacher remembered to talk in class.
The teacher remembered who to punish.
The teacher remembered that Tom flunked.
The teacher escaped failing Tom.
The teacher heard Tom leave.
The teacher remembered his books.
The teacher gave Tom his books.
The teacher gave his books to Tom.
The teacher told Tom to study.
The teacher asked Tom what to teach.
The teacher told Tom that he should study.
The teacher flew home.
The teacher was attacked.
Connine et al. assume that the verb frame preferences of writers
are similar to the preferences of readers and listeners, and that these
preferences will decide what kind of sentence is made up. They report
that their findings were such that the data can be used as a
serviceable index of verb frame preference. However, this claim is
based on their computing a measure of transitive bias by dividing the
number of transitive completions (categories 9-14 above), by the number
of transitive plus intransitive completions (intransitive categories 1-
6 above). Although this measure shows differences in transitive bias
for different verbs, it does not distinguish among the different
possible subcategorization frames within the transitive categories,
which play a crucial role in the proposal of Ford et al. (1982).
When we look at Connine et al.'s findings in detail, a more complex
picture emerges. If verb frame preferences are the same for the
different subjects, one would expect that high percentages of subjects
would go for the same syntactic structure. However, the findings of
Connine et al. do not unequivocally support this assumption. 	 When we
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look at the ninety-seven verbs that were used only once, either in
experiment 1 or experiment 2, we see that only four verbs show a
preference over 80% for one subcategorization frame: 92% of subjects
gave a sentence with try [inf-S], 90% of subjects gave a sentence with
continue [inf-S], 82% of subjects gave a sentence with object [PP], and
82% of subjects gave a sentence with attempt [inf-S]. For three verbs
one frame was used by 70%-80% of subjects, for seven verbs one frame
was used by 60%-70% of subjects, and for sixteen verbs one frame was
used by 50%-60% of subjects. In other words, for thirty out of
ninety-seven verbs, half or more of the subjects used the same lexical
frame. On the other hand, for twenty-four out of ninety-seven verbs,
the most used verb frame was only used by between 13% and 33% of
subjects, while for a further fourteen verbs, the most used frame was
used by just over one third of subjects, i.e. between 34% and 38%.
Furthermore, for motion, the highest percentage of subjects using a
frame was equal among three frames: 18% of subjects used [PP], 18% of
subjects used [inf-S PP] and 18% of subjects used [NP inf-S}. 	 For
nine verbs, the highest percentage of subjects using a frame was equal
between two frames. For seven verbs, the difference between the two
most used frames was one subject; for thirteen verbs, the difference
between the two most used frames was two subjects; for eight verbs the
difference between the two most used frames was three subjects; and for
five verbs the difference between the two most used frames was four
subjects. In other words, for forty-three out of ninety-seven verbs,
the difference between the two most used verb frames was between nil
and four subjects. What we see then is that at the one hand almost a
third of the verbs tested have a lexical frame which is preferred by at
least half of the subjects, while on the other hand, over a third of
the verbs tested have as the most used frame a frame which is preferred
by between 13% and just over a third of subjects. Furthermore, we see
that of the ninety-seven verbs tested we find that almost half of the
verbs have two verb frames which are preferred by about equal numbers
of subjects.
These findings then rule out the 'strong preference claim', at
least for language production, since on that view, we would predict
that high percentages of subjects would show preference for one frame
for all verbs. It could be argued that these findings support the
'weak preference claim', the claim that the strength of different
frames is determined by the different speech communities that the
subjects belong to.	 On this view, it could be argued that different
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lexical frames of different verbs are more or less specific to
different speech communities, which would show up in more unified or
more diversified uses of these different verbs. However, in both
experiments all subjects were undergraduates of the University of
Massachusetts, which implies that they at least share one important
speech community. 	 A possible alternative explanation of these
findings could be that the use of different verb frames of some verbs
is more constrained by the topic than of other verbs. Connine et
al.'s findings for the thirty verbs which were used in both experiments
might shed further light on this question. If the order of preference
of lexical frames of different verbs is more or less sensitive to
influences from specific speech communities, we would expect that verbs
which show high percentages for one verb frame would show this
preference in both experiments. On the other hand, if a high
percentage for a specific lexical frame in the first experiment is due
to the topic, or to some other factor, then it would not necessarily
follow that this high percentage will be duplicated in the second
experiment.
When we look at the thirty verbs which were used in both experiments,
we find the following results. In both experiments together there
were eleven verbs of which one lexical frame was used by more than half
of the subjects. Comparing the results of the two experiments, we see
that for three of these eleven verbs the most used frame differed in
the two experiments, which does not support the view that lexical
preference is used:
1stexperiment	 ______________
call	 [NP]
	
54%
	
[Adj or N] 24%, [NP] 21%
paint	 [NP PP] 46%, [NP] 26%
	
[NP]
	
59%
read	 [NP]
	
62%
	
[NP PP]
	
38%, [NP] 21%
For the other eight verbs the same lexical frame was used most often,
which could point at lexical preference being used. However, for
these eight verbs the percentages of subjects choosing the verb frame
in the two experiments differed between 1% and 32%:
1st experiment	 2nd experiment	 difference
2nd experiment
promise
refuse
leave
visit
watch
buy
[mI—SI 51%
[inf—S] 95%
[NP]
	
54%
[NP]
	
56%
[NP]
	
60%
[NP]
	
49%
[inf—S] 52%	 1%
[inf—S} 97%	 2%
[NP]
	
48%	 6%
[NP]
	
48%	 8%
[NP]
	
48%	 12%
[NP]
	
66%	 13%
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clean	 [NP]
	
56%	 [NP]
	
31%	 25%
beg	 [PP]
	
60%	 [PP]
	
28%	 32%
Only for refuse is there an almost absolute preference for one lexical
frame. Of the other seven verbs, only two show the same relative
preferences for the two most used lexical frames:
buy	 (1) [NP] 49%,	 [NP PP] 15%,	 [NP inf-S] 13%
	
(2) [NP] 66%,
	 [NP PP] 21%,	 [NP NP]
	
7%
	
visit (1) [NP] 56%,
	 [NP PP] 36%,	 [I - [PP] 3%
	
(2) [NP] 48%,	 [NP PP] 24%,	 [Adj or N] 13%
whereas the other five verbs differ for the second and third frames
with highest percentages:
beg	 (1) [PP]
	
60%,
	
(2) [PP]
	
28%,
	
clean (1) [NP]
	
56%,
	
(2) [NP]
	
31%,
	
leave (1) [NP]
	
54%,
	
(2) [NP]
	
48%,
promise(1) [inf-S] 51%,
(2) [inf-S] 52%,
	
watch (1) [NP]
	
60%,
	
(2) [NP]
	
48%,
[NP mI-SI 28%,
[NP Wh-S] 21%,
[NP PP] 21%,
[PP} 13%,
[NP inf-S] 13%,
[Adj or N] 17%,
[NP that-S] 26%,
[that-SI 21%,
[perc comp] 13%,
[NP PP} 31%,
[inf-SJ - [NP PP] 5%
[inf-S] 17%
[PP] 13%
[NP PP] 10%
[NP PP] 10%
[Inf-S) - [NP PP] 7%
[NP PP] - [that-S] 5%
[NP that-S] 13%
[NP Wh-SJ 10%
[PP] 10%
These findings cannot, therefore, be taken as conclusive evidence for
lexical preference being used in language production.
When we look at the remaining nineteen verbs used in both
experimenI, again the findings do not unequivocally support the view
that lexical preference is used: only one verb shows very similar
results in the two experiments:
	
fight (1) [PP] 38%,
	 [ ] 28%,	 [NP] 8%
	
(2) [PP] 28%,	 [1 10%,	 [NP] 7% - [Adj or N] 7%
A further six verbs have the same frame with highest percentage in both
experiments, but differ for the second and third frames with highest
percentages:
	
drive (1) [PP} 44%,	 [NP] - [NP PP] 21%
	
(2) [PP] 34%,	 [Adj or N] 28%,	 [NP PP] 13%
fly	 (1) [PP] 49%, 	 [ ] 13%,	 [NP PP] 8%
	
(2) [PP] 45%,	 [Adj or NJ 38%,	 [ ] 7%
hear	 (1) [NP] 33%, 	 [that-S] 18%,
	 [PP] 15%
	
(2) [NP] 41%,	 [NP PP] 28%,	 [that-S] 13%
hire	 (1) [NP] 41%,	 [NP inf-SJ 23%,	 [NP PP] 15%
	
(2) [NP] 38%,	 [NP PP] 28%,	 passive 13%
race	 (1) [PP] 49%, 	 [in.f-S] 28%,	 [ ] 8%
	
(2) [PPI 31%,	 [Adj or N] 21%,	 [ ] 10%
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sing	 (1) [PP} 33%,
	 [ 1 23%,	 [NP P1']
	
21%
(2) [PP] 41%,	 [NP PP] 21%,	 [NP] 13%
Moreover, seven verbs got different results in the two experiments:
ask	 (1) [NP Wh-S} 26%,
	 [NP] 21%,	 [PP] 18%
(2) [NP] 38%,
	 [NP PP] 28%,	 [NP Wh-S] 13%
choose(1) [inf-S] 31%,
	 [NP] 26%,	 [NP inf-S] 18%
(2) [NP] 38%
	 [PP] 34%,	 [NP PP] 10%
debate(1) [P1'] 33%,
	 [Wh-S] 26%,	 [NP] 21%
(2) [Wh-S] 17%,
	 [PP] 10%,	 [NP] - [NP PP] 3%
know (1) [Wh-S] 38%,
	 [that-SI 26%,
	 [Wh-S] - [NP PP] 17%
(2) [that-S] 28%,	 [NP] 24%,	 [NP PP] 10%
study (1) [NP] 33%,
	 [PP} 23%,	 [ ] - [NP PP] 13%
(2) [PP] 48%,	 [ ] 21%,	 [inf-S]-[Wh-S]-[NP P1'] 7%
teach (1) [NP] 49%,	 [NP Wh-S] 15%, [NP PP] 10%
(2) [NP PP] 28%,
	 [PP] 24%,	 [NP] 13%
tell (1) [NP that-S] 28%, [NP] 18%,
	 [NP Wh-S] 13%
(2) [NP Wh-S] 24%,
	 [NP]-[NP inf-S] 17%
help (1) [perc compl]-[NP inf-S] 21%,	 [NP]-[NP PP] 15%
(2) [NP PP] 24%,	 [NP]-[NP inf-S] 13%
The last four verbs did not show strong differences between the
different frames, bt showed differences in percentages between nil and
ten percent (3 subjects):
order (1) [NP] 31%,
	 [NP inf-S] 28%,
	 [NP PP] 18%
(2) [NP]-[NP PP] 28%,	 [inf-S]-[NP inf-S] 3%
play (1) [PPJ-[NP P1'] 36%,
	 [ ]-[NP] 10%
(2) [PP] 34%,
	 [NP PPil 24%, [ ] 21%,	 [NP] 17%
signal(1) [NP] 23%,
	 [PP]-[NP inf-S] 15%
(2) [NP]-[NP inf-S] 13%, [PP]-[NP PP] 7%
write (1) [NP]-[NP PP] 28%,
	 [PP] 1%,	 [ ] 13%(2) [NP] 28%,
	 [NP PP] 24%,	 [Adj or N] 17%
Connine et al.'s findings do not give us a clear indication that
lexical preference is used in language production. Even their claim
that the findings show a general transitive-intransitive bias is
problematic in the face of verbs like choose, study and play, which
give quite different biases in the different experiments:
choose(1) [mi-SI 31%,
	 [NP] 26%,	 [NP inf-S] 18%
(2) [NP] 38%	 [PP] 34%,
	 [NP PP] 10%
study (1) [NP] 33%,	 [PP] 23%,	 [ ] - [NP PP] 13%
(2) [PP] 48%,
	 [ ] 21%,	 [inf-S]-[Wh-S]-[NP PP] 7%
play (1) [PPI-[NP PP] 36%,
	 [ J-[NP] 10%
(2) [PP] 34%,
	 [NP P1'] 24%,	 [ ] 21%,	 [NP] 17%
If lexical preference guides both language production and
comprehension, then we would expect the findings of Connine et al. to
emulate the findings of Ford et al. (1982). However, this is only the
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case for a few verbs. Of the sixteen verbs tested on argument
structure by Ford et al., eleven were also tested by Connine et al.
When we compare the results we see the following:
Two verbs, carry and debate give rise to the same sort of results
in the different experiments: for carry, Ford et al. found a strong
preference (90%) for the [NP PP] frame over the [NP] frame (at least in
one of their test sentences, see above). Connine et al. also found
that more people used the [NP PP] frame then the [NP] frame (60%-30%).
For debate, Ford et al. found a slight preference (55%) for the [PP]
frame over the [NP PP] frame; this was also reflected in the Connine
et al. results (33%-3%, and 10%-3%).
Four further verbs, discuss, want, tell and position, gave rise to
strong preferences in Ford et al.'s experiments, which were not
reflected in Connine et al.'s findings: for discuss, Ford et al. found
a 100% preference for the [NP PP] frame over the [NP] frame. Connine
et al., on the other hand, found that only 2 subjects preferred the [NP
PP] frame over the [NP] frame (51%-46%). For want, Ford et al. found
a very strong preference for the [NP] frame (90%) over the [NP PP]
frame; Connine et al. found the same preference, but in greatly
reduced form (28%-lOX, i.e. 7 subjects).
	 For tell, Ford et al. found
a strong preference (90%) for the [NP that-SI frame over the [NP]
frame. In the first experiment of Connine et al. this result was
emulated, although in greatly reduced form (28%-13%). However, in the
second experiment the [NP] frame was used more often than the [NP that-
SI frame (17%-lOX). For position, Ford et al. found a preference of
70% for the [NP PP] frame over the [NP] frame; Connine et al. only
found that 3 subjects preferred the [NP PP] frame over the [NP] frame
(36%-28%).
For object the pattern was reversed: while Ford et al. only found
a slight preference for the [PP] frame over the [NP PP] frame (55%),
Connine et al. found a strong preference for the [PP] frame over the
[NP PP] frame (82%-3%).
The remaining four verbs, keep, signal, buy, and include, gave rise
to quite different results in the different experiments: for keep,
Ford et al. found a strong preference (95%) for the [NP PP] frame over
the [NP] frame, but Connine et al. found a strong preference the other
way around (46%-13%). For signal, Ford et al. found a strong
preference (90%) for the [NP PP] frame over the [NP] frame; on the
other hand, in both their experiments, Connine et al. found a slight
preference for the [NP] frame over the [NP PP] frame (23%-lOX, 13%-7%).
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For buy, Ford et al. found a strong preference (80%) for the [NP PP]
frame over the [NP] frame, while Connine et al. found a strong
preference the other way around in both experiments (49%-15%, 66%-21%).
For include, Ford et al. found a preference for the [NP] frame (65%)
over the [NP PP] frame; Connine et al. found a slight preference for
the [NP PPJ frame over the [NP] frame (46%-41%).
If lexical preference is used at all, the preferences appear to
vary depending on whether we are dealing with language production or
comprehension. This in itself is not problematic for models with
separate lexicons for production and comprehension. flowever, neither
the Ford et al. findings, nor the Connine et al. findings present
compelling evidence for the assumption that communicators use lexical
preference at all.
3.1.4. Experiments based on sentence completion tasks.
Clifton, Frazier & Connine (1984) report on two experiments which
they conducted to test whether lexical preference regarding transitive—
intransitive use of verbs plays a role in sentence comprehension. In
the first experiment subjects read 48 transitive and intransitive
sentences containing transitive or intransitive bias verbs, as in
(3.20):
3.20. Verb
	 Sentence	 Sentence
preference form
a. transitive transitive
	 The babysitter read the @ story to the
sick child.
b. intransitive transitive
	 The babysitter sang the @ story to the
sick child.
c. transitive intransitive The babysitter read to @ the sick
child.
d. intransitive intransitive The babysitter sang to @ the sick
child.
The sentence presentation was interrupted at @ for a secondary task.
These sentences were presented visually one word at a time. A word or
nonword irrelevant to the current sentence was presented directly
following the first word after the verb, and subjects were asked to
make a lexical decision about these words. Clifton et al. found that
reaction times were significantly shorter or longer depending on
whether the verb bias coincided with the sentence form or not:
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Verb preference
Sentence form
	 Preferred transitive	 Preferred intransitive
Transitive	 908	 1008
Intransitive	 1000	 877
Mean reaction times in ins.
These findings seem to support the assumption that lexical preference
guides the processor in assigning structure to the sentence. However,
when we look at the materials used, there are a few problems. In
order to determine which verbs have transitive or intransitive bias,
Clifton et al. (1984) followed the forming procedure, along the lines
of Connine et al. (1984) discussed above, apart from for a few verbs
for which the experimenters' judgment was taken to be indicative of
lexical preference. As we saw above, it is not clear that results
obtained from the forming procedure can be taken as reflecting lexical
preference, and besides, when the Connine et al. findings are compared
with the Ford et al. (1982) findings, it seems that the uses or
preferences shown are different for language production and
comprehension. As was the case in the Connine et al. forming
procedures, the subjects involved in the Clifton et al. forming
procedure and experiments were undergraduate students of the University
of Massachusetts.
On the view that the strength of different frames is determined by
the different speech communities that the subjects belong to, we would
therefore expect that the Clifton et al. results would reflect the
Connine et al. results. Of the twenty-three verbs used in the Clifton
et al. experiment, fifteen were also tested in the Connine et al.
experiments. When we compare these fifteen verbs in the two
experiments, it turns out that of the eight verbs which are taken to be
preferred transitive by Clifton et al. two were found to be preferred
intransitive by Connine et al. (race and fight); and of the seven
verbs found to be preferred intransitive by Clifton et al., two were
found to be preferred transitive (signal and stop) by Connine et al.;
one was found to be preferred transitive in one experiment and
preferred intransitive in the other (study), and one was found to be
equal between transitive and intransitive in one experiment, although
it scored slightly higher for intransitive in the second experiment
(play). Moreover, Clifton et al. use two verbs, call and study, as
having transitive bias in their first experiment, while they use the
same two verbs as having intransitive bias in their second experiment.
If it cannot be shown convincingly that the verbs used in the first
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Clifton et al. experiment actually have transitive—intransitive bias,
then it is doubtful that we can take the results of this experiment as
constituting evidence for lexical preference.
If the results of this experiment are not due to lexical
preference, the question arises why there are significant differences
in reaction times for the two groups of verbs. A factor that could
play a role in these results is that the verbs used in the experiment
are not homogeneous in what they can express.	 On the one hand, we
find verbs like read, watch and call. Read implies that the subject
is reading some reading material, independent of whether the verb is
used transitively, as in John read a book, or intransitively, as in
John read all night.	 Moreover, for verbs like read the thematic role
of the subject stays the same whether or not there is an overt object
present.	 On the other hand, we find ergative/causative verbs, for
which the different subcategorization frames are linked to differences
in thematic structure. For example, hurry used intransitively
expresses that the subject does the hurrying, as in Ann hurried to
school; whereas hurry used transitively expresses that the subject
causes the object to hurry, as in Ann hurried the children to school.
Because these differences in thematic structure give us different
interpretations, we have to ask whether verbs like hurry are
represented in the mental lexicon as single entries or as different
entries reflecting the different thematic structures. 	 If the latter
is the case, verbs like hurry would be processed differently from verbs
like read.	 In processing verbs like hurry, the processor would have
to disambiguate the verb, which might involve conceptual information,
and thereby increase processing time. Furthermore, if consistent
preferences are found for verbs like hurry, these could signify a
preference for one thematic structure over another, rather than a
preference for one subcategorization frame, as might be the case if
consistent preferences are found for verbs like read.
Some light is thrown on this question by Stowe (1989), who reports
on some experiments concerning ergative/causative verbs. Using a
word—by—word grammaticality decision task, Stowe presented subjects
with sentences in which the subject is either animate or inanimate, as
in (3.21):
3.21a. Before the police stopped the driver was already getting
nervous.
b. Before the truck stopped the driver was already getting
nervous.
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AMBIGUOUS
the driver
678	 759
687	 747
CONTEXT
Police! stopped
truck
ANIMATE	 691	 757
INANIMATE 697
	 724
Mean RTs in ms.
DISAMBIGUATING
became very
1420	 820
811	 777
Stowe argues that the agent of ergative/causative verbs is
typically animate, because it is obligatorily intentional. Because of
this an inanimate noun cannot felicitously be assigned the agent role
but can be assigned the theme role. Since these differences in
thematic role are correlated with differences in syntactic structure,
it is possible to test how these sentences are processed. If lexical
preference is used in processing these sentences then we would expect
that subjects would go for the same analysis for both (3.21a) and
(3.21b), i.e. if the preferred frame of stop is the transitive, then we
would expect subjects to be garden—pathed in both sentences, whereas if
the preferred frame of stop is the intransitive, then we would expect
subjects not to get garden—pathed in either of the two sentences.
	 A
second possibility could be that lexical preference interacts with
plausibility.	 On this view, if the preferred frame of stop were the
transitive frame, we would expect subjects to garden—path in sentences
like (3.21a). However, we would also expect an increase at the verb
or at the object noun phrase, due to the preferred frame being rejected
and the intransitive frame being accessed. If the preferred frame of
stop were the intransitive frame, the results should be the other way
around. On the other hand, if both subcategorization frames become
available, or if these different frames are stored as different lexical
entries, and subjects decide for one or the other, depending on the
animacy/inanimacy of the subject, then we would expect subjects to
garden—path in (3.21a), but not in (3.21b).
	 This is exactly what
Stowe found:
The interaction between animacy and ambiguity was significant, while
there were no other significant differences at any position tested.
What this result shows, is that lexical preference is not used for
ergative/causative verbs, bit rather that the different frames become
available and a choice has to be made between them. This result still
leaves us with two possibilities concerning how these verbs are
represented in the lexicon, and what this means for the lexical
preference view. If these verbs are stored as different lexical
entries, which both get accessed, then this result cannot shed light on
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whether lexical preference is used for verbs other than
ergative/causative verbs.	 On the other hand, if these verbs are
stored as single lexical entries, of which the different
subcategorization frames become available simultaneously, then this
result does not support the view that lexical preference is used in
processing.
When we look at all verbs used in the first Clifton et al. (1984)
experiment, it turns out that of the eleven verbs claimed to be
preferred transitive, three verbs have different thematic structures
depending on whether they are used transitively or intransitively
(clean, race, and hide). Of the twelve verbs claimed to be preferred
intransitive, four verbs have different thematic structures depending
on whether they are used transitively or intransitively (stop, hurry,
worry, and stand), whereas for one verb, consult, the intransitive
expresses 'to work as a consultant', as in Ann consults for a big firm,
and the transitive expresses 'to go to someone/something for
information', as in Ann consulted her doctor. 2 This means that (given
Stowe's (1989) findings concerning ergative/causative verbs) in the
processing of more than a third of the verbs used, lexical preference
does not seem to play a role. Moreover, since only reaction times
collapsed over the two groups of verbs (preferred transitive/preferred
intransitive) are given, we cannot evaluate what these findings
signify, or how the ergative/causative verbs compare to the rest of the
verbs used.
In the second experiment, Clifton et al. tested the assumption that
lexical preference is used in processing sentences with gaps (empty
positions in the constituent structure) and fillers (lexical items that
control the interpretation of the gap). They assume that if the
preferred lexical frame of a verb is the transitive, then a gap will be
postulated immediately following the verb, whereas if the preferred
lexical frame of a verb is the intransitive, no gap will be postulated
immediately following the verb. If this is the case then one would
expect faster reading times for sentences in which the postulated gap
coincides with the actual gap, whereas one would expect slower reading
times for sentences in which the postulated gap differs from the actual
gap, because reanalysis would have to take place.
In this experiment, sentences were presented word by word on a
screen. At the end of the sentence a full—stop appeared after which
the subjects made a grammaticality judgment concerning the sentence, by
pushing one of two buttons.	 Sentences were made up in four
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categories, transitive sentences containing a subordinate clause with a
lexical head as in (3.22a), transitive sentences with a headless
relative clause, as in (3.22b), intransitive sentences containing a
subordinate clause with a lexical head as in (3.23a), and intransitive
sentences with a headless relative clause, as in (3.23b):
3.22a. Transitive sentences, lexical head.
Tommy's girlfriend was impressed by the car that Tommy built!
stole/drove ____ at the racetrack.
b. Transitive sentences, headless relative.
Tommy's girlfriend was impressed with what Tommy built/stole!
drove ____ at the racetrack.
(verbs: pure transitive, biased transitive, biased intransitive)
3.23a. Intransitive sentences, lexical head.
The guests were upset by the vicious dogs they had to tiptoe/
hurry/pass quietly by ____
b. Intransitive sentences, headless relative.
Nobody told the visitors what they should tiptoe/hurry/pass
quietly by ___
(verbs: pure intransitive, biased intransitive, biased transitive)
In the transitive sentences, Clifton et a!. used three types of
verbs, verbs they took to be purely transitive, verbs they found to be
preferred transitive, and verbs they found to be preferred
intransitive. The expectation was that verbs which were purely
transitive or biased transitive would elicit faster reaction times in
these sentences than verbs that were preferred intransitive. In the
intransitive sentences, again three types of verbs were used, purely
intransitive verbs, biased intransitives and biased transitives. For
these sentences the expectation was that the purely intransitive verbs
and biased intransitives would elicit faster response times than the
biased transitive verbs. However, as was the case with their first
experiment, we cannot be sure that the verbs claimed to be preferred
transitive or intransitive by Clifton et al. actually have this
preference. As noted above, although the results of the same forming
procedure were used for the two experiments, two verbs which were used
as being preferred transitive in the first experiment, call and study,
were used as being preferred intransitive in the second experiment.
The verb send, which was classified as being preferred transitive in
119
the first experiment, had become a pure transitive in the second
experiment. Furthermore, as was the case in the first experiment, a
number of verbs differed in preference when compared to the Connine et
al. (1984) findings.
According to Clifton et al., their stimulus sentences were
constructed in such a way that the lexical fillers used were
pragmatically appropriate for the gaps, while the Wh—fillers were
neither particularly appropriate nor inappropriate, being lexically
nearly empty.	 It would seem, however, that several sentences are
pragmatically more complex than others, i.e. the reader has to make a
number of extra assumptions in order to interpret them. For example,
in order to interpret the sentence in (3.24) the experimental subject
has to make the assumptions that the letter involved is discussed in
some other written material, and that the teacher read from this other
written material to the children:
3.24. The teacher was thinking of the letter that she had read to the
children about.
When we compare this to the sentence in (3.25), it turns out that in
order to understand (3.25) no such extra assumptions need to be made:
3.25. The teacher was thinking of the letter that she had complained
to the children about.
In order to interpret (3.26) the reader has to make an assumption such
as that the teacher involved has been told to complain about something
to the children, or that the teacher involved thinks it is a good thing
to complain to the children from time to time:
3.26. The teacher wondered what she should complain to the children
about.
What we see then is that for a complete interpretation of a
sentence more is involved than just assigning the filler to the correct
gap, and that for some sentences this may involve making more
assumptions than for other sentences. On the view that the
inferential process involves processing time as well as the process of
assigning structure to the sentence, this means that we cannot be sure
whether the reaction times for the sentences reflect the one rather
than the other.
Clifton et al. say that their results support the claim that
lexical preference plays a role in comprehension, because:
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"Corzgruence between preferred verb frame and sentence
syntax fad Ii ta ted the processing of filler-gap sentences
early enough to affect a speeded grammatical i ty judgment
task (or incongruence interferes wi th them)." (Clifton et
al., 1984, p. 705).
However, only the results in one condition (transitive sentences with a
Wh-phrase filler) bear out Clifton et al.'s expectation. In both the
intransitive sentences with a Wh-filler and with a lexical filler,
reaction times are faster for the incongruent verbs than for the
congruent verbs, which is incompatible with the view of Clifton et al.;
for the transitive sentences with lexical fillers the reaction time for
the incongruent verbs is even faster than for the 'pure' transitives,
which again goes against the view of Clifton et al.3:
Sentence	 Wh-phrase	 filler	 lexical filler
form	 Pure	 Con	 Incon	 Pure	 Con	 Incon
Transitive	 932	 1055	 1208	 1081	 1085	 1027
Intransitive	 1189	 1219	 1209	 1216	 1254	 1245
Mean Reaction Times in ms. for sentences judged grammatical.
("Pure" indicates pure transitive or intransitive verbs, as
appropriate; "Con" indicates congruence between preferred verb frame
and sentence syntax; and "Incon" indicates incongruence between
preferred verb frame and sentence syntax.)
Clifton et al. do not comment on the findings for the intransitive
sentences. Concerning the findings for the transitive sentences with
lexical fillers they say that:
"(...) the transi ti ye sentences of Experiment 2 that had
lexically informative fillers showed no lexical expectation
effect. The difference between wh-fillers and lexical
fillers suggests that when a filler has already been
identified, the processor may use information about the
pragmatic fi t between the filler and a potential gap rather
than subcategorization information in deciding whether to
postulate the gap. Thus, pragmatic information relevant
to the current sentence may overcome lexical expectations
based on a verb's preferred lexical form assessed
independently of the current sentence." 	 (op. cit., p.
706).
However, this does not explain why the incongruous verbs actually
yielded faster reaction times than the 'pure' and congruous verbs.
Even if we take the Clifton et al. results at face value, they do
not support the claim that lexical preference influences sentences
comprehension, since only one of the four conditions tested shows
results which are compatible with the claim.
	 We cannot be sure that
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the verbs used in the experiments actually have the preferences they
are claimed to have, nor has it been shown that the purported
preferences in production are the same as preferences in comprehension.
Furthermore, given that differences in reaction times may be influenced
by sentences being more or less pragmatically complex, it is unclear
what exactly has been tested in these experiments.
We can show that experiments like the ones discussed above cannot
constitute evidence for lexical preference by comparing experimental
findings of Tanenhaus, Stowe and Carl son (1985) and Tanenhaus, Boland,
Garnsey and Carison (1989). In both papers the authors report on
experiments conducted to establish whether lexical preference plays a
role in sentences containing fillers and gaps along the lines of
Clifton et al. (1984).	 Sentences were constructed containing early
and late gaps, in order to see whether lexical preference caused the
subjects to garden—path.	 In addition, sentences were made up with
plausible and implausible fillers, to see whether these would give rise
to a plausibility effect.
	 Examples of the different sentences are
given in (3.27) and (3.28):
3.27a. The sheriff wasn't sure which (horse, rock) the cowboy raced
___ down the hill. (early gap).
b. The sheriff wasn't sure which (horse, rock) the cowboy raced
desperately past ___. 	 (late gap).
3.28a. The district attorney found out which (witness, church) the
reporter asked ___ about the meeting. (early gap).
b. The district attorney found out which (witness, church) the
reporter asked anxiously about ___. (late gap).
Sentences were presented on a screen and subjects were asked to
indicate whether or not they understood each sentence.
Although both Tanenhaus et al. (1985) and Tanenhaus et al. (1989)
say that they relied on the findings of Connine et al. (1984)
concerning lexical preferences of verb frames, we see that whereas
Tanenhaus et al. (1985) take race to be preferred transitive, and ask
to be preferred intransitive, Tanenhaus et al. (1989) claim exactly the
opposite, namely that race is preferred intransitive, whereas ask is
preferred transitive.
The results reported in the two papers were the following:
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Tanenhaus et al. (1985): % sentences jud ged comprehensible.
Verb expectation: transitive, e.g. 'race' intransitive, e.g. 'ask'
early gap	 late gap early gap	 late gap
Plausible filler 	 76%	 65%	 66%	 85%
Implausible filler 58%
	 51%	 45%	 81%
Tanenhaus et al. (1989): % sentences jud ged comprehensible.
Verb expectation: transitive, e.g. 'ask' intransitive, e.g. 'race'
early gap	 late gap early gap
	
late gap
Plausible filler
	 83%	 79%	 64%	 83%
Implausible filler 64%
	
64%	 47%	 85%
What we see then is that, although the results of the different
experiments are quite similar, they are based on contrasting
assumptions concerning preferences for transitive-intransitive verb
frames. Unfortunately, neither Tanenhaus et al. (1985), nor Tanenhaus
et al. (1989) give the full range of verbs they used with their
purported preferences, so that we cannot fully evaluate their findings.
A number of experiments have been conducted to test whether there
is a difference in processing sentences like (3.29), depending on
whether the verb used has 'direct object-bias' (NP-bias), or whether
the verb has 'complement-bias' (clausal bias):
3.29. The historian (suspected/read) the manuscript of his book
On the view that lexical preference is used, one would expect that in
(3.29) the NP the manuscript of his book would be interpreted as a
direct object, if the preferred frame of the verb is the simple
transitive, whereas it would be taken as the subject of a complement
clause, if the preferred frame of the verb is the one which takes a
complement clause. Furthermore, one would expect that this difference
would disappear when a full complement clause (containing that) is
used, instead of a reduced complement clause (without that).
Mitchell & Holmes (1985) tested twelve sentences similar to the one
in (3.29) but all having a complement clause continuation, containing
eleven different verbs. In order to establish verb preferences they
conducted a preliminary questionnaire study (conscious preference
judgment task) along the lines of Ford et a! (1982), discussed above.
Although for ten of the eleven verbs they found reasonably strong
preferences one way or the other, for discover they found NP-bias in
one sentence, and clausal-bias in another. In the experiment discover
appears both as an NP-bias verb and as a clausal-bias verb. The
sentences were read by subjects in a phrase-by-phrase self-paced task.
Mitchell & Holmes found that reading times for the disambiguating
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phrase were much longer following verbs with an NP bias than following
verbs with a clausal bias. This difference disappeared in a
subsequent experiment in which that was inserted in the sentences.
These results then seem to support the claim that lexical preference is
used in processing these sentences. However, Holmes, Kennedy & Murray
(1987) observe about this that:
"(...) a possible problem for this interpretation is
created if one examines performance for each verb type with
and without the complementizer across their two
experiments.	 This comparison indicates that, for verbs
with a direct-object bias, the addition of the
complementizer appeared to speed up viewing time, whereas
for verbs wi th a complement bias, i t increased viewing
time. It is hard to understand why the presence of the
complementizer might slow down reading times for items
assumed to be already biased towards a complement
interpretation. Mitchell and Holmes' conclusion would
have been more convincing if they had compared reduced and
unreduced complement versions of the same sentence in the
one experiment and had found garden-pa thing only for the
verbs with a direct-object bias."
	 (Holmes et a!., 1987,
p. 287).
Holmes et al. (1987) report on an experiment they conducted to test
whether insertion of a complementizer made a difference to the way in
which subjects process a sentence. They presented subjects with three
types of sentences, as in (3.30):
3.30a. The maid disclosed! the safe's location within the house! to
the! officer.	 (transitive).
b. The maid disclosed that! the safe's location within the house!
had been changed. (full complement).
c. The maid disclosed! the safe's location within the house! had
been! changed.	 (reduced complement).
Sentences were presented word by word in a self paced reading task.
No difference was made between possible biases of the verbs involved.
Holmes et al. found that at the disainbiguating point after the the
ambiguous noun phrase, longer reading times were obtained for reduced
complement constructions compared with direct object sentences.
However, longer reading times were also obtained for the sentences
containing full complements compared to the direct object sentences.
Furthermore, the reading times for the reduced and full complements
were almost identical. These findings cannot be the result of
subjects garden-pathing in the complement sentences, because then the
effect should only show up in the sentences with a reduced complement,
and not in those with a full complement.
	 Holmes et al. suggest that
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this increase in reading time may be due to the additional complexity
of having to process an additional clause.
Holmes (1987) reports on an experiment, similar to the one of
Holmes et al. (1987), but in which verbs were used according to lexical
preference.	 This experiment is described in more detail in Holmes,
Stowe and Cupples (1989).
	 In order to establish lexical preference,
subjects were asked to complete sentence fragments like She
believed....	 Sixteen verbs were found that showed NP-bias, and
sixteen that showed clausal bias. However, as we saw above,
preferences found in a sentence completion task like the one used by
Holmes (1987), are not necessarily the same preferences as the ones
used in comprehension - if preferences are used at all. Besides, when
we compare the results obtained by Holmes (1987) with the results of
Connine et al. (1984), we see that of the eight clausal-bias verbs
tested by both Holmes and Connine et al. five are found to have NP-bias
by Connine et al. instead of clausal bias, although the results for the
NP-bias verbs tested by both are roughly similar.
In order to check whether pragmatic plausibility has an effect on
how sentences are processed, sentences were made up in different
categories, containing plausible and implausible NPs. To establish
the pragmatic plausibility or implausibility of objects, Holmes
conducted a preliminary test in which subjects were given sentences, as
in (3.31):
3.31a. The tenant remembered the reply.
b. The tenant remembered the smoke.
Subjects were asked to rate the sentences according to plausibility.
Sentences like (3.31a) were found to be rated as highly plausible,
whereas sentences like (3.31b) were found to be rated as implausible.
On the basis of these ratings Holmes constructed sentences as in (3.32)
and (3.33):
3.32a. The reporter saw (that) her friend was not succeeding.
(NP-bias verb, plausible object).
b. The reporter saw (that) her method was not succeeding.
(NP-bias verb, implausible object).
3.33a. The candidate doubted (that) his sincerity would be
appreciated.
(Clausal-bias verb, plausible object).
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Sentence
Type
Transitive
That clause
Reduced clause
Bias
Comp.
NP
Comp.
NP
Comp.
NP
b. The candidate doubted (that) his champagne would be
appreciated.
(Clausal—bias verb, implausible object).
The sentences were presented on a screen, word by word, in a cumulative
fashion. After each word subjects had to decide whether the sentence
could continue grammatically, by pushing a button.
The results of the experiment appear to support the view that
lexical preference plays a role in the processing of these sentences,
i.e. reading times increased sharply at the verb following the subject
of the complement clause in the NP—bias reduced complements, whereas
there was only a slight increase at the same point in the Clausal—bias
verb reduced complements, and no increase in both kinds of sentences
containing full complement clauses.
However, these findings can be contrasted with findings of Kennedy,
Murray, Jennings & Reid (1989). Kennedy et al. report on an
experiment they conducted, using the same materials as Holmes et al.
(1987), but incorporating the verbs with different biases as used by
Holmes (1987). In this experiment sentences were presented as a whole
on one line on a screen, and eye—movements were recorded.
Kennedy et al.'s findings are almost identical to Holmes et al.
(1987):
Mean Total Pass per Word Reading Time (insec) for each Sentence Type and
Verb Bias.
Zone
1	 2	 3
220	 201	 227
232	 201	 283
236	 198
	
263
225	 198
	
293
222	 209
	
267
240	 199
	
283
The zones under consideration were divided into a zone including the
verb (1), a zone containing the 'object' NP (2), and a disambiguating
zone (3), as in (3.34):
3.34. The workers considered! the last offer from the management! of
the! factory.
Both the sentences containing reduced complements and the sentences
containing full complements took longer to process than the sentences
containing direct objects.	 Moreover, Kennedy et al. found that the
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purported verb biases did not have the effect expected if lexical
preference is used in processing these sentences. They found that in
all three sentence types the disambiguating zone took longer to read
when NP-bias verbs were used than when clausal-bias verbs were used.
On the lexical preference view, one would expect this to be the case
for the sentences containing reduced complements, but not for the
sentences containing direct objects, for which the lexical preference
view would predict that the sentences containing clausal-bias verbs
would take longer to process than the sentences containing NP-bias
verbs.
There are two major differences in the results of Holmes (1987) and
Kennedy et al. (1989): there is a significant difference between the
processing of sentences with full and reduced complements in Holmes's
experiment, but not in Kennedy et al.'s experiment. Also, Holmes
finds support for the lexical preference view, while Kennedy et al.
(1989) do not.	 Why should these experiments give us such different
results?
To account for the first difference, we have to look at how the
different experiments were conducted. One major difference between
the two experiments is that in the Kennedy et al. experiment, subjects'
eye-movements were measured, while they were reading the sentence which
was presented as a whole.	 In the Holmes experiment, the sentence was
presented word by word, and subjects had to make a grammaticality
judgment after each word. The method of presentation and the nature
of the experimental task can clearly have a strong influence on the
results of the experiment (see, e.g. Just, Carpenter & Woolley, 1982;
Kennedy & Murray, 1984; Pynte, Kennedy, Murray, & Courrieu, 1988).
In Kennedy et al.'s experiment, the subjects' task is simply to read
the sentence, which, at least partly, reflects a normal reading
process; in Holmes's experiment, on the other hand, the subjects are
engaged in an activity which does not reflect the normal reading
process. It may well be the case that the demand for a grammaticality
judgment after each word influences the way in which subjects process
the sentence. This could have as a consequence that linguistic clues
could play a more decisive, or different, role in Holmes's experiment
as compared to Kennedy et al.'s experiment. For example, the
complementizer that signals to the processor that a complement clause
is going to follow. The absence of the complementizer could therefore
bias subjects to a direct object reading, rather than to a complement
clause reading, since the subjects are not provided with a context in
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which they are encouraged to consider a complement contiwation. It
may well be the case that in Kennedy et al. 's experiment the absence of
the complementizer does not play as big a role in how the sentence is
processed as in Holmes's experiment, because the sentence is presented
as a whole, so that subjects have more clues as to the continuation of
the sentence. In Holmes's experiment, the subjects cannot look ahead
to how the sentence continues, and, because they have to make a
grammaticality judgment, a definite choice has to be made on
encountering the NP, so that the presence or absence of the complem
may have more weight in these sentences. This then could be an
explanation of why there is a marked difference between the processing
of sentences with full and reduced complements in Holmes's experiment,
but not in Kennedy et al.'s experiment.
The second difference between Holmes's experiment and Kennedy et
aL's experiment is that Holmes's experiment gives rise to results that
seem to support the lexical preference view, and Kennedy et al.'s
experiment does not. To account for this we have to look at Holmes's
findings concerning 'pragmatically plausible' and 'implausible'
sentences, and at the nature of the verbs involved in the experiments.
In order to test whether pragmatic information influences initial
structural choices, Holmes used NPs which could function as plausible
and implausible objects. Because Holmes found that in the reduced
implausible 'NP-bias' sentences, reading time increases at the
disarnbiguating word in the same way as in the reduced plausible 'NP-
bias' sentences, she concludes that pragmatics does not influence the
way in which structure is assigned to these sentences. However,
although a sentence like (3.31b), repeated here, may be judged to be
pragmatically implausible, it becomes a lot more plausible with a
continuation as in (3.35):
3.31b. The tenant remembered the smoke.
3.35. The tenant remembered the smoke billowing out of her flat.
Even a sentence like (3.36) which may be judged unacceptable:
3.36. The secretary read the fashion.
becomes perfectly plausible, when fashion is not the last word in the
sentence as in (3.36), but is followed by, for example, magazine, as in
(3.37):
3.37. The secretary read the fashion magazine.
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When we compare the reduced implausible 'NP-bias' sentences with
the reduced implausible 'clausal-bias' sentences, it turns out that for
almost all implausible 'NP-bias' sentences a continuation is possible
which turns the NP into a plausible direct object, as in (3.35) and
(3.37) above, whereas for most of the implausible 'clausal-bias'
sentences no such continuation is possible, e.g. ? The candidate
doubted his champagne ... This has as a consequence that if the
absence of the complementizer biases the subjects towards a direct
object reading of the sentences, then in the NP-bias sentences there is
nothing to tell them this will lead to a garden-path, whereas in the
implausible 'clausal-bias' sentences, the implausibility of a direct
object continuation may lead the subjects to go for a complement
reading. When we look at Holmes's findings, we see that in both the
implausible 'NP-bias' and 'clausal' bias sentences there is an increase
in reading time at the nouns compared to the plausible conditions.
Because a grammaticality judgment has to be made at this point, we can
take these findings as indicating a decision about possible
continuations. When we compare the plausible and implausible
'clausal' bias sentences, we see that whereas there is an increase in
reading time at the disambiguating word in the plausible sentences,
there is actually a decrease in reading time at the disambiguatirig word
in the implausible sentences, pointing to a decision already having
been made. This means that pragmatic processes play a role in how
these sentences are analyzed, contrary to Holmes's claim that the
analysis is made only by use of lexical preference.
The question remains why Holmes's findings show a sharp increase at
the disambiguation point for sentences with 'NP-bias' verbs but not for
plausible sentences with 'clausal-bias' verbs, which seems to support
the lexical preference view. We saw that Kennedy et al. found that
this is the case even when the verbs appear in sentences containing
direct objects, for which the lexical preference view would predict
that the sentences containing 'clausal-bias' verbs would take longer to
process that the sentences containing 'NP-bias' verbs. When we look
at the verbs used in the experiments, we see that there is a difference
between the group of 'NP-bias' verbs and the group of 'clausal-bias'
verbs, in that eleven out of the sixteen 'NP-bias' verbs have different
senses in the direct object and complement readings of the tested
sentences, i.e. urge, judge, show, answer, see, hear, recognize,
expect, understand and find. For example, find can express something
like 'to discover an object by searching', as in: the doctor found the
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label, or it can express something like 'to learn or discover (a fact
that was not known)', as in: the doctor found that the fever had
disappeared completely. When we compare this to the 'clausal-bias'
verbs, we see that the same only holds for two out of sixteen verbs,
i.e. claim and argue. This means that in most of the sentences with
'NP-bias' verbs, subjects not only have to decide on which syntactic
construction to go for, but also which sense of the verb is being used.
On the other hand, in most of the sentences with 'clausal-bias' verbs,
the subjects only have to decide on the syntactic structure, while the
sense of the verb stays the same. This indicates that the difference
in Holmes's reading time is due to the fact that in the 'NP-bias'
sentences subjects not only have to recover from a syntactic garden-
path, but also from a semantic garden-path, whereas in the plausible
'clausal-bias' sentences subjects only have to recover from a syntactic
garden-path, without this changing the semantics in a significant way.
This proposal is supported by Holmes's (1987) findings: there is a
substantial increase in reading time at the disambiguating word in the
reduced plausible sentences with 'NP-bias' verbs (403 msec.).
However, there is also an increase in reading time at the
disambiguating word in the reduced plausible sentences with 'clausal-
bias' verbs, although much less then in the sentences with 'NP-bias'
verbs (110 msec.). On the lexical preference view this result cannot
be explained, since we would expect the findings for the 'clausal-bias'
verbs in the reduced plausible sentences to mirror those in the
unreduced plausible sentences, which show a decrease in reading time at
the disambiguating word.
In Kennedy et al.'s experiment, we see that reading times are
longer for sentences containing 'NP-bias' verbs than for sentences
containing 'clausal-bias' verbs in all three sentence types. As we
saw above, on the lexical preference view, we would expect sentences
with a direct object containing 'NP-bias' verbs to take less time than
the ones containing 'clausal-bias' verbs. However, on the view that
the 'NP-bias' verbs are semantically more complex than the 'clausal-
bias' verbs (because the 'NP-bias' verbs are semantically ambiguous as
well as syntactically), the Kennedy et al. findings are not puzzling,
but can be taken as pointing to greater processing cost for processing
complex verbs than for processing more simple verbs.
We see then that neither tasks like conscious preference judgments
and sentence completion tasks, nor experiments based on findings from
these tasks give us convincing evidence for the claim that lexical
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preference is used in processing, whereas the findings of Kennedy et
al. (1989) seem to point to lexical preference not being used in
processing.
Further evidence against the lexical preference view comes from
Nicol & Osterhout (1988), as reported in Nicol & Swinney (1989).
Nicol & Osterhout examined reactivation patterns using a cross-modal
priming paradigm. This cross-modal priming paradigm is an on-line
testing technique whereby sentences are presented auditorily, and
subjects are asked to make a lexical decision to visually presented
word/nonword targets.
Nicol & Osterhout used sentences such as in (3.38), in which the
target was presented at the *:
3.38a. That's the actress that the dentist from the new medical
centre in town had invited * to go to the party.
b. That's the actress that the dentist from the new medical
centre in town had planned * to go to the party with.
They found that there was priming for actress immediately following
planned as well as following invited, even though plan can only occur
with an inanimate direct object, (with one exception: The baby was
planned), e.g.
3.39a. Michelle planned a party.
b. *Michelle planned the actress.
Lexical preference proponents could argue that the preferred
reading of plan happens to be the transitive reading. However, Nicol
(1988) conducted a follow-up study which contrasted 'quasi-
intransitive' verbs like plan (which can appear transitively and
intransitively), and true intransitives such as hesitate. This study
shows that significant priming of the head of the relative (e.g.
actress in (3.38)) always occurs after the 'quasi-intransitives', but
not after the true intransitives. This result then shows that a gap
is postulated after 'quasi-intransitive' verbs, even when it is
inappropriate, as in the case of the verb only taking an inanimate
object and the head of the relative referring to an animate object.
These findings indicate that the view that verbs are stored and
accessed according to lexical preference is not tenable; whenever a
verb can be used transitively, a gap will be postulated.
What we have seen above is that there is no evidence which supports
the assumption that verb subcategorization is used according to lexical
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preference, and that there is at least some evidence (Kennedy et al.,
1989; Nicol, 1988) against the lexical preference view. With models
of comprehension based on lexical preference ruled out, we are left
with the alternative that in processing some input verb all the
subcategorizat ion frames are recovered and a choice is made among these
(parallel access).
	 As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, this
still leaves us with two possibilities; the possibility that
subcategorization information guides the processor in assigning
structure to the input, and the possibility that the processor first
assigns a structure to the input using some different strategy, and
then uses subcategorization information to check the consistency of the
structure. In the next section, we will look at experimental findings
which bear on this question.
32. Parallel access.
The findings of Nicol & Osterhout (1988), and Nicol (1988)
discussed above, throw some light on the question of whether
subcategorization information guides the processor in assigning
structure or not. In both experiments sentences were tested
containing fillers and gaps, such as (3.38), repeated here:
3.38. That's the actress that the dentist from the new medical
centre in town had planned/invited * to go to the party.
On the view that subcategorization information is used to check an
initial structure assignment rather than to guide the initial structure
assignment, we would expect that gaps are not proposed immediately
after encountering the verb, but only when no other gap is found to
assign the filler to (as proposed by Frazier, Clifton & Randall, 1983;
and Clifton & Frazier, 1986). However, Nicol's (1988) and Nicol &
Osterhout's (1988) experiments show that gaps are proposed immediately
after the verb is encountered, at least for those verbs which can take
an object. This means that the processor must have access to
subcategorization information on encountering the verb, and that it is
guided by this subcategorization information in proposing or not
proposing a gap.
Mitchell (1989) argues that the findings of Nicol (1988) and Nicol
& Osterhout (1988) are not decisive. He argues that even though there
was no significant priming following intransitive verbs, it could still
be postulated that what priming there was was caused by the same
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procedure as the priming in the case of transitive verbs.	 He goes on
to say that:
"It could still have been argued that the gap-positing
processes are equivalent for all types of verb, but that
once filler information has been activated, this can be
suppressed more rapidly when filtering operations reveal
that the gap is ungrammatical."	 (Mitchell, 1989, p. 144).
However, these arguments present a number of difficulties. 	 What
Mitchell is arguing for is an independent gap-positing process, which
postulates a gap following any verb. However, this goes against the
assumption that the parser follows the principle of Minimal Attachment,
which Mitchell assumes to be responsible, together with the principle
of Late Closure, for the initial assignment of structure to an input
string (Mitchell, 1987, 1989; cf. Frazier, Clifton & Randall, 1983;
Clifton & Frazier, 1986). 	 The principle of Minimal Attachment
predicts that no gap is postulated following any verb, since this would
be a potentially unnecessary node. 	 Only if the initial analysis
cannot accommodate the filler, will a gap be postulated. More
importantly, Mitchell proposes that a gap is posited after any verb,
bet filtering operations using lexical preference information come into
play so rapidly that this shows up in the amount of priming a filler
receives. This means that the only way in which we would be able to
distinguish this proposal from the proposal that all subcategorization
frames of the verb are activated, would be to show that no significant
priming takes place following a preferred intransitive verb. However,
this has not been shown by any of the experiments concerning lexical
preference (as discussed above).
We can conclude from this that on encountering a verb all
subcategorization frames of the verb are accessed in parallel, and that
the processor assigns a structure to the input string on the basis of
this. However, as was pointed out in the beginning of this chapter,
models based on parallel access have been criticized in the literature,
on the grounds that the predictions they make are not borne out.	 A
well-known example of this model is Fodor, Gariett &	 ver 's (1968)
Verb Complexity Hypothesis.	 Fodor et al. proposed that on
encountering a verb all syntactic subcategorization frames are
accessed. The expectation was that the more complex a verb is, i.e.
the more different subcategorization frames it has, the more perceptual
difficulty there is in processing the sentence containing the verb,
giving rise to increased processing time.
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This expectation was tested by Hakes (1971), using the 'phoneme-
monitoring technique'. Subjects read sentences and had to push a
button on encountering a specific phoneme, such as fb/ in book-keeper
in the sentences in (3.40):
3.40. The manager suspended (simple verb)! suspected (complex verb)
the book-keeper when he discovered that five thousand dollars
was missing.
Furthermore, subjects were instructed to say in their own words what
the sentence meant, after hearing it.
Hakes did not find any difference in monitoring times between the
simple and complex verbs, but he did find that paraphrasing was more
accurate for sentences containing simple verbs, than for sentences
containing complex verbs.
This result has been used in the literature to conclude that
parallel access of verb subcategorization information does not play a
role in comprehension (e.g. Garnham, 1985; Mitchell, 1989). However,
it is not clear that this conclusion is warranted. Hakes himself does
not take his results as convincing evidence against parallel access of
subcategorization information.
	 He proposes two possible explanations
for the results.	 It could be the case that the results show that
subcategorization information only plays a role in later stages of
processing (i.e. the checking model). A second explanation could be
that a set of possible structural hypotheses is formulated while a
clause is processed, based on subcategorization information, but that
decisions among these hypotheses are made only after a clause boundary
is reached. If this is the case, then the expected complexity effect
should only show up at the end of 'bookkeeper' in (3.40), rather than
at the beginning.
These are not the only alternative explanations that can be given
for the findings. It could be the case that the task of listening for
a phoneme and responding to it as quickly as possible influences the
way in which subjects process the sentence. It may be that subjects
do not process the sentence as fully as they would do normally, because
their prime concern is recognizing the phoneme.
	 Moreover, it is not
clear whether all factors influencing the results have been taken into
account in the interpretation of the results.
	 Foss and Gernsbacher
(1983) show that phoneme-monitoring time is positively correlated with
the duration of the vowel following the target phoneme.
	 They showed
that target phonemes produced shorter monitoring times if they had
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shorter vowels. However, Hakes (1971) does not mention this factor,
and because he does not give us all the test sentences used, we cannot
evaluate whether this could have influenced the results.
In order to get a better understanding of what is involved in
comprehension concerning the use of verb subcategorization information,
we have to take a step back and consider what it actually means to say
that the processor makes use of verb subcategorization information.
Fodor, Gav-eLi& 8&ver (196w) proposed that on encountering a verb the
processor recovers its syntactic subcategorization frame(s). For
example, a verb like arrest subcategorizes for an NP, so that on
encountering the verb the processor recovers the subcategorization
frame:
arrest v[_ NP]
However, this is not the only possibility. An alternative is that
it is not the syntactic subcategorization frame that is recovered, but
rather a specification of the number of arguments that a verb can take.
This proposal would make different predictions.
	 For example, a verb
like send has three syntactic subcategorization frames:
send y r_ NP 1
LNPPPI
LNPNPJ
These three subcategorization frames represent two different predicate—
argument structures:
send (x,y)
(x,y,z)
This means that we can view verbs as being more or less complex
depending on whether we take syntactic subcategorization frames or
argument structure as a measure of complexity.
A second factor which has a bearing on verb complexity is the
question of implicit arguments. It has been argued in the literature
that, for example, a sentence like (3.41) implies that Ann sent a book
to someone, even though this is not explicitly mentioned (e.g. Carrier—
Duncan, 1985; Haegeman, 1987; Zubizarreta, 1985):
3.41. Ann sent a book.
A consequence of this could be that rather than having two predicate—
argument structures, a verb like send only has one argument structure,
namely the one with three arguments. This could mean that verbs which
are complex in terms of syntactic subcategorization frames are simple
in terms of argument structure.4
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Shapiro, Zurif & Grinishaw (1987, 1989) conducted a number of
experiments to establish whether syntactic subcategorization
information or predicate—argument structure information is used in
processing verbs.
	 In their first experiment Shapiro et al. made up
sentences containing verbs from five different categories. The first
three categories contrast transitives, nonalternating datives and
alternating datives:
(a) Transitives, i.e. verbs that take a single object NP, such
as cherish. Verbs from this category have one
subcategorization frame, [_ NP], and one argument structure,
(x, y).
(b) Nonalternatirig datives, i.e. verbs that allow an NP PP,
such as donate. Verbs from this category have two
subcategorization frames, [_ NP], [_ NP PP], and two argument
structures, (x, y), (x, y, z).
(c) Alternating datives, i.e. datives that also allow double—
NPs, such as send. Verbs from this category have three
subcategorization frames, [_ NP], [_ NP PP] and [_ NP NP], and
two argument structures, (x, y), (x, y, z).
The last two categories of verbs used in the experiment contrast
verbs that can occur with an object NP and with an S', where the 5' is
a that—clause, such as accept, with verbs that can occur with an object
NP and with an S', where the S' is either a that—clause, an
interrogative clause, or an exciamative clause, such as know. Shapiro
et al. argue that these different clauses have distinct semantic
properties, and will therefore be represented as separate argument
structures of the verb. As a consequence the first group of verbs are
taken to be 'two complement' verbs, which have two subcategorization
frames, [_ NP] and [_ S '], and two argument structures, (x, y) and
(x, P). The second group of verbs are taken to be 'four complement'
verbs, which again have two subcategorization frames, [_ NP] and
[_ S'], but four argument structures, (x, y), (x, P), (x, Q), and
(x, E), where P ranges over propositions or that—clauses, Q ranges over
interrogatives and E ranges over exclamations.
Shapiro et al. say that if one looks at verb complexity in terms of
syntactic subcategorization, then the continuum for least to most
complex will be:
	 Transitives < Nonalternating datives = Two
complements = Four complements < Alternating datives. 	 However, if
argument structure accounts for differences in verb complexity, then
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the continuum for least to most complex will be: Transitives <
Nonalternating datives = Alternating datives = two complements < Four
complements.
Sentences were tested using the cross—modal lexical decision task,
i.e. subjects heard sentences over earphones, and were presented a
word/non—word on a screen in the vicinity of the verb, about which they
had to make a lexical decision.
Shapiro et al. found that the results supported the claim that
argument structure, rather than syntactic subcategorization information
is used by the processor:
Mean RT's (in ms) for verb types
Transitives	 Nonalternating	 Alternating	 Two	 Four
datives	 datives	 complement complement
626	 672	 679	 676	 731
The difference in reaction time between the transitives and the middle
three categories was significant, as was the difference between the
middle three categories and the four—complement verbs, while the
differences among the middle categoráes was not significant. This
seems like fairly strong evidence for the claim that argument structure
information is used in processing verbs.
Unfortunately, the results turn out not to be so convincing when we
look at the verbs that were used in the different categories. None of
the categories of verbs is homogeneous, which means that it makes no
sense to compare the different categories and draw conclusions on the
basis of this.	 The five transitive verbs tested were: secure, fix,
measure, cherish and exhibit. Of these five verbs two can actually be
used as datives, secure, as in He secured himself a good job, and fix,
as in He fixed me a drink; moreover, exhibit can be used
intransitively as well as transitively, as in She regularly exhibits at
the Tate Gallery.	 The five nonalternating datives tested were
surrender, address, return, restore and donate. Of these, surrender
can be used intransitively, as in The enemy surrendered, and it can
subcategorize for a PP, as in The army surrendered to the enemy.
Address has two senses, 'to write an address on something', as in I
addressed the envelope, and 'to direct a speech at someone', as in The
politician addressed the audience. Even though these different senses
take the same argument structures, it could be postulated that subjects
have to disambiguate the verb, which could account for an increase in
processing time. Return is a causative verb, such as hurry (discussed
above), which can be used intransitively, when it expresses that the
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subject comes or gets back, as in Spring will return. Furthermore, it
can be used as an alternating dative, as in Don't forget to return me
my keys5. The five alternating datives used were dig, buy, send, lend
and reserve. Of these dig, buy and lend can be used intransitively,
while send can occur with an infinitive, as in He sent to tell us he
couldn't come, and with a PP, as in Send for a doctor. The five two—
complement verbs were regret, assume, accept, claim and maintain. Of
these assume, claim and maintain, have a number of different senses.
The five four—complement verbs were discover, recognize, remember,
state and indicate. Of these recognize can occur with an NP and an
infinitive, remember can occur with an infinitive, expressing 'to take
care not to forget', and indicate can be used intransitively to express
something like 'showing which way one is going in a car', as in The
driver forgot to indicate.
In a second experiment, Shapiro et al. (1987) tested whether or
not the syntactic realization of an argument has a bearing on verb
complexity. They compared transitives, datives with an optional third
argument and verbs with an obligatory third argument (e.g. hand), using
the same cross modal lexical decision task as in the first experiment.
They predicted that if verb complexity is determined by the number of
argument structures a verb can take, then the obligatory three argument
verbs should yield similar results as the transitive verbs, while the
optional datives should yield longer reaction times. On the other
hand, if implicit arguments are part of the same argument structure as
explicit arguments, then optional datives and obligatory three argument
verbs should yield similar reaction times.
Shapiro et al. got the following overall
difference between the datives and the other
significant:
Mean RTs (in ins) for verb categories
Transitives	 Datives	 Obligatory
622	 647	 606
results, where the
two categories is
These results seem to point at datives with optional arguments having
the different argument structures represented separately. However, as
was the case in the first experiment, the groups of verbs used were not
homogeneous. The six transitives and six optional datives used, were
mostly the same verbs as in the first experiment, while the group of
obligatory three argument verbs consisted of six verbs, hand, entrust,
put, will, devote and place. Of these, will can occur as a modal
verb, and as a main verb with an NP and an infinitive, or with a that-
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clause. The third argument of place is optional, as in I placed an
order for 500 shoes, and even put can occur with an implicit third
argument, as in I put it rather strongly, or PThy don't you put 'Yours
sincerely'? Since the verbs used in each category are not
homogeneous, again it makes no sense to draw conclusions concerning
verb complexity on the basis of these results.
When we compare the results for individual verbs from the first and
second experiments, we see that some verbs got very similar results in
both experiments; for example measure had a mean reaction time of 633
ms. in the first experiment, and 638 ms. in the second experiment.
However, other verbs got widely different reaction times in the two
experiments, some being much faster in the first experiment than the
second, e.g. secure (1st experiment: 614 ms., 2nd experiment: 652
ins.), and send (1st experiment: 646 ins., 2nd experiment: 684 ins.),
while others were much faster in the second as compared to the first,
e.g. dig (1st experiment:	 680 ins., 2nd experiment:	 607 ms.), and
exhibit (1st experiment: 638 ms., 2nd experiment: 593 ms.). These
differences in reaction times for the verbs in the two experiments
raise the question of how reliable this sort of reporting of findings
is in giving us an insight in verb complexity. Although reaction
times are given for individual verbs, they are collapsed over subjects.
We might learn more if reaction times were given for individual
subjects, and if the same subjects were tested repeatedly, so that it
could be assessed whether differences in reaction times in different
experiments are due to individual subjects showing differences, or
different groups of subjects showing differences.
What we have seen then is that there is no experimental evidence to
support the view that lexical preference is used in comprehension.
Rather the evidence supports the view that subeategorization frames
become available in parallel, and a choice is made among them. We can
then ask what the nature of these subcategorization frames is, and
whether they represent syntactic information, or some sort of argument
structure. Unfortunately, the results of the few relevant experiments
that have been carried out to date do not throw much light on this
question.
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Chapter 4: Conceptual structure.
In the last two chapters, we have seen that the experimental
findings are not incompatible with Relevance theory predictions
concerning on-line sentence processing. In this chapter, we will look
at Relevance theory proposals about how conceptual representations are
computed, and point out some problems with these proposals. To
understand what is involved in full interpretation, we need an account
of what constitutes conceptual structure. We will evaluate proposals
by Jackendoff (1983) and Pinker (1990) concerning conceptual
representations. This leads to the proposal that verbs are
represented as structured concepts. This view of verb representation
together with Relevance theory gives us an account of when arguments of
verbs can be left implicit. Finally, an alternative proposal is made
concerning how addressees compute conceptual structures on the basis of
the linguistic input.
4.1. The Relevance theory approach to logical hypothesis thilding.
As we saw in chapter 1, Sperber & Wilson (1986) propose that in
language comprehension the addressee recovers the logical form of a
linguistic input.
	 In order to fully interpret an utterance, this
logical form has to be enriched to become a propositional form. For
an account of real time utterance interpretation, this means that
questions need to be answered concerning the nature of the logical form
representation, how this logical form is recovered, and how it is
completed into a fully propositonal form on-line.
	 Concerning the
first question, Sperber & Wilson propose that:
"a logical form is a well-formed formula, a structured set
of cons ti tuen ts, which undergoes formal logical operations
determined by its structure." (Sperber & Wilson, 1986,
p.72).
This notion of logical form is different from the level of LF such
as proposed in a GB framework, where 12 is defined as the level of
grammar at which quantifier scope and other properties are directly
represented (cf. thomsky, 1981, 1986). In GB, this representation
consists of lexical items and natural language syntax, whereas in
Relevance theory logical forms are representations in the 'language of
thought', i.e. well-formed formulae containing concepts and logical
variables rather than lexical items. Sperber and Wilson assume that
logical forms are trees of labelled nodes, and that the labels used
are logical:
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"The logical labels should be a set of basic logical
categories, perhaps from a fixed range which is part of
basic human mental equipaent, which might be regarded as
variables over conceptual representations of different
types."	 (op. cit., p.205).
They use the pro—forms of English to represent these variables, e.g.
SOMEONE as a variable over conceptual representations of people.
As a simplified illustration of the logical form of a sentence like
(4.1), they give (4.la):
4.1. John invi ted Lucy.
4.la.	 SOMETHING IS THE CASE
SOMEONE	 DID SOMETHING
John	 invited	 SOMEONE
Lucy
Sperber & Wilson argue that, viewed in this way, the logical form of
(4.1) carries the information that John did something, that John
invited someone, etc.; in other words, a number of analytic
implications of (4.1) can be read of f the logical form representation
directly.
According to Sperber & Wilson, in order to recover the logical form
of an utterance in real time utterance interpretation, the addressee
builds anticipatory logical hypotheses about the overall structure of
the proposition expressed by an utterance. These hypotheses are
needed by the addressee to enable her/him to resolve potential
ambiguities and ambivalences. Sperber & Wilson assume that these
logical hypotheses are built on the basis of anticipatory syntactic
hypotheses, unless the addressee already has an incomplete logical form
available which can function as an anticipatory logical hypothesis, as
may be the case with, for example, answers to questions.
Sperber & Wilson assume that after recognizing the first word of an
utterance, the addressee assigns it to a syntactic category (e.g., NP),
and then makes the anticipatory syntactic hypothesis that it will be
followed by another syntactic category (e.g., NP —> VP). By variable
substitution this then yields an anticipatory logical hypothesis, e.g.,
(NP(John) VP) —> 'John DO/BE/HAVE SOMETHING'.
	 Sperber & Wilson say
that:
"On this approach, there is a clear sense in which the
logical category labels correspond to, and are indeed
semantic interpretations of, syntactic category labels of
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natural language (though there need not be a one-to -one
correspondence)." (op. cit., p.206).
However, this approach faces a number of problems. One problem is
that Sperber & Wilson do not explain how the relationship between
concepts and logical variables is represented. As we saw in chapter
1, Sperber & Wilson propose that conceptual addresses give access to
different types of information - lexical, logical and encyclopaedic.
The encyclopaedic entry of a concept contains information about the
extension and/or denotation of the concept. 	 The lexical entry gives
access to information about the natural language counterpart of the
concept, including its syntactic category membership.
	
We might
therefore expect that the logical entry would give information about
the concept's logical category membership. However, this is not the
case: Sperber & Wilson postulate that the logical entry consists of a
set of deductive rules which apply to logical forms of which that
concept is a constituent. 	 It seems then that the logical category is
only assigned to a concept indirectly, i.e. via the syntactic category
membership of its linguistic counterpart. However, as Sperber &
Wilson point out (see above), there is not necessarily a one-to--one
correspondence between syntactic category and logical category labels,
which raises the question of how the correct mapping of concepts onto
logical categories is ensured.
Another problem that faces the approach sketched by Sperber &
Wilson is that they do not explain how and on what basis syntactic
hypotheses are formed; for example, whether these are built for each
word, or only for major phrases. Sperber & Wilson say in respect to
this:
"(the addresseeJ might not only identify each word and
tentatively assign it to a syntactic category, but use his
knowledge of i ts lexical properties and syntactic co-
occurrence restrictions to predict the syntactic categories
of following words or phrases." (op. cit., p.205).
As an illustration of how they envisage the process of hypothesis
building, Sperber & Wilson give the example in (4.2):
4.2. Jennifer admitted stealing.
They assume that after Jennifer is recognized, it will be assigned to
the syntactic category NP. On the basis of this the addressee makes
the anticipatory syntactic hypothesis that it will be followed by a VP,
which yields, by variable-substitution, the anticipatory logical
hypothesis in (4.3):
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4.3. Jennifer DID SOMETHING.
Sperber & Wilson assume that Jennifer has been assigned to NP
straightaway, but this is not necessarily the only possibility.
Jennifer is a noun, and although the addressee can make the
anticipatory hypothesis that it is the whole NP, this need not be the
case. S/he can use her/his knowledge of the lexical properties and co-
occurrence restrictions of Jennifer to build the hypothesis that it
will be followed by a surname (anticipatory syntactic hypothesis:
N —> N), that it will be followed by a PP, or that it will be followed
by a subordinate clause. In principle, these are all possible
expansions of Jennifer. Since the addressee has no means of deciding
which of these hypotheses will turn out to be the correct one, it
follows that s/he will have to make a series of anticipatory syntactic
hypotheses. This has as a consequence that not one logical hypothesis
will be made, but that, by variable-substitution, the different
syntactic hypotheses will yield a series of anticipatory logical
hypotheses. Furthermore, when for example the anticipatory syntactic
hypothesis (N —> PP) is made, there is not just one logical variable
that can be used to substitute the PP in the logical hypothesis.
Jackendoff (1983) identifies and justifies several basic 'conceptual'
categories. At least four of these, PLACE, MANNER, TIME and PROPERTY
can be realized by a PP. If we accept these, then the anticipatory
syntactic hypothesis (N —> PP) would give us, by variable
substitution, the following logical hypotheses:
4.4a. 'Jennifer SOMEWHERE ...'
b. 'Jennifer SOME MANNER ...'
c. 'Jennifer SOME TIME ...'
d. 'Jennifer SOME PROPERTY ....'
Although 'Jennifer SOME PROPERTY ...' and, arguably, 'jennifer
SOMEWHERE ...' can be realized as natural language NPs, e.g.
(Np (NJennifer)(ppwith the big ears))
(N p (NJennifer)( ppfrom next door))
it is difficult to find natural language NPs which realize 'Jennifer
SOME TIME ...'. MANNER is even more problematic, because it typically
modifies actions, so that 'Jennifer SOME MANNER ...' cannot be realized
by natural language NPs. This means that, unless one wants to say
that there are constraints on which logical variables can be
substituted for which syntactic category in which position in the
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syntactic tree, one ends up with anticipatory logical hypotheses which
are superfluous, in that they will never be realized.
Sperber & Wilson say that when the hearer recognizes admitted, s/he
can make the anticipatory syntactic hypothesis that it will be followed
by an NP, because it is transitive on both of its senses, confess to
and let in. Again this is not the only possibility, because on its
first reading, admit subcategorizes for S, S I , PP (S'), and NP PP, as
well as for NP. If anticipatory syntactic hypotheses are built for
all these possibilities, they in turn give rise to an extended range of
anticipatory logical hypotheses, taking into account that, as was the
case with the PPs above, there is not necessarily a one—to—one
correspondence between the logical category labels and the syntactic
category labels.
That PPs are not the only syntactic categories which can map onto
different logical categories, is illustrated in the next step in the
process of hypothesis building for the utterance in (4.2). Sperber &
Wilson give as anticipatory logical hypotheses built on the syntactic
hypothesis (admitted —> NP):
4.5a. Jennifer let SOMEONE in.
b. Jennifer confessed to SOMETHING.
This again raises the question of how one knows which logical variable
to substitute for which syntactic category, since (4.5a) has SOMEONE, a
variable over people, whereas in (4.5b) SOMETHING is used, a variable
over things. We see here that NPs can be realized by two logical
variables. However, Jackendoff (1987) points out that NPs can express
almost any conceptual category, for example, earthquake expresses an
event, and redness expresses a property. If these conceptual
categories are represented in logical variables, then any hypothesized
NP would give rise to a wide range of logical hypotheses.
Even if we presume that an NP is substituted by only two variables, as
in (4.5a) and (4.Sb), this would still give us four logical hypotheses,
and besides it would have as an undesirable consequence that (admitted
—> NP) would yield the logical hypothesis in (4.6):
4.6. Jennifer admitted (confessed to) SOMEONE. (in the sense of:
*the thing that Jennifer admitted doing was someone).
Hypothesis (4.6) would be ruled out on the grounds of semantic
incompatibility, so that postulating (4.6) as a hypothesis is
superfluous.
Jackendoff (1983) proposes a variable THING which ranges over people
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and things. Adopting this variable would circumvent the above
problem, although it would not narrow down the range of possible
referents that the logical variable can take in the way that (4.5a) and
(4.Sb) do.
Sperber & Wilson say that, after disambiguation of admitted has
taken place,
"if the speaker has achieved optimal relevance, the word
'stealing' should fall into a place already prepared for it
during the interpretation process." (op. cit., p.208).
Stealing does fall into a place already prepared for it, but the
question is whether it is the right place.
	 According to the
anticipatory logical hypothesis, stealing is a THING. However,
Jennifer admitted stealing entails that it was Jennifer who did the
stealing, not that what Jennifer confessed to was stealing 'in
general'.	 This means that the NP stealing functions here as an
elliptical sentence, which expresses an event in which Jennifer was
involved. However, the anticipatory logical hypothesis proposed by
Sperber & Wilson does not allow for this enrichment, so that it makes
the wrong prediction.
Basing logical hypotheses on syntactic hypotheses can actually lead
to false predictions in some cases. Consider the example in (4.7):
4.7a. A: I went to the pictures last night.
b. B: Me too.
After recognizing me the hearer assigns it to the syntactic category N
and can then, because of its case, build the syntactic hypothesis
(N —> conj. N), e.g. 'Me and John ...'. By variable substitution
this will yield the anticipatory logical hypothesis 'speaker and
SOMEONE ...'.
	 Alternatively, me may be recognized as a displaced
object, so that the syntactic hypothesis can be built that it will be
followed by a sentence with an empty 'object—slot'.
	 However, in
neither of the two hypotheses is there a place into which too can be
fitted, which will render me too uninterpretable. This would imply
that a speaker aiming at optimal relevance would not utter me too; but
surely one would want to say that B's response in (4.7) is more
relevant than the alternative utterance in (4.8):
4.8. B: I went to the pictures last night too.
Although both utterances have the same contextual effects, the effort
required to process (4.7b) is (intuitively) small, whereas processing
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(4.8) takes more effort, which is not set off by any contextual
effects.
In general, it seems that elliptical sentences present a problem as
far as syntactic hypothesis building is concerned, because they induce
the wrong hypothesis to be built, for example:
4.9. Hope to see you soon.
4.10. Police rescued from gang.
This can also happen with sentences with dislocated constituents, for
example:
4.11. That film we saw on the ferry coming to Britain.
There is nothing about dislocated NPs that distinguishes them from
ordinary subject-NPs, so that the wrong hypothesis (NP —> VP) will be
built on recognizing them. Alternatively, we would be forced to adopt
the view that for every first encountered NP in an utterance the
hypothesis that it is dislocated would have to be built, as well as
(NP —> VP), something which is clearly undesirable.
We see then that the proposal that anticipatory logical hypotheses
are built on the basis of' anticipatory syntactic hypotheses cannot be
maintained. Postulating this way of hypothesis formation does not
constrain the number of possible 'readings' of an utterance, but rather
increases then. Because there is no one-to-one correspondence
between syntactic categories and logical categories, postulating that a
particular syntactic category will follow, gives rise to an extended
range of logical hypotheses. Moreover, some of these logical
hypotheses are unrealizable, as was the case with the logical
hypotheses that could be built on the basis of (Jennifer —> PP).
A further problem that faces this proposal is that it gives rise to
the wrong predictions, as we saw with, for example, the elliptical
sentences above. If processing cost was no object, the addressee
could build all possible hypotheses, even unrealizable ones, and
discard all but the one which is borne out by further incoming
information. However, Sperber & Wilson propose that anticipatory
hypotheses are built to constrain the interpretation process, and
thereby the amount of processing effort, so that this view of
hypothesis formation is ruled out.
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4.2. Logical hypotheses without syntactic hypotheses.
Sperber & Wilson's main claim concerning on—line language input
processing is that:
"... the hearer makes anticipatory hypotheses about the
overall logical structure of the utterance arid resolves
potential ambiguities and ambi valences on the basis of
these."	 (op. cit., p.205).
Logical hypotheses not only play an important role in disambiguation,
but, since logical hypotheses are logical forms, they also allow the
addressee to start drawing inferences as soon as one is constructed,
i.e. the addressee does not have to wait until the end of the utterance
to start achieving contextual effects. This property underlies a
further important role of logical hypotheses in comprehension: they
give us an account of such notions as the given—new and focus—
presupposition distinctions. Sperber & Wilson propose that the
smallest stressed constituent in an utterance be called the 'focally
stressed constituent', and that the constituent that the stress
highlights, is the 'focus'. They point out that the focally stressed
constituent rarely determines a unique focus. For example, in (4.2),
repeated below, the focally stressed constituent is stealing, bit the
focus could be stealing by itself, the VP admitted stealing, or the
whole sentence Jennifer admitted stealing. By postulating that the
addressee makes anticipatory logical hypotheses we can account for how
the actual focus is chosen.
4.2. Jennifer admitted STEALING.
The correct logical hypotheses that an addressee recovers during
the interpretation of an utterance are logically related to each other:
"the set of anticipatory hypotheses forms a scale in which each member
analytically implies the immediately preceding member and is
analytically implied by the immediately succeeding member." (op. cit.,
p.208).	 For example, (4.2) gives us the scale in (4.12):
4.12a. Jennifer did something!
What did Jennifer do?
b. Jennifer confessed to something!
What did Jennifer confess to?
c. Jennifer confessed to stealing.
	 (op. cit., p.210)
What we see then is that the scale in (4.12) is a subset of the
analytic implications of (4.2). This subset of implications is
related to the set of possible foci: by replacing the possible focus
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with a logical label one gets an implication in the scale, so that the
scale may be referred to as a 'focal scale'.
These implications can contribute to the overall relevance of an
utterance in two ways; either an implication gives rise to contextual
effects in its own right, or it helps reduce processing cost by giving
direct access to a context in which contextual effects can be achieved.
Sperber & Wilson propose that an implication which gives rise to
contextual effects of its own is a 'foreground implication', and that
an implication which does not give rise to contextual effects is a
'background implication'. On the basis of this distinction, Sperber &
Wilson propose that:
"...the focus of an utterance will be the smallest
syntactic constituent whose replacement by a variable
yields a background rather than a foreground implication."
(op. cit., p.209)
As a consequence, an utterance does not have a unique focus. Where
the focus falls for an individual addressee depends on how the
implications interact with the context that is accessed by the
addressee.
This proposal also sheds light on the intuition that there is a
gradient of given and new information:
"... Wherever the cut—off point between foreground and
background comes, there is a clear sense in which [12b1,
for example, simultaneously acts as a foreground
implication in relation to (12a1, giving a partial answer
to the question it raises, and as a background implication
in relation to [12c], raising a question to which (12c1
gives at least a partial answer. ...even [12c1, which is
necessarily a foreground implication, may simultaneously
raise a background question which some subsequent utterance
(or a continuation of the same utterance) will answer.
Our distinction between foreground and background, like our
notion of focus itself, is thus a purely functional one,
and should play no role in the linguistic description of
sentences."	 (op. cit., p.210).
Postulating that logical hypotheses are formed in the course of
processing does not only give us an account of how disanibiguation is
achieved but also gives us an explanation for stylistic effects.
However, as we have seen, the proposal that these hypotheses are built
on the basis of syntactic hypotheses comes up against a range of
problems. This then raises the question of whether postulating this
is a prerequisite for the way in which Sperber & Wilson view the
interpretation process, and a consequence of Relevance theory.
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Sperber & Wilson support their claim that syntactic hypotheses are
b.iilt during the process of interpretation by referring to Johnson-
Laird (1983). What Johnson-Laird actually says about syntactic
hypothesis formation is the following:
"There are in principle several types of prediction that a
parser might make.
	 It could predict that the next
constituent will be of a particular category. (...) It
could predict that a particular constituent must definitely
occur at SOME later point in the sentence, though not
necessarily as the next constituent. The occurrence of
the predicts a subsequent noun though it may not be the
next word, and the occurrence of a dislocated constituent
predicts a subsequent 'hole' that corresponds to i t.
Finally, the parser could make either sort of prediction
wi th respect to optional cons ti tuen ts. For example, given
the occurrence of a verb that can be used transi tively or
intransitively, it could predict that the next constituent
is optionally a noun phrase. 	 The point about making
predictions is to increase efficiency.
	 If too many
predictions are made, however, the system will collapse
under its own processing load. It would thus be folly to
design a sys tern that made top-down predictions about, say,
occurrences of conjunctions, or adverbs like only or any
other cons ti tuen t that is a biqui tous. Such predictions
would have to be made after almost every word in a sentence
and mostly fail to be fulfilled." (Johnson-Laird, 1983,
pp.320-321).
As Johnson-Laird points out, there are different types of
prediction that a parser might make, in principle. However, this does
not mean that the parser makes syntactic hypotheses in practice.
Johnson-Laird goes on to propose a processing model in which some
syntactic hypotheses are made. In the case of verbs, he proposes that
the parser makes a hypothesis on the basis of the principle of Lexical
Preference (Ford, Bresnan & Kaplan, 1982). As we saw in Chapter 2,
the claim that the parser operates according to this principle is not
borne out by the experimental evidence.
What we saw in the case of verbs, is that the experimental evidence
shows that all subcategorization frames of a verb become available
after the verb is recognized. However, the evidence does not show
what the nature of these subcategorization frames is, whether these are
representations of syntactic subcategorization, or representations of
argument structure (of some sort).
	 If syntactic subcategorization
information becomes available, then building logical hypotheses on the
basis of this runs into problems, as we saw above. However, this is
not the only possibility. Consider, for example, the verb put. Put
has the syntactic subcategorization frame, v[_ NP PP}, as in (4.13):
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4.13. Put it on the table.
On the view that anticipatory logical hypotheses are based on syntactic
hypotheses, the occurrence of put would give rise to an extended number
of logical hypotheses, because, as we saw above, a PP can map onto
different logical variables. However, the PP following put expresses
the logical category SOMEWHERE. Furthermore, as we saw in chapter 3,
put can occur with an implicit argument, as in (4.14):
4.14. Why don't you put 'yours sincerely'?
If anticipatory logical hypotheses are based on anticipatory syntactic
hypotheses, (4.13) and (4.14) predict that put can occur, at least, in
the logical forms in (4.15):
4.15a. SOMEONE put SOMETHING SOMEWHERE.
b. SOMEONE put SOMETHING.
However, although (4.14) only has two overt arguments, we interpret it
as expressing (4.15a) rather than (4.15b), as, for example, in (4.16):
4.16. Why don't you put 'yours sincerely' at the end of your letter?
The reason for this is that (4.15b) is not a possible logical form for
put, because it is inherent in the meaning of put that putting involves
three 'entities': you can't put something without putting it
somewhere. As we saw above, Sperber & Wilson say that:
".... there is a clear sense in which the logical category
labels correspond to, and are indeed semantic
interpretations of, syntactic category labels of natural
language (...).'	 (op. cit., p.206).
However, example (4.14) shows us that logical category labels cannot
just be semantic interpretations of syntactic category labels of
natural language, because that would give rise to the logical form in
(4.l5b); rather, it seems that an utterance like (4.14) is an
incomplete realization of the logical form in (4.15a), and it is by
virtue of the addressee knowing that put has this logical form, that
s/he is able to interpret (4.14) as (4.16). It seems then that what
the addressee recovers on encountering put, is not syntactic
subcategorization information, ixit a specification of what sort of
arguments it must occur with.
Chomsky (1986) proposes that information of this sort is stored in
the mental lexicon. He says that what the lexicon contains is:
"... for each lexical i tern, i ts (abs tract) phonological
form and whatever semantic properties are associated with
it.	 Among these will be the 'selectional properties' of
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heads of constructions:	 nouns, verbs, adjectives and
particles ... The entry for the word hit, for example,
will specify that it takes a complement with the semantic
role of recipient of action (patient), and that its subject
has the semantic role of agent ... For the word persuade,
the lexical entry will specify that it takes two
complements, the target of the action (let us say wi th the
general semantic role of goal) and a proposi tion, and that
the phrase of which persuade is head assi,ns the role of
agent to the subject.	 Let us call these properties
'semantic selection' (s-selection) ... Is it also
necessary to specify in the lexicon properties of
categorial selection (c-selection), for example, that hit
takes an NP complement (hit John)?	 The latter
specification seems redundant; if hit s-selects a patient,
then this element will be an NP. 	 If c-selection is
redundant, in general, then the lexicon can be res tn c ted
to s-selection."	 (Chomsky, 1986, p.86).
Sperber & Wilson assume that logical forms are structured strings of
concepts, rather than natural language lexical items, so that if this
auHPT10 is correct, it raises the question of how these s-selection
frames relate to the logical forms that they map onto, for example, how
semantic roles relate to conceptual categories.
There are a number of problems with this proposal. In the first
place, if we assume that the lexical item put s-selects an agent, a
theme and a goal, then we would expect that an utterance such as (4.14)
is ruled out.	 Since (4.14) is a possible utterance, this means that
put either has two s-selection frames, or one s-selection frame with an
optional goal.	 But either of these possibilities entail that a
sentence like (4.17) is well-formed, which we would not want to say:
4.17. ? John put the book.
Secondly, Chomsky's choice of semantic roles is problematic. On
the one hand, he uses thematic roles such as 'agent' and 'patient',
whose status in linguistic theory is not precisely defined (cf. Dowty,
1989; Jackendoff, 1983, 1987; Stowe, 1989); and on the other hand he
uses a notion 'proposition', as expressing a semantic property.
'Proposition' is not a thematic role such as 'agent' or 'patient',
which raises the question of how it relates to thematic roles.
Furthermore, Chomsky uses 'proposition' as a variable over clauses and
NPs of the appropriate type, namely those that receive a propositional
interpretation, without specifying what the semantic property is that
'proposition' expresses.
In the third place, s-selection frames of this kind do not give us
a unified picture of semantic properties. On Choosky's proposal,
s-selection frames only specify what complements an expression can
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take. This disregards the fact that there also are semantic
restrictions on what kind of adjuncts can occur with different
expressions. Consider, for example, the utterances in (4.18), as
opposed to (4.19):
18a. The girl from next door is clever.
b. The girl with the funny ears is clever.
c. The girl sent home from school is clever.
d. The girl sitting at the window is clever.
e. The girl I met yesterday is clever.
19. ?The girl at five o'clock is clever.
Whereas the sentences in (4.18) are all semantically well—formed,
(4.19) appears ill—formed, unless we interpret at five o'clock as
denoting a spatial position at which the girl is, rather than a time,
for example, when (4.19) is uttered in the context of a group of girls
standing in a circle. It seems then that s—selection frames should
also account for what adjuncts an expression such as girl can take.
However, extending Chomsky's proposal to do this, leads to a number of
problems.
One could say that girl s—selects for SOURCE, as in (4.18a), and
for PROPOSITION, as in (4.18c,d,e). However, there does not seem to
be a thematic role which captures what is expressed by the modifier in
(4. 18b):	 with the funny ears is not a goal, benef active, or
instrument, but rather expresses a property that the girl has. It
seems then that we not only need thematic roles and the notion
'proposition' to describe s—selection frames, but also a notion
'property'.	 However, the property in (4.18b) can also be ascribed to
the girl in a proposition, as in (4.20):
4.20. The girl who has funny ears is clever.
It seems then that 'proposition' itself does not express a semantic
property, but rather that the contents of a proposition can express a
semantic property, which may be a different one in different
propositions, as in (4.18c,d,e) and (4.20). Moreover, it is not clear
what it means to say that the lexical item girl s—selects a source, a
property, or a proposition. None of the modifiers in (4.18) express
semantic properties which are associated with the lexical item girl as
such. Rather communicators use these modifiers to help the addressee
pick out the intended referent of the whole referring expression (cf.
Osgood, 1971; Sridhar, 1988). This means that these modifiers do not
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modify the lexical item girl, but rather constrain the possible
referents of the concept 'girl', by expressing a distinguishing
property.
On the Chomskyan view of language, LF is a level of the grammar,
consisting of lexical items and natural language syntax. This has as
a consequence that the mental lexicon is the only possible place in
which s-selection properties (of whatever format) can be stored.
However, Sperber & Wilson propose that logical forms are
representations of an inner language of thought. Since anticipatory
logical hypotheses are logical forms in various states of completion,
they are stated in the language of thought, rather than in natural
language. This has as a consequence, that logical hypotheses are
hypotheses about what concepts can combine with to yield a well-formed
formula, rather than hypotheses about what lexical items will follow.
As we have seen, the proposal that these logical hypotheses are based
on syntactic hypotheses cannot be maintained, because it is not
syntactic properties that are at stake, but rather semantic selectional
properties: as Chomsky (1986) points out, postulating s-selection
frames may make syntactic subcategorization frames redundant. But
postulating that these semantic selectional properties are properties
of lexical items runs into a range of problems.
However, the language of thought hypothesis allows for a different
view.	 Postulating that the mind computes structured conceptual
representations entails that information about how these
representations may be structured has to be stated somewhere. Sperber
& Wilson propose that concepts have entries for different types of
information.	 This allows for the proposal that one type of
information that is stored under a concept is information concerning
which conceptual categories the concept can combine with. In other
words, we can view s-selection frames as specifying semantic
selectional properties of concepts, rather than of lexical items.
Since conceptual selection frames apply to logical forms rather than
natural language, this entails that they are stored in the logical
entry of a concept, rather than in the lexical entry.
If we assume that selection frames are specifications about the
logical forms that a concept can appear in, then we can account for the
problems that faced Chomsky's (1986) proposal above. As a first
approximation 1 , we can propose that in the case of put the addressee
accesses the logical entry of the concept, which will give her/him the
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s-selection frame which tells her/him what logical variables the
concept has to combine with to yield a well-formed formula, i.e.
4.21. SOMEONE put SOMETHING SOMEWHERE.
The addressee can then use this selection frame as an anticipatory
logical hypothesis. In the case of (4.14), repeated here, there is no
linguistic realization of the logical variable SOMEWHERE:
4.14. Why don't you put 'yours sincerely'?
On the view that s-selection frames specify semantic selectional
properties of lexical items, this led to the position that put has two
s-selection frames. However, one of the central claims of Relevance
theory is that the linguistic input often underdetermines the
propositional form of an utterance. This means that we can maintain
that put only has the logical selection frame in (4.21), which yields
the incomplete logical form (4.22) for the utterance in (4.14):
4.22. Why don't you put 'yours sincerely' SOMEWHERE.
This incomplete logical form can then be completed into a propositional
form, such as (4.16), in accordance with the principle of relevance.
4.16. Why don't you put 'yours sincerely' at the end of your letter?
Viewed in this way, logical selection frames not only specify what
conceptual categories the concept must combine with to yield a well-
formed conceptual representation, but they also specify what a concept
can combine with to yield a complex concept. For example, the concept
GIRL will have as a specification that it can combine with a PROPERTY
to yield a complex concept, as in the examples in (4.18), repeated
here:
4.18a. The girl from next door is clever.
b. The girl with the funny ears is clever.
c. The girl sent home from school is clever.
d. The girl sitting at the window is clever.
e. The girl I met yesterday is clever.
Logical s-selection frames then specify two things, in the first place
they specify what a concept has to combine with to yield a well-formed
formula, and secondly, they specify what a concept can combine with to
yield a complex concept.
As we saw earlier, Sperber & Wilson (1986) say that the lexical
entry of a concept contains information about the syntactic category,
co-occurrence possibilities and phonological structure of the word
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which is the natural counterpart of the concept. Postulating that s-
selection frames are stored in the logical entry however, forces us to
reconsider this view. Not only does it become superfluous to say that
co-occurrence possibilities are contained in the (input part of the)
mental lexicon, but, since the selection frame specifies the logical
structures the concept can occur in, it also becomes superfluous to
postulate that information about the syntactic category of the word
associated with a particular concept is stored in the mental lexicon.
Instead, all the addressee has to do is recognize the phonological form
of a word; this phonological form maps onto a concept (or different
concepts in the case of ambiguity), which gives access to the logical
entry of that concept, from which the addressee can recover the logical
selection frame of the concept, as illustrated in figure 1):
Mental lexicon
Phonological	 _______________Concept
entry 1
Figure 1): Recovering the logical selection frame.
It follows from this proposal that all linguistic expressions map onto
concepts which have a semantic selectional specification. These
semantic specifications consist of logical variables, which are
conceptual categories. However, this raises the question of what
conceptual categories there are, and how they combine to yield these
logical s-selection frames.
4.3. The language of thought reconsidered.
Although Sperber & Wilson postulate that there may be a set of
conceptual categories, which is part of basic human equipment, and as
such part of the language of thought, they do not specify in detail
what these conceptual categories are.
Jackendoff (1983) develops a theory of semantics which takes as its
basic premise that meaning in natural language consists of information
structures represented at the level of conceptual structure. He
proposes that the major units of conceptual structure are conceptual
constituents, which belong to a small set of major ontological catego-
ries. He argues that 'pragmatic anaphora' provide evidence for these
different conceptual categories. As an example, he gives (4.23):
4.23. I bought that yesterday.
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When someone points and simultaneously utters (4.23), the addressee has
to pick out what is referred to by that from the immediate visual
context, but s/he Dust also interpret the word that. Jackeixioff
argues that what that does is constrain the kind of entity that the
addressee has to pick out:
"... the izzaximally simple NP "that" expresses a minimally
specified [THING] in [4.23], and the visual field is the
source of the remaining information in the intended
message." (Jackendoff, 1983, p.52).
Because interpreting (4.23) involves both linguistic and visual
information, the interpretation of that must be an expression at the
level of conceptual structure, which means that THING must be a
conceptual category.
Jackendoff goes on to show that more categories than THING have to
be distinguished as 'entities' at the conceptual level, because we can
refer to them in the same way as we can refer to THINGS. As examples,
he gives (amongst others):
4.24a. Your coat is here [pointing] and your hat is there [pointing].
PLACE
b. Can you do that [pointing]? ACTION
c. That [pointing] had better not happen again around here.
EVENT
d. You shuffle cards thus [demonstrating]. MANNER
e. The fish that got away was this [demonstrating] long.	 AMOUNT
In this way Jackendoff distinguishes a set of basic conceptual
categories: THING, EVENT, STATE, ACTION, PLACE, DIRECTION, PATH,
PROPERTY, AMOUNT, and MANNER. He does not claim that these categories
exhaust the possibilities, hit argues that for these categories
linguistic and visual evidence are both present most prominently.
Further categories may be SOUND, SMELL and TIME.
Claiming that these categories are basic does not mean that they
cannot have any internal structure. For example, a PLACE may
incorporate a THING, as in the PLACE on the table, which incorporates a
THING, the table. However, Jackendoff argues that PLACES (and other
categories) cannot be reduced to THINGS, because they individuate our
perceptions in different ways: As an illustration of this, Jackendoff
compares (4.25a) and (4.25b):
4.25a. Here is your coat, and there is your hat.
b. This is your coat, and that is your hat.
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He says about these examples that:
"(4.25aJ locates the coat and hat, while [4.257,] identifies
them - two entirely different sorts of information." (op.
cit., p.50).
This means that THING does not have a privileged role among these
categories, but rather that the conceptual categories "characterize the
distinction among major classes of entities that we act as though the
world contains" (op cit., p.51). In support of this he points out
that the different conceptual categories can be referred to by using
grammatical constructions which closely parallel constructions used to
refer to THINGS. For example, each conceptual category can give rise
to a Wh—question, with what to refer to a THING, where to refer to a
PLACE or a PATH, how to refer to a MANNER or an AMOUNT, while ACTIONS
give rise to what did ... do?, and EVENTS to what happened?
Jackendoff points out that each of these questions can give rise to a
reduced answer of the appropriate category. Furthermore, Jackendoff
notes that we cannot just quantify over THINGS, but also over the other
conceptual categories, apart from AMOUNT: we do not only get
something/everything, bit also somewhere/everywhere for PLACE and PATH,
do something/do everything for ACTION, some way/every way for MANNER,
etc.
Extra—linguistic support for some of these categories comes from
observation of human perceptual development. Sridhar (1988) makes a
number of generalizations about prelinguistic cognitive structures,
based on the work of Bower (1974), Osgood (1980) and Greenfield & Smith
(1976).	 Sridhar notes that by about 22 weeks of age, infants
distinguish between 'entities' and 'relations', the states, actions or
operations undergone by entities. Furthermore, they can distinguish
between entities and their location or the movement associated with
them. These distinctions correspond to Jackendoff's categories THING,
for 'entities';	 STATE and EVENT, for 'relations';	 PLACE, for
location; and MANNER, for movement. Sridhar notes that infants are
particularly adept at distinguishing between human and nonhuman
(animate or inanimate) entities, which provides some evidence for
PROPERTY, and that infants distinguish animate entities as capable of
voluntary action and acting upon objects, which corresponds to
Jackendoff's category ACTION.
Jackendoff refers to observations of Kohier (1927) as evidence for
the psychological reality of PATHS:
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"[Kohier) points out that a sufficiently intelligent animal
(e.g., a dog but not a chicken), confronted with food
behind a transparent barrier, will "run in a smooth curve,
wi thout any interruption, out of the blind alley, round the
fence to the new food..." The execution of such a smooth
curve requires i ts being planned in advance - not as a
finite sequence of points joined by straight lines, but as
an en tire path. . . . Thus, if an animal can perform such an
action as Kohier describes, it must be able to formulate
concepts of spatial organization that fall under what we
have called here the major ontological category of paths.
In other words, not only language but the theory of action
as well requires a notion of path, and it is pointless to
try to eliminate it from language on grounds of parsimony.
(op. cit., pp.169-170).
As we saw above, the conceptual categories can have internal
structure. In order to account for how the categories may be
structured, Jackendoff proposes that there are a number of innate
formation rules for conceptual structure. 	 These formation rules
consist of conceptual categories and functions, which map conceptual
categories into different conceptual categories. For example, in on
the table, on is a place-function that maps the table, a THING, into a
PLACE. Some of the formation rules that Jackendoff proposes are given
in (4.26):
4.26a. PLACE -> [ p iace PIACEFUNCTION (THING)]
I	 TOI	 PROM	 ITHING\
b. PATH -> I	 TOWARD	 PLACE)I	 AWAY-FROM
bath VIA
c. EVENT ->	 [event GO (THING, PATH)]
[event STAY (THING, PLACE)]
d. STATE -> [state BE (THING, PLACE)]
[state ORIENT (THING, PATH)]
The rule in (4.26a) expands a PLACE, as with on the table. (4.26b)
expands a PATH, either by mapping a reference THING into a trajectory,
as in to the house, or by mapping a reference PLACE into a trajectory,
as in from under the table. (4.26c) expands an EVENT, either into an
EVENT consisting of a THING moving along a PATH, where the function GO
relates the THING and the PATH, as in John went to the house; or into
an EVENT consisting of a THING and a PLACE, where the function STAY
denotes stasis over a period of time, as in John stayed in the kitchen.
(4.26d) expands a STATE, either into the location of a THING, using the
function BE, as in John is in the kitchen; 	 or to specify the
orientation of a THING, using the function ORIENT, as in The sign
points toward New York.
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Concerning the relationship between natural language syntax and
conceptual structure, Jackendoff argues that every major phrasal
constituent in a natural language utterance corresponds to a conceptual
constituent which is one of the conceptual categories. He says that:
HIf a major phrasal cons ti tuen t is used referentially, i t
corresponds to a projectable instance of a major onto-
logical category. In other words, all major phrasal
categories play the role assigned to NPs alone in firs t-
order logic."	 (op. cit., p.67)
Moreover, he argues that the lexical heads of a major phrasal
constituent correspond to functions in conceptual structure. These
functions can have zero or more argument places that must be filled in
order to form a complete conceptual constituent. For example, in The
man went to the house, man corresponds to a zero-place function which
maps into the category THING, to corresponds to a one-place function
which maps into the category PATH, and went corresponds to a two-place
function which maps into the category EVENT.
Jackendoff points out that there is one exception to the
correlation of major phrasal constituents with conceptual categories:
VP is a non-major category which corresponds to the conceptual category
ACTION.	 Jackendoff leaves it open whether a more general category
PREDICATE should be distinguished. 	 He argues that ACTIONS can be
clearly individuated, while this does not seen to be the case for verb
phrases which do not express ACTIONS.	 However, even in the case of
'non-actions' we can distinguish between the whole EVENT or STATE and
the predication of the 'non-action'. Not only do we get (4.24b) to
refer to an ACTION, and (4.24c) to refer to an EVENT, but also (4.24f)
to refer to a 'non-action':
4.24b. Can you do that [pointing]? ACTION
c. That [pointing] had better not happen again around here.
EVENT
f. That [pointing] happened to me once. 'non-action'
In (4.24f) that cannot refer to the whole EVENT, because the EVENT
involves a different THING of whom the 'non-action' is predicated.
ACTIONS give rise to what did ... do? and EVENTS to what happened?
However, we can also have what happened to you? which does not question
the whole event (as with what happened?), but rather the predication of
the non-action. This can have a reduced answer, such as Fell over arid
broke my leg. It seems then that we not only need a category ACTION,
but also a category which individuates 'non-actions'. 	 One way of
159
realizing this is by proposing a general category PREDICATE which
subsumes ACTION. This proposal is compatible with the assumption that
an addressee constructs anticipatory logical hypotheses: on
encountering a THING, the addressee recovers that the THING has to
combine with something that is predicated of that THING to yield a
well—formed formula. Only recovering the actual predication will tell
the addressee what the nature of the predication involved is.
4.3.1. Decomposition versus holism.
Jackendoff's proposals concerning the representation of conceptual
structure rest on the assumption that lexical meanings are
decompositional, although they do not decompose into necessary and
sufficient conditions. His main argument for this position is that on
the view that meanings are unstructured monads, one cannot account for
the creativity of concept formation and categorization. Jackendoff
distinguishes between a representation of a projectable 'entity', i.e.
a TOKEN, and a representation of a category, i.e. a TYPE. 	 He argues
that:
"... one can create new (TYPE) concepts at will. One of
the simplest ways to do this is to construct, for an
arbi trary (TOKENJi, a (TYPEJ of THINGS LIKE [TOKENJi, where
likeness can be determined along any arbitrary class of
dimensions. For each of the indefinitely many [TOKENS)
that one can construct in response to environmental
stimulation, there are any number of such [TYPES]. These
in turn can be used to categorize arbitrary (TOKENS].
(...) We (...) have reason to reject Fodor 's (1975) theory
that all possible [TYPES) are innately given as unanalyzed
,nonads: a (TYPE] without internal structure cannot be
compared wi th novel (TOKENS] to yield categorization
judgments. Moreover, Fodor 's theory en tai is that that
there is only a finite number of (TYPES), since there is
only a finite space in the brain for storing them all.
.But if one can generate new [TYPES) at will on the basis
of given (TOKENS], then ei ther the set of (TYPES) must be
infinite, contra Fodor, or else the set of (TOKENS) must be
finite and innate, a totally implausible conclusion."
(op. cit pp.82-83).
However, Relevance theory proposes that concepts give access to
different types of information, and that the context in which the
concept is used determines what subset of that information becomes
available. This has as a consequence that 'the creativity of
categorization' can be accounted for in terms of comparing subsets of
information stored in logical and encyclopaedic entries of concepts,
rather than by claiming that concepts are decomposed structures.
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Jackendoff (1989) argues that the (holistic) meaning postulate
account of meaning denies the possibility of generalizing over the
inferential properties of different lexical items. As an example, he
looks at the entailment relationship between the members of causative-
noncausative pairs, such as in (4.27):
4.27a. x killed y -> y died
b. x lifted y -> y rose
c. x gave z to y -> y received x
Jackendoff points out that in a meaning postulate theory these
inferences are totally unrelated. However, intuitively they follow a
single pattern, which can be captured in a schema, such as in (4.28),
where E stands for an Event:
4.28. x cause E to occur -> E occur
In order to be able to use a schema like (4.28), the meaning postulates
for kill, lift, and give should be given like (4.29), rather than like
(4.27):
4.29a. x kill y -> x cause [y die]
b. x lift y -> x cause [y rise]
c. x give z to y -> x cause [y receive zJ
Jackendoff argues that if one adopts the meaning postulates in (4.29)
then there is no difference between the meaning postulate and the
decoinpositional approach. The meaning postulates in (4.29) are a
notational variant of the analysis of causatives in a lexical
decomposition theory: it is claimed that there is an element cause
which is mentioned in the analysis of many lexical items, and which
gives access to more general-purpose rules of inference.
However, Carston (1985) uses causative verbs to argue against the
decompositional view, and in favour of meaning postulates. She points
out that it has been shown (e.g. Fodor, 1981) that even for causative
verbs only necessary conditions, bit not sufficient conditions can be
given. This means that one ends up with a system of partial
definitions. This has as a consequence that most of the advantages of
the decoinpositional approach are lost, such as predictions of synonymy
and antonymy.
Carston argues that even if meanings can be decomposed, there still
is a need for inference rules (i.e. meaning postulates) to account for
entailments, such as those between 'X CAUSE P' and 'P' (what Jackendoff
calls a 'schema', as in (4.28)).
	 Furthermore, she argues that
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relations which may hold among primitives in a decompositional system
can only be stated in terms of meaning postulates, since primitives are
not definable. This then means that the meaning postulate approach is
a uniform approach, while the decompositional approach still has to
incorporate inference rules. However, Jackendoff does not propose
decomposition as an alternative to inference rules, but rather gives a
place to both within his framework. The question then is how one can
decide between the two proposals concerning the nature of concepts.
Pinker (1989) presents evidence from different sources that verb
meanings, at least, seem to be decomposed. Pinker claims that Gentner
(1981) and Gergely & Bever (1986) show that, compared to nouns, verbs
are processed quite differently. Verbs are not remembered well
verbatim; they do not survive intact in double translations (where one
bilingual speaker translates a passage, and another bilingual speaker
translates it back); and verbs do not survive intact in paraphrases of
sentences. Moreover, children, in general, acquire verbs later than
nouns, and tend to make mistakes in using verbs, which are attributable
to incomplete or mislabeled semantic structures in many cases.
Pinker shows that some argument structure errors that children make can
only be explained if one assumes that children link argument structures
to details of the verb's semantic structure:
"Say the child seeks verb Vi which has meaning Mi, argument
structure Ai, and stem Si. Instead, his retrieval
mechanism gives him stem 52 from verb V2, because of the
similarity of its meaning M2, with Mi. Now the question
is: will the argument structure used by the child be A2,
because the stem is 52, or Ai, because the meaning is Mi?
Another way of putting it is, when a stem and a meaning
part company, does the stem get its way in choosing the
argument structure, or does the meaning? The empirical
answer is that when Ai and A2 are different, we usually
find Ai, the argument structure belonging to the target
meaning, being used. Children say Put Eva the yukky one
first, or You put the pink one to me, not Put the yukky one
into/onto Eva first.
	 Conversely, they say Give some
icecream in here, not Give some icecream to here.
	 (...)
The view that argument structures are arbitrarily and
conventionally paired wi th verbs directly and on a verb-by-
verb basis, wi th no consistent con tn by
 tion from lexical
semantics other than specifying the number of arguments,
would predict that an intruding verb should carry its own
argument sruture along wi th i t; the fact that the child
had a different meaning in mind would be irrelevant.
(Pinker, 1989, p.339).
Further evidence for the decomposition of verbs that Pinker
presents, comes from the finding by Levin (1985), and Laughren, Levin &
Rappaport (1986) that certain semantic elements (such as motion,
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causation and contact) recur in different combinations which give rise
to the range of different argument structure alternations (such as I
gave the book to Ann - I gave Ann the book). Pinker argues that:
"More generally, there are strong universal tendencies for
large sets of verbs wi thin and across languages to make the
same kinds of semantic distinctions (...) and for
grammatical processes to attend to those distinctions."
(op. cit., p.170).
On the other hand, Carter (1976), Bybee (1985), and Talmy (1985) show
that there are other semantic distinctions which verbs rarely make in
any language.
However, although verbs in different languages make the same kinds
of semantic distinctions, the way in which they are lexically realized
can differ considerably. Pinker argues that one language may have a
verb which expresses to walk in a particular manner, while in another
language there is only a verb for walking itself, which has to combine
with some other element such as an adverb to express that kind of
walking. Moreover, some languages have a single verb for making and
doing, while others distinguish them. On the view that verbs map onto
monadic concepts, this would lead to an extreme version of the Sapir-
Whorf hypothesis, while on the view that verbs meanings are decomposed
structures this can be easily accounted for.
Furthermore, Pinker points out that there is a correlation between
the aphasic syndrome called agrammatism and the use of verbs.
Spontaneous speech of agrammatic aphasics is non—fluent, utterances are
usually short, words like determiners, auxiliaries and prepositions are
often omitted, and the range of syntactic structures used is
restricted.	 However, agrammatic aphasics also turn out to have
particular difficulty with verbs. 	 Pinker says about their use of
verbs that:
"[Agramma tic aphasicsJ make errors in inflecting theni, have
difficulty producing them, and often omit them entirely
(Gleason, Goodglass, Obler, Green, Hyde, and Weintraub,
1980; Mann, Saffran, and Schwartz, 1976; Mi cell,
Mazzuchi, Menn, and Goodglass, 1983; Miceli, Silveni,
Villa, and Carammaza, 1984). Since these defici ts involve
the use of verbs in sentences, they could reflect the
difficulties in coordinating syntactic constraints with
verbs' representation, rather than difficul ties in
representing or processing the verbs themselves. 	 But
Miceli et al. (1984) showed that verbs themselves suffer in
agrwmatism. They simply asked agramma tics to name
objects and actions depicted in drawings; no sentence
processing was required. Agrammatics had more difficulty
naming actions than objects.
	 This was not due to the
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intrinsic difficulty of the task; anomics - brain-injured
patients with general difficulties in naniirzg - showed the
opposite pattern, and intact control subjects showed no
difference. As Gentner notes, these findings suggest that
verb meanings and syntactic rules share some of their
neurological machinery."
	 (op.cit, p.172).
If these findings constitute evidence for decomposition, we must ask
how the view that verb meanings are decomposed structures can be
squared with the claim that verb meanings are not definable. Pinker
argues that we can view verbs as consisting of universal, recurring,
grammatically relevant meaning elements plus slots for bits of
conceptual meaning idiosyncratic to the particular verb.
	 He proposes
that the complete meaning of a verb will be derived from three factors:
"(a) the information in 1he grammatically irrelevant
conceptual slots; (b) the cognitive content of the various
grammatically relevant elements and configurations (...),
and (c) general principles of lexicalization (such as
conventionality, genericness, and stereotypy) that dictate
that when a semantic s true ture is lexical ized in to a single
word, this in and of itself can lead to emergent semantic
properties. Thus a semantic structure translated into a
paraphrase need not be exactly synonymous with the single
word it is designed to represent." (op. cit., p.168).
This proposal is not without problems. If lexicalization of a
semantic structure as a single word gives rise to "emergent semantic
properties", then one would like to have some account of how those
properties are represented. An appeal to notions such as
'conventionality', 'genericness' and 'stereotypy' by itself does not
constitute such an account.
4.3.2. Jackendoff's treatment of verbs.
Jackendoff (1983) shows how a small number of functions together
with the basic conceptual categories can give us a unified treatment of
the meaning of verbs of spacial location and motion. As we saw above,
spatial sentences can be divided between those that express EVENTS and
those that express STATES. EVENTS can expand into different sorts of
EVENTS. In the first place, EVENTS can consist of a thing moving
along a path, as in (4.30):
4.30. EVENT -> [event GO (THING, PATH)]
For example, John ran to the house refers to an event in which John
traverses a path specified as being to the house. The verb run
specifies both that John traverses a path and the manner in which he
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does it (running). 	 (4.30) then captures the similarity among such
verbs as fly, fall, walk, crawl, come and go.
Secondly, an EVENT can consist of a thing staying at a place, as in
(4.31):
4.31. EVENT -> [event STAY (THING, PLACE)]
For example, Ann remained at home refers to an event in which Ann stays
at a place specified as at home. The function STAY then accounts for
the similarity among such verbs as stay and remain.
STATES can also expand into different sorts of STATES. There are
STATES that consist of a thing being in a place, as in (4.32):
4.32. STATE -> [state BE (THING, PLACE)]
An example of this is The rig lay on the floor, which refers to a state
of the rug being in a certain place, i.e. on the floor. (4.32) then
captures the similarity among such verbs as be, stand, sit and live.
STATES can also consist of a thing pointing in a certain direction, for
which Jackendoff uses the function ORIENT, as in (4.33):
4.33. STATE -> [state ORIENT (THING, PATH)]
For example, The sign points to Philadelphia expresses the orientation
of the sign, and the direction in which it is oriented, to
Philadelphia.	 (4.33) accounts for the similarity among verbs such as
point, aim and face.	 Jackendoff distinguishes a third class of
STATES, referred to by 'extent sentences', in which the subject is
asserted to occupy the entire path at a single point in time. 	 He
captures this by introducing a function GOExt, as in (4.34):
4.34. STATE -> [state GOExt (THING, PATH)]
An example of this is This road goes to London, in which the road does
not move, but occupies an entire path, specified by to London, at a
single point in tine. (4.34) accounts for such verbs as extend,
reach, and go. Jackendoff notes that most verbs of extent can also be
used as verbs of motion (as specified by (4.30)), which may give rise
to ambiguities, as in The giant reached to the ceiling, which can be
used to describe a movement by the giant, or the giant's extreme
height. Jackendoff suggests that one explanation of this may be that
GO and GOExt are not in fact different functions, but that the
difference depends on whether GO is a function of an EVENT or a STATE.
EVENTS can incorporate a two-place function CAUSE, which relates a
THING and an EVENT, or two EVENTS, as in (4.35):
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4.35a. [event CAUSE (THING, EVENT)]
b. [event CAUSE (EVENT, EVENT)]
(4.35a) accounts for such examples as John made us laugh, while (4.35b)
accounts for John's blowing bubbles made us laugh. EVENTS can also
incorporate ACTIONS, where an ACTION corresponds to the syntactic
category VP.
	 Jackendoff (1983) proposes that ACTION will be
incorporated in the representation.
	 However, Jackendoff (1987)
argues that ACTION is better represented on a separate action tier.
Jackendoff follows Gruber (1965) in assuming that the semantics of
motion and location provide the basis for a range of semantic fields.
Jackendoff restates Gruber's hypothesis as the 'Thematic Relations
Hypothesis':
"In any semantic field of [EVENTS] and [STATES], the
principal event—, state—, path—, and place—functions are a
subset of those used for the analysis of spatial location
and motion. Fields differ in only three possible ways:
a. what sorts of entities may appear as theme;
b. what sorts of entities way appear as reference objects;
c. what kind of relation assumes the role played by
location in the field of spatial expressions."
(Jackendoff, 1983, p.188).
Jackendoff argues that assuming the thematic relations hypothesis
allows one to conceive of the mind as adapting existing structures to
new purposes, such as for organizing concepts which lack perceptual
counterparts.
Jackendoff goes on to discuss a number of semantic fields in
terms of the thematic relations hypothesis, the temporal, possessional,
identificational, circumstantial and existential fields:
Temporal field:
a. [EVENTS] and [STATES] appear as theme.
b. [TIMES] appear as reference object.
c. Time of occurrence plays the role of location.
(op. cit., p.189).
Jackendoff shows how proposing this field predicts the parallelism of
temporal and spatial expressions, as in (4.36):
4.36a. The meeting is at 6:00.
	 (BE).
We moved the meeting from Tuesday to Thursday. (GO)
Despite the weather, we kept the meeting at 6:00.
	 (STAY)
b. The statue is in the park. (BE)
We moved the statue from the park to the zoo. (GO)
Despite the weather, we kept the statue on its pedestal. (STAY)
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Alienable possession
a. [THINGS] appear as theme
b. [THINGS] appear as reference object.
c. Being alienably possessed plays the role of location; that is,
"y has/possesses x" is the conceptual parallel to spatial "x is
at y".	 (op. cit., p.192).
This proposal means that expressions such as Beth has/possesses/owns
the doll will be represented as (4.37):
4.37. [State BEpo5s ([DOLL], [ p lace ATposs ([BETH])])]
Although this proposal may seem implausible, some support for it
comes from the fact that some languages do not have a verb have, but
instead use the verb be, as in Scottish Gaelic:
4.38. Tha botul aig an duine.
Is a bottle at the man. = The man has a bottle.
Furthermore, English has possessive The book is mine, and The book
belongs to Beth.
Identificational field:
a. [THINGS] appear as theme.
b. [THING TYPES] and [PROPERTIES] appear as reference objects.
c. Being an instance of a category or having a property plays the role
of location.	 (op. cit., p.194)
This field accounts for such examples as John became a father and Ann
is famous. An example of this is (4.39):
4.39. Elise is a pianist.
(stats B(Idsst((Th p, Tok,s (11Sf], [ p lacs ATId.st ([Thins Typs PIANIST])])]
(op. cit., p.194).
Again the analysis may seem implausible, but it is reflected in
Scottish Gaelic, where we find (4.40):
4.40. Tha nii 'nam mhaighstir-sgoile.
Am I in my school-master. = I am a school-master.
Circumstantial field:
a. [THINGS] appear as theme.
b. [EVENTS] and [STATES] appear as reference objects.
c. "x is a character of y " plays the role of spatial "x is at y".
(op. cit., p.198).
This field accounts for such examples as John is/started/stopped/kept
playing football.
Jackendoff describes a further 'pseudospace', which only has a
single reference location:
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Existential field:
a. [THINGS] and [STATES] can serve as theme.
b. There is one reference region, called [EX], expressed by
"existence".	 (op. cit., p.202).
This field gives us expressions such as Come into/be in/go out of
existence, and verbs such as create, exist and destroy.
These different semantic fields account for the different uses of
be, as in (4.41):
4.41a. The book is on the table. 	 (Spatial).
b. The meeting is at six o'clock. 	 (Temporal).
c. The book is mine.	 (Possessive).
d. Ann is a teacher.	 (Identificational).
e. Ann is nice.	 (Identificational).
f. Ann is reading.	 (Circumstantial).
Jackendoff analyses keep as (4.42), and shows how the different
semantic fields account for its uses, as in (4.43):
4.42. [Event CAUSE ([THING], [Event STAY ([THING], [PLACE])])]
4.43a. Sue kept the books on the shelf. 	 (Spatial).
b. We kept the meeting at six o'clock. 	 (Temporal).
c. Sue kept the book.	 (Possessive).
d. Sue kept John a happy man.	 (Identificational).
e. Sue kept John happy.	 (Identificational).
f. John kept reading. (Circumstantial).
Jackendoff's proposals then give us a treatment of (some) polysemy
in language. Rather than having to claim that verbs like go and keep
have different, though related, senses, this account shows that a
unitary meaning gets different interpretations depending on which
semantic field is at stake.
4.3.3. Pinker's treatment of verbs.
Pinker's (1989) treatment of verbs is motivated by his work on
language acquisition. He addresses the question of how children learn
which verbs have argument structure alteration and which don't. His
starting point is the observation that many verbs allow argument
structure alteration, as in (4.44-4.46):
4.44a. John gave a book to Ann. 	 give: NP! - NP2 to NP3
b. John gave Ann a book.	 NP! - NP3 NP2
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4.45a. John passed the book to Ann. pass: NP! - NP2 to NP3
b. John passed Ann the book.
	 NP! - NP3 NP2
4.46a. John told the story to Ann.
	 tell: NP! - NP2 to NP3
b. John told Ann the story.	 NP! - NP3 NP2
At first sight, it might seem that the child could make a
generalization that any verb with the argument structure NP! - NP2 to
NP3, can also occur with the argument structure NP1 - NP3 NP2. The
problem that faces the child is that not all verbs with the
prepositional argument structure can occur with both versions of the
alteration:
4.47a. John donated a picture to the museum.
b. John donated the museum a picture.
4.48a. John reported the accident to the police.
b. *John reported the police the accident. 	 (Pinker, !989, p.7).
The problem faced by the child is exacerbated by the fact that negative
evidence is not available to the child: the child cannot conclude from
the non-occurrence of sentences like (4.47b/4.48b) that these sentences
are ungrammatical, because it may just be accidental that no-one has
uttered them in the child's hearing.
The child is not only faced with this problem in relation to the
dative alteration, but also in relation to the passive (4.49), the
lexical causative alteration (4.50) and the locative alteration (4.51),
(op. cit., p.8):
4.49a. John touched Fred.
Fred was touched by John. (also hit, see, like, kick, etc.)
b. John resembled Fred.
*Fred was resembled by John.
4.50a. The ball rolled.
John rolled the ball.
b. The baby cried.
*John cried the baby.
(also slide, melt, bounce, open, close,
etc.)
4.51a. Iry
 loaded eggs into the basket.
Iry
 loaded the basket with eggs. (also spray, cram, splash,
stuff, etc.)
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b. Iry poured water into the glass.
*Iry poured the glass with water.
Pinker argues that there are two sorts of constraints that govern
argument structure alteration, morphological constraints and semantic
constraints. Because the morphological constraints do not bear
directly on my concerns I will leave these aside, and concentrate on
the semantic constraints.
	 Pinker points out that dativizable verbs
share a semantic property, which he calls the 'possessor effect', which
distinguishes them from undativizable verbs. This means that in the
case of verbs which appear with to, the indirect object is not only the
goal of the movement or transfer of the direct object, but also its
possessor. In the case of verbs which appear with for, the indirect
object is not only the beneficiary of the act, but also must come to
possess the direct object as a result of the act. To illustrate this
'possessor effect', Pinker gives the following examples:
4.52a. John sent the package to the border/boarder.
John sent the boarder/*border the package.
b. Rebecca drove her car to Chicago.
*Rebecca drove Chicago her car.
c. Bob made/got/stirred/tasted the cake for Phil.
Bob made/got/*stirred/*tasted Phil the cake.
What we see then, for example, is that send does not allow alteration
in the case of the indirect object border, because this denotes a
location, which can be a goal, but not a possessor. In the case of
boarder alteration is possible, because it is both a goal and a
possessor.
Verbs which allow lexical causative alteration also share a
semantic property, which Pinker calls the 'directness effect'. This
means that intransitive verbs expressing an event allow the causative
alteration if the event is caused by direct or physical contact, but
not if the event is caused by an extended chain of causation, in which
case the causation is expressed by a causal verb such as make, cause or
let.	 This then can explain the difference between (4.50a) and
(4.50b), repeated here:
4.50a. The ball rolled.
John rolled the ball.
	 (also slide, melt, bounce, open, close,
etc.)
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b. The baby cried.
*John cried the baby.
John made the baby cry.
Moreover, as Pinker points out, it accounts for why we cannot have
(4.53a), although (4.53b) is fine:
4.53a. *John broke the glass by startling the carpenter, who was
installing it.
b. John made the glass break by startling the carpenter, who
was installing it.
	 (op. cit., p.49).
On the other hand, if the event is caused by direct contact, break does
allow the causation alteration, as in (4.54):
4.54. John broke the glass by dropping it.
The semantic property underlying the locative alteration is what
Pinker calls 'the holism effect'. This means that verbs denoting the
transfer of some substance or set of objects into or onto a container
or surface, allow the locative alteration if the action results in
complete filling or depletion, but not if the action does not result in
a complete filling or depletion, which accounts for the differences
between (4.55) and (4.56), (op. cit., p.49-50).:
4.55a. Irvy loaded hay into the wagon.
Irvy sprayed water onto the flowers.
Irvy emptied water from the bucket.
Irvy drained mud from the pipes.
b. Irvy loaded the wagon with hay.
Irvy sprayed the flowers with water.
Irvy emptied the bucket of water.
Irvy drained the pipes of mud.
4.56a. Irvy threw the cat into the room.
Irvy pushed the car onto the road.
Irvy read a story from the book.
Irvy threw the ball from the porch.
b. *Irvy threw the room with the cat.
*Irvy pushed the road with the car.
*Irvy read the book of a story.
*Irvy threw the porch of a ball.
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Pinker argues that previous attempts to account for how children
learn which verbs allow alteration and which verbs don't (e.g.
Mazurkewich & White, 1984;
	 Pinker, 1984) failed, because of an
unwarranted assumption. They assumed that although the syntactic
argument structure of a verb could be transformed into a different
argument structure (by some lexical rule), the semantic representation
of the verb itself was basically unchanged by this operation. In
other words, the new and old verb forms were taken to be synonymous.
However, Pinker argues that when we look at the different alterations,
it turns out that we do not just end up with the same verb having
different argument structures, bet rather that the rules underlying
alterations act directly on the verb's meaning and change it into a
different meaning. On this view, the semantic representation of a
verb is changed and as a result its argument structure changes too.
This change is brought about by what Pinker calls 'linking rules' (see
fig. 2 below, op. cit., p.63):
fig . 2.
Input verb:
	 Rule that changes
	 Output verb:
semantic structure
Semantic structure 1
	 > Semantic structure 2
I	 I
I	 I
linking rules
	 I linking rules
I	 I
I	 I
Argument structure 1
	 Argument structure 2
Pinker argues that the semantic change that underlies the dative
alteration is a change from a predicate meaning 'to cause X to go to Y'
into a second predicate, 'to cause Y to have X'. The way in which the
verb meaning then changes is that whereas the first predicate focuses
on the effect that the action has on a theme, the second predicate
focuses on the effect the action has on the possessor. Because the
rule which changes the semantic structure changes a goal (cause to go
to Y) into a possessor (cause Y to have), it cannot apply when a goal
cannot be converted into a possessor, as is the case with send when it
has a goal such as border, as in (4.52a), repeated here:
4.52a. John sent a package to the border/boarder.
John sent the boarder/*border a package.
Similarly, causavization involves converting a predicate 'Y
changes' into a predicate 'X causes Y to change'. When a verb denotes
a change which is not directly causable, then the rule which converts
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the first predicate into the second won't apply, because there is
nothing to apply to.
Pinker proposes that locativization involves converting a predicate
meaning 'to cause X to go into/onto Y' into a predicate meaning 'to
cause Y to change state by means of putting X into or onto it'. Only
verbs which have a means of expressing how a container or surface
changes state because of the addition of something onto or into it,
will be sensitive to this conversion.
Pinker calls these rules 'broad—range' rules. He goes on to show
that although these rules are necessary for an account of argument
structure alterations, they are not sufficient because there are
negative exceptions to these rules. For example, although Ann can
become the "possessor" of news because Sue told it to her, or shouted
it to her, Sue shouted Ann the news is not possible, while Sue told Ann
the news is fine.	 In order to account for cases like this, Pinker
proposes that a second type of rule operates over alterations, "narrow—
range rules". These rules range over specific properties of verbs.
For example, the dative alteration occurring with verbs like tell,
show, ask, but not with verbs like shout, whisper, scream is due to the
fact that the primary function of the second type of verb is to focus
on the manner in which a message is communicated: although they can be
used to express successful communication, the verbs do not necessarily
imply that successful communication has taken place. The first type
of verb is not concerned with the manner in which the communication
takes place (e.g. telling can be done by whispering or shouting), but
with the particular kind of content that the speaker communicates, and
the way in which the hearer interprets it, for example, ask involves a
question, which requires an answer. 	 'Narrow range' rules operate over
these finer distinctions among verbs.
Pinker argues that the semantic constraints do not just apply to
rules converting one argument structure into another, but underlie verb
meanings regardless of whether they have been derived from related verb
meanings. This accounts for the (a) examples in (4.57)—(4.59), even
though they are not derived from the (b) examples, which are
ungrammatical (op. cit., pp.65-66):
4.57. Dative: to cause Y to have.
a. Alex bet Leon $600 that the Red Sox would lose.
b. *Alex bet $600 to Leon that the Red Sox would lose.
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4.58. Causative: to cause Y to change.
a. John killed Mary.
b. *Mary killed (=died).
4.59. Locative: to cause Y to change state by means of putting X into
or onto it.
a. I filled the glass with water.
b. *1 filled water into the glass.
It turns out then that the argument structures that a verb has are not
just syntactic variations but are the result of semantic properties of
a verb meaning.
Pinker argues that different argument structures are associated
with one or more 'thematic cores'. These 'thematic cores' are
schematizations of types of events or relationships that define the
cores of meaning of classes of possible verbs, conflation classes. As
possible 'thematic cores' for some argument structure types he
proposes:
Double-object:
X causes Y to have Z.
e . g. Mary gave Ann a book.
Transitive:
X acts on Y.
e . g. Mary greeted Ann.
Unergative Intransitive:
X acts.
e.g. Mary 1atghed.
Unaccusat ive Intransitive:
X is in a location or state or goes to a location or state.
e.g. Mary arrived.
Transitive with oblique containing to:
X causes Y to go to Z.
e.g. Mary gave the book to Ann.
Transitive with oblique containing with:
X causes Y to go into a state by causing Z to go to Y.
e.g. Mary filled the glass with water.
Intransitive with oblique containing to:
X goes to Y.
e.g. Mary went to the lecture.
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These 'thematic cores' give us broad conflation classes, over which
broad-range rules operate. Within these classes the specification of,
for example, different manners, types of effect, and properties, define
narrow conflation classes, over which narrow-range rules operate.
These 'thematic cores' can be realized in different semantic
fields, as proposed by the 'thematic relations hypothesis' (Gruber,
1965;	 Jackendoff, 1983;	 discussed above), in which the semantic
elements are given a specific interpretation. Moreover, different
verbs within the same conflation class can be characterized as
consisting of the thematic core of that conflation class together with
idiosyncratic elements of meaning.
Pinker goes on to show how a fairly small vocabulary of semantic
elements can be used to give explicit representations of a wide range
of verb conflation classes. The semantic elements he uses are similar
to those proposed by Jackendoff (1983), but are based on the cross-
cultural survey of verb meanings carried out by Taliny (1985), which
shows that there are recurring elements of verb meanings across
languages. Pinker presents about fifty verb subclasses, embracing
many hundreds of verbs.
4.3.4. Problems facing the decomposition view of verbs.
One of the differences between the representations proposed by
Pinker, and those by Jackendoff (1983), is the way in which actions are
conceived of. Jackendoff proposes that ACTIONS are EVENTS from which
one argument is missing, the one corresponding to the ACTOR. Pinker,
on the other hand, proposes that actional events involve a function
ACT, which takes one or two arguments. A second difference is that
whereas Jackendoff proposes CAUSE as a basic function, Pinker follows
Talmy (1985, 1988) in analyzing causation into different ways in which
an agonist and an antagonist can interact. These give rise to
different causal relations, which can be represented by subordinating
relations between a dyadic ACT (which has two arguments) and an EVENT
or STATE, with the causal relation marked by a feature. the first
argument of ACT can be equated with Talmy's 'antagonist', while the
second argument can be equated with Talmy's 'agonist'.
On the Jackendoff approach, this has as a result that, for example, the
'to-dative' is represented as in (4.60), while on the Pinker approach
it is represented as in (4.61):
4.60. [Evsat(Thn ACTOR) r, [*ctcon CAUSE (/, [Evs.t 60 ((Thf.,], [Path])])]]
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4.61.	 EVENT
leffect
/ \
ACT	 THING	 THING	 EVENT
[1	 ['
60	 THINS PATH
[7]	 [1
On Jackendoff's analysis, we recognize that what an ACTOR does
falls under the category ACTION, and differences among different
actions are captured by what makes up the ACTION constituent. On
Pinker's analysis the claim is that what we recognize is that someone
acts on something, where the differences among different actions are
captured by, for example, different causal relations. This means that
on the analysis proposed by Pinker, we lose ACTION as a basic cognitive
category. However, ACTION can be distinguished using Jackendoff's
tests for cognitive categories, while Pinker's analysis is not
supported by these tests.
A problem that faces both Jackendoff's and Pinker's approaches is
the question of whether there is a principled way in which to decide
how much detail goes into a semantic representation. For example,
Pinker analyzes eat as in (4.62), while Jackendoff (1987) analyzes
drink (which presumably belongs to the same conflation class, as in
(4.63):
4.62.	 EVENT
ACT THING THING MANNER
[]	 ()	
UjgU
4.63. (Evsst CAUSE ((Thin, ], [Ev.nt 60 ([1hn, LIQUID], [Path TO ( ( p lus IN ((fling MOUTH OF
([This,] I)])])])))]
Jackendoff says of his analysis that it is an oversimplification.
Presumably there would be more information about the trajectory that
the liquid traverses, the drinker swallowing, etc. However, this
representation has as a result that we could go into more and more
detail, without there being a clear cut—off point.
	 On Pinker's
analysis of eat, no information at all is given of the trajectory that
the eaten substance traverses. Pinker says of his analysis that the
quoted symbol ("eating") "serves as a pointer to some cognitive
representation of the physical and geometric properties of the manner."
(Pinker, 1989, p.193). Therefore some of the information that for
Jackendoff is part of the semantic representation of the verb, is
stored separately in Pinker's model.
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Regarding the analysis into ACT THING THING, Pinker says that "the
second argument is the en ti ty that is "affected", but only in the sense
that it is involved in the act and its participation helps to define
what kind of act it is; it does not necessarily change state or
location." (op. cit., p.193). However, since the analysis does not
show what causal relation there exists between the two entities apart
from the fact that the second argument is the entity that is affected,
this might as well be represented as (4.64):
4.64.	 EVENT
THING	 ACT
/
EAT THING
On this analysis, the second argument is the entity affected because it
is part of the act that the first argument carries out. Information
about the 'physical and geometric properties' of the act can then be
stored in the encyclopaedic entry of EAT. The advantage of this
analysis over Pinker's analysis is that it keeps ACTION (here
represented as ACT) as a cognitive category, in accordance with
Jackendoff's analysis of cognitive categories.
Pinker proposes that the verb cut may be represented as in (4.65),
where real names have been used for actors and patients:
4.65.	 EVENT
effec	 means
	
ACT THING THING	 EVENT: Ident	 EVENT
	
[Bob] (pear]
	
.._-'7Zeffect
GO THING PROPERTY ACT THING THING
(pear) cut'	 (Bob) (knife)	 EVENT
GO THING	 PATH
(knife)'
via PLACE through THING
(pear)
against THING
(pear)
This can be paraphrased as 'Bob acts on a pear, causing the pear to
become cut, by means of acting on a knife, causing the knife to go
against and through the pear.' In this representation "cut" again is
taken as a pointer to some cognitive representation of what it means to
be 'cut'.	 However, Pinker partially represents what it means to be
'cut' in the representation of the verb cut, by specifying the means by
which something becomes 'cut'. This analysis is motivated by his
analysis of why verbs like break allow 'anticausavization', having both
a transitive and an intransitive reading, while verbs like cut do not.
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He argues that we can distinguish narrow conflation classes as well as
broad conflation classes. On his view, break and cut belong to
different narrow conflation classes, distinguishable by the fact that
while break only has an 'effect' component in its semantic structure,
cut has a 'motion' arid a 'contact' component as well as an 'effect'
component. Pinker proposes that the ant icausative alteration applies
to verbs which specify some effect, but only if they do not specify
anything else but an effect.
Although this proposal distinguishes between verbs that do and
verbs that do not allow 'anticausavization', the question is whether it
is necessary to propose that these components are part of the semantic
representation of the verb. An alternative could be that this sort
of information is stored in the encyclopaedic entry of a concept.
Some support for this view comes from experimental evidence of Lucas,
Tanenhaus & Carlson (1990). 	 Lucas et al. investigated what level of
representation is accessed for antecedent assignments and instrument
inferences. For instrument inferences, subjects were presented with
isolated sentences containing verbs that strongly imply certain
instruments, without these instruments being explicitly mentioned, and
the same sentences with a lead-in sentences containing an explicitly
mentioned instrument, as in (4.66):
4.66. (Lead-in: There was a broom in the closet next to the kitchen.)
John swept the floor every week! on Saturday.
I markstere target was presented for lexical decision.
Appropriate target: broom, inappropriate target: closet.
In order to control for task specific effects, these sentences were
presented with different tasks, a lexical decision task, in which the
subject had to decide whether the target is a word or a non-word, and a
naming task, in which the subject had to name the target. The
subjects heard the sentences over head-phones, while the target words
were projected on a screen. Lucas et al. found that the presence of
the verb implying the instrument did not speed up either the lexical
decision task nor the naming task when the target was the instrument
compared to the inappropriate target, when subjects were presented with
the sentences in isolation. On the other hand, reaction times for the
instrument targets were significantly shorter than for the
inappropriate targets, in both tasks, when the sentences were presented
with the lead-in sentence.
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These findings cannot be explained if one accepts that a verb like
cut is mentally represented as in (4.65). If a representation like
(4.65) is recovered on hearing a verb like cut, then the information
becomes available directly that the action is done by means of acting
on some instrument, where that instrument is caused to behave in a
certain way. On seeing a word like broom, after processing a verb
like sweep, broom would fall into place as instrument within the
representation of the verb, whereas there would not be any room within
this representation for an unrelated word like closet. On this view
then, one would expect that, even when a sentence containing a verb
like sweep or cut is processed in isolation (without a lead-in
sentence), reaction times would be speeded up in the case of instrument
targets as compared to unrelated targets. However, Lucas et al. found
that this is not the case.
On the view that information about instruments is not part of the
semantic representation of the verb itself, but is stored in the
encyclopaedic entry of the verb, we can explain the findings of Lucas
et al. On this view, when one processes the sentence in isolation,
the verb (and the other words) maps onto some conceptual
representation, which gives access to encyclopaedic information;
amongst other things, it gives access to assumptions about the action
involving some instrument. However, these assumptions have no
privileged status in comparison to other assumptions in the
encyclopaedic entry. For example, since the second sentence in (4.66)
focuses on John's habit of sweeping the floor every week, rather than
on the means by which he does this, there is no reason to actually
access the information that sweeping may involve a broom. This means
that broom does not have any more cognitive significance f or the
subject than closet, so that reaction times do not differ for these
words.	 When the subject processes the sentence with a lead-in
sentence, the situation is different. 	 Broom in the lead-in sentence
gives access to encyclopaedic information, such as what brooms look
like, that brooms are used for sweeping, etc. Again the assumption
that brooms are used for sweeping does not have any privileged status
compared to other assumptions in the encyclopaedic entry. However, on
encountering sweep in the second sentence, this gives access to
encyclopaedic information concerning sweeping. Since the assumption
that brooms are used for sweeping is encyclopaedic information about
both brooms and sweeping, this becomes highly accessible, so that the
subject can draw the inference that John used the broom in the closet
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for sweeping the floor. In this situation, brooni will be recognized
quicker than closet, because it is mentally represented as part of the
inference that the subject has just drawn.
A further problem that Pinker's proposal faces is the fact that it
commits him to the claim that whenever a verb occurs with different
argument structures this means that it has different meanings. As we
saw above, in many cases of alteration this claim is indeed borne out,
and accounts for which verbs will occur with particular alterations and
which do not.	 However, there are cases where different argument
structures do not seem to entail different verb meanings.	 This means
that Pinker has to propose different meanings which do not seem to be
borne out by how we understand these verbs. 	 Cases that present a
problem for Pinker's account are the 'for-datives'. Pinker proposes
that underlying the alteration between, e.g., Bob baked a cake for Sue,
and Bob baked Sue a cake, lies the broad range rule in (4.67), (op.
cit., p.220):
4.67a.	 (VENT
or/to
ACT THING	 THING	 STATE
((Bob)] [(cake)]
	
-1s__
HAVE THING	 THING
[(Sue)] (cake)
4.6Th.	 EVENT
ACT THING	 THING for/to	 aeans
[(Bob)] [(Sue)]
	
S
STATE	 EVENT
HAVE THING	 THING	 ACT THING THING
(Sue)	 ((cake)]
	
(Bob) (cake)
Pinker says that (4.67a) can be paraphrased as 'Bob acted on a cake in
order for Sue to have the cake', while (4.6Th) can be paraphrased as
'Bob acted on Sue, in order for Sue to have a cake, by means of acting
on the cake'.
The analysis in (4.6Th) implies that we can have (4.68a) on a par
with (4.68b), because Pinker analyzes both bake and kiss as a thing
acting on a thing, where the second thing is the affected entity:
4.68a. John: What did you do to Sue?
Bob: ?I baked her a cake.
4.68b. John: What did you do to Sue?
Bob:	 I kissed her.
However, the exchange in (4.68a) is unacceptable, because baking
someone a cake is doing something for someone, rather than to someone.
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Pinker defends his analysis of 'for-datives' by referring to work
by Green (1974):
"Green notes that the relation between the agent and the
beneficiary is somewhat different in the double-object form
than in the preposi ti onal form, as is shown in (5.50). In
the double-object form, the agent and the beneficiary must
exist at the same time, and the agent must know that the
beneficiary exists.
(5.50)
The American ambassador baked a cake for fames I.
*The American ambassador baked fames I a cake.
I bought a ring for my wife in case I should decide
to marry.
*1 bought my wife a ring in case I should decide to
marry.
She's going to sing a song for her late lover.
*She 's going to sing her late lover a song.
Green proposes that the meaning of these double-object
forms involve a component "I in tends Y to have Z" and that
the predicate "intend", unlike, say, "wish", "want", or
"hope", has a presupposition that I believes Y and Z to
exist. We could say that I must have Y in mind when
entertaining his intention, and in fact that the I-Y
relation is part of the definition of what X's intention
is. That would be the interpretation of the represen-
tation "I acts on Y for Y to HAVE Z" in the lower half of
(65b] and would motivate the difference between it and the
preposi tional form. The actual action would be a means to
realizing this intention, though the intention itself
needn't actually be realized.	 (op. cit., p.221).
However, this proposal implies that the prepositional form does not
carry the intention of X that Y comes to have Z, but this seems not to
be true in an example like (4.69):
4.69. I knitted this jumper for Ann, but I never managed to give it to
her.
By uttering (4.69) the speaker communicates that he intended Ann to
have the jumper, but that for some reason this intention never actually
was realized.
The relevance theory view of logical hypothesis formation and the
distinction between foreground and background implications gives us an
alternative account of why it seems that in the double-object form the
relation between the agent and the beneficiary is somewhat different
than in the prepositional form, without having to claim that this is
due to the different forms expressing different meanings. Let us
compare (4.70) and (4.71):
4.70. John knitted Ann a jumper.
181
4.71. John knitted a jumper for Ann.
When (4.70) is processed it will give rise to the following
(simplified) correct logical hypotheses:
4.70a. John DID SOMETHING.
John knitted SOMEONE SOMETHING.
John knitted Ann SOMETHING.
John knitted Ann a jumper.
On the other hand, (4.71) will give rise to the correct logical
hypotheses in (4.71a):
4.71a. John DID SOMETHING.
John knitted SOMETHING FOR SOMEONE.
John knitted a jumper FOR SOMEONE.
John knitted a jumper for Ann.
These lists give us the focal scales for the utterances in (4.70)
and (4.71), as discussed above. Sperber & Wilson (1986) argue that
the strongest presuppositional effects are carried by analytic
implications of background implications. On this view, if the focus
of (4.70) is a jumper, and the background is John knitted Ann
SOMETHING, then the information that Ann exists will be analytically
implied by the background, and an addressee who rejects this will be
unable to access a context in which the utterance would be relevant.
On the other hand, if the focus in (4.71) is on Ann, then the
background is John knitted a jumper for SOMEONE, which does not
analytically imply that Ann exists. 	 Therefore, we do not have to
claim that 'intention' carries a presupposition that the beneficiary
exists. Both (4.70) and (4.71) can express that John knitted the
jumper with the intention that someone comes to have it, where the
existence of Ann is analytically implied in (4.70) because of the focal
scale. This proposal has as a consequence that we do not have to
postulate that verbs like bake, knit, sew, etc. have different
meanings, one meaning expressing that the subject acts on a
beneficiary, as Pinker is forced to do. What we see then is that
there is a difference between verbs whose different argument structures
express different meanings, and verbs which can occur with different
argument structures which do not affect the meaning of the verb itself.
One way in which we can account for this is to treat 'for-datives' as
having one semantic representation, but that we can use this
representation in different ways in constructing logical hypotheses.
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A major problem which both Jackendoff's and Pinker's proposals
face, is the fact that not all proposed semantic structures correspond
in a transparent way to syntactic structures in natural language.
Jackendoff proposes that there are correspondence rules between
syntactic structure and conceptual structure. This proposal is taken
up by Pinker, who suggests that there are linking rules which map open
arguments in semantic structure onto syntactically distinguishable
argument types, based on their position in the semantic structure.
When we look at the conceptual structures proposed by Jackendoff, we
see that although there is a general correspondence between the subject
and direct object positions in a sentence and the first and second
argument positions in conceptual structures, it turns out that this is
not always the case. In particular, when we look at Jackendoff's
proposal for the possessional field, we see that there is no direct
correspondence between the syntactic positions in English sentences,
and the positions in the conceptual counterparts of these sentences.
Jackendoff proposes that verbs like have, possess, own, receive and
lose are analyzed as in (4.72):
4.72a. Beth has/possesses/owns the doll.
[State BEp oss([DOLL],[ p iace ATp053([BETH])])]
b. Beth received the doll.
[Event GOp oss([DOLL],[Path TOposs([BETH])])]
c. Beth lost the doll.
[Event GOposs([DOLL],[ path FROMp055([BETH])])]
What we see in these examples is that Beth is the subject in the
English sentences, but does not correspond to the first argument in the
conceptual structure. Moreover, this difference between linguistic
and conceptual structure does not occur with all verbs in English
expressing possession, so that one cannot postulate that there is a
systematic idiosyncratic mapping to express possession. For example,
belong shows correspondence between linguistic and conceptual
structure, as proposed by Jackendoff:
4.73. The doll belongs to Beth.
[State BEp 083([DOLL], [ p iace ATp055([BETH])])]
One way out would be to say that verbs like the one in (4.72) have
marked linking rules attached to them. However, Pinker argues against
this move. One of the reasons he gives for this is that:
any theory that would depict 'have' as a highly marked
exception going strongly against the thematic grain would
leave it a mystery that 'have' is such a high—frequency,
ubiquitous verb, and one that children acquire early and
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without any reversals of subject and object or intrusions
of spatial prepositions ..."
	
(op. cit., p.189).
In order to account for this problem, Pinker proposes that
possession can be conceptualized in two ways: firstly, as
'possessional' PATHS and PLACES, as Jackendof I proposes, and secondly,
as involving a primitive state type, which can be simply viewed as
HAVE. In order to show the relation between these two ways of
expressing possession, Pinker proposes an inference rule which says
that "If X HAVE Y, then Y BE (place—function) X".
However, this move is not without problems. If the semantic
representation of have is not motivated by our basic conceptual
categories, bet rather is acquired as a primitive function, and
moreover if the relation between HAVE and possessional BE is expressed
by an inference rule, then what we end up with for HAVE is a picture
indistinguishable from the meaning postulate view. If we acquire HAVE
in this way, then the question arises what the motivation is for saying
that other verbs are not primitive functions with relations amongst
them expressed by inference rule, but rather that they decompose into
primitive components.
What we see then is that Jackendoff's and Pinker's approaches come
up against a range of problems. However, Jackendoff's and Pinker's
proposals concerning the semantic representation of verbs actually
consist of two claims. 	 A closer look reveals that these problems
primarily concern the claim that verbs are semantically decomposed
structures. As we saw above, there does not seem to be a principled
way in which to determine how much detail goes into the decomposed
structure, and, as we saw with verbs like cut, the proposed structure
is not supported by the experimental evidence.
However, the claim that verbs decompose can be separated from the
claim that the arguments a verb occurs with are an integral part of its
meaning. This claim means that we cannot view a verb such as put as
having a meaning PUT, which happens to occur with a subcategorization
frame [_ NP PP]. Rather, put occurs with two THINGS and a PATH
(incorporating a PLACE) because it is inherent in an act of putting
that it involves these entities, so that they will be part of the
semantic representation of the verb.
This way of viewing verb meanings gives us a basis for an account
of argument structure alterations, and of how children learn which
verbs do and do not allow alterations. The question then is whether,
in order to give a full account, we also need to adopt the proposal
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that the verbal part of the semantic representations is decomposed, and
indeed whether decomposition necessarily follows from the view that
there is a set of basic conceptual categories, as Jackendoff seems to
suggest.
4.3.5. Structured verb meanings without decomposition.
At the heart of Pinker's and Jackendoff's proposals lies the
conflation class hypothesis, the hypothesis that classes of verbs are
organized around 'thematic cores'. Proposing these 'thematic cores'
can account for the findings that there are strong universal tendencies
for sets of verbs to make the same kinds of semantic distinctions, and
that it is certain semantic elements that recur in different
combinations which give rise to the range of different argument
structure alterations, because it is these semantic elements that make
up the 'thematic cores' of the different conflation classes. Pinker
and Jackendoff go one step further in proposing that these 'thematic
cores' are part of the conceptual structure of the individual verbs,
while the differences among verbs of the same conflation class are
shown by idiosyncratic conceptual slots. In other words, verbs are
represented as decomposed structures, whose components consist of basic
semantic elements and idiosyncratic conceptual slots.
However, a different way of viewing these conflation classes is to
see them as types of states and events, where individual verbs are
instantiations of the type, without this implying that the
representation of the type is incorporated in the semantic
representation of the instantiation. Pinker argues against this
second view on the grounds that it does not give us an explanation of
why particular semantic differences among verbs have predictable
syntactic consequences. He argues that on this view:
"In principle, any culturally salient distinction could be
used as a dimension or feature helping to define
similarity, and the syntax could reflect those similarity
clusterings. This is another way of saying that from the
point of view of grammar, verb meanings are not constrained
at all."	 (Pinker, 1989, p.166).
Pinker says that, on this view, deciding whether a verb like cut
expresses a causative relation would be a similar process to deciding
whether a dog is an animal and would depend on a person's real-world
knowledge of causation.	 However, there are some problems with this
argument.	 If verb conflation classes are organized around 'thematic
cores', then these 'thematic cores' constrain class membership whether
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or not their representations are part of the representations of
individual verbs: unlike a word like dog, which by itself does not
give any information to help a child decide that it's an animal, verbs
occur with arguments which are compatible or incompatible with
different 'thematic cores', so that without real—world knowledge
possible conflation class membership is constrained. For example, a
verb which occurs with three arguments is not compatible with a
thematic core containing one argument. 2
	Furthermore, the nature of
the arguments involved can help the child decide what kind of verb is
at stake. For example, a child who learns that TO involves a THING
going to a PLACE can infer that when a verb occurs with to (such as
walk, drive, give, etc.), the verb entails a THING going along a PATH
to a PLACE.	 This need not necessarily be specified in the semantic
representation of the verb, but can be stored in the logical entry of
the concept.	 The inference itself helps the child decide on
conflation class membership.
This raises the question of whether we need decomposition for an
explanation of why different verbs behave as they do.
	 Let us look at
motion verbs such as run, walk, swim, etc. Jackendoff proposes that
motion verbs specify that a thing traverses a path, where the
distinction among different manners of motion is marked in a 'manner'
slot, which gives access to conceptual information concerning the
particular manner, e.g. running. Pinker points out that for verbs
like run it is difficult to decide on conceptual grounds whether they
should be represented as 'to run, with the effect of motion along a
path', or as 'to move along a path, by means of a running action' (cf.
Talmy, 1985). However, Pinker proposes that a verb like run, as in
John ran to the store should be analyzed as an act in a particular
manner with the effect of motion along a path, as in (4.74), where
"running" gives access to conceptual information concerning running:
4.74.	 EVENT
-Thffect
	
ACT THING MANNER	 EVENT
(x]
	
'running	 60 THIN6 PATH
x	 []
Pinker argues that this analysis is justified on linguistic grounds,
because it helps to differentiate verbs of voluntary motion (e.g. run)
from verbs of physical motion (e.g. move). However, Jackendoff (1987)
shows how his analysis can also differentiate between these verbs, so
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that again there is no principled way in which to choose betweent the
two analyses.
When we take a closer look at verbs like run, walk, etc., it turns
out that they can be used in different ways3. On the one hand, they
can specify the manner in which someone gets somewhere, as in John ran
to the store, the reading that Pinker's and Jackendoff's analyses apply
to. On the other hand, they can focus on the activity itself, without
implying that the actor is going somewhere, as in John ran or John ran
for an hour every day.	 That this is a real difference between the
uses of these verbs is borne out by the fact that the two uses of verbs
like run show different syntactic behaviour in, e.g., Dutch. In
Dutch, the perfect can be formed with either the auxiliary zijn (be) or
the auxiliary hebben (have). Hebben is used with activity verbs such
as Dutch read, write, work, and static verbs such as Dutch rest, sleep,
glow. Zijn is used with mutative verbs, such as Dutch die, wake up,
melt, etc. When we look at motion verbs, it turns out that when they
are used to focus on the activity itself, the perfect has to be formed
with hebben, while zijn has to be used when one wants to communicate
that the activity was used to go along a path, going somewhere (e.g.,
Rijpma & Schuringa, 1978).
Because Pinker assumes that different argument structures always
give rise to different semantic representations, he proposes that verbs
like run occur with two representations. Although he does not
actually give a representation for run as in John ran, it is implicit
in his proposals that this would focus on the activity of running, as
in (4.75), in which "running" again gives access to conceptual
information concerning running:
4.75.	 EVENT
ACT THING NANNER
(John]
'running'
Pinker proposes that different semantic structures are derived from
eachother by rules. This means that a child who has learnt that a
verb like run has the semantic structures in (4.74) and (4.75), can
apply the rules underlying the mappings from one semantic structure
onto another to other motion verbs, and so learn that verbs like swim,
walk, crawl, skate, etc. also have these semantic structures.
However, this picture creates a problem. Pinker analyzes a verb like
yawn as in (4.76), which is indistinguishable from (4.75):
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4.76.	 EVENT
ACT THIN6 MANNER
ri	 I
Li	 I
yawning
This means that one would expect that (4.76) could be transformed into
(4.77a), by the same rule that transforms (4.75) into (4.74), but this
is not the case, as shown by (4.7Th):
4.77a.	 EVENT
_-2'	 effect
	
ACT THING MANNER	 EVENT
(xl
	 I
	
yawning	 60 THING PATH
x	 (1
b. ? John yawned to the store.
In order to account for the impossibility of (4.77) as opposed to
(4.74), we would have to give narrow-range rules. The question then
is what component of the structure this narrow-range rule should
operate over. Although yawning and running both involve movement of
some sort, the nature of the movements involved is quite different, and
it seems that it is this difference which determines that run can occur
with a PATH, and yawn cannot. Pinker proposes that there are
different MANNERS, e.g. manners of motion, and manners of acting. It
does not have to be explicitly stated in the representation which
manner is involved, because the different manners are associated with
different functions, for example, the function (30 indicates that the
manner involved is a manner of motion. To represent roll, as in The
ball rolled, Pinker proposes the representation in (4.78):
4.78.	 EVENT
60	 THING	 MANNER
	
(I	 I
'roflThg'
On a par with this representation it could be proposed that the
representation of run in (4.75), should also incorporate the function
GO, as in (4.79), so that the MANNER will be interpreted as a manner of
motion:
4.79.	 EVENT
effect
	
ACT THING MANNER	 [VENT/\
	
'running	 60 THING
Pinker says about GO events without a PATH that:
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I••• the MANNER information specifies the mo tion of the
theme or parts of the theme relative to its own internal
frame of reference (1. e., its prominent axes or center of
mass), or with respect to its local environment, with no
implication that there is any translation of the object as
a whole with respect to the environment." (op. cit.,
p.182).
However, in a yawning event the lips move relative to an internal
frame of reference, just as the legs move relative to an internal frame
of reference in a running event, so that a case can be made for
incorporating the GO function in the representation of yawn, as well as
in the representation of run. It seems then that we cannot explain
the difference between verbs like yawn on the one hand, and run on the
other, by looking f or specific semantic components in the
representations of the verbs. Instead, we have to turn to conceptual
information, which is stored under the idiosyncratic manner slots.
This tells us that the nature of the different motions involved is such
that the one cannot be used to move along a path, whereas the other
can, although it does not necessarily have to lead to movement along a
path.
Decomposition is proposed as an explanation of why some verbs allow
argument structure alterations and others do not. Since decomposition
fails to differentiate between the above verbs, nothing is gained by
postulating that motion verbs decompose, while doing so creates the
problem that there is no principled way in which one can decide which
proposed decomposed structure is the correct one.
We can capture the difference between the different uses of verbs
like run by postulating that the arguments of the verb are an integral
part of the semantic representation, without having to claim that the
verbal part itself is decomposed: run, as in John runs every day, can
be represented as in (4.80), in which case it focuses on the activity
of running, while run as in John ran to the store can be represented as
in (4.81), where the PATH slot is sufficient for the inference that the
activity is used to go somewhere:
4.80.	 (VENT	 4.81.	 (VENT
THING	 ACT	 THING	 ACT
	
II	 I	 A
	
(John) run	 (John) run PATH
(to the store)
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On this view, the mapping from (4.76) onto (4.77a) will be blocked by
the conceptual information that activities like yawning cannot be used
for locomotion.
When we look at the explanations that Pinker gives for the dative,
locative and causative alterations, it turns out that decomposition is
not crucial to these explanations.
The broad—range rule underlying the dative alteration is the
'possessor effect': for the alteration to occur the indirect object
must be not only the goal of the movement or transfer of the direct
object but also its possessor. This means that the alteration depends
on information about the indirect object, rather than on information
about the verbal part of the representation.
In order to account for differences among dative verbs which depend
on narrow—range rules, Pinker sets up detailed representations. For
example, tell, which can alternate, is represented as (4.82), while
shout, which cannot alternate, is represented as (4.83):
4.82. tell
	 EVENT: possessional: co.aunication
AIrTHING	 effect
[(Bob)] [(story)]
GO THING PATH
	
PROPERTY	 (story)
for/to	 STATE: episte.ic	 to PLACE
/\
	
BE THING PLACE
	 at THING
	
(story) ,t\	 (kids)
at THING
(kids)
4.83. shout	 EVENT physical
effect
	
[(Bob)] [(news)]
	
'shouting'
IEVENT: perceptual
PROPERTY
	
'sound'	 GO THING PATH
(news) [
to PLACE
at THING
(John)
It is not clear whether these representations are necessary to explain
the difference between tell—type verbs aix! shout—type verbs. When we
look at Pinker's explanation of the difference, it turns out that this
hinges on two things.
	 In the first place, the THING that is told is
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defined with respect to the speaker's intention that the hearer comes
to know the THING, whereas the THING that is shouted is not defined in
terms of an intended effect in the hearer (although shouting something
to someone can imply successful communication, which presumably is
inferred rather than given). What we are dealing with here are
constraints on the interpretation of THING, which do not depend on tell
or shout being decomposed; we could have the same constraints in a
representation in which they are not decomposed. Secondly, Pinker
argues that, unlike telling, shouting focuses on the behaviour of the
communicator:
• .when shouting a question. what makes it shouting has
nothing to do with a listener and can be defined in terms
of the behaviour of the speaker alone." (op. cit.,
p.118).
However, this means that what distinguishes shouting from telling
depends on the conceptual information that we have about what it means
for someone to shout, which again does not depend on whether shout is
decomposed or not.
The broad-range rule underlying the locative alteration is the
'holism effect', i.e. verbs denoting the transfer of some substance or
set of objects into or onto a container or surface, allow the locative
alteration if the action results in complete filling or depletion, bit
not if the action does not result in complete filling or depletion.
The broad-range rule underlying the causative alteration is the
'directness effect', i.e. the causative alteration is allowed if the
event is caused by direct or physical contact, bit not if the event is
caused by an extended chain of causation.
Pinker points out that these effects follow from more general
constraints on the interpretation of the affected entity, i.e. the
direct object, regardless in what construction it appears. The holism
effect follows from a general holism constraint which specifies that
the affected entity must be completely affected. This constraint
applies not only to locatives, bit also to the (a) examples in (4.84),
as opposed to the (b) examples:
4.84.a. John drank the glass of beer.
Beth climbed the mountain.
Bill painted the door.
Gary wrote many TV shows.
b. John drank from the glass of beer.
Beth climbed up the mountain.
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Bill painted on the door.
Gary wrote for many TV shows. 	 (op. cit., p.67).
In the (a) examples, the action affects the whole referent of the
argument, i.e. all the beer was drunk, the entire height of the
mountain was climbed, the whole door was painted, and the TV shows were
written in their entirety by Gary.
The directness effect follows from a general directness constraint
which specifies that what the agent did had an immediate impact on the
affected entity (i.e. the direct object). This constraint applies not
only to the causative alteration, bot also to the (a) examples in
(4.85), as opposed to the (b) examples:
4.85.a. Sally slapped/hit/kicked Mary.
Squeaky Fromme shot Ford.
b. Sally slapped/hit/kicked at Mary.
Squeaky Froinme shot at Ford.
In the (a) examples Sally landed a direct blow on Mary as intended, and
Squeaky's shooting had a direct impact on Ford.
When we look at the causative alteration, it turns out that there
are in fact verbs, which do not behave as one would expect on a
decomposition view: although they describe the same event with or
without causation, and although the causation involved is direct, the
inchoative intransitive and the causative transitive cannot be
expressed by the same verb.	 These are verbs like kill/die, take/go,
and raise/rise. On the view that, for example, die decomposes into
something like 'thing go out of existence', one would expect that when
direct causation is involved one would be able to say John died Bill;
or vice versa, if kill decomposes into something like 'thing causes
thing go out of existence', where the causation involved is direct, one
would expect that 'thing go out of existence' could be realized as
Someone killed (=died). However, this is not the case. To account
for this, Pinker proposes that there are no narrow-range lexical rules
that map between these forms. He says about this that:
"Intuitively, the rules governing stem-sharing reflect how
much the language lets you bend or enrich a verb 's meaning
before it has to be treated as a completely different verb.
In effect, the lexicon groups some kinds of events together
as exemplars of the same kind, to be expressed by a single
verb, and differentiates other kinds of events. If John
kills Bill, is that just causing him to die, or is there
something unique about the act of killing that makes it
different from the sum of its parts of causing arid dying?
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English provides one kind of answer to this question."
(op. cit., p.134).
Decomposition is invoked to explain when argument structure
alteration is possible, but if the decomposition of verbs like kill
does not give us such an explanation, then again we have no
justification for decomposition. If we have to propose that there is
more to the meaning of these verbs than their decomposed structures,
then the decomposed structure cannot be the semantic re presentation of
the verb, and it is unclear what it does represent. It could be
argued that there is a conceptual slot in the representation of kill
which gives access to information about what makes an act qualify as a
killing act. However, none of the conceptual constituents that Pinker
proposes seems to capture what kind of slot this could be: an act of
killing is not dependent on a particular MLNNER or PROPERTY.
Similarly, when we look at Jackendoff's proposals, it turns out
that what is crucial to his treatment of the polysemy of verbs like
keep is not that keep is decomposed, but rather that the arguments that
it takes are interpreted in different semantic fields. As we saw
above, the analysis of keep (as in (4.42)) stays constant, while the
different interpretations we get are due to us interpreting the
arguments in different semantic fields, as in (4.43):
4.42. [Event CAUSE ((THIN6],[Event STAY ([THIN6],[PLACE])])J
4.43a. Sue kept the books on the shelf.
	 (Spatial).
b. We kept the meeting at six o'clock.
	 (Temporal).
c. Sue kept the book.	 (Possessive).
d. Sue kept John a happy man.	 (Identificational).
e. Sue kept John happy. 	 (Identificational).
f. John kept reading. 	 (Circumstantial).
The analysis of keep does not contribute anything more than monadic
keep would. This means that we can retain the 'thematic relations
hypothesis' without this committing us to decomposition.
When we look at the evidence that Pinker cites in support of
decomposition (see section 4.2.1.), it turns out that this is
compatible with the view that arguments are part of the semantic
representations of verbs, with or without decomposition. For example,
Pinker says that some argument structure errors children make can only
be explained if one assumes that children link argument structures to
details of the verb's semantic structure. This seems too strong; the
findings can be explained if one assumes that children view argument
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structures as part of the semantic representation of the verb, without
this entailing that the verbs are decomposed.
Pinker argues that decomposition is supported by the fact that the
same kinds of semantic distinctions may be lexically realized
differently in different languages. For example, one language may
have a verb which expresses 'to walk in a particular manner', while
another language may use some other element such as an adverb to
express that kind of walking. Pinker argues that on the view that
verbs map onto monadic concepts, this would lead to an extreme version
of the Sapir—Whorf hypothesis, but that it would be easily accounted
for on the decomposition view.
However, accounting for this does not depend on adopting the
decomposition view. Pinker's explanation is based on the assumption
that verbs are organized in conflation classes around 'thematic cores'.
These 'thematic cores' can account for the similarity in semantic
distinctions across languages, while languages may differ as to what
specific instantiations of these 'thematic cores' are lexically
realized as verbs. But as we saw above, the view that individual
verbs are instantiations of 'thematic cores' does not necessarily
entail that the representations of these 'thematic cores' are part of
the representations of the individual verbs. 	 An alternative is that
information concerning conflation class membership is stored as an
inference rule in the logical entry of a concept. On this view the
shared 'thematic cores' can still account for similarity in semantic
distinctions across languages, while language specific influences can
account for whether a particular instantiation of a 'thematic core'
(such as walking in a particular manner) is individuated as a concept,
and lexically realized in a language.
Pinker also assumes that the finding that some aphasics have more
difficulty naming actions than objects indicates that verb meanings
decompose. However, this conclusion is not warranted by the findings,
since they can be explained in many different ways without requiring
decomposition.4
The view that arguments are part of the semantic representations of
verbs does not commit us to the view that verbs decompose into basic
components. Moreover, by viewing verbs themselves as functions
without internal structure, we do not face the problems that the
decomposition view encounters. This way of viewing the representation
of verb meanings overcomes a problem that the holistic (meaning
postulate) approach faces.
	 On the holistic view of word meaning,
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inference rules for verbs cannot be formulated only involving the verbs
themselves, e.g. we can only infer Y DIES from KILL if the inference
rule is given as: X KILL Y -> X CAUSE [Y DIE] . However, if the
lexical item kill maps onto an unstructured concept KILL, then there is
no explanation for where the X and Y come from, nor what they stand
for.	 Carston (1985) proposes that:
"... I and Y are variables ranging over arbitrary stretches
of conceptual material, and (...) I and Y are upward
entailing environments." (Carston, 1985, p.29).
However, if this were the case, an utterance such as John has
killed again would give rise to an inference such as JOHN CAUSE [AGAIN
DIE], or, on the view that interpreting the utterance involves
recovering an implicit argument, it could give rise to an inference
such as JOHN CAUSE [SOMEONE AGAIN DIE] . Carston notes in a footnote
that:
"Defining these (variables] is a problem for all analyses
and needs attention."	 (op. cit., p.29).
On the view that arguments are an integral part of the semantic
representation of the verb, this problem disappears, because the
variables turn out to be the arguments of the verb.
A further advantage of this view is that it gives us a basis for an
account of implicit arguments.
4.4. Implicit arguments.
Pinker proposes that all different argument structures that a verb
can appear with represent different meanings of the verb. However, as
we saw with 'for-datives' this view cannot be maintained. A further
consequence of his proposal is that it fails to make a distinction
between verbs such as run, whose different argument structures express
different meanings, and verbs such as eat for which this is not the
case. As we saw above, only when run occurs with a PATH, does it
necessarily imply movement along a path; on the other hand, it is
intrinsic in the meaning of eat that something is eaten, whether this
is lexically realized or not. We can account for this by proposing
that eat, unlike run, only has one semantic representation, so that
even when eat occurs without an overt second argument, this argument is
implicit, because it is part of the semantic representation of the
verb.	 Relevance theory then can account for how we interpret this
implicit argument in different contexts: 	 in accordance with the
principle of relevance (c.f. Haegeman, 1987). 	 As an example of how
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the interpretation process works, consider Fillmore's (1986) examples
in (4.86)—(4.88):
4.86. When my tongue was paralyzed I couldn't eat or drink.
4.87. We've already eaten.
4.88. I've tried to stop drinking.
Fillmore notes that whereas in (4.86) eat and drink simply designate
the physical activities of eating stuff and drinking stuff, in (4.87)
eat is used to mean something like eat a meal, and in (4.88) drink is
interpreted as drink alcoholic beverages.	 How then do we get these
different interpretations? On interpreting (4.86) the addressee
recovers eat THING and drink THING, where the interpretation of the
THINGS involved is constrained by what we know about eating, such as
that eating involves something solid, and usually involves food of some
sort, and that drinking involves something liquid. Because the
activities are mentioned in the context of when the speakers tongue was
paralyzed, assumptions about what is involved in eating and drinking as
physical activities become easily accessible. This could give rise to
contextual effects, such as that the speaker was physically
uncomfortable, that she was hungry and thirsty at the time, that maybe
she was fed intravenously, etc. This means that the recovery of
SPEAKER COULD NOT EAT THING and SPEAKER COULD NOT DRINK THING may be
relevant without any further enrichment, because the assumption that
the speaker could not engage in these physical activities has some
contextual effect.
To interpret (4.87), the addressee again recovers eat THING.
However, in this case it is not enough to recover that the speaker and
someone else have already been engaged in the physical activity of
eating something, or of eating food, because we know that people
perform this activity regularly, so that it will not give rise to any
contextual. effects. In order for the utterance to achieve relevance,
the addressee has to assume that a significant instance of eating is
referred to. Since meals are the main occasions of taking food for
most people, MEAL is an easily accessible enrichment of THING.
Moreover, this enrichment gives rise to contextual effects, such as
that the speaker does not want to eat anything else, or that the
speaker is ready to do something else.
To interpret (4.88), the addressee recovers drink THING. Although
the proposition that the speaker has tried to stop drinking any liquid
completely may give rise to contextual effects such as that the speaker
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has tried to commit suicide, in the absence of a context which supports
this interpretation, it will be ruled out because of our assumption
that in order to live we have to drink. 	 This means that in order for
the utterance to achieve relevance THING has to be enriched. The
concept of drinking gives access to assumptions about drinking things,
such as the assumption that we drink liquids for sustenance, that we
drink alcoholic liquids for pleasure and/or intoxication, and that
drinking too ouch alcohol is bad for us. If the interpretation of
THING as 'any liquid' is ruled out, the only interpretation that
achieves relevance, will be the 'alcoholic drink' interpretation,
because it gives rise to contextual effects such as that the speaker
has been drinking too much alcohol, that s/he perceives that as a
problem, that s/he is addicted to it etc.
Relevance theory then can account for how implicit arguments are
interpreted. However, this is not all that needs to be said about
implicit arguments: As we saw in section (4.1.2), although Thy don't
you put 'yours sincerely'? is perfectly acceptable, a sentence like
John put the book is not, although we recover in both cases that a
PLACE is involved.	 This means that we not only have to account for
how implicit arguments are interpreted, but also for when we can use a
verb with an implicit argument. 	 Fillmore (1986) shows that verbs
differ as to whether and under what circumstances they can occur with
implicit arguments. 	 There are verbs like eat, drink, sew, and read,
whose implicit argument is indefinite. Fillmore claims that the
implicit arguments of these verbs are obligatorily disjoint in
reference with anything saliently present in the context, and therefore
he refers to them as 'Indefinite null complements' (INC).
There are also verbs like accept, object and wait which can occur
with an implicit argument, but only if the missing information can be
immediately retrieved from the context. Because the referents of
these implicit arguments have to be recoverable from the context,
Fillmore refers to them as 'Definite null complements' (DNC).
The difference between these two types of verbs is illustrated by
Ingham (1989), who compares eat to follow in the following examples:
4.89a. *J0} brought the sandwiches bit Ann didn't eat - she ate the
cakes instead.
b. The guide left but the tourists didn't follow - they followed
the courier instead.
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In (4.89a) the implicit argument of eat can not refer to the
sandwiches, but has to be interpreted as something like anything, while
in (4.89b) the implicit argument of follow has to refer to the guide
mentioned in the sentence.
Fillmore argues that we can not give a pragmatic explanation for
when an argument may be left implicit with the second type of verb,
because no matter how clear the pragmatic context, some arguments
cannot be left implicit. For example, even if it is perfectly clear
to the addressee that a particular door is in question, (4.90) cannot
be used to refer to that door:
4.90. *Did you lock?	 (op. cit., p.98).
Fillmore argues that a semantic explanation for DNC verbs does not
seem possible either, because semantically related groups of verbs do
not display the same behaviour regarding whether or not they allow
implicit arguments. Some examples that Fillmore gives in support of
this are:
4.91. She insisted.	 *She required.
*She demanded.
I tried.	 *1 attempted.
They concurred. 	 *They acknowledged.
She found out.	 *She discovered.
I'm waiting.	 *IIm awaiting.
When did she leave? *When did she vacate?
*When did she abandon?
I protest.	 *1 oppose.
I object.
Fillmore goes on to show that for polysemous verbs, DNC may be
restricted to particular senses. For example, when we talk about
winning or losing a game, an election, or any competition, we can say
he won or she lost; however, when we talk about a prize that was won,
such as the gold medal, the blue ribbon, we cannot say he won, and when
we talk about a wallet or key that was lost, we cannot say she lost.
Some other examples that Fillmore gives are:
4.92. They accepted my offer. 	 They accepted my gift.
They accepted.	 *mey accepted.
I applied for the job.
	 They applied the bandage.
I applied.	 *They applied.
She arrived at the summit. She arrived at the answer.
She arrived.	 *She arrived.
I forgot to fix it.	 I forgot my keys.
I forgot.	 *1 forgot.
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I heard that you resigned.
I heard.
She left home.
She left.
She opened the shop early.
She opened early.
I heard the song.
*1 heard.
She left the package.
*She left.
She opened the envelope.
*She opened.
Fillmore concludes that although there seem to be some semantic
commonalities underlying DNC phenomena (e.g. the semantic connections
between win and lose), these phenomena are not explainable by semantic
facts. He proposes that individual verbs, or, in the case of
polysemous verbs, senses of verbs have to be represented as having
certain of their arguments marked for omission, either definite or
indefinite.
However, given our reanalysis of how verbs are represented, it
turns out that Fillmore's conclusion is too pessimistic, and that a
semantic/pragmatic explanation is possible.
When we consider verbs that appear with THINGS, it turns out that
there is a general principle underlying whether the THING can be left
implicit or not, so that we do not have to propose that individual
verbs are marked for implicit THINGS. This principle is that a verb
can only be used with an implicit THING if the interpretation of the
THING is constrained by the rest of the utterance, or by assumptions
made available by the interpretation of the rest of the utterance.
This gives rise to different possibilities. 	 The meaning of the verb
may constrain the interpretation of the THING, for example, as we saw
with eat and drink above.	 Also, the interpretation of a further
constituent in a particular utterance may constrain the interpretation
of the THING in that utterance.	 For example, compare (4.93a) and
(4.93b):
4.93a. ?Paul gave to Ann.
b. Paul gave to Amnesty International.
In (4.93a) to Ann does not constrain what it is that Paul gave Ann.
In (4.93b), on the other hand, to Amnesty International does put a
constraint on what he gave: we know that Amnesty International is a
charity, and that charities want money to do their work. This means
that the money interpretation becomes easily accessible.
When neither the verb nor any other constituent in the utterance
constrains the interpretation of THING, then it cannot be left
implicit. Why would this be the case? Relevance theory provides the
answer.	 According to relevance theory a (genuine) communicator tries
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to be optimally relevant. This means that s/he intends the utterance
to provide the addressee with adequate contextual effects for as little
processing effort as possible. This has as a consequence that the
communicator must choose the utterance which s/he thinks is optimally
relevant. When the intended interpretation of an argument is not
constrained by the rest of the utterance, then an utterance in which it
is left implicit is not going to be the most relevant one that the
speaker can choose, and therefore it will be ruled out. For example,
consider a situation in which two people, John and Sue are discussing
the popularity of a particular book. John wants to illustrate this by
communicating that Paul gave the book in question to Ann. In
principle, there are several utterances that John can choose from, e.g.
(4.93a) and (4.94):
4.93a. Paul gave to Ann.
4.94. Paul gave it to Ann.
By uttering (4.93a), John merely communicates that PAUL GAVE THING TO
ANN. By inserting it in (4.94), John communicates that the referent
of THING is retrievable from the immediate context, thereby
constraining the interpretation of THING to the thing that they are
discussing, i.e. the book. This means that by uttering (4.94) John
saves Sue processing effort by guiding her to the intended
interpretation, so that (4.94) rather than (4.93a) is optimally
relevant. Moreover, by uttering (4.93a), John would communicate that
(4.93a) is the most relevant utterance that he could have used to
communicate the assumption(s) he wants to communicate. In (4.93a)
there is no explicit constraint on the interpretation of THING, so that
in principle it could refer to any THING that is manifest to Sue (such
as the objects surrounding her). But by uttering (4.93a) John makes
explicit that the THING was given to Ann, which therefore could
encourage Sue to find a connection between Ann and the thing given, and
thereby to conclude that John has changed the subject.
Relevance theory in fact predicts when a THING can be left
implicit: when the communicator chooses an utterance from a range of
possible utterances s/he chooses the optimally relevant one, which will
be the one which gives the addressee adequate contextual effects f or as
little processing effort as possible. When the interpretation of a
THING is constrained by the rest of the utterance, or by assumptions
made available by the rest of the utterance, it can be left implicit
because that will save the addressee recovering its phonological form;
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when the interpretation is not constrained by the rest of the
utterance, the communicator will have to put a constraint in, for
example, by the use of a pronoun.
As we saw above, Fillmore makes a distinction between INC verbs,
such as eat, drink, and read, and DNC verbs, such as follow, and
accept. He says about this distinction that implicit arguments of INC
verbs are obligatorily disjoint in reference with anything in the
context, while implicit arguments of DNC verbs have to get their
interpretation from the immediate context. This distinction is
illustrated by Inghani's (1989) examples, repeated here:
4.89a. J0 brought the sandwiches but Ann didn't eat - she ate the
cakes instead.
b. The guide left but the tourists didn't follow - they followed
the courier instead.
However, it turns out that the distinction that Fillmore draws is
not valid, and that we can account for the behaviour of verbs like eat
and follow without this distinction. In order to explain why (4.89a)
is ill-formed and (4.89b) is well-formed we have to look at what kind
of constraints the verbs involved put on the interpretation of THING.
In the case of verbs like eat, drink and read, the verb puts a
constraint on the type of THING that can be eaten, drunk or read,
without putting any constraint on what instance of the THING is
involved. This means that if one wants to communicate that a
particular instance of a THING is at stake, one cannot just leave THING
implicit, but has to specify what instance is meant, either by
explicitly mentioning the thing or by putting an explicit constraint on
the interpretation of THING, such as a pronoun. In the case of a verb
like follow, there is no constraint on the type of THING that can be
followed (in principle, one can follow anything), but the
interpretation of THING is constrained by the fact that the THING has
gone or is going somewhere before the THING that follows.
When we look at the interpretation of (4.89a), it turns out that
the interpretation of THING is not "obligatorily disjoint" with the
sandwiches. Since eat does not put a constraint on an instance of
THING, the addressee cannot interpret THING as just referring to the
sandwiches;	 however, (4.89a) communicates that Ann did not eat
anything of the type that can be eaten, which means that the sandwiches
are included in what she did not eat.	 Furthermore, since cakes are
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also things that can be eaten, the cakes are also included in what Ann
did not eat, so that (4.89a) is ill—formed.
Utterance (4.89b), on the other hand, communicates that the
tourists did not follow a THING that had gone somewhere before them;
since (4.89b) also communicates that the guide left, the most
accessible interpretation of THING is that it refers to the guide.
Because follow does not put a constraint on a particular type of THING,
there is nothing to stop the tourists from following another THING, so
that (4.89b) is fine. Moreover, because of the constraint on THING,
we understand the courier as going somewhere before the tourists.
This also explains why we cannot have (4.95a) if we want to communicate
that John could not follow the lecture, but have to use (4.95b):
4.95a. ? John went to the lecture on astronomy, but hej couldn't
follow.
b. Johni went to the lecture on astronomy, but hei couldn't
follow it.
On interpreting (4.95a), we recover that John could not follow a THING
that had gone somewhere before him. However, there is nothing in the
context that has gone somewhere before John so that (4.95a) cannot be
easily interpreted. On interpreting (4.95b) we again recover that
John could not follow a THING that had gone somewhere before him.
However, in (4.95b) the use of it constrains the interpretation of the
referent of THING to the lecture on astronomy.	 Because a lecture on
astronomy cannot physically go anywhere, this gives rise to a non—
spatial interpretation, i.e. epistemic going and following.5
In the same way, we can account for when approach can occur with an
implicit argument, and when it can't, as in (4.96):
4.96a. They approached me.
They approached.
b. We were approaching the town.
We were approaching.
c. They approached the solution.
*They approached. 	 (op. cit., p.101)
Approach puts a constraint on the interpretation of its object in that
it expresses a spatial relation between the THING approaching and the
THING approached, such that the first THING is moving toward the second
THING which is stationary. This means that the THING approached can
be left implicit (as in (4.96a) and (4.96b)), when it is manifest what
202
the approaching THING is moving towards. 	 In the case of interpreting
(4.96c) with the solution left implicit, the addressee recovers that
They are moving towards a stationary THING. However, even if the
concept SOLUTION is easily accessible it does not represent a
stationary thing that one can physically move towards, so that They
approached does not make sense.	 When the solution is explicitly
mentioned or referred to, it will give rise to a non—spatial
interpretation, in this case epistemic approaching. When we look
again at (4.96a) it turns out that when the argument is left implicit
the utterance can only be interpreted as expressing a spatial
approaching and not approaching as in 'making overtures to'. This can
be explained along the same lines as the example in (4.96c). A
consequence of this is that we do not have to postulate that the
'making overtures to' interpretation is a separate meaning of approach.
When the spatial interpretation of approach is ruled out by the
context, a non—spatial interpretation is made, but the specific
interpretation that an addressee makes is dependent on the nature of
the concept involved and the context, in accordance with the principle
of relevance.
Fillmore shows that polysemous verbs may allow implicit arguments
only with particular meanings and not with others. On the view that
different verb meanings are represented as structured concepts
incorporating the arguments that the verb appears with, we can account
for this in a straightforward way. Fillmore goes on to conclude that
different meanings of a verb will have to be individually marked as to
whether they allow an implicit argument or not. However, it turns out
that this is not necessary, and that in fact it makes the wrong
predictions. For example, Fillmore points out that win can occur with
a direct object that designates a contest or a prize, but that only on
the first reading does it allow an implicit argument, i.e. we
necessarily understand (4.97) as meaning that Ann won some competition,
not a prize:
4.97. Ann won.
However, in (4.98) we understand Sue as having won a prize in the
lottery, not as having won the contest, even though, according to
Fillmore, this reading of win does not allow an implicit argument:
4.98. Sue was happy, because she won in the office lottery.
How then can we account for this?	 When we look at the different
meanings of win, we see that, on the one hand, it can express that
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someone won some competition, and on the other hand that someone won
some prize.	 However, one doesn't just win a prize, but rather one
wins a prize in a competition of some sort. This means that an
utterance like (4.99a) already contains an implicit argument, such as
in (4.99b):
4.99a. Ann won the silver medal.
b. Ann won the silver medal in the skating championships.
This in turn means that in order to get the 'prize' interpretation for
(4.97) the addressee has to recover two implicit arguments, while in
(4.98) in the christmas lottery rules out the competition
interpretation. Moreover, whereas on the first reading of win the
interpretation of the implicit argument is constrained by it being an
instance of a competition, 'prize' does not put a constraint on what
instance of the THING is involved, because a prize can be anything won
in a competition. If a speaker wants to communicate that someone has
won a particular instance of a prize, such as a silver or gold medal,
s/he therefore will have to provide an explicit constraint on the
interpretation of the direct object. By uttering (4.97) the speaker
only provides a constraint on the 'competition' interpretation, and not
on the 'prize' interpretation, so that, in accordance with the
principle of relevance, this is the only interpretation that the
speaker could have intended to communicate.
Fillmore argues that verbs like win and lose can only occur with an
implicit argument if there is a contextually given competition of which
the subject is the winner or loser, but this claim is too strong. For
example, consider (4.100):
4.100. Martina Navratilova has won again.
Assumptions about Martina Navratilova being a tennis player, together
with the constraint on the implicit argument of win, may give rise to
the interpretation that Martina Navratilova has won an instance of some
competitive tennis event. This interpretation may be relevant in its
own right, without there having to be a particular contextually given
competition, for example, in a discussion of the achievements of older
sports people.
As further examples of verbs which have different meanings, one
permitting an implicit argument, and the other not permitting an
implicit argument, Fillmore gives open and close, as in (4.101) and
(4.102):
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4.101a.	 She opened/closed the drawer.
b. *She opened/closed.
4.102a. They opened/closed the shop early.
b. They opened/closed early.
Fillmore takes it for granted that (4.102b) contains an implicit
argument. However, open and close also occur as ergative verbs, as in
(4.103):
4.103. The shop opened/closed early.
and an alternative view is that in (4.102b) open and close are
ergative, rather than transitive verbs with an implicit argument. On
this view, what makes (4.102b) special is not that a different meaning
of open and close is used, but rather that we interpret they as
representing the shop. This analysis is supported by the fact that we
often refer to shops, pubs, restaurants, etc. by means of referring to
the people who run them, as in (4.104):
4.104a. Ann: Shall we go to the DIY shop in Chelmsford?
b. Sue: It's closed on Sundays.
c. Sue: They're closed on Sundays.
In (4.104c) there is no implicit argument, and they can only be
interpreted as representing the DIY shop, by identifying it with the
people who run it. That this is not a special use of they to refer to
a third person singular thing, is shown in (4.105):
4.105. Pubowner: We are open seven days a week.
On this analysis we do not have to account for when open and close can
occur with an implicit argument, and when not. Because there is no
constraint on the instances of THINGS that can be opened and closed,
the THING cannot be left implicit.
When we look at verbs which can occur with implicit arguments other
than THINGS, it turns out that again an argument can only be left
implicit, if its interpretation is constrained by the rest of the
utterance, or by assumptions made available by the interpretation of
the rest of the utterance. However, there is a difference between
THINGS and non—THINGS such as PLACES and PATHS, in that the latter
categories are individuated in relation to THINGS; i.e. a PLACE exists
by virtue of a THING potentially or actually being located in it, while
a PATH exists by virtue of a THING potentially or actually traversing
it.	 This means that the interpretation of PLACES and PATHS is
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inherently more constrained than the interpretation of THINGS, and
consequently they can be left implicit more easily.
This can explain why we can have (4.106), (4.107) and (4.108b), but
why (4.109) sounds awkward:
4.106. John put the book on the table.
4.107.	 Bill put the book down.
4.108a. Ann: I don't know how to finish this letter.
b. Sue: Why don't you put 'yours sincerely'?
4.109. ? Pat put the book.
Put occurs with a THING and a PATH incorporating a PLACE, but it does
not constrain their interpretation. In (4.106) the PATH is left
implicit. However, because (4.106) communicates that the book ends up
on the table by John putting it there, the interpretation of PATH is
constrained to 'some path between John and the top of the table'.
Because recovering this may be relevant in its own right, the PATH can
be left implicit.	 In (4.107) the PLACE is left implicit.	 However,
the interpretation of PLACE is constrained by the PATH being down from
Bill, which makes it a PLACE down from Bill.	 Again, recovering this
may be relevant in its own right, so that the PLACE can be left
implicit.	 In (4.109) both PATH and PLACE are left implicit. 	 Since
neither Pat, nor the book in (4.109) constrain the interpretation of'
where the book was put, it cannot be left implicit. 	 In (4.108) again
both PATH and PLACE are left implicit. However, 'yours sincerely'
gives access to the assumption that we only use 'yours sincerely' to
finish a letter, so that the interpretation of PLACE is constrained to
AT END OF LETTER, and since Ann is writing a letter, the most
accessible instance of LETTER, is the letter she is writing, which
gives us the interpretation in (4.108c):
4.106c. Why don't you put 'yours sincerely' at the end of your letter?
When we look at verbs like arrive and leave (as in She left home),
it turns out that they express relations between THINGS and PLACES.
The PLACES involved are different for the different verbs: in the case
of arrive, the PLACE is where the THING is/was going to before
arriving, and in the case of leave, the PLACE is where the THING is
before leaving. This means that for arrive the PLACE can only be left
implicit if assumptions about where the THING is/was going are easily
accessible, thereby constraining the interpretation; and for leave the
PLACE can only be left implicit if assumptions about where the THING
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is\was before leaving are easily accessible, thereby constraining the
interpretation. This explains why we can't have something like
(4.11Oa), while (4.11Ob) is fine:
4.11Oa. Ann was walking through the woods. *She arrived at six
o'clock.
b. Ann walked to school.
	 She arrived at six o'clock.
Similarly, return (as in Peter returned home) expresses a relation
between a THING and a PATH incorporating a PLACE, where the PLACE is a
place that the THING left from before. This means that for return the
PATH (incorporating a PLACE) can only be left implicit if assumptions
about where the THING left from are easily accessible.
We now can account for Fillmore's examples, given in (4.111):
4.11la. She left home.
	 b. She left the package.
She left.	 *She left.	 (op. cit., p.102)
Leave in (4.11!a) expresses a relation between a THING and a PLACE, as
set out above.	 This means that, when it is manifest where she left
from, the PLACE can be left implicit.
	 In (4.122b), leave does not
express a relation between a THING and a PLACE, but rather it expresses
that someone left something somewhere. In other words, there is
already an implicit PLACE where she left the package. On this reading
of leave there is no constraint on the THING that can be left
somewhere, so that in general it cannot be left implicit, whether or
not the PLACE is explicitly stated.
How then can we account for the differences in (4.112)?:
4.112a. When did she leave?
b. *When did she abandon?
c. *When did she vacate? (op. cit., p.99)
Example (112a) can be explained along the same lines as (4.11la). In
(4.112b) abandon does not put any constraint on the THING that can be
abandoned, so that it cannot be left implicit. In (4.112c) vacate
does put a constraint on the type of THING that can be vacated, i.e. a
THING that can contain something. However, it does not constrain what
instance of the THING is at stake. Because vacating always involves a
particular instance of a THING, we cannot leave it implicit.
Fillmore concludes that when a verb can sometimes occur with an
implicit argument and sometimes not, this is evidence for the verb
being polysemous. However, this is not necessarily the case: as we
saw with follow in (4.89b) and (4.95), repeated here, we do not have to
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propose that follow has different meanings in (4.89b) and (4.95) to
account for whether it can occur with an implicit argument.
4.89b.	 The guide left but the tourists didn't follow - they followed
the courier instead.
4.95a. ? Johnj went to the lecture on astronomy, but hej couldn't
follow.
b. Johnj went to the lecture on astronomy, but hei couldn't
follow it.
In these examples it is not the verb that determines the
interpretation, but rather the constraint on the THING involved. In
the same way, we can account for Fillmore's examples in (4.113) and
(4.114):
4.113a. She arrived at the summit.
She arrived.
b. She arrived at the answer.
*She arrived.
4.114a. We returned to the camp.
We returned.
b. We returned to the task.
*We returned.	 (op. cit., pp.101-102).
In the (a) sentences the PLACES can be left implicit, if it is manifest
which PLACE is at stake. Since answer and task in the (b) sentences
are not THINGS that can be viewed spatially as PLACES where a THING is
going to, the constraints on the PLACES involved in (4.113b) and
(4.114b) will yield a non-spatial interpretation. However, as was the
case with follow in (4.95), if they are left implicit, it is difficult
for the addressee to recover them, because all that the verbs tell
her/him is that a particular sort of PLACE is involved, where the THING
was going. This again means that a communicator aiming at optimal
relevance will have to put an explicit constraint in her/his utterance
to guide the addressee to the intended interpretation.
A further example that Fillmore discusses is the verb give.
Fillmore argues that when we look at when give can occur with an
implicit argument, it turns out that this only happens when we
interpret give as 'contribute', and not when we interpret it as giving
a gift to a friend. Fillmore says about this that:
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"If you were to overhear me saying something like
(16) I gave a complete set of BLS volumes.
(1. e., omitting the TO-phrase), you might conclude that I
was talking about my contribution to a departmental book
drive, but you would know that I could not be talking about
a Valentine's Day present to my wife." (op. cit., p.100).
Fillmore concludes from this that give is ambiguous between a
'contribute' meaning and a 'giving presents' meaning, where only the
'contribute' meaning can be used with an implicit argument. This
raises the question of why give would have a meaning 'contribute',
while there is a separate lexical item contribute which expresses the
same meaning.	 The only motivation Fillmore has for proposing a
'contribute' meaning for give is that it resembles the verb contribute
in when it can occur with implicit arguments. However, it turns out
that give can occur with an implicit argument to express 'giving
presents' as well, provided that there is a constraint on the
interpretation of the implicit argument, as in (4.115):
4.115. I always give books on birthdays.
In (4.115), on birthdays constrains the interpretation of the implicit
argument to something like to people whom speaker gives presents to for
their birthdays.
Why then can't one get a 'present to a person' interpretation in
Fillmore's example (16)? In (16) no explicit constraint is given on
the interpretation of what or who the BLS volumes are given to. Since
give itself does not put any constraint on the interpretation of the
implicit argument, if you overheard (16), you would have to assume that
the communicator intended a complete set of BLS volumes to be a
sufficient constraint to recover the implicit argument. This then
could give access to assumptions such as that a complete set of BLS
volumes may be wanted by a university department or a library, because
those are places associated with books. Because BLS volumes are not
associated with a particular person, a 'present to a person'
interpretation is ruled out.
Fillmore notes that with know we can leave the argument implicit in
the case of (4.116), but not in the case of (4.117):
4.116a. They know that she resigned.
b. They know.
4.117. They know Louise.
*They know.
	
(op. cit., p.102).
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In the case of (4.116) know expresses a relation between the
subject and a thought, i.e. it communicates that they know that the
propositional form communicated by she resigned is true. Thoughts
only exist by virtue of people having them, and the only way in which a
thought can be made manifest to someone is by communicating that
thought in some way.	 This means that a thought can only be left
implicit if it already is mutually manifest to communicator and
addressee. Unlike ThINGS of which there can be lots which are
mutually manifest in a context, the only thoughts which are mutually
manifest are thoughts which have been communicated, and of these the
thought which is most easily accessible is the thought which is present
in the immediate context, i.e. the thought most recently communicated.
In (4.117) know does not express a relation between the subject and
a thought, but rather it expresses that they have a representation of
Louise, i.e. that they have a conceptual address for Louise which gives
access to information about her. In this case Louise cannot be left
implicit, because, although the interpretation of the argument is
constrained by it being a conceptual address, there is no constraint on
the particular instance involved.
We can account for forget, remember, see, hear and notice, as in
(4.118) along the same lines as for know in (4.116):
4.118a. I forgot that she'd fixed it.
I forgot.
b. I remembered that he was there.
I remembered.
c. I see that they're here.
I see.
d. I heard that you resigned.
I heard.
e. He noticed that she was blind.
He noticed.
In (4.118) the verbs take a thought as an argument, where forget and
remember express what happened to the thought in memory, while see,
hear and notice express how the thought was acquired. For all these
verbs the thought can only be left implicit if it is mutually manifest
to communicator and addressee.
When see and hear are used with a THING they constrain the type of
THING that can be seen or heard, i.e. objects for see, and sounds or
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sequences of sounds for hear. This means that the THING can be left
implicit when one wants to refer to the type, as in (4.119), but not
when one wants to refer to a particular instance of a THING, because
instances are not constrained, as in (4.120):
4.119.	 She couldn't see or hear very well anymore.
4.120a. I see the rat.
*1 see.
b. I heard the song.
*1 heard.
Fillmore notes that when forget and remember occur with a THING
they cannot be left implicit, whereas when they occur with an ACTION
they can, as in (4.121-4.122), op. cit., pp.101-102):
4.121a. I forgot my keys.	 b. I forgot to fix it.
*1 forgot.	 I forgot.
4.122a. I remembered my keys. b. I remembered to fix it.
*1 remembered.	 I remembered.
However, (4.121a) and (4.122a) do not express that the subject forgot
or remembered a THING, but rather that the THING is part of an implicit
ACTION, which the subject forgot or remembered to perform, i.e.
(4.121a) could express that the subject forgot to bring the keys, while
(4.122a) could express that the subject remembered to bring them.
This analysis is borne out, when we compare for example (4.121a) to
(4.123):
4.123. I forgot the bread.
When (4.123) is uttered by someone who has just come back from
shopping, it does not express that s/he forgot the THING 'bread' as a
conceptual address, or as an object, nor that s/he forgot to bring the
bread, bit rather that s/he forgot to thy it. Since this is not
recoverable when the THING is left implicit, it follows that it cannot
be left implicit.
What we see then is that the view that arguments are part of the
conceptual representation of verbs gives us a basis for a
semantic/pragmatic account of implicit arguments. On the one band,
the meaning of a verb may constrain the interpretation of the argument
that it occurs with, and on the other hand, the interpretation of the
rest of the utterance, or assumptions made available by the rest of the
utterance may constrain the interpretation of the argument that it
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occurs with.	 We have seen that the relevance theory proposal that
communicators aim at optimal relevance accounts for why an argument can
only be left implicit under these conditions: 	 they make the
interpretation of the implicit argument immediately recoverable. If
the interpretation of an argument is not immediately recoverable, the
communicator has to put an explicit constraint in the utterance to
guide the addressee to the intended interpretation.'
4.5. Conceptual structure and logical hypotheses.
We started this chapter by looking at what the notion of 'logical
form' means within the framework of relevance theory, and how relevance
theory proposes that the logical form of an utterance is recovered
during input processing. As we saw, Sperber & Wilson (1986) propose
that anticipatory logical hypotheses about the overall structure of the
propositional form of an utterance are built during the comprehension
process.	 They propose that these logical hypotheses consist of
'logical categories', which may be regarded as variables over
conceptual representations. Although Sperber & Wilson do not specify
in detail what these categories are, we saw that Jackendoff proposes a
set of basic conceptual categories which are supported by linguistic
and non—linguistic evidence. 	 Adopting these categories gives
substance to Sperber & Wilson's proposal.
Sperber & Wilson propose that anticipatory logical hypotheses are
based on anticipatory syntactic hypotheses, but we saw that this
proposal gives rise to a range of problems. Instead of constraining
the possible form that the conceptual representation of an utterance
can take, this proposal leads to an explosion of different hypotheses,
some of which are not realizable as well—formed conceptual structures.
The 'language of thought' hypothesis allows for a different view of how
anticipatory logical hypotheses are constructed. Given that language
of thought representations are structured representations, information
about how these representations may be structured has to be stated
somewhere.	 Sperber & Wilson assume that conceptual structure consist
of conceptual addresses which give access to different types of
information.	 On the basis of this I proposed that one type of
information that conceptual addresses give access to is information
concerning conceptual structure. On this proposal, conceptual
addresses give access to information concerning how concepts combine to
form well—formed formulae in the language of thought, and to
information concerning what a concept can combine with to form a
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complex concept. This led to the further proposal that structural
information is stored in the logical entry of a concept, as logical
selection frames.
Postulating that these selection frames are stored in the logical
entry of a concept has as a consequence that we can account for how
anticipatory logical hypotheses are built without having to appeal to
anticipatory syntactic hypotheses: when the addressee accesses the
logical entry of a concept, this will give her/him the selection frame
which tells her/him conceptual categories the concept needs to combine
with in order to yield a well—formed logical form. The addressee can
then use this selection frame as an anticipatory logical hypothesis.
It then seemed that information about what arguments a verb, for
example hit, can occur with can be recovered from the selection frame
associated with the concept, e.g. HIT. However, as I have argued
above, the view that verbs map onto simple concepts cannot be
maintained;	 rather the arguments that a verb occurs with are an
integral part of its meaning, and therefore should be part of its
conceptual representation. What this means is that when an addressee
recognizes a verb, e.g. hit (as in Pat hit Ann), s/he will recover the
concept in (4.124)7:
4.124.	 EVENT
THING	 ACT
/\
HIT THIN6
The concept will then give access to the logical selection frame, which
specifies what the concept has to combine with to form a well—formed
formula in the language of thought (i.e. a proposition). The concept
expresses an event, and EVENTS take place somewhere and at some time,
which will be specified in the selection frame:
[[EVENT - ] [PLACE] [TIME]]
PROPOSITION
Not only can hit be individuated as an EVENT, but also as a
PREDICATE and more specifically an ACTION (for which I will use ACT)
which will therefore be specified in the selection frame, on a separate
tier. This tier also shows what the ACT can combine with to form a
complex ACT (where the star after PROPERTY indicates that the resulting
complex ACT can itself have a PROPERTY again):
[ACT [HIT [THING]] ([MANNER]) ([PLACE]) ([PROPERTY'])]
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You can hit a thing in a certain manner, for example, you can hit
someone hard, which means that the ACT can combine with a MANNER to
yield a complex ACT, although it does not have to. Furthermore, it
can be specified where the affected THING was hit, for example, Pat hit
Ann on the head, which means that the ACT can combine with a PLACE.
Moreover, ACTS can have properties, for example, you can hit someone
with a stick, which means that the ACT can combine with a PROPERTY to
yield a complex ACT. It could be objected that with a stick expresses
with what kind of instrument the act was performed, rather than a
PROPERTY. However, the difference between Mary hit John and Mary hit
John with a stick is not that the first was performed without an
instrument, and the second with an instrument: given an appropriate
context, we may infer from the first one that Mary hit John with her
hand. The function of a PROPERTY containing WITH is simply to modify
a conceptual constituent.	 The way in which this modification is
interpreted depends on what we know about the particular concept at
stake (encyclopaedic knowledge). Thus, in a man with a stick, with a
stick expresses a property of the instance of MAN at stake, which may
be interpreted as that man having a stick, while in Mary hit John with
a stick, with a stick expresses a property of the hitting ACT, which
nay be interpreted as involving a stick as instrument. In red with
stripes, with stripes expresses a property modifying RED, which may be
interpreted as the red being intermingled with stripes; while in red
with anger, with anger expresses a property modifying RED, which may be
interpreted as the anger causing the redness. These interpretations
depend on encyclopaedic knowledge of the concepts involved, and are
arrived at in accordance with the principle of relevance.
As we saw earlier in this chapter, Jackendoff says that VP is the
only non—major phrasal category that corresponds to a conceptual
category, while all other conceptual categories can be correlated with
major phrasal categories. 	 The analysis proposed here provides us
with an explanation of why this would be the case. ACTS, and more
generally PREDICATES differ from other conceptual categories in that
they do not individuate concepts in the way the other conceptual
categories do. Although PREDICATES contribute to conceptual
structure, particular PREDICATES can only be individuated as part of
the concept in whose selection frame they occur, and consequently they
get their interpretation from that concept.8
What we see then is that logical selection frames specify different
sorts of information.	 In the first place, the selection frame shows
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what a concept has to combine with in order to yield a well-formed
formula in the language of thought. 9 In the second place, the
selection frame will specify what conceptual category the concept
belongs to, and what the concept can combine with to form a complex
concept (if anything), which will be stated in a separate tier. In
the third place, the selection frame will specify constraints on the
interpretation of the concept, if there are any.
The concept GIRL will have the logical selection frame:
[[EVENT/STATE [THING - I [PREDICATE]] (PLACE] [TIME]]
PROPOSITION
[THING GIRL ( - (PROPERTY*])]
so..
ndivduatio
The lower tier tells us that the concept GIRL belongs to the
category THING, and that it has to be individuated in some way to occur
as a constituent in conceptual structure. Moreover, it tells us that
GIRL can occur with a PROPERTY, although it does not have to.
PROPERTIES modifying THINGS in this way play a different role from e.g.
PROPERTIES modifying ACTS.
	 Whereas PROPERTIES modifying ACTS change
the nature of the ACT involved, PROPERTIES modifying THINGS help
individuate the instance of the THING at stake.	 This is represented
by the hyphen'°. PROPERTIES modifying THINGS can be either concepts
of the conceptual category PROPERTY, or they can be PROPOSITIONS,
saying something about the THING at stake.11
The upper tier specifies that the whole THING has to combine with
some PREDICATE, and the resulting STATE or EVENT has to combine with a
TIME, and a PLACE to yield a well-formed formula in the language of
thought.
The concept GIRL above has the constraint that it has to be
individuated in some way to occur in conceptual structure.
	 A
constraint can be more specific than that. 	 For example, the verb
drink will have the logical selection frame:
[[EVENT - ] [PLACE) [TIME]]
PROPOSITION
[*cr [DRINK [THING	 )] ( [MANNER ]) ([PROPERTY])]
TYPE LIQUII
In this selection frame it is specified that the type of THING that can
be drunk is LIQUID.12
A mass noun such as sugar will map onto a concept with a logical
selection frame similar to that of GIRL.
	 The difference is that it
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does not carry the constraint that the THING has to be individuated in
some way:
[(EVENT/STATE [THIN; - ] [PREDICATE]] (PLACE] (TINE]]
PROPOSITION
(THIN; SUGAR ( - (PROPERTY'])]
The effect of this selection frame, i.e. the effect of the absence of
the constraint, is that SUGAR can be interpreted as a TYPE of THING.
RED, as in red socks gives access to the following selection frame:
[[EVENT/STATE (THING (PROPERTY - ] THING] [PREDICATE]] [PLACE] [TIME]]
PROPOSITION
((THIN; (PROPERTY RED] THIN6])/ [PROPERTY RED ([PROPERTY])]
The upper tier shows what RED has to combine with to yield a well—
formed formula, while the lower tier shows that RED can combine with a
THING to become a complex THING, although it does not have to, and that
it can combine with another property to yield a complex property.
When we look at what kind of concepts there are, it turns out that
we can make a distinction between concepts that occur in conceptual
structure and concepts that do not. When we look at this second sort
of concept it turns out that their function is to constrain the
interpretation of the utterance in which they occur in some way.
Within this second group of concepts we can distinguish different sorts
of concepts. What they have in common is that none of them gives
access to encyclopaedic information: their 'meaning' is exhausted by
their logical selection frame, which shows how they constrain the
interpretation process. This means that they have no further role to
play in general cognitive processes, and consequently they do not have
to occur in conceptual structure. What this means is that although
they give access to logical selection frames, they themselves do not
appear as constituents of these logical selection frames.
In the first place, there are concepts which occur simply to
constrain what type of logical hypothesis can be built. For example,
complementizer that does not occur in conceptual structure, but signals
that a proposition is following, by which it constrains the possible
logical hypothesis that can be built. In other words, that maps onto
a conceptual address for that, which gives access to its logical
selection frame:
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[[EVENT/STATE (THING - J [PREDICATE]] [PLACE) [TIME]]
PROPOSITION
[(THING) PROPOSITION]
The lower tier of this logical selection frame simply says that a
PROPOSITION is following, which can be individuated as a THING, and the
upper tier specifies that it has to combine with certain categories to
yield a well—formed formula in the language of thought.
In the second place, there are concepts which do not themselves
occur in conceptual structures, hit which put constraints on how a
particular constituent is interpreted. An example of this is a(n).
Verhagen (1986) proposes for the Dutch indefinite article een
(represented by Verhagen as '[@n]' to show that the vowel is reduced to
a schwa) that:
"... by using [in] the speaker presents the idea evoked by
the nominal phrase as "instantiated"; thus, the general
interpretation of "[?n] X" is, roughly, "instance of I",
1. e.,	 "spa tio—teraporal ly continuous piece of some
'universe', labelled X".	 ... (en] evokes the idea of an
instance of a concept; it does not in itself mean that some
instance exists."	 (Verhagen, 1986, p.118).
When we look at how the indefinite article behaves in English, it turns
out that this proposal can be extended to English a(n). Reinterpreted
in our framework, this means that what a(n) does is signal that an
instance of a THING is at stake. In other words, it puts a constraint
on the interpretation of a following THING. This means that the
phonological or orthographic form a(n) maps onto a conceptual address
A, which gives access to the following logical selection frame:
((EVENT/STATE [THING] (PRED!CATE]1 [PLACE] (TIME]]
PROPOSITION
(THING]
Ind4v4duat1on:
Iista.cs
Kempson (1988a) shows how assumptions of Relevance theory can
account for the way in which we interpret the definite article. The
key to this account lies in the Relevance theory proposal that we can
distinguish immediately accessible information (i.e. information
accessible at low processing cost) from information in general.
Kempson lists what is immediately accessible information as follows:
"(A) Representations of information visually present to the
speaker and hearer (if sui tably picked out, for
example by pointing);
(B) Informa ti on already represented ei ther in previous
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propositions or in what precedes the part of the
utterance the hearer is processing;
(C)Information associated with concepts used in
immediately previous linguistic material;
(D)The implicit content of an utterance derived by
deduction from the utterance in combination wi th
whatever the hearer takes to be the context;
(E)The logical forziz of the sentence associated with the
utterance being processed. (Kempson, 1988, p.153).
Based on this notion of accessibility of information, Kempson
proposes that when a speaker uses a definite expression, s/he indicates
that a representation of an NP-type is immediately accessible to the
hearer. This proposal can be restated in the framework presented
here, by postulating that the definite article maps onto a conceptual
address for the which gives access to the following logical selection
frame:
[[EVENT/STATE (THING] [PREDICATE]] [PLACE] [TIME]]
PROPOSITION
[THING]
Indhduatlon:
Accessible instance
Blakemore (1987) shows that discourse connectives should be
analyzed as constraints on the pragmatic computations a proposition may
enter into. For example, she argues that the meaning of so is an
instruction to interpret the proposition it introduces as a logical
consequence. Blakemore shows that the proposition introduced by so
can be a logical consequence of a proposition which has been
communicated, as in the case of (4.125a) and (4.125b), or the speaker
may be drawing attention to a proposition which she has derived from
observation of a given state of affairs, as in (4.125c), uttered in the
context where the speaker has just seen someone arrive home laden with
parcels:
4.125a. There's $5 in my wallet.
	 So I didn't spend all the money
then.
b. A: Ton's car isn't here.
B: So he decided not to come after all.
c. So you've spent all your money.
	 (Blakemore, 1987, p.86).
Blakemore argues that discourse connectives such as so, after all,
and therefore do not represent concepts, because they do not occur in
conceptual structure. Instead, she proposes that they are part of
"... [an] essentially procedural theory that deals with the
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way in which elements of linguistic structure map directly
onto computations themselves - that is, on to mental
processes. ... a complete account of the relationship
between linguistic form and pragmatic in t erpre ta ti on must
include not just a theory of logical form, but also a
theory of grammatically specified constraints on pragmatic
computation."	 (op. cit., p.144).
Although Blakemore says that this 'procedural theory' should
account for the way in which elements of linguistic structure map onto
mental processes, when she discusses after all she says:
"... after all is not part of a linguistic representation
which is developed into a proposition, but imposes a
constraint on the pragmatic computations a proposi tion may
enter into."	 (op. cit., p.125).
This raises a number of problems. Blakemore does not give an
account of how a discourse connective can be an element of linguistic
structure, but nevertheless not be part of the linguistic
representation that she assumes is computed in the interpretation
process.	 The assumption that a linguistic representation is computed
entails that a representation is made of how the different linguistic
elements are structurally related. The claim that discourse
connectives are elements of linguistic structure which nevertheless are
not incorporated into linguistic representations, calls for some
explanation of how they are represented.
Also, Blakeinore views discourse connectives not as putting
constraints on how linguistic representations are processed, but rather
as constraints on the pragmatic computations that a proposition may
enter into. This means that the constraints must be represented in a
format that can be 'read' by the central cognitive device, i.e. they
must be represented in the language of thought. Furthermore, when we
look at Blakemore's proposal for the meaning of so as an instruction
that the proposition it introduces is a logical consequence, we see
that by necessity so introduces a proposition. Again, this
information has to be stated somewhere.
Given the proposal that there are concepts which do not occur in
conceptual structure, we can reanalyze Blakeinore's proposals. We can
view discourse connectives as mapping onto concepts which give access
to logical selection frames. These selection frames give access to
information concerning what logical hypothesis should be built and,
moreover, to information which puts a constraint on how the resulting
propositional form should be interpreted.
	 On this view, we can say
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that so naps onto a concept SO which gives access to the following
logical selection frame:
(PRoPos1TIo1
1ogIca coussqusics of p ro p osto ii contsxt
Represented in this way, we do not have to postulate that there is a
separate 'procedural theory' to account for the interpretation of
discourse connectives. A consequence of this is that we end up with a
unified account of constraints on interpretation: constraints nay
range over the kind of logical form that can be built, they may range
over the interpretation of elements within a logical form (as is the
case with the interpretation of THING when it occurs with drink), or
they may range over whole propositions, as is the case with so.
With these logical selection frames, we can now account for how
anticipatory logical hypotheses are built: when the addressee accesses
the logical entry of a concept, this will give her/him the selection
frame, which tells her/him how to construct a well-formed formula in
the language of thought.
	 The addressee can then use this selection
frame as an anticipatory logical hypothesis. In the next chapter, I
will discuss the actual process of building anticipatory logical
hypotheses more extensively, and I will propose an input-processing
model which operates by building these anticipatory logical hypotheses.
I will show that this model is compatible with the experimental
findings, and moreover how it can account for experimental findings
which have presented problems for existing models.
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Chapter 5: A Relevance-driven model of input processing.
In most existing processing models little or no account is taken of
the fact that the use of natural language is a process of interaction
between communicator and addressee, in which both parties are involved
in establishing successful communication. 	 Work on 'context-neutral'
languages for computers, and on Artificial Intelligence seems to have
influenced psycholinguists in trying to explain input processing
phenomena purely in terms of hearers'/readers' activity, without taking
into account that the communicator is responsible for the input:
"It is natural to think of perception and comprehension as
including analogues of the parsing operations of formal
grAmnurs, and so to view A.I. parsing schemes as potential
models of (portions of) some mental processes."
(Karttunen & Zwicky, 1985, p.9).
Natural language use, however, is more than the use of a 'context-
neutral' language with the context added: as Relevance theory shows
us, the choice of a particular utterance is a consequence of the
context in which it is uttered. 	 Communicators intend their audience
to believe that they are worth paying attention to, and addressees only
pay attention to information which seems relevant to them. As we have
seen, the principle of Relevance says that:
"Every act of ostensive communi cation communicates the
presumption of its own optimal relevance." (Sperber &
Wilson, 1986, p.158)
where the presumption of optimal relevance is defined as:
"a) The set of assumptions (I) which the communicator
intends to make manifest to the addressee is relevant
enough to make it worth the addressee's while to process
the ostensive stimulus.
1,) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one the
communicator could have used to communicate (I). (op.
cit., p.158).
It follows from this that a communicator aiming at optimal relevance
will not only try to make her/his utterance worth the addressee's while
on the message level, but will also try to keep processing cost down,
by accommodating her/his choice of linguistic output to the processing
needs of the addressee.
This view of communicator/addressee interaction together with the
notion of logical hypothesis building has consequences for a model of
input processing, because it forces us to look at the interpretation
process as a process in which the addressee expects the communicator to
Ui
Linguistic Processor
prosodic processor..,,
mental lexicon
phonological forms
orthographic forms
be aiming at optimal relevance, and in which s/he will interpret an
utterance according to this expectation.
5.1. The model.
I propose a processing model, in which the on—line interpretation
process is driven by the principle of Relevance, a model which takes
into account that the input for comprehension is never 'neutraP, but
is produced by a communicator aiming at optimal relevance.
I will not have anything to say about the role of the prosodic
processor, although I assume that prosodic properties play a role in
the building of logical forms, by delimiting local phrases, and that
they have an effect on the choice of context in which an utterance will
be processed, by delimiting foreground and background assumptions.
Likewise, I will not have anything to say about the way in which
the phonological form (or orthographic form) of a lexical item is
recognized during the interpretation process.
Central Cognitive Device
[_context
I
Principle of
. Relevance
concepts	 logical I—PROPOSITIONAL
processor I FORM
Figure 5.1) A Relevance driven model of input processing.
In this model the 'linguistic processor' is responsible for
recognizing the phonological (or orthographic) form of a lexical item.
It does not, however, assign it to a syntactic category, nor does it
assign a syntactic structure to the string of lexical items that make
up an utterance. The phonological (or orthographic) forms give access
to the concepts associated with them. The logical processor accesses
the logical entry of the concept, which will give it the logical
selection frame associated with the concept.	 Based on the selection
frames of concepts, anticipatory logical hypotheses are made. These
logical hypotheses can be enriched by accessing the context and the
encyclopaedic entries of concepts, in accordance with the principle of
Relevance, until a fully propositional form has been built.
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Let us consider how, given this model, an addressee would process
an utterance like The girl is in the room. When an addressee who is
processing The girl is in the room recognizes the, this will map onto
the concept THE, which gives access to the logical selection frame
(Lsf) of THE:
THE Lsf: ([(VENT/STATE [THING] [PREDICATE]] [PLACE] [TINE]]
PROPOSITION
[THING]
Iudvduato:
Accsssb1s ustauc.
The higher tier will yield a logical hypothesis, while the lower tier
gives a constraint on the interpretation of the following THING1:
PROPOSITION
[VENT/STATE	 [PLACE] [TIME]
[THING]	 [PREDICATE]
Acc.ssb1.
staRs
When girl is recognized, the addressee already has a logical hypothesis
available. This has as a consequence that although GIRL gives access
to the whole logical selection frame for GIRL, there is no need to use
the information in the higher tier, because all the addressee has to do
is enrich the logical hypothesis s/he already has, not build a new one:
GIRL Lsf: [[EVENT/STATE [THING - ] [PREDICATE]] [PLACE] [TINE]]
PROPOSITION
[THING GIRL ( - [PROPERTY])]
so..
hdIvduatfoa
The information in the lower tier together with the logical hypothesis
built on encountering THE, then yields the further hypothesis:
PROPOSITION
EVENT/STATE	 [PLACE] (TINE]
THING	 [PREDICATE]
GIRL: Accsssb1s
ustaucs
([PROPERTY])
This logical hypothesis enables the addressee to look for an accessible
instance of a GIRL, in accordance with the principle of Relevance.2
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Then when is is recognized this maps onto the concept:
STATE
THING PREDICATE
BE	 PLACE
The conceptual address gives access to the logical selection frame:
BE Lsf: ([STATE - ] (PLACE] (TIME]]
PROPOSITION
[PREDICATE (BE [PLACE]] ((PROPERTY])]
Again the information in the higher tier in the selection frame is not
used, because there already is a logical hypothesis, in which the
information from the lower tier can be incorporated. Moreover, the
verb itself yields the information that it expresses a STATE, which
modifies the resulting logical hypothesis, while the present tense puts
a constraint on the interpretation of TIME 3 . The interpretation of
TIME may be further enriched then shown here, if this is needed to
yield a relevant interpretation:4
PROPOSITION
STATE	 (PLACE]
	
TIME: at ti.. of
__._-_	 uttiraic.
THING	 PREDICATEI	 /
GIRL: Accsssb1. BE (PLACE] ((PROPERTY])
lastauce
Prepositions are like verbs, in that their arguments form an
integral part of their meaning. 5 This means that the preposition in
maps onto the concept:
PLACE
/\
IN	 THING
This will give access to the logical selection frame:
IN Lsf: ([EVENT/STATE] [PLACE - I (TIME]]
PROPOSITION
[[STATE [THING] [PREDICATE BE [PLACE - ] (PLACE] [TIME]]
PROPOSITION
(PLACE IN (THING] ([PROPERTY])]
The information retrieved from this selection frame can be incorporated
into the logical hypothesis:
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PROPOSITION
STATE	 (PLACE] TIME: •t ti.. of
stt.raac.
THING	 PREDICATE
GIRL: Acc,ssibl,	 BE	 PLACE ([PROPERTY])
astaac.
IN [THING] ([PROPERTY])
On encountering the, the informat ion can be added that an
accessible instance of a THING is at stake, while room supplies the
information what kind of THING is at stake. This enables the
addressee to look for an accessible instance of a room, in accordance
with the principle of Relevance:
PROPOSITION
at H.. of
utt.ranc.
THING	 PREDICATE
GIRL: Accus$bls	 BE PLACE
stauc.
IN THING ([PROPERTY])
ROOM: Accssslbl.
I	 astaacs
([PROPERTY])
If the communicator achieved optimal relevance, what the addressee
ends up with at the end of the utterance is the propositional form of
the utterance The girl is in the room. What we see is that not all
the conceptual category slots needed to yield a well—formed formula are
filled. If a category slot is not filled by conceptual material, then
the addressee will interpret it as expressing some instance of the
conceptual category. However, if it is relevant for the addressee
which instance is at stake, e.g. at what PLACE the above STATE held,
then s/he has to recover this information in accordance with the
principle of relevance. If the addressee cannot supply this
information, then s/he will not find a relevant interpretation and
communication fails.
All that an addressee needs in the interpretation process is to
recover the phonological form of a word from the mental lexicon and
then access the logical entry of the concept associated with that
phonological form. As a consequence there is no role left for a
syntactic parser in this model. It is generally assumed that we need
to postulate a parser to account for how the addressee recovers the
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structure of an utterance. However, the aim of the interpretation
process is not to recover the linguistic structure of the utterance,
but rather to compute a propositional form which gives rise to adequate
contextual effects for as little processing cost as possible.
	 In
order to do this an addressee needs to recover the logical form of an
utterance. Because in many instances the linguistic form of an
utterance underdetermines the logical form of the proposition
expressed, analyzing the syntactic structure of the linguistic input
will not provide the addressee with all the information required to
construct the right logical form.
	 This means that if a linguistic
syntactic representation were computed, this would not provide the
whole basis for the logical form representation. Moreover,
postulating that a syntactic representation is computed raises the
question of how this syntactic representation is 'translated' into or
mapped onto a (non—linguistic) logical form; as we have seen, we
cannot maintain that anticipatory logical hypotheses are built on the
basis of syntactic hypotheses.
	 If we want to maintain the view that
syntactic structure is computed, we have two possibilities.
	 In the
first place, we could postulate that syntactic structure is computed
and mapped onto logical form in some way.
	 However, on this view we
need to account for how the logical form can be richer than the
syntactic structure of the linguistic input.
	 Moreover, on this view
we lose the possibility of having logical hypotheses, which Sperber &
Wilson (1986) see "as playing a crucial role in disazabiguation and
reference assignment" (op. cit., p.206). In the second place, we
can postulate that syntactic structure is computed, but that logical
hypotheses are constructed independently of this syntactic structure.
However, if we can construct the logical form of an utterance indepen-
dently of the syntactic structure of the linguistic input, then
recovering that syntactic structure does not contribute anything to the
interpretation process.
As we saw in chapter 1, section 1.1, the experimental evidence
cited to show that syntactic structure is computed either does not in
fact show this (e.g. Forster & Olbrei, 1973), or is open to a different
interpretation (e.g. Tanenhaus et al., 1985). On the other hand, the
experimental findings by Tyler & Warren (1987) support the view that
(at least) no overall syntactic representation of an utterance is
constructed. As we saw in section (1.1), Tyler & Warren conducted a
number of experiments to see how listeners use the global and local
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structural organization of an utterance in the process of language
comprehension.	 Some of the sentences they used are repeated here:
5.la. Late target (syntactically well—formed)
An orange dream! was loudly watching/ the house! during smelly
lights/ because within these signs! A SLOW KITCHEN! snored! with
crashing leaves.
b. Scrambled (global syntactic disruption)
Because within these signs! during smelly lights! was loudly
watching! the house! an orange dream! A SLOW KITCHEN! snored!
with crashing leaves.
c. Syntactic disruption (local)
An orange dream! was loudly watching! the house! during smelly
lights! because within these signs! SLOW VERY KITCHEN! snored/
with crashing leaves.
As we saw, Tyler & Warren found that response times to sentences
with global syntactic disruption were not significantly slower than
than those in the late condition, but disruption of the local syntactic
structure did significantly slow down response times as compared to the
late condition. Tyler & Warren argue that these findings show that
the addressee does not construct a syntactic representation which spans
anything larger than a local phrase. To account for their findings
they propose that in processing an utterance the addressee uses
prosodic, syntactic and semantic information to construct local
phrases. These local phrases are integrated together into a "higher
level" representation by means of the semantic and prosodic
relationships between the phrases, so that a syntactic level of
representation which spans the entire utterance is not constructed. A
problem with this is that it presents us with a parser which utilizes
the rules of syntax to construct representations of local phrases but
not of larger sequences of phrases, without an account of why this
would be the case.
The model proposed here can account for these findings in a
straightforward way, without having to postulate a syntactic parser
which only operates over local phrases.	 In all three conditions the
addressee will build anticipatory logical hypotheses. In the late
condition the different concepts will fall into the slots present in
the logical hypotheses in a linear fashion. Although in the scrambled
condition the concepts cannot be fitted in the logical hypotheses in a
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linear fashion, the addressee has slots available for the concepts so
that the interpretation process will not be slowed down much. In the
(local) syntactic disruption condition, on the other hand, no slot will
be available for VERY, while KITCHEN cannot be fully interpreted, so
that the process of propositional form building will be slowed down.
To illustrate this let us look at the process of logical hypothesis
building for these two latter conditions in more detail:
5.lb. Scrambled (global syntactic disruption)
Because within these signs! during smelly lights! was loudly
watching! the house! an orange dream/ A SLOW KITCHEN! snored!
with crashing leaves.
When processing (5.lb), the addressee first encounters BECAUSE.
Blakemore (1988) analyzes because (at least on one reading) as
expressing a logical relationship, in that it introduces a premise for
a conclusion, i.e. it introduces evidence for another proposition.
Within our framework, this means that BECAUSE gives access to the
logical selection frame:
BECAUSE Lsf: [[PROPOS1TION] [PROPOSITION]]
[PROPOSITIONs]
•vId.cs for propostoa
From this selection frame the addressee can built the logical
hypothesis that two propositions will follow. Then when s/he
encounters within, this will map onto the concept:
PLACE
WITHIN THIN6
This will give access to the logical selection frame:
WITHIN Lsf: [(EVENT/STATE] [PLACE - I [TINE]]
PROPOSITION
(PLACE WITHIN [THIN6] ([PROPERTY])]
Since there is no PLACE slot in the existing logical hypothesis, the
addressee will have to access the whole selection frame. However,
there is a PROPOSITION slot so that the information in this logical
selection frame can be incorporated into the logical hypothesis:
PROPOSITIONi
	
PROPOSITIONfi
[EVENT/STATE]
	
PLACE [TINE]
WITHIN [THING] ([PROPERTY])
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On encountering these the addressee will recover that some
accessible spatially near THINGS will follow, while signs specifies
what kind of THING is at stake; this can be fitted into the THING slot
already available in the logical hypothesis. On encountering during,
this will map onto the concept:
TIME
DURING	 THING
This concept will give access to the logical selection frame:
DURING Lsf: [(EVENT/STATE] [PLACE] [TIME -
PROPOSITION
[TIME DURING [THING] ([PROPERTY])]
psrod of H..
Because the addressee already has a logical hypothesis, only the lower
tier will be accessed, which can then be incorporated in the logical
hypothesis:'
	
PROPOSITIONs	 PROPOSITION
(E VENT/STATE]
	
PLACE	 TIME
	
WITHIN THING	 DURING [THING] ([PROPERTY])
	
SI6NS	 of ti..)
SMELLY and LIGHTS can be fitted into the THING slot. Then when was is
recognized, it maps onto the concept BE:
STATE
/
THIN6 PREDICATE
BE	 PLACE
This concept gives access to the logical selection frame:
BE Lsf: [[STATE - ] [PLACE] [TIME]]
PROPOSITION
[PlElIcATE [BE [PLACE]) ([PROPERTY])
Because there is no PREDICATE slot in the logical hypothesis, the whole
selection frame is accessed, which yields the information that BE
expresses a STATE which has to combine with a PLACE and a TIME to yield
a PROPOSITION. Since there is an empty STATE/EVENT slot in the
logical hypothesis which combines with a PLACE and a TIME, the
information from the selection frame can be incorporated into the
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logical hypothesis. Moreover, the past tense puts a constraint on the
interpretation of TIME:
	
PROPOSITIONs	 PROPOSITION
STATE	 PLACE	 TIME: bsfor. tSss
of it tsr sucs
(THING] PREDICATE	 WITHIN THING
	 DURING THING
I	 "N
	
BE [PLACE] ([PROPERTY])
	
SIGNS	 PROPERTY LIGHTS
SMELLY
LOUDLY WATCHING will then be interpreted as a circumstantial PLACE.
Watching will map onto the concept WATCH:
EVENT
THIN6	 ACTA
WATCH THIN6
However, the 'ing' part causes the addressee to access a different
logical s-selection frame:7
WATCH-ING Lsf: [[sTATE/EVENT [ACT - J [PREDICATE]] (PLACE] [TIME]]
PROPOSITION
[[ACT - ] [EVENT] [PLACE] [TINE])
PROPOSITION
[ACT[WATCH [THING]] ([MANNER]) ([PROPERTY])]!
(CIRCUMSTANTIAL [*CT[ WATCH [THIN6]] ([MANNER]) ([PROPERTY])]]
PLACE
This selection frame says that the ACT must either combine with a
predicate to yield a STATE or EVENT, which in turn combines with a
PLACE and a TIME to yield a PROPOSITION, as in (5.2):
5.2. Watching television is addictive.
or that it combines with an EVENT, a PLACE and a TIME to yield a
PROPOSITION, as in (5.3):
5.3. Watching his feet, John tried to tango.
Furthermore, it says that the ACT can combine with a MANNER and a
PROPERTY to yield a complex ACT, and that the ACT can occur as a
CIRCUMSTANTIAL PLACE. Since the addressee already has a logical
hypothesis, only the lower tier of the selection frame needs to be
accessed, which yields the logical hypothesis:
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PROPOSITION44PROPOSITIONi
STATE	 PLACE	 TIME: befors t.s
of vttsrasce
[THIN6] PREDICATE	 WITHIN THING	 DURING THINGZN	 I
BE	 PLACE	 SIGNS	 PROPERTY LIGHTS
/\	 I
AT	 ACT	 SMELLY
WATCH [THING] MANNER ([PROPERTY])
LOUDLY
HOUSE will be fitted into the most accessible THING slot, i.e. the
slot most recently postulated, while ORANGE DREAM will be fitted into
the remaining THING slot. When a slow kitchen is encountered, rio more
THING slots are available, so that it cannot be fitted into the first
PROPOSITION. However, the logical hypothesis states that there is a
second PROPOSITION coming, and by accessing the complete logical
selection frame of the indefinite article, the addressee recovers how
this PROPOSITION is going to be build:
PROPOSITIONn
EVENT/STATE [PLACE] (TIME]
(THING]
	
[PREDICATE]
instance
PROPOSITIONS
STATE	 PLACE	 TIME: bsfors ti..
of ott.rancs
THING	 PREDICATE	 WITHIN THING DURING THING/\	 I
PROPERTY DREAM	 BE	 PLACE	 SIGNS	 PROPERTY LIGHTS
I	 I
ORANGE	 AT	 ACT	 SMELLY
WATCH THING MANNER
I	 I
HOUSE LOUDLY
The rest of the utterance can then be fitted into the logical
hypothesis, until the propositional form has been recovered:
PROPOSITION4	 PROPOSITION
-----
STATE	 PLACE	 TIME: bsfors ti..	 (VENT [PLACE] TIME: before ti.e
of utterance	 of utterance
THING	 PREDICATE WITHIN THING OURIN6 THING 	 THING	 PREDICATE
ZN A I ZN
PROPERTY DREAM BE PLACE	 SIGNS	 PROPERTY LIGHTS PROPERTY KITCHEN SNORE	 PROPERTY
/\	 I	 /\
ORANGE	 AT	 ACT	 SMELLY	 SLOW	 WITH THINGZN
WATCH THING MANNER	 PROPERTY LEAVESI	 I	 I
HOUSE LOUDLY	 CRASHING
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What we see then is that it does not matter that the syntactic
structure of the utterance is globally disrupted: although the
different concepts cannot be fitted into the logical hypothesis in a
left—to—right fashion, for all concepts there are conceptual slots
available in the logical hypothesis into which they can be fitted.
When we look at the locally disrupted sentence, repeated here, it
turns out that with this sentence there is no conceptual slot available
in the logical hypothesis into which the concept VERY can be fitted,
and moreover that KITCHEN cannot be fully interpreted.
5.lc. Syntactic disruption (local)
An orange dream! was loudly watching! the house! during smelly
lights/ because within these signs! SLOW VERY KITCHEN! snored!
with crashing leaves.
When processing this sentence, the addressee thuds logical
hypotheses in the way set out before. When the addressee encounters
SLOW, s!he has the following logical hypothesis available:
PROPOSITIONS
[EVENT/STATE]
	
PLACE	 [TIME]
WITHIN THING
SIGNS
PROPOSITIONc
STATE	 [PLACE]
	
TIME: b.fors tss
of itt.raac.
THING	 PREDICATE	 DURING THING
	
PROPERTY DREAM BE PLACE	 PROPERTY LIGHTSI	 I
ORANGE	 AT ACT	 SMELLY
WATCH THING MANNERI	 I
HOUSE LOUDLY
SLOW gives access to the logical selection frame:
SI.OW Lsf: ([EVENT/STATE (THING (PROPERTY - ] THING] [PREDICATE]] [PLACE] (TIME]]
PROPOSITION
((THING (PROPERTY SLOW] THING])/ (PROPERTY SLOW ((PROPERTY WITH (THING]])]!
(PROPERTY SLOW ((PROPERTY PLACEcrc])]
Because there is no THING or PROPERTY slot in the logical hypothesis,
the addressee has to access the upper tier of the selection frame,
which tells her,'him that SLOW has to combine with a THING to form a
complex THING which is part of an EVENT or STATE. Because there is an
EVENT/STATE slot in the logical hypothesis, this information can be
b..iilt into the logical hypothesis so that when the addressee reaches
very, s/he has the following hypothesis available:
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PROPOSITION4I	 PROPOSITION
STATE	 [PLACE]
	
TIME: befor, ti..	 EVENT/STATE	 PLACE	 [TIME)
of itt or a ics
THING	 PREDICATE	 DURIN6 THIN6	 THING (PREDICATE] WITHIN THING
	
PROPERTY DREAM BE PLACE	 PROPERTY LI6HTS	 PROPtRTY THING	 SIGNS
I	 A	 I	 I
ORANGE	 AT ACT	 SMELLY	 SLOW
WATCH THING MANNER
	
I	 I
HOUSE LOUDLY
The concept VERY gives access to the logical selection frame:
VERY Lsf: ([STATE/EVENT [THING [PROPERTY (AMOUNT - J PROPERTY] THING] (PRED]] [PLACE] [TIME]]
PROPOS ITION
([EVENT ( THING ][ACT [MANNER [AMOUNT - ] MANNER]] [PLACE] (TIME]]
PROPOSITION
[PROPERTY [AMOUNT - ] PROPERTY]
[MANNER [AMOUNT - ] MANNER)
The upper tiers specify what VERY must combine with to yield a
PROPOSITION, while the lower tiers show that VERY is always part of a
complex concept, either a PROPERTY, or a MANNER. When we look at the
logical hypothesis the addressee has, there is no empty MANNER nor
PROPERTY slot available. This means that VERY cannot be fitted into
the logical hypothesis in a straightforward way. Accessing the upper
tiers of the selection frame does not help, because there is no
PROPOSITION slot available in the logical hypothesis either. This
means that VERY cannot be integrated within the logical hypothesis,
which will cause an increase in processing time.
When KITCHEN is recognized, this will give access to the selection
frame:
KITCHEN Lsf: [(EVENT/STATE [THING - ] [PREDICATE]] (PLACE] [TIME])
PROPOSITION
[THING KITCHEN ( - [PROPERTY])]
S...
adivf dust si
Although there is a THING slot available in the logical hypothesis,
the lower tier of the selection frame specifies that KITCHEN needs to
be individuated in some way. Because no individuating concept (such
as an article or demonstrative) has been encountered, the addressee
does not know how to interpret KITCHEN, which again will lead to an
increase in processing cost.
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What we see then is that Tyler and Warren's findings are accounted
for naturally within this framework, without us having to postulate
that the addressee constructs a syntactic representation of individual
phrases tht not of sequences larger than individual phrases.
5.2. Issues of on-line comprehension.
The model proposed here not only can accommodate the findings by
Tyler & Warren, it can account for the other experimental findings
discussed in this thesis, including findings which have presented
problems for processing models with a syntactic parser, e.g. multiple
centre-embedded sentences.
	 In order to do this, we have to address
one more question. Sperber & Wilson (1986) propose that processes
such as disambiguation and reference assignment take place on-line, on
the basis of anticipatory logical hypotheses, and in accordance with
the principle of Relevance, i.e. the addressee will go for the
interpretation which yields adequate contextual effects for as little
processing effort as possible. The different sorts of contextual
effects are clearly defined by Sperber & Wilson (see section 1.2.5).
The question then is what constitutes processing effort.
5.2.1. Processing effort.
A partial answer to the question of what constitutes processing
effort is provided by the Relevance theory notion of accessibility.
Relevance theory proposes that the interpretation of a linguistic input
depends on its interaction with assumptions (the context) which are
either already held in memory, or can be constructed from assumption
schemas, to yield contextual effects. These assumptions and assump-
tion schemas have to be retrieved from memory. The more accessible an
assumption is, the easier it is to recall from memory. What makes an
assumption accessible? As we saw in the last chapter, Ketnpson (1988)
lists what is immediately accessible information as follows:
"(A) Representations of information visually present to the
speaker and hearer (if suitably picked out, for
example by pointing);
(B)Information already represented ei ther in previous
propositions or in what precedes the part of the
utterance the hearer is processing;
(C)Information associated with concepts used in
immediately previous linguistic material;
(1)) The implicit content of an utterance derived by
deduction from the utterance in combination wi th
whatever the hearer takes to be the context;
(E) The logical form of the sentence associated wi th the
utterance being processed. (Kempson, 1988, p.153).
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Relevance theory proposes that contexts are ordered according to
accessibility, axxl that extending a context is a cyclic process, i.e.
only some extended contexts are accessible from the immediate context,
but these extended contexts make further extensions accessible, which
in turn make further extensions accessible, etc. Actually accessing a
context involves processing effort, and each step of context extension
involves more processing effort, so that from this we can conclude that
the fewer steps of context extension needed to yield an interpretation
with adequate contextual effects, the smaller the processing effort.
However, this is not all that needs to be said about processing effort.
In many of the psycholinguistic experiments discussed in this
thesis, ambiguous sentences, such as the ones in (5.4), and 'garden—
path' sentences, such as in (5.5), are presented to subjects in
isolation, i.e. the 'null context':
5.4a. Joyce said Tom left yesterday.
b. John hit the girl with a book.
5.5a. Since Jay always jogs a mile seems like a short distance to him.
b. The horse raced past the barn fell.
When these sentences are presented to subjects in isolation, they
are not acts of ostensive communication, i.e. they are not used to
communicate propositions to the subjects. This means that going for
one rather than the other interpretation is not going to give the
subject more contextual effects, e.g. knowing that Joyce said something
yesterday does not give the subject more contextual effects than
knowing that Tom left yesterday, if the subject does not know who Joyce
and Tom are, etc. Moreover, by formulating these sentences the
researchers are not aiming at optimal relevance, i.e. they are not
accommodating the choice of sentence to the processing needs of the
subjects. A communicator actually uttering one of the sentences above
would only do so if the utterance is the most relevant one s/he could
use in order to communicate the proposition s/he wants to convey, i.e.
when it accommodates the processing needs of the addressee best. This
means that experiments in which sentences are processed in isolation do
not necessarily reflect normal utterance interpretation: the initial
context in which the sentence is processed does not contain any
assumptions that have a bearing on the interpretation, and the
interpretation of the sentence will yield no or very little contextual
effects. However, as we have seen, it has been found that ambiguous
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sentences, as in (5.4), have a favoured interpretation when processed
in isolation, i.e. (5.6):
5.6a. Joyce said (Tom left yesterday).
b. John (hit (the girl) (with a book)).
and the 'garden—path' sentences, as in (5.5), are called so because
they cause subjects to go for the wrong analysis (again when processed
in isolation). If we cannot account for this in terms of contextual
effects, we will have to account for it in terms of processing effort.
However, when we look at, e.g. (5.4a), the difference in processing
effort between the two analyses cannot be explained in terms of numbers
of context extensions involved in the different interpretations,
because extending the context does not make one interpretation more
relevant than the other. 	 Why then does the favoured interpretation
involve less processing effort? When we look at what happens when
(5.4a) is processed, it turns out that 'accessibility' does not just
apply to assumptions, but also to conceptual slots in the logical
hypothesis.
When the addressee encounters Joyce, this will give access to the
logical selection frame:8
JOYCE Lsf:	 ([(VENTISTATE [THING - I [PREDICATE]] (PLACE] (TIME)]
PROPOSITION
[THING JOYCE (- [PROPERTY'))]
This logical selection frame will yield the logical hypothesis:
PROPOS IT ION
EVENT/STATE	 (PLACE]
	
[TIME]
THING	 [PREDICATE]
JOYCE
([PROPERTY])
On encountering said the PREDICATE slot can be filled by SAY
[PROPOSITION] ([MANNER]) ([PROPERTY*1), and moreover, the past
constrains the TIME slot to BEFORE TIME OF IJTTERANCE:9
PROPOSITION
EVENT	 [PLACE]
	
TIME: b,for, tiss
of utteriucs
THING	 ACT
JOYCE	 SAY [PROPOSITION] ([MANNER]) ([PROPERTY])
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TOM gives access to the Logical selection frame:
TOM Lsf:	 (((VENT/STATE (THING - ] [ PREDICATE]] [PLACE] (TIME]]
PROPOSITION
(THING TOM ( - (PROPERTY'])]
Because there is no THING slot available in the logical hypothesis, the
whole logical selection frame has to be accessed, so that TOM will be
taken as the start of the subordinate PROPOSITION, in the logical
hypothesis:
PROPOSITION
EVENT	 (PLACE]
	
TIME: bsfsrs H..
of utt.rauc.
THING	 ACT
JOYCE	 SAY PROPOSITION ([MANNER]) ([PROPERTY])
EVENT/STATE (PLACE] [TIME]
THIN6	 [PREDICATE]
TON
([PROPERTY])
On encountering left the PREDICATE slot can be filled by LEAVE
[PLACE] ([MANNER]) ([PROPERTY]), and moreover, the past constrains the
TIME slot to BEFORE TIME OF UTTERANCE.
PROPOSITION
EVENT	 (PLACE]
	
TIME: befor. His
of .tt.rs.cs
	
THIN6	 ACT
	
JOYCE	 SAY PROPOSITION ([MANNER]) ([PROPERTY])
EVENT (PLACE] TIME: b.for. ti..
of ett.rancs
THING	 ACT
	
TOM	 LEAVE (PLACE] ([MANNER]) (PROPERTY])
On encountering YESTERDAY, this will be fitted into the most
accessible TIME slot, which in this case is the TIME slot in the
subordinate PROPOSITION. What makes this the most accessible slot?
A conceptual slot is the most accessible when it is being inserted in a
logical hypothesis, when it is being filled, and when a constraint is
put on its interpretation. When new conceptual slots are inserted
into the logical hypothesis, they in turn become more accessible.10
In (5.4a) the TIME slot in the subordinate PROPOSITION is the TIME slot
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postulated most recently, and moreover the tense of LEAVE has put a
constraint on its interpretation immediately before YESTERDAY is
encountered, so that it is more accessible than the TIME slot in the
main clause.	 Because of this, the processor will not even consider
the TIME slot in the main clause. Only if YESTERDAY is incompatible
with conceptual material already available, e.g. in the case of Joyce
said Torn is leaving yesterday, or if it is incompatible with
assumptions in the context, will this assignment be rejected, and the
TIME slot in the main PROPOSITION tried. Because rejecting the first
interpretation, and going for the TIME slot in the main PROPOSITION
would involve more processing effort, which is not offset by an
increase in contextual effects, 'Joyce said (Tom left yesterday)' is
the most relevant interpretation, and therefore the interpretation that
the addressee goes for when processing (5.4a) in isolation.
When (5.4b), repeated here, is processed in isolation, it is
interpreted as (5.6b), rather than (5.6c):
5.4b. John hit the girl with a book.
5.6b. John (hit (the girl) (with a book)).
5.6c. John hit (the girl with a book).
Again, we can account for this by looking at how the logical
hypothesis for this sentence is built. By the time the addressee
encounters with, s/he has the following logical hypothesis available:
PROPOSITION
EVENT [PLACE] TIME: befors t$.,
of sttsraucs
THING	 ACT
I
JOHN	 HIT THING ([MANNER]) ([PLACE]) (PROPERTY])
GIRL: *cc,ssb1s
lustaics
([PROPERTY])
The addressee then has two optional PROPERTY slots available.
Optional slots differ from the other slots in a logical hypothesis in
that they do not have to be filled by any conceptual material in order
to yield a well—formed formula: they merely show what a concept can
combine with to form a complex concept, or, as is the case with
PROPERTIES following THINGS, they can help the addressee to pick out
the THING at stake. This means that they do not become immediately
accessible on being inserted in the logical hypothesis. Rather,
optional slots become accessible either when the addressee recovers a
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concept of the same type which cannot be inserted into a slot which has
to be filled in order to yield a proposition, or they can become
accessible because assumptions in the context make the complex concept
relevant. In the case of (5.4b) the addressee accesses the logical
selection frame of WITH, and finds that WITH THING is a PROPERTY.
This then makes both optional PROPERTY slots in the logical hypothesis
accessible.
Why then would the addressee go for the interpretation in (5.6b)?
Concepts do not only give access to their logical selection frames, but
also give access to encyclopaedic information. For (5.4b) this means
that the addressee has access to encyclopaedic information for JOHN,
HIT and GIRL by the time s/he encounters WITH THING. The concept WITH
THING together with HIT makes accessible the assumption that we can hit
people with something, while WITH THING together with GIRL does not
make accessible any assumptions which help assign reference to the
GIRL. In order to accommodate WITH THING as a PROPERTY of GIRL the
addressee would have to make extra assumptions, which would involve
extra processing effort because it would involve creating a context,
which means extending the accessible context. Because the addressee
aims for the interpretation which involves least processing effort,
assigning WITH THING to the PROPERTY of HIT is the only assignment that
the addressee can go for.	 This assignment is borne out when the
addressee encounters 8 lxiok. If the THING turns out to be
incompatible with being an instrument used in hitting, e.g. the blue
eyes, this will lead to reanalysis.
What we see then is that even when a sentence like (5.4b) is
processed in isolation, the addressee goes for the interpretation which
is supported by the (limited) context which is created during the
interpretation process. This does not mean that when a sentence like
(5.4b) is actually used as an act of ostensive communication, the
addressee will always go for this analysis first. If the context does
not enable the addressee to assign reference to GIRL before WITH THING
is encountered, and it is important to the addressee to know which girl
is meant (e.g. when there are several girls in the context), then WITH
THING will be assigned to the PROPERTY slot of GIRL.
As we have seen, when subjects process a sentence like (5.5a),
repeated here, in isolation, they get 'garden—pathed', because they
take a mile to be the object of jogs, rather than the subject of the
main clause.
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5.5a. Since Jay always jogs a mile seems like a short distance to him.
Jog is ambiguous among a number of different readings, which means that
it maps onto different concepts, causing the addressee to build
different logical hypotheses'1:
1. PROPOSITION	 PROPOSITIONs
(VENT (PLACE] TIME
JAY	 ACT	 ALWAYS
JOG [PATH] ((MANNER]) ((PROPERTY])
2. PROPOSITIONn
	
PROPOSITIONS
EVENT [PLACE] TINE
JAY	 ACT	 ALWAYS
JOG [THING] ([MANNER]) ([PROPERTY])
D5staac.
Because the addressee cannot choose between these logical
hypotheses at this stage, s/he will maintain both. These logical
hypotheses will be processed in parallel, until a choice can be made
between them. When the addressee encounters the indefinite article a,
this will give access to the logical selection frame:
A Lsf: [[EvENT/sTATE [THING] [PREDICATE)] [PLACE] [TIME]]
PROPOSITION
[THIN6]
Iista.c.
This logical selection frame shows both that an instance of a THING is
following, and what that THING has to combine with to yield a
PROPOSITION. Why then does the addressee go for the interpretation of
the THING as the direct object, rather than as the subject of the
second PROPOSITION? As we have seen, the addressee only uses
information from both tiers of a logical selection frame if s/he has
not got a logical hypothesis yet, or if the information in the lower
tier cannot be fitted into the logical hypothesis. In this case, the
lower tier yields the information that an instance of a THING is
following. Although there is no THING slot in logical hypothesis 1,
in logical hypothesis 2 there is a THING slot in which the instance of
THING can be fitted. Because the indefinite article signals that an
'explicit' THING is following, and there is no comma to indicate that
the first proposition is complete, there is no reason for the addressee
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to assume that the THING signalled by the indefinite article should be
taken as the beginning of the second proposition rather than as the
THING following JOG.
Let us now look at why subjects get 'garden—pathed' with sentences
like (5.5b), repeated here:
5.Sb. The horse raced past the barn fell.
By the time the addressee encounters raced, s/he will have the
logical hypothesis:
PROPOSITION
(VENT/STATE (PLACE] [TINE]
THINS	 [PREDICATE]
HORSE: *cc.ssb1s
I	
lastanc.
([PROPERTY])
Raced will map onto a number of different concepts.' 2
 The past
reading of (5.5b) will give access to the logical selection frame
RACEt:
RACEi Lsf: [[EVENT - ] (PLACE] [TINE]]
PROPOSITION
[*ci [RACE [PATH]] ([MANNER]) ([PROPERTY5])]
The passive reading will give access to the logical selection frame
RACE2:
RACE2 Lsf: [[STATE [THING] (PREDICATE BE [cIRcUN5TANTIAL - ] [PLACE] (TINE]]
PROPOSITION	 PLACE
[cIRcuMsTANTIAL AT [AcT [RACE [PATH)] ([MANNER]) ([PROPERTY5])]
PLACE
In principle, the addressee has a choice between fitting RACEi into
the PREDICATE slot in the logical hypothesis, and fitting RACEZ into
the PROPERTY slot in the logical hypothesis. However, the PREDICATE
slot has to be filled with conceptual material in order to yield a
PROPOSITION, while the PROPERTY slot is an optional slot. This means
that the PREDICATE slot is accessible, while the PROPERTY slot only
becomes accessible if the addressee recovers a concept which cannot be
inserted into a slot which has to be filled in order to yield a
proposition, or if assumptions in the context make the resulting
interpretation relevant.	 In this case, the lower tier of the logical
selection frame of RACES can be inserted into a slot which has to be
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filled in order to yield a proposition, and moreover, there are no
assumptions in the context which make inserting RACE2 in the PROPERTY
slot of HORSE relevant, so that the addressee will choose the PREDICATE
slot, rather than the PROPERTY slot.
What we see then is that we can define processing effort not only
in relation to contexts, but also in relation to logical hypothesis
formation and completion. In relation to context extension we saw
that the fewer steps of context extension needed to yield an
interpretation with adequate contextual effects, the smaller the
processing effort;
	
in relation to filling conceptual slots in a
logical hypothesis we saw that the more accessible a conceptual slot,
the smaller the processing effort involved in recovering it. In
actual utterance interpretation, the amount of processing effort
involved in computing an interpretation will depend on the interaction
of these different processes.
5.2.2. Multiple centre-embedded sentences.
Different explanations have been proposed to account for the
difficulty of processing multiple centre-embedded sentences like:
5.7. The rat the cat the dog bit chased ran away.
For example, Kimball (1973) proposed seven parsing principles, one
of which, the principle of New Nodes, explained why deletion of
complementizers can make sentences difficult to understand: the
complementizer signals that a new phrasal node should be started.
However, the difficulty in processing sentences like (5.7) does not
seem to be due to the absence of complementizers. As we saw in
chapter 1, Newmeyer (1983) points out that multiple centre-embedded
constructions, with complementizers, are unacceptable:
5.8. The cheese that the rat that the cat chased ate was rotten.
Newmeyer argues that we can explain the unacceptability of multiple
centre-embedded sentences by combining the competence model of
generative grammar with a model of immediate memory storage. However,
this proposal does not give us an explanation of why the sentences in
(5.7) and (5.8) are unacceptable, while the sentence in (5.9) is fine,
even though it has the same multiple centre-embedded structure:
5.9. The game those boys I met invented resembles chess.13
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Moreover, it does not give us an explanation of why there is a
gradient of unacceptability, so that (5.10) is more unacceptable than
(5.7) and (5.8) even though it involves less words:
5.10. Oysters oysters oysters split split split.'3
Smith (1989) proposes that the differences in processing difficulty
of these sentences is due to "the repetition of structurally undiffe-
rentiated phrases whose relations are therefore opaque." 	 (Smith,
1989, p.58). In other words, whereas the NPs the game and those boys
in (5.9) differ in number, and the third NP is a pronoun, in (5.7) we
have three NPs of the same structure, and in (5.10) we have three
identical NPs. Similarly, in (5.9) we have three different VPs, while
in (5.10) we have three identical ones. 	 Smith says that because of
this "the human processing mechanism is too confused to cope."
(op.cit., p.58). However, this does not explain why the processing
mechanism would be "too confused to cope", and moreover, it cannot be
the whole story, because although (5.11) may be more difficult to
process than (5.9), it still seems easier than (5.7):
5.11. The game the boy the girl met invented resembles chess.
Given that there is a gradient of acceptability for multiple
centre-embedded sentences, it cannot be due to the structure of these
sentences, nor to the structure of the constituents, nor to limitations
of immediate memory storage, that some of these sentences are difficult
or impossible to process. Smith says that another difference between
(5.9) and (5.10) is that whereas in (5.10) we have three identical VPs
which moreover are ambiguous between a transitive and an intransitive
reading, (5.9) involves VPs which are "of radically different meaning
and involve no ambiguity . . ." (op. cit., p.58). However, just like
split, meet is ambiguous between (at least) a transitive and an intran-
sitive reading, while (5.9) is still easier to process than (5.7) in
which none of the verbs has this ambiguity. Nor does reference to
differences in verb meaning by itself give us an explanation, because
the verbs in (5.7) are quite different in meaning, but this does not
seem to make processing easier.
We can explain this phenomenon by looking at what is involved in
the interpretation of these different sentences, i.e. how the addressee
recovers 'who did what to whom'. It turns out that the concepts
referred to in the different sentences constrain the interpretation to
a greater or lesser extent. 	 let us consider (5.7), repeated here:
243
5.7. The rat the cat the dog bit chased ran away.
On encountering The the addressee recovers the logical selection
frame for THE:
THE Lsf: [[EVENT/STATE [THIN6] [PREDICATE]] [PLACE] [TIME]]
PROPOSITION
[THING]
Iudiv4duatoi,:
Accsssibh hstaics
The addressee then can set up a logical hypothesis into which RAT is
fitted:
PROPOSITION
EVENT/STATE	 [PLACE]
	
[TIME]
THING	 [PREDICATE]
RAT: Acc.ssb1,
ista.cs
([PROPERTY))
On encountering the again, the addressee recovers that an
accessible instance of a THING is following. S/he does not find a
THING slot in the logical hypothesis, so that s/he has to access the
higher tier of the logical selection frame of THE, which shows how a
PROPOSITION can be formed. 	 Because RAT can take a PROPOSITION as a
PROPERTY, this information can be fitted into the logical hypothesis,
into which CAT then can be fitted;
	 this process is repeated on
encountering the dog, while BITE will be fitted in the most recently
postulated PREDICATE slot. The THING slot following BITE in the
logical hypothesis can be filled by CAT, as the CAT is most accessible
THING, by virtue of the PROPOSITION being a PROPERTY of the CAT,
yielding the following logical hypothesis:
S.
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PROPOSITION
EVENT/STATE	 [PLACE]
	
(TIME]
THING	 [PREDICATE]
RAT: *cc.ssb1s
asta.cs
PROPERTY
PROPOSITION
EVENT/STATE	 (PLACE]
	
(TIME]
THING	 (PREDICATE]
CAT: Accsssb1.
lastaici
PROPERTY
PROPOSITION
EVENT/STATE	 [PLACE] TIME: befor. tsi
of utt.raici
THING	 ACT
006: Accissibis BIlE THING
hstaocs	 I
((PROPERTY])
	
CAT
This logical hypothesis presents the addressee with a number of
problems. The addressee is faced with finding or setting up referents
for the 'accessible instances' of RAT, CAT and DOG. The PROPERTY
modifying RAT should help the addressee pick out the intended referent,
but since that PROPERTY itself contains an accessible instance of CAT,
finding a referent for RAT becomes dependent on finding a referent for
CAT. This is repeated in that the PROPERTY modifying CAT should help
the addressee pick out the intended referent, but since that PROPERTY
itself contains an accessible instance of DOG, finding a referent for
CAT is made dependent on finding a referent for DOG. There is no dog
in the context, nor does accessing the encyclopaedic entries of RAT,
CAT, and DOG yield any accessible dog, so that the addressee cannot
find any referent.
On encountering chased, the addressee has two PREDICATE slots
available into which the concept could be fitted, both of which are
equally accessible. Encyclopaedic entries of the concepts encountered
do not constrain the interpretation: it could equally well be the cat
as the rat who did the chasing, and it could even be the dog,
performing a number of different actions. Moreover, the cat, the rat
and the dog could all be chased. When the addressee encounters ran
away, this could again apply equally well to the cat as the rat, and
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again encyclopaedic entries of the concepts involved do not constrain
the interpretation. What we see then is that it is not due to the
repetition of structurally undifferentiated phrases that the human
processor is too confused to cope, as Smith (1989) proposes, bit rather
that this is due to there not being any basis on which to decide what
reference should be assigned to the different animals, and to there not
being any basis on which to decide what concepts should go where in the
logical hypothesis.
When we compare this with the interpretation of (5.9), repeated
here, a different picture emerges:
5.9. The game those boys I met invented resembles chess.
Building a logical hypothesis for (5.9) occurs along the same lines
as for (5.7). The addressee is faced with similar problems as in
processing (5.7), in that s/he has to find or set up a referent for
GAME. The PROPERTY modifying GAME should help the addressee pick out
the intended referent, but since that PROPERTY itself contains BOYS,
finding a referent for GAME becomes dependent on finding referents for
BOYS.	 However, from this stage the interpretation of (5.9) differs
from that of (5.7). The PROPERTY modifying BOYS should help the
addressee pick out the intended referent, and in this case the PROPERTY
does constrain the interpretation of BOYS. In the first place, I maps
onto a THING which is constrained by it being the communicator. This
means that even when (5.9) is processed in isolation, the addressee can
set up a (partial) conceptual representation for the THING. Moreover,
meet can be easily disambiguated to MEET THING. Although again the
THING could be either GAME or BOYS, the addressee can recover that
games are not usually met by anyone, but that people are, so that the
indeterminacy can be resolved in favour of BOYS. This means that the
addressee now has a constraint on the interpretation of BOYS, namely
that the BOYS at stake are boys that the communicator met. When
INVENT THING is encountered, there are two PREDICATE slots available
into which it could be fitted, and a filler for THING has to be found.
However, the addressee can easily recover that people are not usually
invented, but that they do invent things or ideas, so that the
indeterminacy can be resolved in favour of BOYS INVENT GAME. This in
turn gives the addressee a constraint on the interpretation of GAME,
namely that the GAME at stake is a game invented by the boys that the
communicator met. When RESEMBLE THING is recovered, there is only one
PREDICATE slot left into which it can be fitted, which yields GAMEi
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RESEMBLES THING, and this hypothesis is confirmed by CHESS, since chess
is a game as well.
What we see then is that we can account for the differences in
processing difficulty of multiple centre-embedded sentences, by looking
at how the kinds of concepts involved together with encyclopaedic
information concerning those concepts help or hinder completion of the
logical hypotheses into a propositional form.
5.2.3. Filler-gap dependencies.
A phenomenon that has to be accounted for in a theory of natural
language comprehension is how sentences containing 'gaps' (empty
positions) and 'fillers' (antecedents for these gaps) are processed.
For example, in (5.12) which people is the antecedent for the empty
position after invite, and in (5.13) the relative pronoun who is the
antecedent for the empty position after likes:
5.12. Which peoplej did Peter invite _ j to the party?
5.13. I saw the man whoj John likes	 j.
Within linguistic theory, in particular GB theory, it is postulated
that apart from the gaps in (5.12) and (5.13), there are other gaps,
i.e. PRO as in (5.14), and NP-trace in, amongst others, passive
constructions (5.15), and raising constructions (5.16):
5.14. Maryj decided PROj to treat herself to a night on the town.
5.15. Johnj was hit 
-
i by the ball.
5.16. Peters seems _j to be ill.
Psycholinguistic research into filler-gap dependencies has mostly
been concerned with Wh-gaps (including relative pronouns) and PRO (e.g.
Clifton & Frazier, 1986; Cram & Fodor, 1985; Fodor, 1988; Frazier,
Clifton & Randall, 1983), but work has also been reported on NP-trace
(e.g. Bever & McElree, 1988; Frazier & Flores d'Arcais, 1989; McElree
& Bever, 1989; Nicol & Swinney, 1989).
When we look at what the processor is faced with in assigning a
filler to a gap, we can, in principle, distinguish a number of
different processes. In the first place, the processor needs to
recognize fillers and gaps; in the second place, the processor may
consider whether a potential antecedent is an appropriate antecedent
for the gap; and in the third place, the actual assignment has to take
place.
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In the literature, not much has been said about how fillers are
recognized.	 Instead, research has been concerned with how gaps are
recognized, and how fillers are assigned to gaps. This has lead to
the proposal of strategies which assume that gap recognition is a
unified process, i.e. that the processor will follow the same strategy
for detecting gaps irrespective of the nature of the fillers and gaps
involved. On the one hand, it has been proposed that gaps recognition
is 'gap-driven', i.e. that gaps are only postulated when the processor
predicts the occurrence of a phrase of a particular type, and lexical
material is missing in the position where it should occur (e.g. Clifton
& Frazier, 1986; Fodor, 1978; Frazier et al., 1983; Jackendoff &
Cullicover, 1971). On the other hand, it has been proposed that gap
recognition is 'filler-driven', i.e. that on encountering a filler the
processor postulates that a gap of the appropriate type will follow
(e.g. Frazier, 1987c; Frazier & Flores d'Arcais, 1989).
When we look at the fillers of the different kinds of gaps
postulated, i.e. Wh-gap, PRO and NP-trace, we see that there is a
difference between Wh-fillers and the other fillers in that the Wh-
fillers are the only ones that have a specific form whereby they may be
signalling to the processor that a gap is following, for example which
people in (5.12), and who in (5.13). In contrast, when we look at the
fillers in (5.14), (5.15), and (5.16), there is nothing that could tell
the processor that a gap is following, since the NPs do not differ from
NPs in sentences without a gap; for example compare (5.14) and (5.17):
5.14. Maryj decided PROj to treat herself to a night on the town.
5.17. Mary decided that she would stay at home.
On the basis of this observation, one can conclude that a 'filler-
driven' account is possible for the detection of Wh-gaps, but that no
such account is possible for the detection of PRO and NP-trace.15
Nicol & Swinney (1989) present some experimental findings which
support the view that postulating Wh-gaps is in fact 'filler-driven'.
However, these findings rest on the assumption that that in sentences
like (5.18) is a relative pronoun:
5.18. The book that Mary liked was expensive.
Nicol & Swinney assume that that is a relative pronoun without
giving any justification for their assumption, but in the linguistic
literature it has been pointed out that this analysis faces some
problems (e.g. Radford, 1988; Van Riemsdijk & Williams, 1986).
	 For
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example, it has been pointed out that that cannot occur as the object
of a proposition, as in (5.19a), while other relative pronouns can:
5.19a. *The girl with that I was talking
b. The girl with whom I was talking
In the GB theory literature, it has been proposed that that in
relative clauses should be analyzed as a complementizer, rather than as
a relative pronoun. On this view, there is an empty relative Wh
element (Ci) in the relative clause which accounts for the Wh—gap:
5.20. The book [c' Oj that [ip Mary liked ti]]
As a justification of this analysis, Radford (1988) points out that
relative clauses containing an overt relative pronoun followed by a
complementizer occurred in Old and Middle English, and are found in
other languages. However, the analysis of that as a complementizer is
not without problems either. According to GB principles, the analysis
of that as a complementizer should make structures like (5.21)
ungrammatical, while we find that they are perfectly acceptable:
5.21. The book [c O that [i p ti amused me]]
In order to account for the grammaticality of structures like
(5.21), Pesetsky (1982) proposes a special rule which collapses the
empty Wh element (Of) and the complementizer into one constituent which
inherits all the features of the empty Wh element, so that the
structure in (5.21) is changed to (5.22):
5.22. The book [c that [i p tj amused me]]
Haegeraan (1991) says about this that:
"Pesetsky's rule captures the intuition that the element
that [in examples like (5.22)1 is not quite the ordinary
complementizer but that it also acts like a relative
pronoun ..."
	 (Haegeman, 1991, p.424).
However, what we end up with here is a structure in which that is
indistinguishable from a relative pronoun. This means that even the
analysis put forward by GB theory supports the view that that is
interpreted as a relative pronoun, as is assumed by Nicol & Swinney
(1989) 16
As we saw in section (3.1.4), Nicol & Swinney (1989) discuss
experiments by Nicol & Osterhout (1988), and Nicol (1988) in which
reactivation patterns were examined in sentences containing relative
pronoun that and gaps, such as in (5.18):
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5.18a. That's the actress that the dentist from the new medical
centre in town had invited * to go to the party.
b. That's the actress that the dentist from the new medical
centre in town had planned * to go to the party with.
They found that there was priming for actress unmediately following
planned as well as following invited, even though plan can occur both
with and without a direct object. Nicol (1988) conducted a follow-up
study which contrasted 'quasi-intransitive' verbs like plan (which can
appear transitively and intransitively), and true intransitives such as
hesitate. This study shows that significant priming of the head of
the relative (e.g. actress in (5.18)) always occurs after the 'quasi-
intransitives', but not after the true intransitives.
These findings are incompatible with 'gap-driven' accounts of Wh-
gap recognition, because such accounts predict that a gap is only
postulated if the processor predicts the occurrence of a particular
phrase, and then does not encounter any lexical material in the
position where it should occur. On such accounts, priming should only
occur after to in sentences like (5.18a), i.e. after the processor
discovers that no overt object follows invited, and priming should not
occur at all in sentences like (5.18b), because no object needs to
follow planned and, in fact, animate objects cannot follow it. On the
other hand, these findings are compatible with the view that the
processor recognizes a Wh-filler as a filler, and postulates that a gap
of the appropriate type will follow, so that it will immediately
consider the assignment of the filler to any gap of the appropriate
type that it encounters.
Nicol & Swinney (1989) also discuss a priming experiment reported
by Swinney, Ford, Frauenfelder & Bresnan (1988), in which reacti-vation
patterns were examined in sentences like (5.19):
5.19. The boxeri visited the doctork thatk the swimmer at the
competition had *1 advised *2 him *3 to see	 about the
injury.
(* = probe point).
Swinney et al. found that there was significant priming for doctor
after advised even though it is followed by a lexical NP (him):
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Priming scores (Lexical Decision RTs to Control Words Minus RTs to
Semantically
 Related Words for Each Referent) at Each Probe Point
Probe point
Referent	 1	 2	 3
Boxer	 23	 20	 51'
Doctor	 32	 56'	 42
Swimmer	 9	 0	 20
C' = significant priming).
	 (Nicol & Swinney, 1989, p.13).
These findings are again incompatible with 'gap-driven' accounts of
Wh-gap recognition. Because there is lexical material following
advised, no priming of doctor should occur at probe point 2. On the
other hand, if the processor recognizes a Wh-filler as such, and
postulates that a gap of the appropriate type will follow, then it will
immediately consider the assignment of the filler to any gap of the
appropriate type that it encounters, which is reflected in these
findings 16
Given the model proposed in this thesis, the process of recognizing
Wh-fillers and gaps can be accounted for in a straightforward way, by
looking at the logical selection frames of Wh-phrases. For example,
which and who in Wh-questions give access to the logical selection
frames:
WHICH Lsf:	 [PRoPosITIoN [] (THING] []
[THINGs]
Instance from
set of THIN6S
WHO Lsf:	 [PRoPosITIoN [] [THING] [) J
[THIN6 ( - [PROPERTY])]
Perso.
The lower tiers in the logical selection frames put a constraint on the
instance of THING that is at stake, while the upper tiers specify that
in order to yield a PROPOSITION the THING has to occur as a
constituent, and combine with other conceptual categories, without
specifying what it combines with or where it occurs. This causes the
processor to postulate that a PROPOSITION will follow in which the
THING will have to be fitted, so that any THING slot that is postulated
in the logical hypothesis will be considered as a possible gap into
which the THING can be fitted.
Relative pronoun that has as a logical selection frame:
THAT Lsf:	 [PRoPosITIoN [I [THINGi] [1
PROPERTY OF THINGi
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This selection frame specifies that a PROPERTY of. a THING is following,
which is a PROPOSITION in which that THING itself occurs, without
specifying what it combines with or where it occurs. However, since
the function of relative clauses is to help the addressee identify or
set up a referent for a THING, the resulting PROPOSITION does not form
part of the overall PROPOSITION that is being processed. Rather,
because the resulting PROPOSITION is a PROPERTY of the THING at stake,
it can be matched against, or represented as encyclopaedic information
under the conceptual address of the THING at stake. This logical
selection frame then causes the processor to postulate that a
PROPOSITION will follow in which the THING will have to be fitted.
The processor will first build this separate PROPOSITION, before
continuing to build the overall PROPOSITION expressed by the utterance
in which the relative clause occurs.
Because the fillers of PRO and NP-trace are not recognizable as
such, no 'filler-driven' account can be proposed for how PRO and NP-
trace are recognized. Frazier et al. (1983) and Clifton & Frazier
(1986) follow Chomsky (1981) in assuming that infinitive phrases are
analyzed as clauses which contain an empty subject position, referred
to as PRO, so that as soon as the processor encounters the infinitive
it will postulate that there is a PRO in need of a filler. However,
Chierchia (1982, 1985) and Turner (1989) argue that this analysis of
infinitives cannot be maintained, because analyzing the infinitive as a
proposition with a missing subject position makes the wrong
predictions. On the view that the infinitive in (5.20) is a
proposition with an empty subject position, we would have to assign
John as the missing subject:
5.20. Johns wants PRO to read a book.
If we take (5.20) as a premise, together with the premise in
(5.21), the analysis in (5.20) predicts that the conclusion in (5.22)
can be validly drawn from the two premises:
5.21. Bill wants what John wants.
5.22. Bill wants John to read a book.
We know that (5.22) is not a valid conclusion from the premises in
(5.20) and (5.21). Rather, the conclusion we draw from these premises
is (5.23):
5.23. Bill wants (Bill) to read a book.
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Yet by postulating that PRO is the empty subject position in a
proposition which is filled on-line, one cannot explain why this is the
case.
To account for this, Chierchia (1982, 1985) and Turner (1989)
propose that the infinitive is an argument, rather than a proposition
in need of an argument. On the view that the infinitive is an
argument of the verb, there is no empty argument position available in
the logical form for a 'subject', so that the inference in (5.22)
cannot be drawn. If the infinitive represents a proposition in need
of an argument than that argument would have to be supplied in the
logical form, which then would give rise to the inference in (5.22).
If PRO is not the empty subject position in a proposition, then the
question arises whether PRO is recognized as a gap at all.
McElree & Bever (1989) present some experiments which show that PRO
is in fact not postulated as a gap, when its (intuitive) position in
the sentence is encountered. In these experiments McElree & Bever
presented sentences like (5.24) to subjects:
5.24. The stern judge! who met with the defence! adamantly refused
[PRO] to (P1)! argue about the appeal. (P2)
Subjects were asked to read the sentences on a computer screen, in
sections as denoted by the slashes in (5.24). At the points (P1) and
(P2) subjects were presented with a probe word, drawn from the
antecedent NP (e.g. stern in (5.24)), which remained on the screen
until the subject had made a yes/no recognition judgment. McElree &
Bever found that priming for PRO only occurs at the end of the
sentence, P2, and not at the probe point immediately following the
infinitive, P1.	 If a gap was postulated at this point, we would
expect priming to occur.
It may be argued that PRO would only be postulated after the
addressee encounters the actual verb, e.g. argue in (5.24). However,
evidence that this is not the case comes from an experiment conducted
by Osterhout and Nicol (1988). Using the cross-modal priming
technique, the technique whereby sentences are presented auditorily,
and subjects are asked to make a lexical decision on visually presented
word/nonword targets, Osterhout & Nicol presented sentences like the
following:
5.25a. The actress invited the dentisti from the new medical centre
PROj to *1 go to the pa*2rty at the *3 mayor's *4 house *5
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b. The actressi was invited by the dentist from the new medical
centre PRO to *1 go to the pa2rty at the *3 mayor's *4
house *5
(* = probe point).
and obtained the following results:
Priming scores (Lexical Decision RTs to Control Words Minus RTs to
Semantically Related Words f or Each Referent) at Each Probe Point
Probe point
Referent	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Test of materials of the type exemplified in sentence (5.25a)
Actress	 21	 0	 28	 24	 3l
Dentist	 -10	 15	 370	 77	 6
Test of materials of the type exemplified in sentence (5.25b)
Actress	 19	 -8	 29	 320	 400
Dentist	 19	 31	 480	 2	 -3
(0 = significant priming).
If PRO were postulated immediately, then we would expect significant
priming to occur at probe point 1. If it were postulated after the
verb was encountered, we would expect significant priming to occur at
probe point 2.	 However, this is not the case.. 	 We see that
significant priming only occurs from point 3 onwards, which is 1,000
msec. downstream from probe point 1.	 These findings then again
support the claim that PRO is not postulated as a gap on-line.
Not much work has been done to establish whether NP-trace following
the passive and raising verbs is postulated as a gap on-line.
However, McElree & Bever (1989) not only tested PRO in their
experiments, but also tested NP-trace following passives and raising
constructions, as postulated by GB theory. Again using the priming
technique, they presented subjects with sentences involving the raising
construction, like (5.26), and passive sentences like (5.27):
5.26. The stern judge! who met with the defence! is sure [t] to
(P1)! argue about the appeal. (P2)
5.27. The dazed cabbie! who drove the beat-up taxi! was resented [t]
(P1)! constantly. (P2)
McElree & Bever found that priming for NP-trace occurs only at the
end of the sentence (probe point 2) for both sentence types, and not
immediately following the trace (probe point 1). Again, if NP-trace
were postulated as a gap on-line we would expect priming to take place
at the first probe points in these sentences.
Because of the analysis of passives as involving movement of the
object, it has been assumed that passives are more difficult to process
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than actives, which seemed to be borne out by experimental evidence
(e.g. Gough, 1965, 1966; Mehier, 1963). However, these experiments
involved comprehension tasks which take place after the sentence as a
whole has been processed, such as sentence-picture matching tasks, and
theref ore do not show whether passives are more difficult to process
than actives on-line. In fact, Black, Nickels & Byng (1992) present
data which suggests that in sentence-picture matching tasks, reversal
errors are not due to on-line processing, but can be explained in terms
of the off-line processes involved in the mapping from a conceptual
representation onto pictures. Also, findings from Carrithers (1989)
show that on-line processing of passives is not more difficult than
actives.
If no gap is postulated on-line, as suggested by the findings of
McElree & Bever (1989) then we can explain the finding that passives
are not more difficult to process than actives on-line simply by
postulating that building conceptual structures for both passives and
actives proceeds along the same lines, without passives being
transformed into an underlying 'active' structure. As we saw in
section 4.3.2, Jackendoff proposes that Be maps onto a concept
expressing THING BE PLACE, where the PLACE can be a physical PLACE, or
a non-physical PLACE such as a temporal PLACE or an identificational
PLACE. The passive will map onto a CIRCUMSTANTIAL PLACE, and
expresses that the THING is in the circumstance defined by some other
THING having acted on it (as proposed by Pinker (1990)).
If PRO and NP-trace are not postulated as gaps on-line, the
question arises what it is they represent. Our interpretation of a
sentence like (5.28) does involve working out whether it is Mary who is
taken to be kind or whether the person referred to by him is taken to
be kind, and there must be something that enables us to do this:
5.28. Mary asked him to be kind.
Fodor (1989) argues that it may be the case that PRO is rapidly
interpreted although it does not give rise to rapid priming. She
argues that this position might be possible if one assumes that PRO is
present at S-structure, but only receives an interpretation at LF (as
proposed by GB theory):
"Possibly, then, a sluggish response on the priming task,
even after antecedent assignment, is characteristic of
elements that are not assigned their antecedents at S-
structure, regardless of whether they exist at S-structure"
(Fodor, 1989, p.205).
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However, this does not explain why priming of other elements
decreases after they have been interpreted, while priming would
increase after PRO has been interpreted. If priming signifies
activation in the case of Wh-fillers, then it should occur on
activation of antecedents of PRO. Moreover, as Podor herself points
out, this proposal would give us no explanation of why NP-trace does
not show immediate priming, since in GB theory NP-trace gets its
interpretation at S-structure, rather than at logical form.
Chierchia (1982, 1985) argues that PRO represents semantic
information. He proposes that this information is a matter of
semantic entailments, which can be captured by meaning postulates.
Given the account of conceptual structure presented here, we can
show why this would be the case, for both PRO and NP-trace. Because
PRO and NP-trace are not postulated as gaps in conceptual structure,
the infinitive and the passive cannot map onto STATES or EVENTS in
conceptual structure, but rather map onto PREDICATES (which in the case
of passives are circumstantial PLACES). PREDICATES differ from other
conceptual categories in that they do not individuate concepts in the
way the other conceptual categories do. PREDICATES can only be
individuated as part of the concept in whose logical selection frame
they occur, and consequently they get their interpretation from that
concept.
In on-line comprehension, the processor's concern is to build a
well-formed conceptual structure.
	 When it encounters a PREDICATE
slot, it will build a well-formed PREDICATE.
	 In order to fully
interpret the resulting PREDICATE, the whole STATE or EVENT expressed
by the verb has to be taken into account. In the case of a subject-
predicate structure, the structure of the logical form will match the
semantic representation of the verb, and can be interpreted
accordingly.
In the case of an infinitive and of a passive, the structure of the
logical form does not match the semantic representation of the verb.
In the case of the infinitive, the processor has to make an inference
as to which THING the predication applies to, which can be stated
separately as an implication of the logical form. On this view, the
logical form does not itself contain a 'subject' for the infinitive,
and therefore predicts that the right conclusion will be drawn in the
case of (5.20) - (5.21), repeated here:
5.20. John wants to read a book.
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5.21. Bill wants what John wants.
The passive expresses that a THING is in a CIRCUMSTANTIAL PLACE,
which Pinker (1990) analyzes as expressing that "I is in the
circumstance defined by Y acting on it." (Pinker, 1990, p.134).
The structure of this CIRCUMSTANTIAL PLACE again does not match the
semantic representation of the verb, which means that in order to fully
interpret the PROPOSITION, the addressee has to draw the inference as
to what caused the THING to be in the circumstance expressed by the
CIRCUMSTANTIAL PLACE.
	 Because the THING is the affected entity, the
addressee can easily draw the inference that some other THING acted on
it in the way expressed by the verb. 	 This inference can then be
represented as an implication of the PROPOSITION.
In the literature, it is generally assumed that the assignment of
an antecedent to a gap is accomplished immediately, as soon as the gap
is postulated. However, when we consider what is involved in 'gap-
filling', we can, in principle, distinguish between two different
processes. In the first place, when a gap is encountered the
processor may consider whether a potential antecedent is an appropriate
antecedent for the gap; and in the second place, the actual assignment
has to take place. If the processor went straight from encountering a
gap to assigning a filler to it, some structures would always be
inherently more difficult to process than others because they would
always involve reanalysis.
In contrast, Relevance theory considerations would lead one to
expect that the first process plays an important role in processing
filler-gap dependencies. One would expect that if the processor has a
choice about whether to assign a filler to a gap or not (e.g. in the
case of an ambiguous verb), the filler would only actually be assigned
to a gap, if the assignment gives rise to an interpretation in
accordance with the principle of Relevance.
Frazier, Clifton & Randall (1983), and Clifton & Frazier (1986)
propose the Most Recent Filler Strategy (MRFS). This strategy says
that:
'TJuring language comprehension a detected gap is initially
and quickly taken to be co-indexed with the most recent
potential filler."
	
(Frazier et al., 1983, p.196).
They propose this strategy to account for the finding that readers take
less time to process sentences like (5.29a) than sentences like
(5.29b):
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5.29a. Whoj could the girl have begged (PRO) to sing for _j?
b. Whoi could the girl have begged _ j (PRO) to sing?
Frazier et al. and Clifton & Frazier argue that for sentences like
(5.29a) a reader following the MRFS will appropriately assign the girl
to PRO, and then who to the gap after for. A reader applying this
strategy to sentences like (5.29b) will again assign the girl to the
PRO, but then not find a gap to assign who to.	 Because this is an
obligatory filler, reanalysis has to take place. This will take tine,
and therefore sentences like (5.29b) will take longer to understand.
Because of these findings, Frazier et al. called sentences like (5.29a)
'recent filler' (RF) sentences, and sentences like (5.29b) 'distant
filler' (DF) sentences.
However, the explanation proposed by Frazier et al., and Clifton &
Frazier rests on two assumptions: in the first place, it is assumed
that PRO is postulated as a gap on-line, and in the second place, it is
assumed that verb subcategorization frames become available according
to Lexical Preference. As we have seen above, neither of these
assumptions can be maintained. Without these assumptions, the MPFS in
fact predicts that sentences like (5.29a) take longer to process than
sentences like (5.29b). Given that a gap will be postulated after any
potentially transitive verb (cf. Nicol, 1988), a gap will be postulated
following begged, to which, according to the MRFS, who will be
assigned. This turns out to be the correct assignment for (29b), but
in (29a) this would lead to reanalysis when the gap after for is
encountered.
A 'filler-driven' account of the assignments of fillers to gaps is
proposed by Frazier (1987c), and by Frazier & Flores d'Arcais (1989).
Frazier & Flores d'Arcais formulate their proposed strategy as follows:
"Active filler strategy. Assign an identified filler as
soon as possible; i.e., rank the option of a gap above the
option of a lexical noun phrase within the domain of an
identified filler."	 (Frazier & Flores d'Arcais, 1989,
p.332).
Frazier & Flores d'Arcais go on to demonstrate how this strategy is
employed in processing (5.30):
5.30. Who did John see Sylvia with _?
On encountering who, the addressee will assign it to the subject
position, but will reject this analysis when John is encountered. The
processor will then postulate a gap following see and assign who to
this gap.	 This analysis will be rejected when Sylvia is recognized.
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When the gap after with is encountered, the processor will assign who
to this gap, and since no more lexical material follows, this will turn
out the right assignment. However, this proposal goes against the
finding, referred to by Frazier (198Th), that (5.31a) has as a
preferred interpretation (5.31b), rather than (5.31c):
5.31a. Which patient did the nurse bring the doctor?
b. Which patient did the nurse bring the doctor _?
c. Which patient did the nurse bring 	 the doctor?
According to the 'Active filler strategy', the option of a gap will be
ranked above the option of a lexical noun phrase, so that one would
expect that when the processor recovers bring, it postulates that two
gaps will be following, and assigns the 'filler' to the first gap,
which would give one the reading in (5.31c), which is the unpref erred
reading.
Frazier (198Th) says that the assumption that a filler is assigned
to a gap immediately is supported by several indirect sources of
evidence. However, when we look at which sources she actually refers
to, we find Frazier et al. (1983), the first paper in which the Most
Recent Filler Strategy was proposed. In this paper no evidence is
presented for the assumption that a filler is assigned to a gap
immediately, but rather the interpretation of the findings rests on
this assumption. A second source of indirect evidence referred to by
Frazier is Cram & Fodor (1985), who propose an alternative explanation
for the Recent filler/Distant filler phenomenon.	 Again, this
explanation rests on the assumption that antecedents are immediately
assigned to Wh-gaps, rather than providing evidence for this. Other
evidence that Frazier refers to includes Tanenhaus et al. (1985), on
lexical preference, in which the evidence for lexical preference and
f or immediate filling of gaps are mutually dependent.
Gamsey, Tanenhaus & Chapman (1989) report on some experiments
which show reactivation of the antecedent at the Wh-gap, regardless of
whether the antecedent is pragmatically plausible or implausible.
Garnsey et al. measured evoked brain potentials of their subjects while
they read sentences containing Wh-gaps, such as:
5.32a. The businessman knew which customer the secretary called
at home.
b. The businessman knew which article the secretary called
at home.
259
They found that the implausibility of an antecedent (as in (5.32b))
gives rise to a particular evoked potential pattern (N400), whereas the
plausible antecedent (as in (5.32a)) does not give rise to this
pattern. Tanenhaus, Boland, Garnsey and Carison (1989) refer to these
experiments as evidence for immediate filling of the Wh—gap. However,
Garnsey et al. (1989) explicitly state that:
"It is important to realize that N400 is not a direct
reflection of gap filling. It is instead the reflection
of the incongruity that is a consequence of making an
implausible filler—gap assignment in these sentences. In
fact, it is possible that N400 arises not as a consequence
of actually filling the gap but rather merely of evaluating
the possibility of the filler—gap assignment." 	 (Garnsey
et al., 1989, p.58).
Tanerthaus et al. (1989) present some findings concerning the
assignment of fillers to Wh—gaps, which support the view that fillers
are not immediately assigned to gaps. They report on a 'make sense'
reaction time measuring experiment, involving sentences like the
following:
5.33a. The district attorney found out which witness the reporter
asked - about the meeting. (Early gap).
b. The district attorney found out which witness the reporter
asked anxiously about.	 (Late gap).
On the view that a filler is immediately assigned to a gap, one would
expect that in the 'Late gap' sentences which witness would have been
assigned erroneously to the gap after asked, so that when the gap after
abuut is encountered, reanalysis would have to take place. On the
assumption that reanalysis takes time, we then would expect the 'Late
gap' sentences to take longer than the 'Early' gap sentences.
However, Tanenhaus et al. found that the 'Late gap' sentences actually
take less time (4.539 tasec.) than the 'Early gap' sentences (4.623
msec.). As an explanation for this they suggest that there is little
cost associated with reassigning a filler. Although this may be a
possible explanation, even if there is little cost associated with
reassigning a filler, we would not expect the 'Late gap' sentences to
actually involve less time than the 'Early gap' sentences. This
leaves the findings open for an alternative explanation, i.e. that the
processor considers possible gaps without immediately assigning the
filler to the first encountered gap. There is, therefore, no
experimental evidence which directly supports the claim that fillers
are assigned to gaps immediately on encountering them, while the
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findings of Tanenhaus et al. support the proposal that a distinction
should be made between the consideration of a filler-gap assignment and
the actual assignment.
Given the model proposed in this thesis, we can account for the
assignment of fillers to gaps in a straightforward way. In the case
of WH-questions and relative clauses containing a relative pronoun, the
logical selection frame of the Wh-element will specify what logical
hypothesis should be built. Moreover, it specifies that the Wh-phrase
should be incorporated in the logical hypothesis. 	 Let us look at how
this is done in the case of (5.12), repeated here:
5.12. Which peoplej did Peter invite __ j to the party?
Which in (5.12) gives access to the logical selection frame:
WHICH Lsf:	 [PRoPosITIoN (] [THING] [1]
[THIN6]
Instance from
set of THIN6S
This means that when an addressee accesses this logical selection
frame, s/he can built the logical hypothesis that a PROPOSITION is
following in which the THING occurs. When people is recognized it can
be fitted into the THING slot. Then when auxiliary did is recognized,
it will give access to the logical selection frame:
DO Lsf:	 (PROPOSITION [EVENT [THING] ( - ]] [PLACE] [TINE]]
[PREDICATE]
This logical selection frame shows that DO does not itself occur as
a constituent in conceptual structure, but merely signals that a
concept of the category PREDICATE is following, and what this PREDICATE
has to combine with to yield a PROPOSITION. Because the addressee
only has the logical hypothesis that a PROPOSITION is following in
which PEOPLE occurs, s/he will access the whole selection frame of DO,
which yields a logical hypothesis concerning the structure of the
PROPOSITION.	 It can then be considered whether PEOPLE could
appropriately be assigned to the THING slot.	 However, when Peter is
recognized, the addressee recovers that it is a THING, which has to be
fitted in the logical hypothesis.	 By assigning PEOPLE to the THING
slot, the addressee would not be able to integrate PETER into the
logical hypothesis. By assigning PETER to the THING slot, on the
other hand, the addressee retains the hypothesis that PEOPLE will be
fitted into the PROPOSITION somewhere. This means that the assignment
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of PETER to the THING slot is the only assignment possible given the
logical hypothesis. Then, when invite is encountered, the addressee
can build the logical hypothesis that a THING is following, and can
then consider whether PEOPLE could appropriately be assigned to this
THING slot.	 The possibility of this assignment is supported by the
assumption that people invite people to social occasions. When the
addressee encounters TO PARTY, PEOPLE can actually be assigned to the
THING slot, because there are no other potential fillers, and the THING
cannot be left implicit.
Let us now look at (5.31a), repeated here with its preferred
reading (5.31b) and unpref erred reading (5.31c):
5.31a. Which patient did the nurse bring the doctor?
b. Which patient did the nurse bring the doctor ._?
c. Which patient did the nurse bring - the doctor?
When processing (5.31a), the addressee builds logical hypotheses in the
same way as for (5.12). On encountering bring, this will map onto a
number of different concepts, giving rise to a number of different
logical hypotheses.	 The one that is borne out by the rest of the
sentence has two THING slots available. The question then is why the
addressee goes for the assignment of DOCTOR to the first THING slot and
PATIENT to the second THING slot, rather than the other way around.
It turns out that this assignment is not due to any strategy for
assigning fillers to gaps, but rather that it is due to the meaning of
the verb bring. On both dative readings ( [ NP PP] and [ - NP
NP]), bring implies movement towards a PLACE or THING, from the
perspective of that PLACE or THING, i.e. it implies 'coming to where
the place/thing is' (rather than 'going somewhere'). To illustrate
this, it is fine to say (5.34) to the parents of your friend, before
going out, but it is odd to say (5.35) to your friend, when you are in
the pub:
5.34. I'll bring him home at eleven.
5.35. ?? We can have one more drink, and then I'll bring you home.
Example (5.34) is uttered to the parents, and bringing your friend home
involves movement towards the parents, so that the goal of the movement
coincides with where the parents are or will be. Example (5.35) on
the other hand, is uttered in a pub, so that getting your friend home
involves movement away from the pub to somewhere else. Using bring in
(5.35) then gives rise to a clash between the perspective of moving
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away from a place to somewhere else and the perspective of coming to a
particular place, which makes it an odd utterance. What this means is
that by using bring, the communicator communicates that the main
relevance of the utterance does not lie in where a thing is brought to
by someone, but rather that the PLACE or THING that something is
brought to is already in the immediately accessible context, and in
turn gives access to a context in which the utterance will be relevant.
This explains why the sentences in (5.36a) seem odd, while the
sentences in (5.36b) are fine'7:
5.36a. ? The nurse brought a doctor the patient.
? The nurse brought a doctor a patient.
? The nurse brought the patient to a doctor.
? The nurse brought a patient to a doctor.
b. The nurse brought the doctor a patient.
The nurse brought the doctor the patient.
The nurse brought a patient to the doctor
The nurse brought the patient to the doctor.
Bring communicates that the goal is already in the immediately
accessible context, which is confirmed by the use of the definite
article in the (b) sentences, which communicates that an accessible
instance of DOCTOR is at stake. In the (a) sentences, on the other
hand, there is a clash between the information communicated by bring
and the information communicated by the indefinite article, which
merely says that some instance of DOCTOR is at stake. Since the
addressee has no way of knowing which instance is intended, s/he cannot
interpret the action from the perspective of the instance of DOCTOR.
This can explain why (5.31a), has (5.31b) as a preferred reading
rather than (5.31c):
5.31a. Which patient did the nurse bring the doctor?
b. Which patient did the nurse bring the doctor _?
c. Which patient did the nurse bring - the doctor?
When encountering bring in (5.31a), this will map onto a number of
different concepts, giving rise to a number of different logical
hypotheses, one of which is:
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PROPOSITION
EVENT	 [PLACE]
	
TIME: befor. t1..
of uttsranc.
THING	 ACT
NURSE BRIN6 [THIN6i]
	
[THIN62J ([MANNER)) ([PROPERTY))
Accsss b1.
I.. t.ic.
This hypothesis will cause the addressee to consider whether PATIENT is
a possible filler for either of the THING slots. However, when the
and doctor are recognized, the addressee recovers that an accessible
instance of DOCTOR will follow. Because PATIENT is not an accessible
instance, the only assignment that is compatible with this logical
hypothesis is the assignment of DOCTOR to the TRINGi slot and PATIENT
to the THING2 slot.10
As we saw above, Frazier et al. (1983) and Clifton & Frazier (1986)
found that readers take less time to comprehend 'recent filler'
sentences like (5.29a), than 'distant filler' sentences like (5.29b),
repeated here:
5.29a. Whoj could the girl have begged to sing for _j?
b. Whoj could the girl have begged _j to sing?
In order to account for this, they proposed the Most Recent Filler
Strategy. However, as we saw above, the view that a Most Recent
Filler Strategy is used in assigning fillers to gaps cannot be
maintained. How then can we account for these findings? When
encountering who in the sentences in (5.29), this gives access to the
logical selection frame:
WHO Lsf:	 [PROPOSITION [1 [THING] []
[THING ( - [PROPERTY])]
P.rso.
The processor then builds the logical hypothesis that a PROPOSITION is
following, into which the THING has to be fitted. One could postulate
that the processor notes the gap after BEGGED but does not immediately
assign the THING to it. Then when the gap after FOR in (5.29a) is
encountered without any further lexical material, the processor assigns
the THING to this gap. In (5.29b), no further gap is found, so that
the processor has to back—track to assign the THING to the gap after
BEGGED. One could then postulate that the increased processing time
is due to this back—tracking. 	 However, Frazier et al. (1983), and
Clifton & Frazier (1986) also found that a similar difference in
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comprehension time is obtained when the ambiguous verb beg is replaced
by unambiguous control verbs like force and try, so that sentences like
(5.37a) take less time to understand than sentences like (5.37b):
5.37a. Whoj could the girl have tried to sing for _....j?
Subject control (RF)
b. Whoj could the girl have forced _ j to sing?
Object control (DF)
Since there is no constraint on the interpretation of the THING
following FORCE it cannot be left implicit, which means that the THING
referred to by WHO has to be assigned to this THING slot. This would
have as a consequence that no back—tracking would take place, so that
sentences like (5.37b) should not take longer to process than 'recent
filler' sentences.	 Since they do take longer to process, this
explanation cannot be correct. However, as in order to fully
interpret an utterance containing an infinitive the addressee has to
draw an inference as to which THING the predication expressed by the
infinitive applies to, and it turns out that for an explanation of the
findings, we have to look at what is involved in drawing the inference
as to who SING is predicated of.
MacWhiriney (1977, 1982) found that perspective maintenance or
change influences the ease of processing for languages like English and
German, and MacWhinney & Pleh (1988) found the same in a study of
Hungarian. In experiments involving sentences with relative clauses,
they found that processing sentences was easiest (leading to least
error rates and fastest reaction times) when the subject of the main
clause was also the subject of the relative clause:
5.38. The boy who sees the girl chases the policeman. 	 (SS)
more difficult when the object of the main clause was the subject or
the object of the relative clause:
5.39. The boy chases the girl who sees the policeman. 	 (OS)
5.40. The boy chases the girl who the policeman sees. 	 (00)
and most difficult when the subject of the main clause was the object
of the relative clause:
5.41. The boy who the girl sees chases the policeman.	 (SO).
Although the 'recent filler/distant filler' sentences do not
contain relative clauses, we see that in drawing the inferences for the
different sentences, processing times reflect the findings from
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MacWhinney & Pleh: in processing the 'recent filler' sentences the
perspective is maintained in that the subject of the 'recent filler'
sentence is also the subject of the inference, while the perspective is
changed in processing the 'distance filler' sentences, in that the
object of the 'distant filler' sentence is the subject of the
inference.	 The question then is why this change in perspective would
give rise to increased processing time.
	 In the case of RF and DF
sentences such as those in (5.37):
5.37a. Who could the girl have tried to sing for __i?
5.37b. Whoa could the girl have forced
	 j to sing?
we see that when perspective is maintained no new information about the
referent of who is added when the inference is made, i.e. in principle
the referent of who should be recoverable from the relevant
encyclopaedic information stored under GIRL. In the case of a change
in perspective, we see that the inference adds new information about
the referent of who, namely that the singing is predicated of the
referent of who. This means that in the case of distant filler
sentences the addressee will not only access encyclopaedic information
stored under GIRL, but also encyclopaedic information concerning people
singing. This means that in the case of distant filler sentences, the
context is extended further than in the case of recent filler
sentences, which, as we saw in section (5.2.1) increases processing
ef fort, because each time the context is extended by one step
processing effort increases.
5.3. Issues of acceptability.
In the psycholinguistic literature, it is generally assumed that
particular structures are ruled out because of a grammatical rule or
constraint. This has meant that although quite some work has been
done in psycholinguistics concerning the assignment of fillers to gaps,
no experiments have been conducted concerning the processing of ill-
formed sentences such as (5.42) - (5.44):
5.42. Who did Sue see the dog that bit _?
5.43. Who did John believe the claim that Ann saw - ?
5.44. Who did Mary think that - came?
It is generally assumed that no functional (processing) explanation
is possible for the unacceptability of these sentences. For example,
it cannot be the case that the unacceptability is due to the distance
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between the filler and the gap, putting too much strain on memory,
because in a sentence like (5.45) the distance between filler and gap
is much greater than in any of the above sentences, but it is perfectly
acceptable:
5.45. Who did John tell Ann and Sue that Bill had fallen in love
with	 ?
This has led to the conclusion that the unacceptability of the
sentences above must be due to syntactic constraints. However, as
Kempson & Matthews (1987) point out, there are variations in how bad
the different structures are judged to be. On the view that these
structures are unacceptable simply because they are ungrammatical, one
would expect that there would be no gradability in how unacceptable
they are, because there is no gradability in the concept of
grammaticality. In order to account for this, Kempson & Matthews
(1987), and Keopson (1988b) propose that the constraints which are
violated operate over the construction of propositional forms, and that
differences in acceptability are due to how easily an ill-formed
logical form can be rectified to yield a well-formed logical form.
However, the proposal that the unacceptability of these structure is
due to constraints (either operating over linguistic or logical form)
raises the question of why these constraints exist. 	 New,neyer (1983)
argues that:
"There are enough examples of constraint-violating
sentences that seem (intuitively) to present processing
difficulties that it seems reasonable to assume that
constraints arose historically to facilitate the production
and comprehension of sentences. But what has apparently
happened is that, in the course of time, the processing-
derived constraints have taken on a gramnia ti cal "1 ife of
their own", so to speak. Now some constraints do seem to
have a confusion-reducing effect and some seem not to.
But whether they have this effect or not, they have one
fundamental property in common: their formulation involves
such notions as "syntactic category" and "constituent
structure" - that is, their formulation is in terms of the
primitives of grammatical theory." 	 (Newmeyer, 1983,
p.109).
However, this explanation raises a new question, namely why constraints
that started out to facilitate processing, changed to take on a
grammatical "life of their own". This proposal seems to imply that
somewhere along the way the link between grammar and processing was
lost.
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Given the model proposed here, it turns out that we do not have to
propose any special constraints to account for why the sentences in
(5.42)-(5.44) are judged unacceptable, rather there unacceptability
follows from the fact that the logical selection frames of the concepts
involved either cannot be integrated into the logical hypothesis, or
induce the wrong logical hypothesis. To show why this is the case let
us look what happens when (5.42) is processed:
5.42. Who did Sue see the dog that bit _?
On encountering who, the addressee accesses the logical selection
frame:
WHO Lsf:	 [PROPOSITION (1 [THING] (]
[THING ( - [PROPERTY])]
Psrsoii
This causes the addressee to postulate that a PROPOSITION will follow
in which the THING has to be integrated. By the time that the
addressee encounters that, she has the following logical hypothesis:
PROPOSITION
STATE	 [PLACE)	 TINE: bsfors tus
of utteranc.
THING	 PREDICATE
SUE SAW THING ([PROPERTY])
D06
([PROPERTY])
In this logical hypothesis there is no THING slot into which the THING
can be fitted. On encountering that, this maps onto a number of
different concepts, which give access to a number of different logical
selection frames.	 Complement izer that gives access to the logical
selection frame:
THATi Lsf: [[EVENT/STATE [THINc - ] [PREDICATE]) [PLACE) [TINE]]
PROPOSITION
[uk1Nc PROPOSITION]
Demonstrative that gives access to the logical selection frame:
THAT2 Lsf:	 [[vENT/STATE (THING] (PREDICATE]] [PLACE) [TINE]]
PROPOSITION
(THING]
Acc.ss$bl. hutaic. at PLACE
auay fro. co..uuicator
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This logical selection frame specifies that the THING is in a PLACE
away from the communicator, which can be interpreted in different
semantic fields, e.g. a physical PLACE or a temporal PLACE.
Relative pronoun that gives access to the logical selection frame:
T}IAT3 Lsf:	 [PROPOSITION [] [THIN6iJ (J
PROPERTY Of THIN6j
Since DOG has just been fitted into the logical hypothesis, the logical
selection frame of relative pronoun that can be fitted into the logical
hypothesis. This logical selection frame causes the addressee to
postulate that a PROPOSITION will follow in which DOG will occur.
However, as we saw in section (5.2.3), since the function of relative
clauses is to help the addressee identify or set up a referent for a
THING, the resulting PROPOSITION does not form part of the overall
PROPOSITION that is being processed.
	 Rather, the resulting
PROPOSITION is a PROPERTY of the THING at stake, which is represented
under the conceptual address of the THING at stake. This logical
selection frame then causes the processor to postulate that a
PROPOSITION will follow in which the THING will have to be fitted.
The processor will first build this separate PROPOSITION, before
continuing to build the overall PROPOSITION expressed by the utterance
in which the relative clause occurs. Because the logical selection
frame of WHO specified that the THING is part of the overall
PROPOSITION expressed by the utterance, looking for a THING slot in
which it can be fitted will be postponed until the processor resumes
building the overall PROPOSITION expressed by the utterance.
	 This
means that when the THING slot following BITE is encountered, the THING
referred to by who is not available as a filler.
	 Encyclopaedic
information might cause the addressee to postulate that a THING of the
type PEOPLE is at stake (as in: watch out, that dog bites!). However,
since there is no further lexical material following, the addressee
ends up with a logical hypothesis about the overall PROPOSITION
expressed by the utterance, in which there is no THING slot into which
the THING referred to by who can be fitted, so that no complete
PROPOSITION can be computed.
When we look at what happens when (5.43) is processed, it turns out
that its unacceptability again is due to the addressee's inability to
compute a complete PROPOSITION:
5.43. Who did John believe the claim that Ann saw - ?
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When we look at the meaning of the claim that Ann saw someone, we see
that that Ann saw someone does not express a PROPERTY of the claim, but
rather that it expresses what the claim is.
	 In other words, the
concept CLAIM here is a THING which is a thought, i.e. a PROPOSITION,
about which a propositional attitude is expressed.
	 CLAIM then
functions as a THING in conceptual structure, but the addressee
recovers that it is used to refer to a PROPOSITION.
	 This means that
CLAIM has as a logical selection frame:
CLAIM Lsf:
	 [[(VENT/STATE [THING - ] [ PREDICATE)) [PLACE) [TIME]]
PROPOSITION
[THING CLAIM - [PROPOSITION] ( - [PROPERTY])]
so.'
individuat ion
When the addressee encounters that in (5.39), she has the following
logical hypothesis available:
PROPOS IT ION
STATE	 [PLACE]
	
TIME: bsfor, H..
of utt.rancs
THING	 PREDICATE
JOHN BELIEVE THING
CLAIM
(PROPOSITION]
([PROPERTY])
In this logical hypothesis there is no THING slot available in which
the THING referred to by who can be fitted. That maps onto different
concepts which give access to different logical selection frames, as
set out above. The logical selection frame of complementizer that can
be taken as signalling that the PROPOSITION referred to by CLAIM is
following, arid the logical selection frame of relative pronoun that can
be taken as signalling that a PROPERTY of CLAIM is following.
However, these logical selection frames cannot be integrated in the
overall PROPOSITION, so that there is no THING slot available for the
THING referred to by who.	 Tls again means that no complete
PROPOSITION can be computed.
When we look at how (5.44) is processed, it turns out that the
unacceptability is caused by the addressee being momentarily garden-
pathed.
5.44. Who did Mary think that
	 came?
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By the time the addressee encounters that, s/he has the logical
hypothesis:
PROPOSITION
STATE	 [PLACE)	 TIME: bsfor. t.s
of uttsraac.
THING	 PREDICATE
MARY	 THINK [PROPOSITION]
In this hypothesis no THING slot is available into which the THING
referred to by who can be fitted, so that the addressee maintains the
hypothesis that the THING will be fitted somewhere in the PROPOSITION.
As set out above, that maps onto different concepts that give access to
different logical selection frames:
THATi Lsf: [[[VENT/STATE (THING] [PREDICATE]] [PLACE] (TINE)]
PROPOSITION
[CTHING PROPOSITION)
THAT2 Lsf:	 [[[VENT/STATE [THING] [PREDICATE]) [PLACE] (TIME]]
PROPOSITION
[THING]
Acc.ssb1s 4wst,nc. it PLACE
away fro. co..uncator
THAT3 Lsf:	 [PRoPoSITIoN [] [THING ii [I
PROPERTY OF THINGi
THAT3 will be discarded because there is no PROPERTY slot accompanying
an accessible THING. The selection frame of THATi yields the
information that a PROPOSITION is following, which coincides with the
information in the logical selection frame.
	 This means that the
current logical hypothesis will be maintained.
	 The selection frame
of THATZ yields the information that a THING is following, and what it
has to combine with to yield a PROPOSITION. Because no hypothesis
about the form of the PROPOSITION following THINK has been made yet,
this selection frame will cause the processor to build a second logical
hypothesis:
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PROPOSITION
STATE	 [PLACE]
	
TIME: bsfors H..
of gttsranc,
THIN6	 PREDICATE
MARY	 THINK	 PROPOSITION
	
EVENT/STATE	 [PLACE]
	
[TIME]
[THING]
	
[PREDICATE]
Accsssb1. hst,wcs it PLACE
away fro. co..uncator
Then when came is encountered the concept falls into place in the
second logical hypothesis, but not in the first. The resulting
hypothesis could be borne out by further lexical material, for example
as in (5.46):
5.46. Who did Mary think that came for _?
However, because in (5.40) no further lexical material is following,
there is no THING slot in the logical hypothesis to which the addressee
can assign the THING referred to by who. This means that s/he cannot
build a complete PROPOSITION, which makes (5.40) unacceptable.'9
Kempson & Matthews (1987) propose that we can account for why
sentences like (5.44) are judged more acceptable than sentences like
(5.42) and (5.43), by virtue of their resemblance to some other string.
They propose that a sentence like (5.44) resembles a string such as
(5.47) and therefore is easily rectifiable, simply by omission of that:
5.47. Who did Mary think came?
They argue that a sentence like (5.48) is not rectifiable, and
theref ore more unacceptable:
5.48. Whyj do you believe the claim [that John said Bill left _]?
However, (5.48) resembles the string in (5.49):
5.49. You believe the claim [that John said Bill left for some
reason]
Without an account of why the resemblance between (5.48) and (5.49) is
not sufficient for rectifying the misanalysis of (5.48). this
explanation begs the question. However, on the account proposed
above, we can see why sentences like (5.44) are more acceptable than
sentences like (5.42) and (5.43): because (5.42) and (5.43) involve
the building of two propositional forms, while the Wh—element signals
that it occurs in the main propositional form but not in the
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propositional form that expresses a property of a THING, there is no
obvious way in which reanalysis can take place. In contrast, in
(5.44), THAT is ambiguous, and COME not only specifies how it forms a
PREDICATE, but also what it has to combine with to yield a PROPOSITION,
so that when the addressee finds that there is no THING slot available
for the THING referred to by who, s/he can retrieve the logical
hypothesis that that simply signals the start of a PROPOSITION, while
the logical selection frame of COME shows how this PROPOSITION should
be formed.
5.4. Conclusions.
In this chapter, I have proposed an account of sentence processing,
in which logical hypotheses are built on the basis of information
concerning the ways in which concepts can combine to form well—formed
formulae in the language of thought. This account can explain
sentence input processing in terms of the interaction of input and
context, guided by the principle of Relevance, and no autonomous parser
is necessary. Although a lot more work needs to be done on the exact
nature of the logical selection frames of concepts, the approach
presented here sheds new light on a number of processing questions.
That this is a fruitful approach is shown by the fact that it can
account for findings concerning ambiguous and 'garden—path' sentences.
It can also account for findings which have presented problems to other
proposals, such as Tyler & Warren's (1987) findings concerning globally
and locally syntactically disrupted sentences, and multiple centre—
embedded sentences. Moreover, it leads to a different way of looking
at filler—gap dependencies.
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General conclusions.
This thesis started out by looking at two possible views of the
relation between grinmar and the general cognitive system. On the one
hand, there is the view that the grammar is a cognitive subsystem which
accounts for the structure of language, whose vocabalary and operations
are defined independently of the general cognitive system, and account
for the structure of language. On the other hand, there is the view
that the structure of language is explained by basic principles of the
general cognitive system as a whole.
A lot of psycholinguistic work on sentence processing has been
motivated by the view of the grammar as mental and primitive. Because
syntax plays a central role within linguistic theories, many
psycholinguists have assumed that there is an autonomous syntactic
parser.	 However, the view of the grammar as 'psychologically real'
is not supported by independent psycholinguistic evidence. Moreover,
when we look at experimental findings concerning sentence processing,
it turns out that the evidence does not unequivocally support a
syntactic parser, and that the findings can be explained when we look
at the role that pragmatic processes play in language comprehension.
The model presented here is premised on the hypothesis that the
comprehension process is driven by pragmatics, and is aimed at
computing propositional forms in accordance with the principle of
Relevance.	 This account gives rise to a different'f how we can
explain the structure of natural language sentences. The structure
of natural language sentences can be explained, not by basic principles
of the general cognitive system as a whole, but rather by looking at
the relation between the structure of natural language and the
structure of the language of thought.
	 On this view the structure of
natural language sentences is an (often incomplete) reflection of the
structure of the language of thought. This means that the structure
of language of thought sentences is basic, rather than the structure of
natural language sentences, and that what makes a natural language
sentence a possible sentence is whether it maps onto a logical form
which can be completed into a well—formed proposition in the language
of thought, in accordance with the principle of Relevance. Linguistic
form then is constrained by the propositional form that it reflects, so
that if a linguistic input does not map onto a well—formed
propositional form it will not be acceptable.
	 This shifts the focus
of study from the linguistic input to the propositional form underlying
274
this input. Although this move may seem to make our investigations
far more difficult, we have seen that Jackendoff (1983) proposes a
number of basic conceptual categories whose combination into well-
formed formulae is constrained by their meaning.
	
Furthermore, these
categories are supported by independent evidence. Adopting these
categories gives us the beginnings of a principled account of how the
language of thought is structured, while linguistic evidence can help
us to develop such an account.
The proposal that information concerning conceptual structure is
stored under individual concepts shows us a way in which this
information is usable during sentence comprehension. It shows us how
addressees can build anticipatory logical hypotheses about the overall
propositional form of the utterance, which constrain the interpretation
of that utterance. As we have seen, Relevance theory proposes that
these logical hypotheses form a scale of implications, which either
give access to a context in which further hypotheses will yield
contextual effects (background implications), or which give rise to
contextual effects in their own right (foreground). This proposal
gives us a functional explanation for why a propositional form can be
linguistically realized in different ways: different word-orders give
rise to different scales of implications. While in one linguistic
realization an implication may function as a background implication, in
another it may function as a foreground implication, thereby giving
rise to different contextual effects.
As we saw in section (1.1), one of the arguments against functional
explanations of language is that there are innumerable local
ambiguities in natural language, although their exclusion would
facilitate parsing.	 However, given the account presented here, it
turns out that this is not a valid argument. As we saw in section
(5.2.1), even in experimental settings only one analysis of a
structurally ambiguous input will be accessible to the subject, so that
it does not matter that the input is, considered as a sentence,
ambiguous.	 That this may result in the subject being 'garden-pathed'
is not due to the ambiguity of the input per se, but rather to the fact
that the test sentences are not acts of ostensive communication. In
the case of 'garden-path' sentences the experimenter is not
accommodating the choice of sentence to the processing needs of the
subjects, but rather s/he does exactly the opposite. In normal
ostensive-inferential communication the communicator aims at optimal
Relevance, which means that s/he will choose the utterance which
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accommodates the addressee's needs best. This means that the
communicator will only utter an ambiguous sentence (unless making a
joke), when s/he thinks that the addressee will be able to recover the
intended interpretation for at little processing effort as possible
(which excludes reanalysis).
	 Of course, the communicator may not in
fact be optimally relevant, and cause the addressee to go for the wrong
interpretation. However, because communicators are also addressees,
they can anticipate what logical hypotheses the addressee is going to
make, and structure her/his utterance accordingly, so that people are
rarely aware of ambiguity during on-line processing.
This way of looking at the interaction between communicator and
addressee forces us to question the way in which psycholinguistic
experiments are often conducted. As we have seen, when test sentences
are presented in isolation, they do not yield any contextual effects.
Moreover, although subjects will compute the logical form which
involves least processing effort, this cannot be completed into a
propositional form, because, for example, no reference can be assigned,
so that the linguistic input cannot be fully interpreted. This means
that presenting test sentences in isolation does not reflect normal
utterance interpretation. Moreover, if information processing is
driven by the search for Relevance, as proposed by Relevance theory, we
should ask ourselves what the effect is of how experimental subjects
interpret their tasks. It may well be that different interpretations
of what they are doing a particular experimental task for, has an
effect on how subjects actually process the experimental materials.
As we saw in the first chapter, researchers have argued against a
functional explanation of language on the grounds that there are
constraints on linguistic structure which do not facilitate sentence
processing, and even make processing more difficult. However, this
argument presupposes that we can say what does and what does not
facilitate sentence processing in the absence of a psycholinguistic
theory of sentence processing.
	 By actually looking at what is
involved in processing some of the structures ruled out by linguistic
constraints, a different picture emerges. In section 5.3, we saw that
we can account for the unacceptability of some structures involving Wh-
movement simply by looking at what is involved in building the logical
hypotheses resulting from them, rather than by postulating that a
specific constraint is at work. This renders the claim that removing
the constraints would facilitate processing an empty claim:
	 the
structures cannot be acceptable, because they give rise to incomplete
276
propositional forms in the language of thought. Although we have only
looked at a processing interpretation of two constraints proposed by
linguists, the finding that we can explain the unacceptability of the
structures without the need to invoke special constraints, shows that
the view presented here promises to improve our understanding of the
comprehension process.
Although a lot of work remains to be done, the model presented here
gives us an account of sentence input processing in which form and
meaning go hand in hand to guide the addressee to the intended
interpretation.
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Footnotes
Footnotes Chapter 1.
1. Example due to N. y . Smith (1989).
2. I will substantiate this claim in the rest of the thesis.
3. In chapter 5, I will give an alternative explanation in terms of
processing difficulties of why sentences like (1.8) are judged
unacceptable.
4. According to Sperber & Wilson (1986), this process does not only
apply to logical forms recovered from the linguistic input, but
also to 'assumption schemas', schemas which can be used to build
complete assumptions on the basis of contextual information.
However, these 'assumption schemas' are also incomplete logical
forms, not different in kind from incomplete logical forms
recovered from a linguistic input, so that the process of
enrichment can be viewed as a 'domain specific' process, solely
applying to incomplete logical forms, turning them into fully
propositional forms.
5. Sperber & Wilson (1986) say about this that:
"We may assume that the memory of the deductive device has a
limited, indeed a rather small capacity, so that no
extensions beyond that capaci ty are possible. The maximal
contexts are therefore those which, in view of their size,
cannot be extended further."
	 (Sperber & Wilson, 1986,
p.261, footnote 7).
6. For a range of examples supporting this claim, see Sperber &
Wilson, 1986, pp.188-191).
7. In chapter 4, the details of this proposal will be discussed.
Footnotes Chapter 2.
1. I have enclosed most of the interpretations of experimental
findings and conclusions in the form of direct quotes, so that
there could be no doubt that the interpretations I criticize are
the authors' own conclusions. This seems particularly necessary
in relation to issues which have given rise to a lot of claims and
counterclaims, on the basis of misrepresentation.
2. For all reduced plausible sentences in appendix I of Rayner et al.
(1983), a plausible continuation can be found easily on a main
clause reading.
3. Table 4 of Rayner et al. (1983, p.365) shows an increased mean
fixation duration (in msec.) for the fixation prior to
disambiguation for the unreduced plausible sentences (e.g. 2.4c),
compared to the other sentences:
Table 4
1	 2	 3
reduced plausible	 209 213	 222
reduced implausible	 198 208	 209
unreduced plausible 	 197 220
	 234
active implausible	 195 207
	 209
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This could be explained by the extra processing involved in
recovering the extra assumptions, needed to accommodate the
restricted relative.
4. According to Altmann & Steedman (1988), Cram & Steedman's result
was only a rather slight effect. 	 They note that this 'sense-
semantic' effect "turns out to be comparatively hard to manipulate
by comparison wi th the referential effects that
	 [they)
discuss..." (Altmann & Steedman, 1988, p.198). It should be
noted, however, that the examples in (2.7) involve the likelihood
of teachers teaching vs. children teaching, i.e. although it may
not be likely that children teach (in view of our beliefs about
the world), it is not impossible:
The children taught the dog to stand on its back paws.
These examples then are more similar to Rayner et al.'s examples
involving the plausibility of florists sending flowers vs.
performers sending flowers, than to Bever's examples, which
involve the belief that inanimate objects cannot be agents of
actions. What may play a role in these findings may be a sliding
scale from a relatively weak belief about the world (e.g.
performers receiving rather than sending flowers), via a stronger
belief about the world (e.g. that children are taught rather than
teach), to a 'higher order' belief, or knowledge about what kinds
of objects can be arguments of what verbs (e.g. animate vs.
inanimate).
5. This question could be tested empirically, by setting up an
experiment in which sentences of the types (2.15) and (2.16/2.17)
are presented in context, as well as in isolation.
Footnotes Chapter 3.
1. It is often not clear whether it is assumed that subcategorization
frames represent syntactic information or whether it is assumed
that they represent predicate-argument structure of a more
semantic nature.
2. I have relied on the intuitions of native speakers concerning the
two readings of 'consult'. Moreover, both readings are given in
the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (1978), and Van
Dale Groot Woordenboek Engels-Nederlands (1984).
3. Clifton et al. do not say whether these reaction times are
significantly faster or not. However, even if the difference in
reaction times is not significant, the results still do not
support the Clifton et al. view, because they are looking for
significantly faster reaction times for the congruous verbs, as
opposed to the incongruous verbs.
4. Implicit arguments will be discussed in more detail in the next
chapter.
5. At least, according to the native speakers that I have consulted.
Footnotes Chapter 4.
1. In the rest of this chapter, it will turn out that the picture
sketched here in relation to verbs will have to be refined.
2. A problem that remains to be explained is how children learn which
constituents that co-occur with a verb are arguments of the verb
and which are not. However, this is a problem that has to be
addressed by any view of how verbs are semantically represented:
279
it is not resolved by adopting the view of verb representation as
proposed by Pinker, nor is it resolved by adopting a 'monadic
concept' view of verbs.
3. I will disregard further uses of verbs like run such as in She ran
the show.
4. One possible explanation might be that the patients have difficulty
in relating the different entities involved in the action in the
picture to the different argument slots in the semantic
representation of the verb. However, this is mere speculation.
5. Judgments concerning the acceptability of (9a) differ. It may
well be that in a setting where something is discussed regularly,
such as 'following a lecture' among university students, the
interpretation of the implicit argument in an utterance like (95a)
becomes easier to recover.
6. In this section I have not accounted for all the examples that
Fillmore gives. Although many of the examples can be analyzed
along the same lines as I have proposed (e.g. wait vs. await,
protest/object vs. oppose), a few cases remain which are
problematic, such as try vs. attempt, and promise vs. pledge/vow,
where the former can easily occur with an implicit argument, but
not the latter.
7. In this representation I make a distinction between an 'external'
argument and an 'internal' argument. This analysis reflects that
the second argument is the entity affected because it is part of
the act that the first argument carries out. Moreover, it shows
how we can conceive of PREDICATE as a separate cognitive category
(where ACT is a type of PREDICATE). It may be objected that this
analysis would make the wrong predictions for VSO languages, in
which the word-order seems to mirror the analyses proposed by
Jackendoff and Pinker (see 5.2.2 and 5.2.3). l4owever, when we
look at a VSO language such as Scottish Gaelic, it turns out that
we still need PREDICATE as a separate category, as in:
Bha lad a'ceannachd a'chota.
Were they at buying of the coat.
They were buying the coat.
In this example, we see that the predicate occurs as part of a
'circumstantial' PLACE.
8. As we will see in the next chapter, this proposal can account for
experimental findings by Frazier, Clifton & Randall (1983),
discussed in chapter (1), Clifton & Frazier (1986), and others,
which have not been explained satisfactorily.
9. As we will see in the next chapter, in the interpretation process
this specification plays a role only when the addressee does not
yet have a hypothesis concerning the logical form of the utterance
available.
10. This means that although a THING can have an individuating
property, it does not decompose into [THING] [PRQPERTY]. As we
will see in the next chapter, this way of conceiving of PROPERTIES
modifying THINGS plays an important role in the interpretation
process.
11. Because of lack of space I will continue to represent these
different PROPERTIES just as PROPERTY, but the reader should bear
in mind that PROPERTY slots modifying THINGS can either be filled
by a PROPERTY or by a PROPOSITION.
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12. These logical selection frames do not show constraints on the
interpretation of the subject of a verb. I assume that the
interpretation of subject—predicate relations are done in
accordance with encyclopaedic information made available by the
different concepts involved.
Footnotes Chapter 5.
1. To distinguish between logical selection frames and logical
hypotheses, I will represent logical hypotheses as trees of
labelled nodes, rather than in linear notation, which will be
reserved for selection frames. I will continue to represent
structured concepts as trees as well.
2. When a sentence like The girl is in the room is processed in
isolation, for example, in a psycholinguistic experiment, or, as
is the case here, as an example, no referent will be found.
However, in those situations the relevance of the linguistic input
does not lie in its semantic content, and therefore it is not,
properly speaking, a case of verbal or written communication. As
Sperber & Wilson say:
"Verbal behaviour proper begins when an utterance (...) is
manifestly chosen by the speaker for its semantic
properties. . . . verbal communication proper begins when the
speaker is recognized not just as talking, not even just as
communicating by talking, but as saying something to
someone." (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p.178).
3. Unfortunately, it falls outside the scope of this thesis to look at
tense and aspect.
4. I will leave out optional conceptual slots (such as PROPERTY
modifying GIRL in this logical hypothesis), when they have not
been utilized, to limit the space taken up by the representation
of the logical hypotheses.
5. This analysis is supported by the occurrence in Scottish Gaelic of
'prepositional pronouns', lexical items which express a PLACE or
PATH involving a pronoun, e.g. the preposition air (on) gives us:
orm - on me	 oirre - on her orra - on them
ort - on you oirnn - on us
air - on him oirbh - on them
6. Again, I will leave out optional slots when it is clear they are
not being used, because of lack of room on the page. However,
they are still there in the representation.
7. In fact, the 'ing'—form will give access to two logical selection
frames, the one given here, and one which gives watching as a
property. The addressee will recover both and make a choice
between them.
8. It falls outside the scope of this thesis to discuss the nature and
representation of proper names. I assume here that Joyce stands
for an instance of a THING with that name.
9. In fact said will cause two logical selection frames to be
accessed: one in which it is an ACT and one in which it is a
circumstantial PLACE. We will look at the disambiguation of
cases like this in detail in the discussion of (5.5b).
10. We can think of accessibility in terms of 'activation': when a
concept or conceptual slot is accessed it receives activation,
thereby becoming more accessible, t*it when new concepts or
281
conceptual slots are accessed activation on the earlier ones fades
away. This proposal means that we cannot equate accessibility
with 'having been postulated most recently' per Se, because two
conceptual slots of the same type may have the same level of
activation if they are further up-stream in a logical hypothesis,
even though one will have been postulated more recently than the
other.
11. I'll illustrate this with two logical hypotheses, although jog
actually maps onto (at least) four concepts, as in: (1) He jogged
my arm, spoiling my drawing; (2) The carriage jogged along the
road; (3) Jay jogged a mile; (4) Jay jogs to work.
12. Again RACE will actually map onto a number of concepts, and logical
selection frames, but I will only discuss those that are relevant
for this example, i.e. the past and passive readings of RACE that
occur in (5.5b).
13. Examples due to N. y. Smith.
14. As we will see later in this section, this does not mean that they
function in exactly the same way.
15. Frazier & Flores d'Arcais (1989) argue that for Dutch simple
sentences, the processor postulates a structure in which the
finite verb is moved form the end of the verb phrase to the
complementizer position. 	 Some other constituent is then preposed
in front of the verb. Based on this Frazier & Flores d'Arcais
argue that the main clause of every declarative Dutch sentence
begins with a filler, a constituent that has been moved from some
other position in the sentence. Because of this, they argue that
the first NP is recognized as a filler, and is assigned to a gap
in accordance with the Active filler strategy, giving rise to
structures like:
xP
NP	 XP
Aux	 S
NP	 VP
	
NP	 Aux	 V
I	 I	 I
	
Jan heeft e lets	 e	 gezien
John has	 so.ething seen
Verhagen (1986) points out that the proposal that Dutch structure
involves this kind of movement of NPs and other constituents runs
into a number of problems, for which he argues "a consistent and
general solution (...) is not readily at hand within [the GB-I
framework." (Verhagen, 1986, p.75). It falls outside the scope
of this thesis to discuss and evaluate Verhagen's arguments.
However, a problem that can be pointed out is that Frazier &
Flores d'Arcais's proposal entails that processing a Dutch
sentence like Jan heeft lets gezien is quite different from
processing an English sentence like John has seen something, which
does not involve postulating that John and something have been
moved. This makes processing Dutch look like a more complicated
business than processing English. However, on the view that the
linguistic input maps onto conceptual structure, we can account
for processing Dutch and English in a unified way.
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16. However, if that is interpreted as a relative pronoun, why do we
not get a relative pronoun interpretation with structures as in
(5.19a)?
5.19a. *The girl with that I was talking
An alternative explanation could be that the unacceptability of
(5.19a) is due to the fact that that can also be a demonstrative,
signalling that a spacially distant THING is at stake, as in: The
girl with that big dog .... This means that on the view that
that can occur as a relative pronoun, on encountering that, the
addressee has two possible THINGS to fit into the logical
hypothesis, relative pronoun that and demonstrative that. Since
there is nothing in the logical hypothesis to signal to the
addressee that a proposition is at stake, this means that the
addressee would initially be garden-pathed. By using who/whom no
such possibility for garden-pathing exists.
	 This means that a
communicator aiming at optimal relevance can only use who/whom.
Some support for this proposal comes from Dutch. In Dutch, we
find die which can occur as a relative pronoun (both subject and
object) and as a demonstrative (that), but which does not occur as
a complementizer.	 We also find wie (who) which can occur as an
object relative and as an interrogative.
	 This means that we get
relatives such as:
De jongen wie/die ik dit briefje gaf...
The boy	 who	 I this note
	 gave
The boy who I gave this note...
De jongen die/*wie gisteren belde...
The boy
	 who	 yesterday phoned...
The boy who phoned yesterday...
However, in the case of Dutch sentences like (5.19), we find that
only wie can occur, and not die:
De jongen met wie ik aan het praten was
The boy with whom I at
	 talking was...
The boy with whom I was talking...
* De jongen met die ik aan het praten was
This cannot be due to die being a complementizer rather than a
relative pronoun, because it does not occur as a complementizer in
Dutch. However, because it does appear as a demonstrative, as
in:
De jongen met die leuke glimlach...
The boy	 with that nice smile...
using die in Dutch sentences like (5.19), causes the addressee to
garden-path in the same way as set out above for English
sentences.
17. Unfortunately, no experiments using the same paradigm but involving
Wh-questions have been reported in the literature (as far as I
know).
18. According to the native speakers that I have consulted.
19. Some extra support for this explanation, comes from the finding
that the native speakers that I have consulted say that (1) can
only be interpreted as (la), and not as (ib), the opposite to the
preferred reading of (5.31a):
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1. Which patient did the nurse bring a doctor?
la. Which patient did the nurse bring ____ a doctor?
lb. ? Which patient did the nurse bring a doctor ____?
Since the DOCIOR is not an accessible instance, it cannot be
assigned to the THING1 slot, but has to be assigned to the TIIING2
slot, which means that only the THING1 slot is available for
PATIENT. Since PATIENT is not an accessible instance either, the
resulting question is considered to be very awkward.
20. Although this proposal differs from most other explanations for why
sentences like (5.40) are unacceptable, it could be tested by
setting up an experiment in which the different sentences were
compared, i.e. (5.40) without that, (5.40) as it stands, and
(5.41).
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